LANGUAGE AND NATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF CROATIAN LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM

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Language and Nation:
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Language and Nation: An Analysis of Croatian Linguistic Nationalism
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Since the time of Herder (1744-1803), language has been recognized as an important element in defining national identity. Modern scholarship, however, is divided on the source of language’s importance; some scholars emphasize its function as medium of communication while others stress its symbolic role in defining a community. Using Croatian linguistic nationalism as a test case, this thesis engages the debate by evaluating models of language’s relation to the emergence of nationalism. The case is of interest because of two paradoxes: the major role of language in the assertion of Croatian national identity despite the Croatian language’s mutual intelligibility with Serbian, and the lack of significant language reform in post-independence Croatia despite the pre-independence nationalist narrative of an erosion of the language’s distinctness.

To resolve these paradoxes I investigate four periods of Croatian history. First I analyze how well the early nineteenth-century Illyrian movement—Croatia’s first national movement—fits each of five models of language’s role in the emergence of nationalism: Ernest Gellner’s functionalist model, the communications-based perspective of Karl Deutsch, Eric Hobsbawm’s state-centered theory, the “Imagined Community” model of Benedict Anderson, and Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolist approach. I then evaluate how well each theory can explain the role of language during three subsequent periods of nationalist mobilization in Croatia: the era of rivalry between Yugoslavist and “state right” Croatian nationalists in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Croatian fascist regime of World War II, and the movement to establish a Croatian state (circa 1967 to 2005).

I conclude that Hobsbawm’s state-centered theory best fits the Illyrian movement, and best explains the development and paradoxes of Croatian linguistic nationalism over time. However, Croatian nationalism displays continuity with premodern aspects of the country’s culture and politics. Therefore Hobsbawm’s model would be improved by a synthesis with ethnosymbolism’s stress on the role of premodern legacies in modern political movements. Moreover, the survival of Croatian linguistic nationalism in a globalized international system and information-oriented economy calls into question Hobsbawm’s (and others’) prediction of the end of nationally-oriented politics.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was born in 1918—after nearly a century of agitation to unite the “South Slavs.” Linguistic similarity was the basis for fusing the titular peoples into one polity (see Table 1), yet their state (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929) was troubled by language tensions throughout its history. The central conflict was over the relation between the common literary language known as Serbo-Croatian and its Croatian and Serbian variants. The controversy began in the mid-eighteenth century—even before the Kingdom’s birth—as a reaction to attempts to create a unified language for Serbs and Croats. It continued with varying degrees of intensity until the country’s breakup in 1991. The persistence of the issue begs the question: why a conflict when the languages (or “variants”) were so similar as to be mutually intelligible? Explaining the enduring resonance of this issue with the Croatian public is a major goal of this thesis.

In Croatia, public and scholarly interest in language issues waxed and waned throughout the twentieth century. Language remained a symbol of national identity for many Croats. Yet scholars’ accounts of Croatian language policy (Škiljan 2004) and my own preliminary investigation show limited direct government involvement in language planning. Despite past attempts at the radical reform of Croatian and calls from some quarters to re-institute such reforms (Koharović 2000),1 president Franjo Tudjman’s nationalist government did little in the way of language laws.2 This prompts another question: why, despite recurrent linguistic nationalism, were the newly independent Croatia’s language policies so moderate?

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1 See also Mihovilo Dulčić, “Kako vaš je mati učila [How your Mom learned].” Hrvatsko Slovo (Zagreb), July 20, 2001.
2 Interview with Marko Tadić of Zagreb University linguistics department, April 12, 2002, Zagreb.
The Croatian case, therefore, presents two related paradoxes. First, a people who spoke a (legally equal) variant of the dominant language of their polity nevertheless exhibited linguistic nationalism. Second, despite the polemics over language, the demonstrably nationalist government of independent Croatia did not institute a far-reaching language policy. These paradoxes motivate this study. The historical data gathered in investigating these apparent puzzles will be used to evaluate five prominent models of language’s role in the emergence of nationalism: the functionalist perspective of Ernest Gellner (1964; 2006 [1983]); the communications network-based theory of Karl Deutsch(1966); the state-centered model of Eric Hobsbawm (1992); Benedict Anderson’s (1991) “soft constructionist” model of printed language leading individuals to “imagine” the nation; and finally the

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Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian are close relatives within the South Slavic branch. Extinct languages in are brackets, although Church Slavonic is a liturgical language in some Orthodox churches. Source: After Schenker, Alexander M. 1995. *The Dawn of Slavic: An Introduction to Slavic Philology*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pg. 68.
ethnosymbolist view Anthony Smith (1991) that language is an important but not critical marker of deeply rooted ethnic ties. In addition to evaluating these theories, my examination of post-independence language policy will show how linguistic nationalism is being adapted to fit the constraints of a globalizing world.

I argue that the mechanisms of language conflict in ex-Yugoslavia are consistent with the arguments of state-centered theorists such as Hobsbawm (1992, 10); language-based nationalist mobilization does not result from linguistic differences in themselves, but from political entrepreneurs manipulating language in order to align linguistic borders with political borders. Yet when national movements attain power, their language policies are constrained by the administrative, technological and political structures in which they find themselves. However, the evidence does not support Hobsbawm’s strict modernism. Rather, language policy which connected the language with a distinct Croatian premodern literary and political tradition prevailed in the long run, supporting the ethnosymbolists’ stress on the role of premodern roots of nationalism (Smith 1986).

In the remainder of this chapter, I outline preliminary ideas about the connection between language politics and nationalism, both in general and with regard to the Croatian case. I then define some basic analytical concepts used in the thesis. I explain the epistemology and methodology of the study, and conclude the chapter with an outline of the remainder of the thesis.

**DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE POLITICS**

Language is a political issue. Language policy involves choosing a good—a common means of communication—which will necessarily be shared by the public. In all but a few monolingual polities (e.g. Iceland, South Korea, and Japan) such a choice will invariably advantage some groups and hinder others. Because it is necessarily public and involves costs and benefits to various groups, language policy is a political matter, a potential site of conflict over policy.
**Language Choice as Policy**

In a modern society, language choice is a state function. The state decides in which language(s) basic, secondary and post-secondary education will be conducted. It decides which language(s) will be used for debate and deliberation of public affairs and in which language(s) it promulgates its laws. More subtly, the state influences language itself through choice of standard dialect(s) for public education and other state functions and by authorizing institutions which regulate the lexicon and grammar of the official languages (or languages). The first of these actions is captured in Fishman’s definition of language planning as “the authoritative assigning of scarce resources to language” (2004, 79), the second in Weinstein’s conception of language planning as a long term, conscious and government authorized effort to “alter a language itself or to change a language’s functions in society.” (1983, 37)

Assigning roles to language(s) is known as status planning. It determines the functions for which linguistic groups can use their native tongue (Weinstein 1983, 11). Further, state resources are often devoted to developing the language or languages given official status – struggles between linguistic groups are struggles over resources which can be used to reinforce group identity (Safran 1999). Language is also a system of symbols which influences social identity; changing the language internally (corpus planning), or the narrative about the language, can include or exclude people from the shared system of symbols.

**Functional Dimensions of Language**

The functional consequences of language planning are apparent when speakers of nonofficial language are disadvantaged economically or politically because of difficulty communicating in an official language.

People who are not able to communicate—to understand, speak, read and write—in the official language are disadvantaged; they cannot truly participate in public debate. Firsthand information on policy issues will not be available to such a
community. In forums where rhetorical skills are valued, such as the floor of a legislature, nonnative speakers who have learned the dominant political language after their teens will generally be less fluent in expressing themselves. Conversely, native speakers of the official language are at an advantage politically over those who do not speak the official language or who speak it poorly.

Native speakers of official languages are advantaged in the private economy as well as public sphere. In modern societies, official political languages and standard dialects are often the preferred means of communication in business and commerce. Given the large role that states play in modern economies, people with language difficulties will be doubly disadvantaged. It is not surprising, therefore, that those with poor communication skills in the official language (or languages) often find themselves on the bottom rungs of employment and marginalized in politics.

**Symbolic Aspects of Language**

Language has a symbolic aspect in addition to its function as a means of communication. The choice of an official language or languages not only signals the state’s view of who belongs to the national community; it has implications for the way the various language communities view the state. Speakers of an official language might be seen (and see themselves) as central in the given state. They can read the history of the country in their own language. They can be confident that throughout the territory of the state they will be able to communicate (Fishman 2004). For example, an English speaker traveling to Wales can be confident that he will be able to conduct business and deal with local officials in his native tongue, even if he is in a Welsh-speaking county (Williams 1991).

On the other hand, speakers of languages without official status or even nonstandard varieties of the official language may be seen (and see themselves) as peripheral to state and society. The speakers of nonofficial dialects or languages may be seen as belonging to a literary, historical, or religious tradition outside the
national tradition (Safran 1999, 88-89). Language is thus a main element in the creation of symbolic boundaries for the nation, boundaries which are often not coterminous with state boundaries.

Having the power of the state behind it, the national language may expand its range, encroaching on the territory of subordinate languages: “From the perspective of subnational languages, the national languages are in enviable positions. They are viewed as controlling power, funds, jobs, prestige, etc.” (Fishman 1989) Speakers of the regional languages will choose to defect, or have their children educated in the national language, or use more and more terms from that national language in the local language. These acts often serve to weaken non-dominant languages, shrinking their vocabularies and territorial extent, and limiting the social situations in which they are spoken (Hill 1983, 258-260). Individuals who see the non-dominant language as a symbol of their community will naturally feel alarmed at such developments (Crystal 2000, 37-39).

This division of language issues into functional or symbolic components is somewhat artificial. The symbols—including language—which tie a language community or a national community together perform the function of creating unity and facilitating social relations. Yet for analytical purposes the distinction is important; functional differences can be considered more “objective” or “real” in the sense that they take place in the public sphere and are more easily observable. The symbolic aspect of language is a more internal, psychological phenomena, but it has real, observable consequences in situations where language conflicts arise.

**LANGUAGE, THE CROATIAN CASE AND THE THEORY OF NATIONALISM**

Language’s dual nature—functional means of communication versus defining symbol of a national community—gives it salience to the theory of nationalism, which is itself divided into two broad camps. Theorists such as Ernest Gellner (1964)
see nationalism as a functional adaptation to modernity, with little basis in pre-modern factors such as ethnic divisions. Others, notably Anthony Smith, emphasize how nationalism uses symbols connect groups to their presumed premodern origins (Gellner and Smith 1995). Language policy involves a cultural phenomenon which is at once both functional and symbolic; it thus presents an opportunity to examine the relative importance of the functional versus symbolic aspects of nationalism.

Croatian linguistic nationalism has several advantages as a case for theories about the relation of language to nationalism. Standardized in the second half of the nineteenth century, the unified Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian) provided a functional medium of communication. This history makes Croatian and Serbian similar enough that the functional variable of mutual intelligibility—posited by Gellner as a cause of linguistic nationalism—can be eliminated as a causal factor.

Though the Serbs arguably dominated the political sphere in both Royal Yugoslavia (1918-1941) and its socialist successor, there is little evidence that communication barriers hindered Croats in politics—the socialist dictator Josip Broz Tito, who ruled Yugoslavia from 1945-975, was himself a Croat. In addition, Croatia was wealthier than Serbia; language did not block material advancement for Croats. Given the political and economic situation and the mutual intelligibility of standard Serbian and Croatian speech, it is difficult to see a functional reason for the long-running conflict over language.

Despite the development of unified Serbo-Croatians, and the apparent lack of a functional barrier to communication between Serbs and Croats, the unified language’s name, orthography, and the role of dialect borrowings within it were the subjects of disagreement between the Serbs and Croats. This conflict continued for nearly a century and a half despite the lack of a functional barrier to communication between the two peoples. It was a factor in the county’s ultimate breakup, but as
noted previously there was, at first glance, little emphasis on language reform after independence. *Prima facie*, these anomalies make the Croatian case a candidate for fruitful research into the connection between language and nationalism. In depth research will reveal if in fact Croatian linguistic nationalism arose despite the lack of barriers to communication and—in the event of such a lack—how and why the language became a symbol of Croatian national identity.

**Definitions of Key Concepts**

To this point, I have used terms such as nation, nationalism, language, and linguistic nationalism without defining them. In this section, I define these and other key concepts. The scholarly debate about nationalism is so lively partly because of many basic concepts, such as “the nation” and even “language,” are notoriously slippery. The linguistics literature exhibits less disagreement on basic ideas, yet even here words like “language” and “dialect” can vary slightly in meaning. Within each field, however, the definitions of key concepts do display a great deal of overlap; here I present definitions which are squarely within the mainstream of both linguistics and the academic study of nationalism.

**The Political Unit**

The influential theorist Ernest Gellner defined nationalism as “the belief that the political unit and the ‘nation’ should be congruent.” (Gellner 1964, 160) This definition requires two more definitions, those of the terms “nation” and—less obviously—the political unit. While nationalism is a label often limited to movements for complete sovereignty, some groups deemed nationalist have goals short of independence. Examples include the Catalan nationalist movement in Spain and the Welsh nationalist movement in Britain. In these cases, historically and linguistically distinct populations exhibit a desire for self-rule, but are satisfied with a situation less than a fully sovereign state (Guibernau 1999). National movements in
the nineteenth century Hapsburg Empire were more often than not autonomist in nature (Hroch 1993, 6). Conversely, some multinational states have political institutions which represent nations that are not fully sovereign states. The Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly, with powers devolved from Westminster, are cases in point. Empirically, then, and a nationalist movement can be satisfied with a degree of control over a territory rather than full independence, and a state can be something other than a unitary “hard border” sovereign state in the Westphalian mold (Mostov 2001).

**Nationalism, the Nation, and Linguistic Nationalism**

Drawing on the work of several theorists, particularly Smith (1991), Deutsch (1966), and Gellner (1964; 2006 [1983]), I define as *nationalist* any movement that seeks: (1) cultural autonomy—especially in the areas of language, education, and the establishment of cultural institutions, (2) a preponderance of control over the institutions and laws that govern in the principal territory of its “nation” and (3) a large degree of control of its economic resources. *Nationalism* is the ideology that promotes these ideals.

A nationalist program will necessarily seek some sort of political institutionalization of its putative nation, if not outright sovereignty. But what makes a *nation*? I will adopt Miroslav Hroch’s definition of a *nation* as a population that possesses: (1)”a ‘memory’ of some common past, treated as a ‘destiny’ of the group—or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society.”(Hroch 1993, 5)

Hroch’s definition recognizes both the functional (communications), the symbolic (“memory” and “destiny”), and the political (equality of citizens). It
encompasses Gellner’s later conception of nationalism as “the marriage of politics and culture” (Gellner 1994, 27) and the ethnosymbolist emphasis on memories of a collective history (Hutchinson 2005, 16). Its highlighting of linguistic and cultural ties fits well with Fishman’s definition of a national speech community, the symbolic network that includes all members of the nation, but excludes those who do not speak the national language (Fishman 1970). Hroch’s definition, including as it does political and linguistic factors, shows the need for theorists of nationalism to engage with sociolinguistics.

The literature on nationalism is largely agreed on a typology of nationalism into civic and ethnic (sometimes termed Western and Eastern) nationalism (Greenfeld 1992, 15). Civic nationalism, such as that inspired by the French Revolution, defines the nation as a territorially bounded political community (Hobsbawm 1992, 54), even if participation in that community carried with it the obligation to conform to the dominant culture. Ethnic or Eastern national movements, influenced by the German philosopher Herder (1744 –1803), developed later and defined their (potential) nation by language, religion, or other nonpolitical characteristic (Fishman 1972, 127). I argue that, in either case, language is an element in the national program. Civic nationalists, such as the French revolutionaries, seek to unify the political community via language (Grégiore 1975 [1794]). Ethnic nationalists typical seek to sharpen differences with other speech communities, as Yugoslav linguists sought to distinguish Macedonian from Bulgarian (Mahon 1998). As I will show, both tendencies were present Croatia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the “differentiation” side winning in the end.

While the term linguistic nationalism is often applied to ethnic nationalism I use it to mean any attempt to use language to reinforce a political movement. Linguistic nationalists will devote effort and resources to strengthening what they see as the national language, whether this is a distinct idiom that will help cleave off an ethnic
group from a larger polity or a common language that unites a large territory. This
does not mean necessarily that linguistic nationalists seek to eliminate other
languages or dialects within the national territory (Hobsbawm 1992, 36). It does
mean that other languages will be secondary; the national language will be
dominant; the nation’s story will be told in the national language, and the struggle
over the national language will itself often be a major part of the national story.

**Variant, Dialect, Language**

The preceding discussion has presupposed the existence of discrete
languages, but in reality language borders are often blurry. The standardization of
oral idioms into written language leaves a trail of “variants” and “dialects” in its
wake, but just which is “dialect” and which is language often provokes fierce and
emotional debate (Haugen 1966). Here, I explain how I use three related terms,
variety, dialect, and language, in this thesis.

Sociolinguists use a neutral term—language variety—to refer to “a kind of
language”, precisely to avoid the cultural and political overtones of the words
“dialect” and “language.” (Fishman 1970, 16) However, during the Yugoslav the
labels “Eastern” variant and “Western” variant (varijanta) were used to describe
Serbo-Croatian, thereby portraying a cultural division in as merely one of
geography. As an American slavicist pointed out, “the two major variants are
denoted here as Eastern (E) the main cultural capital of which is Belgrade, and
Western (W), the main cultural capital of which is Zagreb.” (Benson 1994, xxi) The
two cities were also, of course, the capitals of the Serbian and Croatian Socialist
Republics. The “Western” variety is now Croatian, the “Eastern” variety Serbian.

In the ex-Yugoslav context the term dialect is used for nonstandard but
recognized regional forms, each of which possesses a literature. Indeed the Croatian
dialects of Kajkavian, Shtokavian, and Chakavian (after their respective words for
“What”) serve to differentiate Croatian from Serbian for linguistic nationalists (Kačić
1997). Most Croatian writers and linguists refer to their neo-Shtokavian language as literary Croatian (*Hrvatski književni jezik*). Croatian nationalists point to the language’s literary history to assert their case that it is an independent language.

I adopt the usage of the majority of Croatian linguists and speak of two languages: Serbian and Croatian; “dialect” will only apply to the recognized regional varieties of spoken Croatian or Serbian which have a literature. This prejudges a crucial issue in the development of Croatian linguistic nationalism, the question as to whether Croatian and Serbian are one language or two. No usage will be totally neutral; however, the text will make the reader well aware of this dispute.

Discussions of what is or is not a language are generally the domain of what Fishman(1970, 16) calls gatekeepers or language elites—the academics, writers and editors who determine standard linguistic usage. In enforcing norms of usage these language elites’ ideas can create or reinforce national identity through language. However, some members of such elites reject the imposition of language rules in favor of a “free-market” in languages.

The idea of a Croatian speech community is now entwined with the idea of a Croatian political community. However, at the beginning of the era of nationalism—the early 1800s—national and linguistic boundaries in the Balkans were still fluid. Language elites and political elites (not mutually exclusive groups) proposed different models for the linguistic and political organization of the South Slavic speaking area. The concepts discussed above are used to analyze how these models are related to Croatian nationalism. To reiterate in more exact terms the central questions of this thesis: why did the accepted divisions between language and variant in the South Slav area change over time, in effect forming narrower speech communities? Why, once Croatian independence aligned political boundaries with this narrow conception of the speech community, was language reform so moderate? These puzzles motivate this thesis, but I aim not only to describe the
Croatian case, but to use it to evaluate major theories of nationalism. The epistemology and methodology of this project are explained in the following two sections.

**Epistemology**

The emergence of nationalism, and the role of language therein, is not easily investigated by a cross sectional, ‘large-N’ analysis of data; these are best used in studies which seek to make mechanistic predictions (Ragin 1999). My goal here is to understand the processes which led to Croatian linguistic nationalism and its manifestation (or lack thereof) in policy, and what that tells us about the accuracy of various theories of nationalism. A case study is an appropriate method for studying a “big and slow-moving” process such as nationalism (Pierson 2003).

Nevertheless a case study with an “N” of one must use an appropriate epistemology in order to contribute to knowledge. Responding to criticism that “small N” case studies are unable to contribute to scientific accumulation of knowledge (Geddes 1990), or are a second-best alternative to “large N” studies (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), case study researchers have developed logics which differ from the reasoning used in quantitative statistical research (Rueschemeyer 2003). Here, I show how these epistemological frameworks enable this single case (or small number of related cases, if my historical periodization is taken into account) to contribute to the social scientific enterprise.

A case is not a single observation; a qualitative researcher may have more data available than someone working with a large data set (Ragin 1992, 4). This seems to imply the possibility of reasoning along statistical or pseudo-statistical lines by “multiplying observations.” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) Observations within the case, however, are not independent; they are related by the very criteria used to select and delimit the case. After observing the initial state, subsequent observations are dependent on how previous events the case. This makes case
studies useful in describing and analyzing how processes affect the social unit over time (George and Bennett 2005). Unfortunately, this dependence invalidates the logic of null hypothesis testing, which relies on independent observations. Moreover, I selected the Croatian case because of its final outcome, a problematic instance of “selection on the dependent variable.” (Geddes 1990) To overcome these problems, I use three alternative logics: deriving “degrees of freedom” from theory itself (Campbell 1975), “inference to the best explanation,” (Lipton 2001) and a qualitative Bayesian approach (Goldstone 2003).

In Campbell’s (1975) “degrees of freedom” approach, a series of observations from a single case is evaluated against the multiple implications of a social theory. A broad theory will always have several implications, things we can expect to observe or events we can predict (or retrodict) if the theory is true. These often have a time dimension—A happens before B (Hall 2003). For example, Gellner’s theory (1964; 2006[1983]) states that industrialization stimulates need for literate workers, but that the language standardization required for literacy leaves non-dominant linguistic groups behind, and these then mobilize to form their own polities. This implies that linguistic nationalism will be seen in areas only after they have begun industrializing, have begun to institute universal basic education, and which have at least one language group which is lagging economically. Case evidence can be used to judge how well a case matches the theory’s multiple implications.

Campbell’s “degrees of freedom” approach is a method of disconfirming a single theory; if many events in a case are contrary to expectations derived from a theory, it is more likely to be false than if it matches most of its expectations. The difference between this approach and the traditional null-hypothesis model is that the “degrees of freedom” are derived from the multiple implications of the theory itself, rather than from many cases. The method can be applied to several theories at once, using data from a single case. When the implications derived from each theory
are framed in terms of exactly the same variables, it is possible to apply statistical
tests (e.g. difference in proportions of matches) to judge which theory is best (Lee
1989). In this thesis such precision is not possible. However, the rigor of matching
implications from each model against historical events helps determine where a
theory is correct, what it gets wrong, and its overall “fit” with the data. In addition
because some theories posit factors which should always be seen in conjunction with
the emergence of nationalism, I am able to judge implications relative importance.
Failure to match on implications involving critical factors requires rejection or
significant adjustment of theory.

A second approach, “Inference to the best explanation” (IBE), asks “how well
various hypotheses would, if correct, explain the available evidence so that we can
determine which hypotheses merit acceptance.” (Lipton 2001, 95) In IBE, multiple
theories are weighed against the evidence of the case. The theory which can offer a
coherent and parsimonious explanation of the case data is considered to be most
correct. Suppose theory A asserts that linguistic nationalism is the result of conscious
(and successful) state action to create national unity by imposing the dominant
language in public schools while theory B asserts that uneven economic
development causes linguistic nationalism led by a disaffected intelligentsia. If case
evidence showed separatist linguistic nationalism emerging in an undeveloped
region where state efforts mandating official language instruction had been
implemented successfully (i.e. some linguistic assimilation had taken place) for some
time, theory B would better explain reality; state efforts to impose an identity have
failed to create unity and simply mobilized the minority language population.

Finally, the “Bayesian” approach to cases stresses how new information
modifies a priori beliefs about phenomena (Goldstone 2003). How should our beliefs
be modified to take into account new data? For example, Gellner’s theory of the
development of linguistically based nationalism can be stated in terms of an a priori
probability; given that we have a case of linguistic nationalism, there is a strong likelihood that the area experiencing the linguistic nationalism is industrializing. Individual cases can then change our beliefs about these probabilities—either towards or away from the Gellnerian prediction—depending on whether in the case being investigated, linguistic nationalism is indeed accompanied by industrialization.

**METHODOLOGY AND DATA**

Because the theories of nationalism that are being evaluated against the Croatian case are concerned with processes that take place over relatively long periods of time, the work in this thesis is in the research tradition of comparative historical sociology, with comparisons being drawn across eras in the single case. I rely largely on secondary sources for data on the nineteenth and early twentieth century development of Croatian linguistic nationalism, making possible temporal comparison across very different political regimes.

Data from the 1980s onward is generally from original sources, mostly texts but also a few interviews with Croatian linguists. I am concerned with written language for the most part, as language policy generally focuses on written material (Weinstein 1983). The texts are divided into three distinct types: popular periodical articles on the language; Croatian laws, policies and programs regarding language; and scholarly works about Croatian—including introductory sections of Croatian grammars and dictionaries.

I collected and analyzed Croatian laws regarding language found at the website of the Croatian government and its relevant ministries. More useful was the Croatian National Gazette [*Narodne Novine*], from which I downloaded and read relevant sections of every language-related law promulgated between 1990 and 2005. I also analyzed the projects relating to language funded by the Croatian

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3 For example at the government and education ministry websites, www.vlada.hr and www.mzos.hr respectively.
4 Website at www.nn.hr
government, information on which is available at the Svibor (2005) database (1995 and earlier) and the zProjekti (2005) database (projects begun after 1996). These data present a more subtle picture of the Croatian government’s goals in language reform than is found simply by looking to legislation.

Evidence regarding the concerned public’s and language elites’ attitudes towards language came from newspaper and periodical articles, largely from online archives between the period 1998 to 2005 due to limits of internet availability. The main periodicals searched were Vijenac, Hrvatsko Slovo, Večerni List, and Zarez. Vijenac is the organ of Matica Hrvatska, a moderately nationalistic Croatian cultural organization. Hrvatsko Slovo is a right wing publication of extreme Croatian nationalists, Večerni List is a mainstream daily newspaper, and Zarez is considered to be a moderately left wing cultural weekly. While not a scientific sample of Croatian writing on language, the texts do represent the outlines of the debate over language in the country. Indeed, quantitative analysis of five major media sources in Croatia shows Hrvatsko Slovo to be at the most nationalist in that it has adopted Croatian “purist” vocabulary (i.e substitutes for foreign loan words), while Zarez is the least purist and nationalist (Czerwinski 2003).

For evidence on attitudes of the language elites, I studied material from Jezik, a journal aimed at both linguists and educated lay persons, particularly high school and university teachers. In addition, I analyzed orthographies and grammars, especially the introductory sections of these works, for insight into how Croatian was conceived by these works’ authors; introductions and prefaces allow Croatian linguists to give their viewpoints on the language’s historical development. It is important to state that my analysis was not a quantitative examination of these texts; rather I interpreted what each source said about the language itself and about language planning in post-Independence Croatian.

\(^5\) Interview with Ante Knežović of the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California, April 2002.
Further insights into language elites’ views were gained by interviews with Professor Maria Znika of the Croatian Institute of Language and Philology, Professor Marko Tadić of the Zagreb University department of linguistics, and Anton Knezović of the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California. The interviews were semi-structured and I took notes rather than record them. Interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ respective offices in Zagreb and Monterey, California, during April, 2002.

**CONCLUSION AND PLAN OF THE WORK**

Croatian linguistic nationalism is an important case because of the nature of the dispute over language in the former Yugoslav territories. The mutual intelligibility of Croatian and Serbian means the case is a natural experiment which eliminates the functional factor of communication as the chief cause of the language-based national mobilization. The case is well documented for a period going back at least 150 years. This enables the temporal comparison that is necessary to analyze a longue durée process such as national identity formation and the role language plays in that process. As Croatia has relatively recently achieved independence, the case also allows an insight into how newly independent nations go about building a national language community. Finally, the case is taking place in the context of European Union expansion, “globalization” of culture, and a technology-driven increase in information transfer; careful study will add to knowledge about how these processes affect language’s connection to nationalism.

The work is divided into five chapters. The current chapter has set out the motivation for and goals of the thesis, outlined basic concepts and definitions, and explained the epistemological foundation of the work. The following chapter is an overview of the literature on nationalism and its relation to language; I describe major theories and draw observable implications from each. Chapter three deals with the premodern development of the Croatian language and presents the first
The case of Croatian nationalist mobilization—the Illyrian movement. The data from this case is matched against expectations derived from the theories being evaluated. The following chapter focusses on the part language played in three subsequent periods of Croatian nationalist mobilization: the struggle between Yugoslav and “State Right” nationalists in the latter nineteenth century, the extreme nationalism of Croatia’s World War II era government, and the lead-up to and events after Croatia’s early 1990s independence. Each is analyzed to determine which theory of language’s role in the emergence of nationalism best explains events in the period. I conclude the thesis by reviewing the findings of the substantive chapters, make further comparisons between periods, propose a synthesis of theories that would better explain the evolution of Croatian linguistic nationalist over time, and suggest further research in light of this new thesis.
CHAPTER 2
NATIONALISM AND LANGUAGE: A LITERATURE REVIEW

Part of the project of this thesis is to evaluate five major theories of nationalism, those of Gellner, Deutsch, Hobsbawm, Anderson, and Smith (see “Epistemology”, chapter one, page 10) After a brief general overview of thought on nationalism, the bulk of this chapter is taken up with an analytical review of those theories—particularly their respective positions on the role of language in nationalism. Observable implications are identified for each model, allowing it to be tested against empirical data from the Croatian case. I also review Adrian Hastings’s work on the link between Protestantism, language, and nationalism. This latter is an historical explanation rather than an abstract model, but it is important as Hastings sees language-based nationalism as developing far earlier than do other scholars. I also review sociolinguistic literature on language planning; concepts from this literature will be used in analyzing the Croatian case. Finally, I put this thesis into a broader context by reviewing literature on the Croatian case and other cases involving language and identity.

AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

The social scientific study of nationalism began in the 1960s and has made rapid progress (Hobsbawm 1992, 3; Breuilly 2006). Central questions have emerged in the field (Smith 1998). Are nations the contingent creations of the forces of modernity, or do they have roots traceable to premodern structures such as ethnic or religious groups? If nationalism is modern, is it the inevitable result of economic
or technological forces or is it a deliberately constructed program used as a path to power? The theories described below take various of positions on these questions.

**Modernist Theories of Nationalism**

According to Anthony Smith, “early explanations of nationalism were strongly influenced by organic varieties of nationalism. Nations were seen as the natural and primordial divisions of humanity, and nationalism was thought to be ubiquitous and universal. “(1999, 3) The perennialist view of nations, common in the eighteenth and especially nineteenth century, held that group differences in language, custom, and religion served as evidence that fixed nations exist, going back to the early Medieval era, though perhaps in a politically dormant state (Smith 1999, 5). For example, French Revolutionary Abbé Sieyès declared that nations “exist in the state of nature” and that they were part of a divine plan or the natural order of things (Smith 1986, 12-13).

Modernism developed as a critique of perennialism and today is the orthodox school of thought on nationalism (Gorski 2000, 1428; Smith 1998). Modernists see nationalism as rooted in the social, economic, and political conditions of modernity. Nations have little if any continuity with past social groupings. Modernists ask, if nations were part of the natural order, why were they “asleep” at times, “awakened” at others? Why did some nationalists stress language as the criterion of nationhood while others stressed religion and still others looked to racial or phenotypical distinctions?

Ernest Gellner (1964; 2006[1983]) developed the first and still most influential modernist theory of nationalism. He proposed that the development of nationalism is a consequence of the larger social change from traditional to industrialized society. Industrialization homogenizes society—causing what Gellner calls “social entropy.” Uneven economic development among preexisting groups, especially linguistic groups, causes them to resist homogenization, engendering nationalism.
Karl Deutsch, like Gellner, sees nationalism as the result of forces unleashed by modernity. But in Deutsch’s model, communications networks, rather than industrialization, are key (1966, 97). Where Gellner is concerned with the splitting of nations, Deutsch is concerned with nation-building. Waterways, highways, railroads, and electronic networks increase the intensity of communication between classes, creating social solidarity. They also link outlying regions with cultural centers (cities). Increased communication usually means linguistic assimilation, though he uses the Swiss as an example to show that sharing similar concepts, despite linguistic differences, can create a national speech community (Deutsch 1966, 97).

Eric Hobsbawm (1983; 1992) sees nationalism as a project of rising elites who attempt to use national symbolism—often recently invented—to mobilize populations and thus gain or maintain power. In Gellner’s model nationalism arises out of impersonal forces; in contrast, Hobsbawm emphasizes the agency of those who control or aim to control a state driving ”national” projects. “[F]or the purposes of analysis nationalism comes before nations; nations do not make states, but the other way around.” (Hobsbawm 1992, 10) Hobsbawm’s view—called instrumentalist or constructionist—is widely influential.

“Soft” constructionists see less explicit planning in the construction of national identity (Motyl 1999). They emphasize psychological factors more than do orthodox modernists or constructionists. In the most influential work of this school, Benedict Anderson (1991) puts forth the idea that nations are imagined as communities through such mechanisms as print capitalism and the creation of “national” maps, censuses and museums.

**Challenges to Modernism**

Modernist theories of nations have been critiqued on both logical and empirical grounds. Appraising the logic of the instrumentalist variation of modernism (e.g. Hobsbawm), Alexander J. Motel (1999) has noted that if we accept
that elites use symbols to mobilize masses we still must ask why symbols of nationhood have resonance with the masses. Here, however, I focus on the empirical challenges to modernism, evidence from historians who have identified what they consider to be national movements in the premodern era and from social scientists who have traced the processes by which ethnic communities mobilized to become nations.

Philip Gorski (2000) believes that a full-fledged nationalism, generated partly by the Protestant focus on the Old Testament and the story of the people of Israel, can be seen in the early modern Netherlands’ revolt, in 1577, against Spanish rule. Leah Greenfield (1992) sees nationalism as developing in England in the 1530s—the time of Henry VIII’s break with Rome—with a fully formed English nation-state evident a century later. These positions stand in sharp contrast to the modernist view, which places the beginning of nationalism around the end of the eighteenth century or the beginning of the nineteenth (Smith 1986, 228).

Other scholars push the roots of nationalism even further back in time. Medievalist Susan Reynolds (2005) focuses on the political communities created by Medieval kingdoms, some of which had a unified set of laws over a territory, a sense of common identity found across classes, and aspects of a common culture. Political scientist John Armstrong (1982) notes that both Eastern and Western churches played a role in governing economic and social life and also inculcated a sense of belonging to a community beyond the local town or village. Adrian Hastings (1997) emphasizes the role of premodern Bible translations in the development of national sentiment. For these three scholars, the materials for nationalism, although not nationalist ideology, were in place before modernity.

**The Ethnosymbolist Synthesis**

The empirical troubles of modernism have prompted the development of a synthesis, ethnosymbolism, which holds that nationalism as a political movement
and ideology is modern but that premodern structures such as religion and ethnicity often form the basis for national identity. Anthony Smith (1986), has investigated premodern identity in a wide array of ethnic groups—or ethnie. An ideal ethnie possesses “a collective proper name, a myth of shared decent, shared historical memories, an association with a specific homeland, [and] a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.” (Smith 1991, 21) These factors are the raw material out of which nations are created; their symbolic resources give nationalism its power (Smith 1986, xxxi-xxxii).

Aside from their differences with modernists over the importance of premodern bases to nationalism, the ethnosymbolist school emphasizes cultural, rather than political or economic, aspects of nationalism. The symbols which resonate with a population, creating national identity and legitimating political authority, are most often drawn from premodern culture. Conflicts are particularly important in creating symbolism which attracts allegiance; these conflicts are embedded in the “national” myth by means of story, song, and saga. Such “memories” themselves are often contested, leading to rival national narratives, which battle over time (Hutchinson 2005, 79-84). For example, French identity oscillates between the heritage of revolution and pre-revolutionary traditions drawn from church and village (Hutchinson 2005, 124-129). Such conflicts may originate along class or regional lines, but they take on a life of their own. For the ethnosymbolist, national identity is not an epiphenomenon; symbols—as assembled and interpreted to produce a “national” culture—have real power to mobilize groups. This section has presented a brief overview of theorists of nationalism, emphasizing the divide between modernists and premodernists—including the ethnosymbolists. I now turn to the role of language in various models.
GELLNER’S SEMINAL THEORY

Despite the fundamental division between modernists and their critics, there are scholars on both sides of the divide who see language as playing a causal role in nationalism and those on both sides who see language-based mobilization as a result, rather than a cause, of nationalism. The next several sections present detailed explanations of language’s role in various models of nationalism along with observable implications from each model. Gellner’s model is seminal in the field, therefore it receives the first and longest exposition. Other theories are often described with reference to Gellner’s work.

Language, Communication, and Nationalism

For Gellner, language’s function as a medium of communication is crucial to understanding its importance for nationalism. An industrial economy—the key characteristic of a modern society—requires literacy in a single language; therefore creating and teaching a standard written language is mandatory for modernization. Non-dominant language groups typically suffer economic and social disadvantage during this process; their reaction leads to language-based nationalist movements (Gellner 2006 [1983], 43-44).

Agricultural (i.e. premodern) societies are characterized by fixed social relations. Occupations, whether farming or specialized trades, are learned through long apprenticeships. Social stratification is between classes rather than between geographically defined nation-states. Limited mobility meant that contact with those outside the immediate village was infrequent. Industrial society, in contrast, is in constant flux. Workers change both occupation and location to meet market demands. Only literacy allows workers to be trained and retrained rapidly to supply a constantly changing market. Literacy becomes necessary for participation in economic life beyond the very lowest rungs. Moreover, only economic participation makes political and social participation possible. Therefore literacy is “[t]he minimal
requirement for full citizenship, for effective moral membership of a modern community… .” (Gellner 1964 )

The demand for literate workers requires the state to institute universal basic education in a common language of instruction. Typically, a standard language will be formed from a dialect spoken by the politically dominant group. The standardization and adoption of an official language gives a functional advantage to those who speak dialects closely related to the standard language. Those who speak languages distant from the standard language are functionally disadvantaged; they cannot communicate well in the dominant medium.

In Gellner’s model it is precisely the groups that have been torn from their traditional way of life by industrialization that are most affected by linguistic disadvantage. Migrants from poor countryside regions often speak languages very different from those of the more advanced urban areas where they congregate. They thus are stuck at the bottom of the economic ladder, performing low status jobs which do not require literacy in the dominant language. Those who stay behind suffer poverty in underdeveloped regions. Some disadvantaged groups, however, possess a sufficiently developed intelligentsia—teachers, publishers, bureaucrats, etc.—which will form a movement to shape one of their own dialects into a standard, official language. According to Gellner it is not possible to predict where such movements will emerge, whether they will demand autonomy or sovereignty, or how successful they will be: “Nationalism itself is fated to prevail, but not any one particular nationalism.” The energy of the aforementioned intellectual class is, however, important in determining success (Gellner 2006 [1983], 45).

Other factors, particularly race and religion, can spawn national movements. Like language, these are barriers to social entropy—they counteract the tendency of modern industrial societies to dissolve distinct groups into a single culture. But while race and religion operate on a psychological level, language’s ability to hinder social
entropy derives from the functional disadvantage non-dominant language groups face during modernization (Gellner 2006 [1983]).

For Gellner, then, language-based national movements are not due to a people’s inherent connection to their traditional dialects; rather they are a byproduct of the new form of social organization required by modernity, a society “based deeply on education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state.” (Gellner 2006 [1983], 46). Though national movements frequently derive “authenticity” through cultural activity such as the rediscovery of epics and collection of folklore, these are simply simulacra legitimizing wholly novel nation-states.

**Implications of the Gellnerian Model**

Gellner’s argument implies that industrialization is necessary for linguistic nationalism (indeed all nationalism) to develop; “agrarian civilizations do not engender nationalism, but industrial societies do.” (Gellner 1994, 16) Put in Bayesian terms, given that we observe a nationalist movement, we expect that the region involved is industrializing, that there are two or more linguistic groups which are unequal politically and economically, and that the state is introducing widespread basic education. Both industrialization and the state’s introduction of basic education should precede the development of a reactive nationalism among subordinate language groups. The language of education will be a critical political issue for such national movements. Nationalist leaders will come from the new intelligentsia (e.g. journalists, teachers, intellectuals) of the subordinate group, and their primary goal will be to transform a dominated peasant culture into a high culture with a standard language capable of being used in education and bureaucracies (Gellner 2006 [1983], 61). Such a movement’s chances of success are determined by “[G]roup size, historicity, and a compact territory.”(Gellner 2006 [1983], 45)
Gellner’s theory is driven by the functional role of language, therefore linguistic nationalism should appear where linguistic divisions between dominant and subordinate groups form a barrier to communication. Non-language-based nationalism could emerge driven by other “counter entropic” factors: “just which groups will emerge as its [nationalism’s] carriers can be only loosely indicated, for it depends on too many historic contingencies.” (Gellner 2006 [1983], 46) However, under Gellner’s model a Croatian nationalism which emphasizes language would seem unlikely, due to Croatian’s mutual intelligibility with Serbian. The persistence of the language issue in Croatia is, at first glance, evidence against Gellner’s model. Analysis in later chapters will allow a more definitive judgment.

**OTHER MODERNIST THEORIES OF LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM**

Gellner’s model has spawned several variants, with other modernist thinkers disagreeing with him in three key areas: the preexisting conditions necessary for the development of nationalism, the mechanism by which language becomes an important factor in defining a nation, and the degree of intentional actions (agency) in creating a language-based nationalism. This section presents several alternative modernist theories and their implications.

**Karl Deutsch: the Role of Communications**

Karl Deutsch’s work (1942; 1966) focusses on the role of communications in building national communities. Where Gellner sees language as a possible barrier to social entropy, Deutsch stresses language’s unifying role in conveying culture and concepts. For Deutsch, a community “consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and services.” (Deutsch 1966, 17) “Complementary habits and facilities of communication” are required to build a sense of common history, the basis of a national community. Ordinarily this depends on having a language in
common; gradually speakers of a set of similar dialects come to “accept as their common standard language above their dialects the speech of the capital or economically central region, as spoken by the elite.” (Deutsch 1942, 532) The expansion of the dominant language’s range is caused by expanding communication’s networks, and goes hand in hand with economic and political integration, which create (respectively) wider markets and territorial jurisdictions.

Documented processes of linguistic assimilation are found as early as the Middle Ages—the gradual formation and adoption of standard English as an administrative language provides an example (Deutsch 1966, 124). Deutsch notes, however, that rate of adoption of vernacular based official languages increased rapidly around 1800, driven by the expanding communications networks that are the result of modern state actions (1942, 532, note 2; 1966, 127-134). These conditions create “mobilized” populations whose members did one or more of the following: read newspapers regularly, lived in towns or cities, payed taxes directly to the central government, or engaged in industrial or trade occupations (Deutsch 1966, 127).

Language-based national movements emerge where rival processes of mobilization develop. If a dominant culture can assimilate newly mobilized members of a non-dominant culture (for example, peasants entering cities for industrial employment) then there will be no linguistic nationalism. However, where members of a large “inactive” (i.e. non-mobilized) population of a subordinate linguistic group are forced into modern economic and political structures, it is likely that a national movement claiming to act in their name will form.

Deutsch illustrates his theory with the example of Finland, where the dominant urban-dwelling Swedes lost power to the Finnish speaking nationalist movement, and of Bohemia where the German bourgeoisie lost power to the Czech
migrants to the cities. Scotland is a counterexample; by the time industrialization drew a significant proportion of Gaelic speakers to the cities they were too few (and English-Scots speakers too many) to prompt a language-based national movement (Deutsch 1966, 130-132).

Deutsch holds open the possibility that a rivalry over assimilation can take place even between closely related dialects. Language, written and oral, is key to a fundamental characteristic of groups, the ability to store and transmit memories and meaning over long periods (Deutsch 1966, 172-173). This implies that populations might speak similar dialects but see their speech as distinct because it is associated with their particular communal history.

Unlike Gellner, Deutsch is not reliant on industrialization as the underlying cause of nationalism, but the expansion of communications infrastructure plays a similar role. This enables the mobilization of the populace, and this mobilization is multifaceted with political (e.g. paying taxes direct to the government), economic (e.g. working in industrial employment), and cultural (e.g. reading newspapers regularly) aspects. The theory does imply we should see increases in these or analogous activities (e.g. watching television news) before linguistic nationalism emerges. Using Bayesian reasoning, having identified an emerging linguistic nationalism, we expect to see a relatively large, non-dominant language speaking population being drawn into a wider communication network. If a case shows linguistic nationalism emerging without this precondition, our belief in the correctness of Deutsch’s theory decreases.

The communications-centered theory of nationalism also implies that preexisting groups with a strong demographic position relative to a dominant group will be likely to resist assimilation in favor of establishing their own language—or more properly a dialect awaiting standardization—as official. Where there are profound language differences, as in the examples cited above, language
itself differentiates groups. Where there is not much linguistic distance, other aspects of culture will be necessary to differentiate groups. Therefore language is a factor in creating national movements, but is neither necessary nor sufficient in itself.

**Hobsbawm: Agency and the State**

In contrast to Gellner and Deutsch, who see the link between language and nationalism as developing from impersonal forces, the historian Eric Hobsbawm stresses the agency of political elites in constructing nationalism. National identity in general and linguistic identity in particular are elite projects designed to mobilize populations and gain political support. Elites do use materials at hand, however; “Nations are constructed essentially from above, but cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below.” (Hobsbawm 1992, 10)

When beginning their construction project, most nationalist leaders are confronted with unstandardized “mother tongues” spoken in limited areas (Hobsbawm 1992, 52-53). To succeed, they must construct a language capable of expressing the concepts necessary for the operation of a modern nation state. Some “high culture” but non-state languages such High German and Italian could serve as state languages immediately, and indeed these gave educated Germans and Italians a national identity before their states were unified. More typically, according to Hobsbawm, constructing a standard language with the vocabulary necessary to govern a society is the work of the state, or of a movement which seeks to control a state. “Languages multiply with states: not the other way around.” (Hobsbawm 1992, 63)

Hobsbawm’s position implies that language’s role as symbol of the nation is a result, not a cause, of a political movement. Moreover, efforts to modernize language will be seen after, rather than prior to, the emergence of a nationalist movement and will not be fully realized until after a state is established by the movement. Once in power, a nationalist government will devote state resources to
modernizing the language, focusing on the technical and political vocabulary of the language to enable it to meet the needs of modern governance. The primary advocates of language modernization programs will be politicians rather than intellectuals, educators, or linguists.

“Soft” Constructivism and Language

Gellner, Deutsch and Hobsbawm focus on “hard” factors—the political and economic structures of society—in creating linguistic nationalism. Benedict Anderson (1991) sees the “nation” and nationalism as a more subjective phenomenon that emerges from the population of a territory coming to imagine themselves as part of a single community. The national *Imagined Community* (the title of Anderson’s influential work) differs from an actual community in that an individual member only ever interacts with a tiny proportion of the inhabitants. Yet the populace is seen as sharing an essential characteristic of community membership.

Anderson proposes a variety of mechanisms which create this vision of national community. Language plays a key role, though that role is a side effect of the rise of print media. In Europe a profusion of unstandardized dialects spoken in limited territories existed. Mass market works could not be printed in every dialect of, say, German, but could be profitable if a single widely understood standard was developed. Once developed, the fixed appearance of the standard language on the printed page gave the illusion of its being a non-changing social phenomenon – one that defined the nation. Readers of newspapers and other literature in a specific standard language came to see themselves as being members of the same community. There are limits, however, to the incorporation of dialects into a single language. Hungarian and German, for example, are far too different to reduce to one written language. Print capitalism fused related dialects together into a single language, creating the image of a single community. The same process, however,
also marked each community out from others who had very different languages.

In contrast to Europe, Latin America contained vast territories where much of the population spoke the language of the imperial governors. Yet Latin American newspapers published at provincial capitals led individuals to imagine that their lives were entwined with those of others in the province. Stories about the installation of a governor, a marriage in a prominent family, the arrival of cargo from the metropole, and similar printed news tended to concern a specific province. News from outside the province was relatively rare, leading these to being imagined as different in some essential aspect.

Despite Anderson’s focus on internal psychological processes, his model does have observable implications. The introduction of large scale printing, either by private enterprises or the state, should precede the development of nationalism in a region. As the “print capitalists” seek larger markets, the standard print form should expand to sharp linguistic boundaries (e.g. between Germanic and Slavic languages). In contrast to Gellner’s model, Anderson does not require industrialization for linguistic nationalism to emerge. But his theory does imply a certain level of literacy among the potential “national” public. Finally, the process by which language becomes associated with the imagined national community is largely unintentional, rather than the action of an elite.

The preceding sections show that key issues of contention have emerged among modernist theorists of nationalism. Each posits his own major, in some cases necessary, condition for development of nationalism— industrialization for Gellner, intensifying communications networks for Deutsch, a power-seeking political elite for Hobsbawm, print capitalism or state printing for Anderson. The models also disagree on the importance of agency in the yoking together of language and nation. Hobsbawm views the purposeful action of elites as key, the other theorists stress impersonal forces. All the theorists discussed so far, however, view
nationalism as a product of modernity. Next I describes the ideas of scholars that believe the connection between language and nationalism is more deeply rooted.

**LANGUAGE AND THE PREMODERN ROOTS OF NATIONALISM**

In this section I describe the role of language in two critiques of modernism - the empirical work of Adrian Hastings and the ethnosymbolist model associated with Anthony Smith. I do not derive observable implications from Hastings’s historical account; his explanation of the emergence of nationalism in Protestant countries is important, however, as it might there might be an analogous process in Catholic lands such as Croatia. I do derive observable implications from Smith’s ethnosymbolist model, because it is presented as a generalizable model.

**Religion, the Vernacular and National Identity**

Adrian Hastings holds that a written vernacular is necessary for the transformation of an ethnic group into a nation; “Oral languages are proper to ethnic groups: widely written vernaculars to nations.” (1997, 21) The development of written vernaculars spurred by the Protestant desire to translate the Bible, and the exposure of the public to those vernacular in Bible translations, formed the basis for ”proto-national“ identities (Hastings 1997, 20).

Vernacular Bibles promoted national feeling in three main ways. First, the demands of translating the Bible stretched an vernacular’s lexicon, enabling it to compete with established high culture languages such as Latin, Greek, and Church Slavonic. Second, in early modern Europe Bibles were the most widely disseminated literature; thus Bible production increased a vernacular’s potential audience. Finally, the Old Testament narrative itself served as model of nationhood; ancient Israel was seen as a people with a common language living under a uniform, God-given rule and possessing God-given right to a territory (Hastings 1997, 36).
In this way the vernacular Bible inspired early nationalism in England and Holland—two Protestant countries where Bible reading was encouraged (Hastings 1997, 38). Biblical language and national feeling reinforced one another. For the English, reading God’s word in their mother tongue inspired a sense of uniqueness. This sentiment spread in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth as century as more English-language editions were demanded by the public. A similar pattern pertained in the Netherlands (Gorski 2000).

Hastings’s work is an historical explanation, not a general model. It is not valid to evaluate his work against the Croatian case. The religious circumstances are different and Croatian nationalism is not evident until a much later era. Nevertheless, I have explained his work in detail here for two reasons. First, he places the emergence of language-based nationalisms far earlier that other scholars. Second, and more importantly, his link between Protestant religion, language and nationalism may be generalizable to encompass other links between religion, language and nationalism. This possibility is discussed in the concluding chapter.

**Ethnosymbolism and Language**

Anthony Smith’s characterization of ethnic/national attributes is multifaceted; language is just one element that might distinguish a people from others. Indeed, he downplays its importance, noting that “language is one of the most malleable and dependent cultural categories; apart from the great language fissures (for example, between Romance, Slavonic, and Germanic language groups in Europe ), particular linguistic formations are largely the product of the interplay of religion and political organization in a given area.” (Smith 1986, 27-28)

For Smith, a nation’s having a distinct language is less important than the resonance the language has as a symbol of ethnicity and/or nationhood. This implies that language’s role in nationalism is characterized by “revivals” of national literature, “rediscoveries” of national epics, the collection of national folk songs, and
other such cultural activities; language operates in conjunction with other aspects of cultural revival that lead to nationalism. Poets, musicians and artists play a large role in driving the nationalist program in Smith’s model. Once nationalists are in power, state resources will be devoted less to language modernization than to creating and inculcating a narrative of the nation which links a glorious past with the modern state.

The preceding two sections have reviewed several models which seek to explain the connection between language and nationalism. On either side of the modernist/premodernist divide there are theorists who believe language plays a causal role in the development of nationalism and those who believe language is peripheral to nationalism. On either side there are those who believe any role language does play in nationalism stems from its function in communication and those who believe language’s role is symbolic. The matrix on the next page (see Table 2) summarizes implications of each theory under discussion; in subsequent chapters I use it to evaluate various theories’ fit with the Croatian case.

**Sociolinguistic Concepts**

Here I introduce concepts from sociolinguistics. These will help open what has been a “black box” until now, nationalist actors’ goals in language policy and their methods of achieving them. Even those who, like most nationalists, maintain that language differences are natural recognize that a speech variety needs to be formalized and standardized to fulfill its the role in modern societies. Language planning is also necessary to make an idiom reflect national identity. Sociolinguists have developed concepts to investigate these types of linguistic engineering.6

**Language Planning: Corpus and Status Planning**

Linguist Ernest Haugen coined the term “language planning” to describe “the activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the

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6 The concepts of status planning and corpus planning were introduced in the first chapter in order to advance the argument there. Here I explain these concepts more fully and present additional ones.
The table presents phenomena the analyst should expect to see if the given theorist is correct about the factors which cause the development of nationalism. The table emphasizes those factors related to language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key condition(s) for the emergence of linguistic nationalism</th>
<th>Gelner</th>
<th>Deutsch</th>
<th>Hobsbawm</th>
<th>Anderson</th>
<th>Smith</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization Two or more non-mutually intelligible languages Uneven Economic Development Elementary education in dominant language introduced</td>
<td>Intensifying communication networks Population “mobilized” through exposure to national media Lack of sufficient dominant population to assimilate non-dominant population (Slavic speaking population concentrated geographically)</td>
<td>State modernization Democratization Mobilization of mass populations by elite manipulation of supposed symbols of nationhood (Latter two conditions apply to late nineteenth century nationalism)</td>
<td>Emergence of “print capitalism” or State sponsored press operating at provincial capital</td>
<td>“Triple Revolution in: Political administration economic organization cultural standardization strong ethnic consciousness based on sense of common descent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Agents of Nationalism</th>
<th>Minor intellectuals, Teachers, Writers</th>
<th>Dominant Group Government Officials Non-dominant group Rival language media</th>
<th>Politicians or would-be political leaders (i.e. politic power is actors’ primary motivation)</th>
<th>Profit-seeking printers, publishers State-run press and officials</th>
<th>Poets, writers creators of national narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impersonal forces or individuals drive nationalism?</td>
<td>Impersonal forces</td>
<td>Impersonal forces</td>
<td>Individual actors</td>
<td>Impersonal forces</td>
<td>Individual actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language a cause or effect of nationalism?</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language’s role in nationalism functional or symbolic?</td>
<td>Functional role</td>
<td>Functional role</td>
<td>Symbolic role</td>
<td>Functional role</td>
<td>Symbolic Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals of language planning</td>
<td>Establishing official/educational status of the non-dominant language Increase economic opportunities for non-dominant group</td>
<td>Dominant group Establishing national speech community, linguistic assimilation Subordinate group recognition of language, eventual displacement of dominant language</td>
<td>Building adequate corpus for running a modern state</td>
<td>Language Planning is largely laissez faire, left to “print capitalists”</td>
<td>Recovery of “National” Myths, Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important Premodern Roots to Nationalism</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community.” (1972 [1961], 133) The term is relatively new, but according to linguist Louis-Jean Calvet the manipulation of language by the state is, “as old as the myth of the Tower of Babel itself.” (1998, 113) For example, in the fifteenth century King Sejong of Korea developed a writing system, han gul, to replace the Chinese writing used in his kingdom. Initially a failure, han gul was eventually revived as a sign of opposition to Japanese occupation (1910-1945) and is today the official writing system and a symbol of Korean identity (Coulmas 1999, 408-409).

Changing the structure of a language, as in the Korean example above, is now considered part of corpus planning, as indeed are the other activities specified by Haugen in the definition quoted above. Another sort of language policy, status planning, is necessary to order “the allocation of functions of languages/literacies in a given speech community.” (Hornberger 2003, 451) Carlos I’s 1550 decision to use Castilian Spanish instead of indigenous languages to evangelize the Indians of South America is an early example of status planning (Calvet 1998, 114). Just as with language planning in general, status planning is old but the term is relatively new, having been proposed by linguist Hans Kloss (1969) in the late 1960s.

In the nineteenth century vernaculars replaced moribund official languages such as Latin, nearly doubling the number of European languages with a formal grammar and literature as well as usage in government (Deutsch 1942). The use of official vernaculars in education systems and bureaucracies left nonstandard dialects threatened. Speakers of “nonofficial” tongues often felt that survival of their idiom required state recognition, therefore status planning increasingly became a political issue (Fishman 1972). Minority speech communities organized meetings—often dubbed “The First Congress on Language X”—to address technical issues in readying the (proposed) language for use in government and education and political issues in raising the status of the (proposed) language (Fishman 1993, 5-7).
Differentiating Languages: Abstand and Ausbau

Making a language or dialect more distinct from other tongues is often a prerequisite to increasing its status; changing a corpus, i.e. corpus planning, is thus closely related to status planning (Fishman 2004). Language distance (Abstand) between adjacent speech communities may be the result of long-standing differences—e.g. Hungarian versus surrounding Slavic and German tongues. However, where Abstand is absent intentional differentiation Ausbau (literally “building-out”) is necessary. Both terms are due to Kloss (1967).

Many Slavic languages are Ausbau languages—distance from Slavic neighbors has been intentionally pursued. For example, Czech and Slovak are languages by Ausbau, which “would have been one linguistic unit if discovered in preliterate state, but political circumstances meant each choose a different dialect to standardize.” (Kloss 1967, 31) Kloss classifies “Serbo-Croatian” as an example of “poly-centric standardization” of nearly identical dialects, but notes that “[t]he relation between the poly-centric standard language … and the Ausbau language (as typified by Slovak in its relation to Czech) is not a static but a dynamic one.” The opposite of Ausbau is Einbau, bringing languages closer together. The story of Croatian vis-à-vis Serbo-Croatian has been a struggle between partisans of Ausbau and those of Einbau.

Kloss held that Ausbau programs must include terms for modern technical concepts. In the premodern or romantic eras a language’s prestige was based on its imaginative works, for example, poetry. In modern times, “[f]or a speechform to be seen as a valid Ausbau language, there must be books in it over factual topics. There are, for example, in Gallego books on demography, fisheries, literature, geography etc. This is more important for the validity of Gallego than the most beautiful verse.” (1978, 151) To be accepted as a true language, a mere dialect must possess the tools to function in a technical age. A corollary is that to be an official language, a
dialect must possess terms for modern concepts of governance. This shows the close relation between corpus planning and status planning. Looked at from the other way around, “[s]tatus planning without adequate corpus follow-up results in an inability to put the target language to use.” (Fishman 2000)

The concepts of corpus planning and status planning, *Abstand* and *Ausbau*, help to make clear the goals language planners are pursuing. They are tools used in this thesis to analyze the various eras in Croatian language policy and the goals and methods of relevant actions in each era.

**LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY**

The preceding sections have been theoretically oriented. Here I turn to empirical studies of language and identity in various situations: non-national and national, non-Croatian and Croatian. The goal is to put the Croatian case in the wider context of literature on language and identity as well as to inform the reader of previous work done on the Croatian case.

**Language and Non-National Identities**

Though often linked with national feeling, at times language defines other sorts of identities. In northern India language has become a marker of religious identity, while in Norway language differences parallel class and regional differences.

Paul Brass’s (1974) study of north India shows that language conflicts between Hindi and Urdu reflect the religious divide between Hindus and Muslims. The spoken languages are nearly identical, but their writing systems differ; Hindi’s is derived from classical Sanskrit, Urdu’s from Arabic. The differences in script and religion parallel Serbian/Croatian, where the Orthodox Serbs use Cyrillic and the Roman Catholic Croats use the Latin Alphabet. Brass sees the language conflict as mostly a struggle for jobs and resources; eliminating the need to be proficient in the
Urdu writing system would remove a Muslim advantage in the competition for jobs in the bureaucracy—a sector they traditionally dominate (Brass 1974, 120).

In Norway, the language divide is a matter of class and region (urban versus rural) identification. The ethnically and religiously country entered its modernizing phase with two contenders for a standardized language. Bokmal (literally book-speech), the Danish-influenced speech of the urban middle classes continues to be the dominant language. Nynorsk, a standardization of rural dialects of Western Norway, is the language of approximately twelve percent of the population. Municipalities can choose which standard is official in their jurisdiction; Nynorsk municipalities are concentrated in the country’s rural Western districts, and speakers tend to be from the working or farming classes (Bucken-Knapp 2003).

**Language and National Identity**

While language can be associated with non-national identities, the most well known language conflicts are linked with national movements—though some such movements stop short of demanding full independence.

Wales is an example of strong support for a language despite a lack of mobilization for political independence. There are strong programs to support the language through education of children in Welsh, societies devoted to Welsh-language music, and other nonpolitical means, but little evident desire for more power being devolved to the principality. Even in Wales, however, the language issue at times reaches into politics; for example language activists questioned the building of a hydroelectric station in rural Wales for fear the plant would result in a large Anglophone migration to the Welsh-speaking area (Williams 1991, 59-60). Language evidently remains a factor in the national identity and practical politics even among linguistic groups that do not seek their own polity.

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Cases similar to the Welsh situation can be found throughout the world. Spain (Basque versus Spanish), Belgium (Flemish versus French), and Quebec (French versus English) are three examples where language rights have been demanded and achieved to a greater or lesser degree without full sovereignty. The lack of electoral success by separatist parties shows that majority populations of all three areas are satisfied with that *modus vivendi*. Scotland is an interesting contrast; its movement for independence from the United Kingdom is much stronger than that of Wales, but there is far less concern for either of its distinct languages, Scots Gaelic or the English-related Scots. Despite the Scottish example, however, the cases listed here show that language remains a political issue for linguistic minorities in many economically advanced societies.

**LITERATURE ON CROATIAN AND SERBO-CROATIAN**

All the cases mentioned immediately above involve *Abstand* languages; Welsh and French are very different from English, Basque is very different from Spanish. In former Yugoslavia, however, the central conflict was over the relation of Croatian and Serbian. Were the two South Slav speechforms distinct languages or “variants” of Serbo-Croatian? Here I discuss some of the literature on these questions. I also address my use of Croatian linguists’ work as both a source of facts about the South Slav languages and as primary data on Croatian language planning.

**South Slav Language Politics**

Robert Greenberg, the foremost English-language scholar on South Slav languages, believes the root of the language polemic lies in the Vienna agreement of 1850, which “reversed several centuries of natural *Abstand* developments for the languages of Orthodox Southern Slavs and Catholic Southern Slavs.” (Greenberg 2004, 23) Croatsians and Serbians came to the negotiating table with differing experiences. Serbian linguists were standardizing a single dialect of rural speech and
breaking with the archaic Slaveno-Serbian heritage of the eighteenth century “Serbian enlightenment.” Early Croat nationalists proposed a standard language based on a widely spoken dialect linked with the literature of the Croatian Renaissance. With an eye towards South Slav unity they also encouraged liberal borrowing from various dialects (Greenberg 2004, 24-26). This basic difference in approach created conflicts throughout the history of the South Slav movement and the Yugoslav state (Greenberg 2004, 48).

Those conflicts are on display in two essay collections which bookend Yugoslavia’s breakup (Bugarski and Hawkesworth 1992; Bugarski 2004). Writing before the dissolution, American slavicist Thomas Magner stressed how quickly the the “variants” of unified Serbo-Croatian were diverging in the critical area of technology while Serbian linguist Pavle Ilić took the position that such divergence was spontaneous and due to national feeling, despite official state policy (Ilić 1992, 115-127). Writing after the breakup, Bugarski (2004, 6) maintained that at the “linguistic-communicational” level Serbo-Croatian exists; speakers of standard Serbian are still understood quite well by those of standard Croatian and vice-versa. In literature and in the psychology of their speakers, however, the languages are rapidly diverging, with Croatian moving fastest away from the old standard (Bugarski 2004, 8).

Dubravko Škiljan poses a query similar to one motivating this thesis: given the stress on differentiating Croatian from Serbian, why such restraint in changes to the corpus of the language itself? Škiljan believes that that language planners and elites are caught in a contradiction. They conceive the Croatian nation in ethnic (as opposed to civic) terms and believe that the language represents that nation. Attempts to modify the language imply that language is changeable at will, an idea which conflicts with the idea of Croatia as a nation with an ethnic core and a language which has a long, organic connection to that ethnic core (Škiljan 2004, 77).
Linguists and Croatian Linguistic Nationalism

It remains to address my use of Croatian linguists’ work both as a source of facts on the development of the South Slav languages and as material to be analyzed for its nationalist (or anti-nationalist) content. Many of these linguists have evident positions on language controversies in Croatia, and many play a role in the republic’s current language planning. At times I look to their work simply for historical facts; other times their work is a primary source which says something about language planning and linguistic nationalism in Croatia. This presents an obvious problem: the historical narrative I use is based on material I know to be biased toward the “nationalist” position of Croatian linguistic distinctness.

I mitigate this problem in two ways. First, when using Croatian linguists’ work as the basis of factual narrative, I try to separate facts from interpretation. Croatian scholarship is professional and generally presents a whole and true factual picture of historical events. I know this because of my second method of correcting for biased sources: triangulation. Greenberg’s work is of use here; I am able to check the mainstream Croatian linguists’ narrative against his accounts, as well as against those of ‘anti-national’ Croatian linguists such as Škiljan and Vladmir Anić.

CONCLUSION

The first sections of this chapter reviewed major theories of nationalism, concentrating on each theory’s account of language’s role in the emergence of nationalism. Observable implications —what is expected to be observed in a study of a national movement if a particular model is correct— were derived for each theory. Key sociolinguistic concepts were then introduced: corpus planning and status planning, Ausbau language and Abstand languages. I then briefly examined cases showing language’s deep connection with identity—including religious and regional identity as well as national identity. Finally, I introduced some of the literature on the Croatian case, explaining how I use this work at times as a
secondary source of facts, at times as primary material on language planning in Croatia and, how I mitigate problems with this method.

The theory of nationalism, even of models of linguistic nationalism specifically, may seem to be far removed from the technical concepts employed by sociolinguists. Yet there are certain congruencies. For example, Kloss’s concepts of Abstand and Ausbau reflect the process of manipulating a supposedly natural marker of identity—language—that is thought by many theorists to be a key factor in the development of nationalism. These concepts describe in the linguistic sphere what modernist theorists hold happens with many types of identity markers, they are deployed to build support for a novel type of polity, the nation-state. More specifically, Kloss’s position that the possession of adequate technical vocabulary is now a necessary condition for dialect to qualify as a distinct language parallels Hobsbawm’s constructivist belief that nationalist movements strive to create a distinct language which possesses terms for the concepts involved in governing a modern state.

Ausbau and Abstand, corpus planning and status planning, and other concepts from sociolinguistics will be used to analyze the data on Croatian nationalism presented in the next two chapters. The first of these presents the case of the Illyrian movement, Croatia’s original and language-oriented national movement, which dated from around 1830 to 1848. Chapter four will cover language’s role in three later periods of nationalist mobilization in Croatia: the latter nineteenth century struggle between the Yugoslavist movement for a large South Slav state and a narrow, purely Croatian nationalist movement; the World War II years under the radical nationalist regime of the Independent State of Croatia; and finally the lead-up to Croatia’s independence as well as the first decade and a half of the new Republic of Croatia.
CHAPTER 3

THE ILLYRIAN MOVEMENT

This chapter describes and analyzes the Illyrian movement, the first national movement among Croats. To supply the necessary background I review the premodern ethnic and linguistic development of Croats and Croatia. I then discuss the modernization of the Hapsburg empire, showing how it triggered the birth of Illyrianism. Next I present a narrative history of the Illyrian movement, followed by analyses of the social conditions in which it arose, of its leaders, and of their linguistic and political aims. I then use the method and epistemology presented in the first chapter (see section “Epistemology”, chapter one, page 10) evaluate how well the various theories of nationalism discussed in the chapter two fit the case data.

CROATIAN ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC DEVELOPMENT

People identifying as Croats live mostly in South Eastern Europe. They are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic and have as mother tongue one of a series of related South Slavic dialects. This section outlines Croat settlement and their premodern linguistic and literary history.

Geography and Slavic Settlement

About ninety percent of the Republic of Croatia’s total population of 4,490,000 are Croats, as are about fourteen percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 4.6 million people. The former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Serbia have significant Croat populations, and Croatia’s neighbor Hungary and nearby Austria also have small, long established Croat settlements (CIA 2009).

In the Republic of Croatia itself there are four distinct regions: Zagreb and the Zagorje (formerly called Civil Croatia), Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Istria (see Figure 1).
Differentiated by history and culture, these regions fell under various imperial powers and legal regimes prior to World War I. Dalmatia was for a long period under direct Venetian, and later Austrian rule, while Civil Croatia and Slavonia were under the Hungarian crown (Gross 1993, 270). Each region is represented by a small coat of arms on the Republic of Croatia’s coat-of-arms and the flag (see Figure 2), as is the historically important city-state of Dubrovnik (Croatian Parliament 2001).

Linguistically, there are three written dialects of Croatian: Chakavian, Kajkavian and Shtokavian—named for their respective words for “what.” Chakavian, the dominant dialect during the Middle Ages, is spoken along the Northern Croatian coast and nearby islands. Kajkavian, spoken around Zagreb and the Zagorje, was
important to the early nineteenth century Croatian national movement. The most widespread dialect, Shtokavian, is spoken in Slavonia, Bosnia and Serbia by South Slavs of Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox faiths (see Figure 3).

The South Slavs are relative newcomers to South Eastern Europe. The area was known in antiquity as Illyria, named for a tribe that inhabited the region that is considered to be the direct ancestors of modern Albanians. Integrated into the Roman Empire in the first century AD, the region became largely Christian in the third century (Schenker 1995, 67). It spanned the frontier between Western and Eastern versions of Christianity; the areas Croats would settle fell mostly under Western ecclesiastical government (Wilkes 1992, 205-13).

Arriving in the sixth century as undifferentiated peoples, the first South Slavs in Illyria lived in self-governing clans but lacked a state structure. Identifiable tribes, including Croats and Serbs, arrived after this first slavic wave. Byzantine scholar-emperor Porphyrogenitus (905-959), wrote that his predecessor Heraclius (r. 610-
641) invited them to settle imperial borderland as military allies (Schenker 1995, 45). There they formed what historian Ivo Banac calls “matrix nations”; they had the cultural and political resources to draw the earlier, generic Slavic settlers into their zones of influence (Banac 1984a, 33).

Each matrix nation was affected by the preexisting political and religious situation in South East Europe. The Serbs fell under the influence of the Byzantines politically and the Eastern Church spiritually. The Croats were shaped by Frankish feudal traditions and the Catholic Church, as well as by the coastal cities’ legacy of Roman civil government and Latin language. A Croatian polity formed on the feudal model. Its duke, Tomislav (r. 910-928), was given the title of King of the Croats by the Holy See in 925 (Banac 1984a, 36).

The Croatian kingdom struggled against yet another newly arrived (but non-Slavic) people, the Hungarians (or Magyars). Conflict led to Croatian control over
Slavonia and much of Bosnia under Tomislav (Banac 1984a, 45), but war with Hungary eventually gave way to a dynastic merger. Croatia was united with Hungary under the Crown of St. Stephen in 1102 (Kann and David 1984). It remained a legally distinct realm however. The Croatian nobles retained many rights: they collected taxes, controlled the granting of estates in Croatian territory, and continued to meet in their assembly, the Sabor. Whether these nobles saw themselves as sharing a culture with the Slavic speaking peasants they ruled is open to question; they certainly did not share a political language as the Croatian assembly’s business was conducted in Latin. What is without doubt is that the Croatian nobles fought to guard their political and economic autonomy from the Hungarian king (Pavletić, Stančić, and Moguš 1997, 9).

**Linguistic and Literary Evolution**

The great majority of inhabitants in Croat lands spoke some form of South Slavic. Being on the border between Western and Eastern Christianity, a variety of writing systems were introduced into the territory. This diversity is reflected in early Croatian documents and inscriptions. By 863 the Orthodox monks Cyril and Methodius had devised a written language, Church Slavonic, based on the South Slavic speech of their home region of Thessaloniki. Though it drew on a variety of existing writing systems, Church Slavonic’s alphabet (Glagolitic) as a whole was unique, representing Slavic sounds not present in Greek or Latin (Schenker 1995, 186-193). On their mission to the Slavs the monks spread the language to the west and north, from Constantinople to what is today the Czech republic. The language became a “supraethnic literary medium” uniting Slavs, but it also developed local versions (Tezak and Babić 1996, 10).

The missionaries’ graphization of Slavic allowed the first written expressions of a distinct Croatian identity. Roman Catholic Croats could worship according to a liturgy written in their own language in a unique alphabet (Barić et al. 1997, 10-11).
Glagolitic was also used for political and legal functions. The Basčanska Ploca (Baska Tablet), an inscribed stone memorial naming the Croatian King Zvonimir (d. 1089) as the grantor of a land deed, is written in Glagolitic (Mijatovic 2000, 45). So too is the Istarski Razvod (Istrian land survey, dated between 1295 and 1375). By the early Middle Ages, then, there is evidence of a uniquely Croatian written language which was identified with a Croatian polity.

In most of the Slavic world Glagolitic was gradually replaced either Cyrillic or Latin script. However, in parts of Croatia the old alphabet remained in use (Mijatović 2000, 55; Pavletić 1997, 67). Despite internal migrations within the South Slav area which prompted a change in the dominant literary dialect from Chakavian to Shtokavian (Barić et al. 1997, 10-11), distinct Croatian linguistic practices persisted through the Renaissance. In 1483, the first work in Croatian, a missal, was printed using the Glagolitic script. Protestant Croats published a New Testament in Glagolitic (see Figure 4). Croatian authors and printers also participated in the Counter Reformation (Cronia 1947, 197). A multilingual dictionary, published by Faust Vrancić (1551-1617) in 1595 (Dictionarium quinque Nobilissimarum Europae Linguarum, Latinae, Italicae, Germanicae, Dalmaticae et Ungaricae) contained 5,000 entries in each of the languages (Leksikografski Zavod 1998). Vrancić called his language Dalmatian, while a near contemporary grammar published in 1604 by Bartul Kasić (Bartholomeo Cassio) (1575-1650) referred to it as Illyrian. Juraj Habdelić (1609 - 1678) called the language Slovenian in his 1670 dictionary, but the subtitle dedicated the work to the youth of the “Slovene and Croatian nations.” The Jesuit Andrija Jambresić (1706-1758) was the first to make a named “Croatian” dictionary. In his Index Illyrico sive Croatico-Latinus (1742), part of his multilingual Latin lexicon (see Figure 5), Jambresić clearly identified the language as Croat, and called himself Croata Zagoriensis, Croat from the Zagorje (Moguš 1995, 169).
The foregoing shows the existence of Croatian political and linguistic identities in the premodern era. There was an identifiable Croatian polity in early Medieval times which continued to have an institutional existence under Hungarian suzerainty, most notably in the *Sabor*. There was also a Croatian written language tradition associated both with Croatian religious practice and the medieval Croatian polity. This political and linguistic legacy continued through the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation and would play a role in South Slavic speakers’ reaction to state modernization.

**Language Politics and Hapsburg Modernization**

Despite individual efforts of lexicographers and the legal and institutional legacy of Medieval Croatia, at the end of the eighteenth century the Croatian language had no official status. A sustained campaign for the use of South Slavic as a
language of politics and business emerged only in the 1820s. A major external factor generated these demands: the change in the administrative language of the Hapsburg Empire from Latin to German.

Croatian had long been part of the Empire. In 1526 Hungarian nobles had placed themselves under the Hapsburg emperor to gain protection from Ottoman attacks. The Croatian Sabor assented to the arrangement the following year. As per usual Hapsburg practice, nobles who voluntarily elected the emperor their king retained many privileges and their traditional assemblies (Kann and David 1984, 7). The eighteenth century state modernization and centralization programs of Hapsburg rulers Maria Theresa (r. 1740-1765) and her son Joseph II (r. 1765-1790) threatened these arrangements. Privileged groups within the empire, first and foremost the Hungarian nobles, resisted.

Joseph II’s replacement of the moribund Latin with German in 1784 was particularly contentious. He imposed German for efficiency, not because of any attachment to the German language or people:

> The German language is the universal language of my empire. Why should I have handled the laws and public affairs of just one province in the national language?... If the Hungarian kingdom were the most important and first of my possessions, I would make its the language the main language of my lands (quoted in Kann 1964, 362).

The Hungarians, the second most populous group in the empire, objected to Germanization. Mirroring the emperor’s actions, in 1790 nobles in the Hungarian Joint Parliament (i.e. the meeting of Croatian and Hungarian nobility) proposed that Magyar replace Latin as the language of government in areas under its jurisdiction (Despalatovic 1975). Hungarian was to be used in administration and basic education in Croatia (Kann and David 1984, 341).

Croatian nobles in the Sabor opposed Magyarization. Their first choice was to defend Latin; as a neutral language it left them on equal footing politically with Germans and Magyars (Pavletić, Stančić, and Moguš 1997). However, while they
continued to defend Latin as the official language until mid-century, in 1827 they acquiesced to the use of Hungarian in elementary education ("Govorimo Hrvatski" 1997; Despalatovic 1975). This action signaled the waning of the Sabor’s ability and willingness to defend traditional Croatian privileges. It also triggered the rise of a new movement of young, mostly non-noble advocates of Croatian rights and South Slavic unity.

**THE ILLYRIAN MOVEMENT**

There had been calls for a single, standard form of South Slavic before the nineteenth century. In 1796, Karlovac grain merchant Josip Šipuš called for a common language in order to facilitate the growth of markets (Leksikografski Zavod 1955a, 339), but his idea came to nothing. During their brief (1809-1813) reign along the northern Adriatic the French tried and failed to impose a single language on the Slovenes and Croats. The former already possessed enough national—or at least linguistic—identity to resist adoption of the Shtokavian-based standard imposed by the Napoleonic governor of the United Illyrian Provinces (Despalatovic 1975, 22). It would be another decade and a half before a national movement emerged with a program based on South Slav unity. Taking the name Illyrian, its first focus was language but it would gradually become more directly political.

**Ljudevit Gaj**

The undisputed leader of the Illyrians in their early years was Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872), a lawyer, publisher and linguist. (Henceforth “Illyrian” refers to the modern movement, not the ancient tribes). Lower middle-class and of Slovene-German background, Gaj was raised in the market town of Krapina, in the Kajkavian speaking region of Zagorje. Despite his foreign roots—German was his mother tongue—he had a deep interest in all things Croatian as a youth, even going so far as to write a book about the mythical origins of his hometown. After local
gymnazium, he studied law in Graz (Austria), engaging in his first political activity there—the formation of an Illyrian club (1828)(Thomas 1988, 16).

Continuing his studies in Pest (now part of Budapest), Gaj met with the Slovak Lutheran pastor Jan Kollar (1793-1852), attracted by Kollar’s Pan-Slavism. The pastor’s ideas in turn were based on the Herderian conception of language as the essential characteristic of nationhood and influenced by slavicist Josef Dobrovsky’s (1753-1829) idea of an Illyrian (South Slavic) dialect as part of a wider Slavic language. While in Pest, Gaj witnessed the beginning of the political phase of the Hungarian national movement, later he followed the example of its leader Istvan Szechenyi (1791-1860) by founding both a literary and a political journal. Polish refugees from the rebellion of 1830-31 inspired the law student. He adapted one of their revolutionary songs for his own verse “Croatia Has Still not Fallen [Još Hrvatska ni Propala].” (Horvat 1975, 63).

Gaj set himself to creating to a standard written language, the first step to national “awakening”, he believed. His initial attempt, the Kratka Osnova Horvatskoga-Slavenskoga Pravopisana [A Brief Basis for a Croatian-Slavic Orthography], was published in 1830. (See Figure 6) In keeping with pan-Slavic ideals, Gaj relied heavily on the Czech writing system to produce “an orthography worthy of its name, through which we can more closely connect ourselves with our brother Slavs, those educated in the Latin script.”(Gaj 1983 [1830], 66) The lawyer returned to Croatia in late 1831. By January 1832 he was meeting with like-minded individuals (“the Gaj circle”) to begin a South Slavic cultural and political movement (Despalatovic 1975, 64).

**Beginnings of Illyrian Activism**

The year 1832 was marked by Illyrian-Croatian activism, though more by Gaj’s associates than himself. The aristocrat Janko Drašković (1770-1856)—a senior statesman figure to the young Illyrians—wrote the first Croatian language political pamphlet, imploring the November 1832 meeting of the Sabor to represent the
people and the fatherland itself against Magyar violations of Croatian rights. Student Ivan Derkos (1808-1834) produced a tract in Latin claiming that the full intellectual development of a people required a literary language based on their own tongue; he proposed creating a standardized, Shtokavian-based language. Zagreb academy instructor Matija Smodek (1808-1881) planned lectures on Croatian (Kajkavian), but Magyar students protested. In response, Croat student Fran Kurelac (1811-1874) posted his “twelve thesis” at the institution. Kurelac also asserted Croatia’s right to separate from Hungary and develop its own language: “A few people who should know well what lingua patriae means think that it might mean Hungarian. Won’t Europe mock us?” (quoted in Despalatovic 1975, 63). The theses, and the language conflict generally, provoked the first violence between Hungarian and Croat students in the modern era (Despalatovic 1975, 65-70).

Despite the activity of other Illyrians, Gaj remained the movement’s true leader. His 1835 publication of the newspaper Novine Horvatzke [Croatian News] and
its literary supplement *Danicza Horvatzka* [Croatian Morning Star] signaled the movement’s formal start. Gaj soon changed the names to *Novina Ilirske* [Illyrian News] and *Danicza Ilirska* [Illyrian Morning Star], introducing the neutral Illyrian appellation to help attract non-Croat South Slavs. This desire for unification manifested itself in Gaj’s work on the language itself. He was creating a vernacular which, although Shtokavian-based, would include contributions from many South Slav dialects. As he wrote in an 1836 editorial in *Danicza*:

> In Illyria there can be only one literary language; let us not search for it in one place, or in one state, but in entire great Illyria. The Germans constructed their literary language from all the dialects of entire Germany; and the Italians traced their sweet speech from all the dialects of entire Italy. Our dictionary is entire Illyria (quoted in Barić et al. 1997, 27).

Beyond language issues, the early Illyrian program amounted to a sort of cultural federalism, with the various peoples united under a common name:

> [O]ur plan is not to erase the specific names, but to unite them under a collective name, because with each specific name specific events are connected, and which together make up the collective experience of the Illyrian nationality. (Gaj in Danicza, 1839, quoted in Barić et al. 1997)

**Illyrianism’s Limited Appeal**

Gaj’s Illyrian project had elements of continuity with earlier linguistic efforts by Croats. Croat lexicographers and encyclopedists had long recognized that people identifying as Croats lived in different regions and spoke and wrote different dialects. Habdelić (1670) had noted that the doublet ‘shto’, ‘kaj’ were both Croatian forms for ‘quid’ (i.e. what) and Jambresić used the same formation in 1742 (Vončina 1993, 8). Thus, the multidialectal element of Gaj’s project was familiar. The Illyrians could also turn to the long and continuous tradition of South Slavic/Illlyrian/Croatian dictionary making to support the creation of a standard language. As recently as 1801 the Dalmatian scholar Jacob Stulli (1730- 1817) had published a Latin-Italian-Illyrian dictionary, which itself continued in the tradition of the earlier lexicographic works of Vrančić (1595), Habdelić, and Jambresić (Thomas 1988, 41).

Despite this continuity the Illyrian project of South Slav unification—which
initially included Slovenes and Bulgarians as well as Croatians and Serbs—went beyond the traditional Croatian sphere of activity, attempting to cross religious and ethnic divides. These efforts did not meet with success. It is doubtful whether the Illyrians truly believed they could include the Bulgarians, and the Slovenes had already shown that they were unwilling to abandon their own linguistic efforts in favor of a Shtokavian-based standard language (Thomas 1988, 19). This left the Illyrians to focus on Shtokavian speakers, including Serbs (within and without Serbia proper) and Bosnians. Their efforts failed, however, to attract the most influential members of the Serbian intelligentsia. Serbs already had an autonomous polity, and their scholar Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864) had made great progress in creating a standard Serbian language. In Bosnia, Illyrianism was popular only among Franciscan friars—the only large group of educated Catholics in the province—and even this enthusiasm was suppressed by the Church (Thomas 1988, 16-17).

Beyond the borders of the Croatian-Slavonian kingdom (i.e. the Zagorje and Slavonia), the Illyrians had true success only in Dalmatia. The movement’s famous Mazuranić siblings—Antun (1805-1888), Ivan (1814-1890), and Matija (1817-1881)—came from a Dalmatian peasant family (Leksikografski Zavod 1955b), and Gaj was greeted by enthusiastic crowds during his 1841 tour of the region. This was good news for the movement as the Dalmatian Renaissance and Counter-Reformation literatures were both an inspiration to the Illyrians and a source for new “Illyrian” words (Despalatovic 1975, 132-133). However, Dalmatia had been ruled by Croat kings at various times and was considered a traditional Croatian land; though a few Orthodox in Dalmatia supported Illyrianism, its success there did not represent a general widening of interest among South Slavs from non-Croat backgrounds.

**The Illyrian Movement Beyond Language**

The Illyrian movement was initially focused on creating a standardized language which was capable of expressing modern concepts in the area of
technology, education, and governance—a necessary step to furthering Croatian political aims (Maissen 1998, 64). Linguistic and political goals went hand-in-hand; national rights could only be claimed by true nations, and true nations had their own languages. Pleading to the Sabor to replace Latin with Croatian, the Illyrian politician Ivan Kukuljević (1816-1889) exclaimed:

\begin{quote}
We are a little Latin, a little German, a little Italian, a little Magyar and a little Slav but in the end—honestly speaking—we are nothing! The dead Roman language, and the living Magyar, German, and Latin [Italian] languages...threaten our life, they have us by the throat. And in our powerlessness we are surrendering our life to them (Kukuljević 1843).
\end{quote}

If they failed to exchange the dead Latin for living Croatian, Kukuljević claimed Croats would lose even their current ambiguous status as “not a nation but the ghost of a nation.” In a Europe where all peoples used living languages, they would be “marooned as if on a small island in the sea” and would die as a people (Kukuljević 1843). To avoid this, political action to gain official recognition for Croatian was imperative.

**Illyrian Politics**

Kukuljević was able to promote the official use of Croatian because of the remarkable work the Illyrians had done in improving the corpus and prestige of Croatian. Not only had Gaj and others enriched the vocabulary of the language, they had increased its profile with the educated public (Thomas 1988, 23-24). *Novine Ilirske* and *Danica Ilirska* were instrumental in making the standard language a tool that Croats could wield against the threat of linguistic assimilation. With their linguistic program well underway, the Illyrians turned to politics.

The roots of Illyrian politics lay in local patriotic reading clubs, the first three of which were established in 1838 in Varaždin, Karlovac, and Zagreb—all in the Zagorje region. The following year three more were established, two on the northern Adriatic coast (Novi Vinodolski and Bakar) and one in southern Hungary (Pecs). Meeting places where Illyrian literature was distributed, they received
support from local officials. For example, the Varaždin club was opened by the county notary and the founding of the Zagreb reading room was aided by the county clerk and treasurer (Despalatovic 1975, 114). There were conflicts over the nature of the societies, however. Janko Drašković, the first president of the Zagreb club, wished to downplay political Illyrianism and instead concentrate on culture, economic self-help, and national enlightenment. Gaj, on the other hand, wished to make the clubs centers for political organizing.

In 1839, Drašković promoted his economic agenda by having the Zagreb club offer prizes for the best books on such rudimentary economic activities as establishing textile factories, a wine export industry, and agricultural education for peasants. Despite the offer of cash rewards no books were submitted, demonstrating the Illyrians’ scant interest in economic affairs. Gaj himself neglected economic matters, waiting a year to join Drašković’s Croatian-Slovenian agricultural society, which had been established in 1841 to improve the chief economic activity of Croatia. Despite eventually joining, Gaj remained a “man of the town” without land or peasants, unlike the gentry that made up many of the more moderate supporters of Illyrianism. The agricultural society remained outside the Illyrian movement (Despalatovic 1975, 131).

Eschewing an economic program, Gaj and his faction were increasingly focussed on strengthening the organization and institutions of cultural Illyrianism, as they believed that a national “awakening” depended on patriotic drama, music and the like. Having gained control of the Zagreb Reading club in mid-1839, they tightened its links with the Illyrian movement, changing its name to the Illyrian Reading Club in Zagreb. Fertile ground for the movement, in 1842 it was the birthplace of plans for the cultural organization Matica Ilirska, a professional Croatian language theatre company (1840), a national museum, and the first Croatian savings bank—both founded 1846 (Despalatovic 1975, 116).
Changes in Illyrian Strategy

Gaj was increasingly willing to take risks in pursuit of Illyrian goals, and he did not limit his political activity to Croatian lands. He appealed to the Czar to support the Illyrian movement, sending letters to the Russian ruler in 1836 and 1838; the second letter noted it was in the Czar’s interest to have a strong South Slav movement occupying Hapsburg attention. In 1839 he traveled to Serbia to enlist support from that new principality and maintained contacts with the Polish exile community (Horvat 1975, 130-131). Gaj had made a transition “from cultural pan-Slavism to political pan Slavism.” (Despalatovic 1975, 117) These political activities again brought him into conflict with Drašković. The latter was trying to maintain good relations between the Illyrian movement and the Imperial government at Vienna and believed that pursuing political pan-Slavism would put the Illyrian movement in danger (Despalatovic 1975, 118).

These disagreements appeared just as party politics began in Croatia. In 1841, following the formation of a Croatian-Hungarian unionist party (the Magyarones), the Illyrian political party was formed (Horvat 1975, 183). Both parties sprang from cultural associations—the Unionists had their Casino in Zagreb just as the Illyrians had reading rooms (Kessler 1981, 231). The Magyarones bested the Illyrians in the November 1841 Sabor elections, partially because in the Zagorje most “peasant nobles”—smallholder Sabor electors supported the Hungarian-linked faction.

Gaj and the movement were now forced to readjust their strategy. Suffrage was sharply weighted to land owners; Gaj need to attract their support. His solution was to attempt to downplay pan-Slavic ideas. The party was now the defender of the Croatian Kingdom, Croatian constitutional rights, and Croatian nationality, all under attack by the Hungarians: “Those that say we are blind, bestial enemies of the Magyars, I must remind them, that we will unite with them right at that hour when they stop being enemies of our language and municipal rights.” (Horvat 1975, 184)
Other Illyrians went further in disavowing political Pan-Slavism. Ljudevit Vukotinović asserted that “Illyrian” was “an ethnic and linguistic identification, one of intellect and feeling, valid only in literary life.” (quoted in Despalatovic 1975, 103) The publisher Dragutin Rakovac (1813-1854) assured his readers that Illyrians wished to “remain, as we have been until now, brethren of the Magyars under the Hungarian constitution.” (Rakovac 1998 [1839], 282) Yet Rakovac also insisted the South Slavic speakers in the Hapsburg empire maintain “their national language, given to us by nature itself.” This meant developing a national literature and education in the national language: “A foreign language can reeducate only the literate, never a whole nation.” (Rakovac 1998 [1839], 282)

Illyrianism’s Final Years

Despite Gaj’s claims of moderation, he continued to pursue pan-Slavic ideas, intriguing with Polish exiles and negotiating with the prime minister of the Serbian principality in 1842 (Horvat 1975, 270). His domestic politics were also robust; Illyrian partisans clashed violently with Magyarones in Zagreb and elsewhere (Despalatovic 1975, 117). Gaj’s tactics brought electoral success, but also caused dissension within the movement. Matica Ilirska gave supporters of a more moderate, culturally-based Illyrianism a nonpolitical forum (Thomas 1988, 19). Even politically oriented Illyrians worried that Gaj’s Pan-Slavism and electoral tactics would bring down the wrath of imperial officials. They were correct, the name “Illyrian” was banned in 1843 (Maissen 1998, 63).

The prohibition did not stop the Illyrians. Illegal publications continued to use the name while the political party was renamed “National.” Gaj engaged in a feud with the Hungarian leader (and liberal nationalist) Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894). For the first time, Gaj’s faction of Illyrians took up an economic issue, this being the struggle over increased economic penetration of Hungarian interests into traditionally Croatian lands. The Magyar government planned to build a railway from
Pest to the Dalmatian coast. The Illyrians took issue with the Hungarians treating the territories through which the railway was to run as an integral part of Hungary rather than as part of the traditional Croatian realm (Despalatovic 1975, 172).

Illyrian linguistic and literary activities did not stop in this period, but rather moved from concerns with the language itself to the production of literature. For example, Ivan Muzaranić published an Illyrian-German dictionary in 1842 and in 1844 an Illyrian version (that is, written in the new standardized language) of the epic *Osman* by Ivan Gundulić (1589-1638), an important Croatian Counter-Reformation writer (Vončina 1993). Mazuranić’s own *The Death of Smail-aga Cengić*, an epic based on a Montenegrin folk story, was completed in 1846. Dimitrija Demeter (1811-1872) wrote an epic play, *Tueta*, celebrating a mythic queen of the Illyrians who fought against Roman imperialism. This followed his 1842 poem *Grobnik Polje*—celebrating a victorious battle fought by the Croats against the Tatars (Karpatsky 2008). This literary production formed the backdrop to the increasing status of Croatian language; in 1847 Croatian became the official language of the Sabor. By this time Illyrianism, however, was in decline. In some ways a victim of its own success, it had achieved its linguistic goals. In addition, by the late 1840s Gaj was in financial difficulty (Despalatovic 1975). The revolutions of 1848 and the subsequent reaction radically changed politics in Croatia, ending the Illyrian movement as such.

**AN ANALYTIC ACCOUNT OF ILLYRIANISM**

I now turn from narrative description to analysis, matching the historical data against the implications of prominent theories of linguistic nationalism developed in chapter two. I concentrate on the following areas: the social and economic conditions necessary for the development of nationalism, the agents of nationalism and their motivations, the causal role (or lack thereof) of language in the origin of national movements, the expected goals of nationalist language programs, and finally the presence or absence of premodern roots to national movements.
Society and Economy at the Birth of the Illyrian Movement

All theories of nationalism under consideration in this thesis specify certain political, social and economic conditions as being necessary or conducive for the emergence of nationalism; here I describe such conditions in Croat lands at the beginning of the Illyrian movement.

At the turn of the nineteenth century the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, though all Hapsburg subjects, lived under various legal regimes. The Slavs of Slavonia were serfs ruled by a Hungarian rural gentry, those on the “military border” were organized as free peasant militias living in extended family groups (zadruga), and Croats in “Civil Croatia” were dominated by German-speaking officialdom and bourgeoisie. Some Catholic South Slavs lived outside of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia—Dalmatian Croats were governed by mostly Italian-speaking Hapsburg administrators while those of Bosnia were Ottoman subjects. The Croatian Sabor did still exist and elected representatives to the Hungarian-Croatian joint parliament in Pest. However, in 1791 the Croatian representatives’ power was weakened when the joint legislature voted that a simple majority could set policy which applied only to Croatia (Jukić 1965, 24). In short, traditional Croat lands were fragmented, administration was in places feudal. The Joint Parliament’s move to extend uniform control over Croatia, however, was a precursor to topdown administrative modernization and centralization.

Economic conditions also varied, but were generally bleak in Croatian lands. An overwhelmingly illiterate population practiced subsistence agriculture on small holdings. Industries such as forestry, which could have helped integrate isolated peasants into the larger European economy, were hindered by the feudal patterns of land ownership (Lampe and Jackson 1982, 64). In the empire as a whole, both the German-speaking Hapsburg core and Hungary proper were more advanced in terms of law and economic development than Croatian areas, with these latter
showing little movement towards modernization (Maissen 1998, 34). Indeed, the entire region was rural: “by any acceptable definition...no Industrial Revolution occurred in any of the Balkan states before 1914.” (Lampe and Jackson 1982, 14)

With the partial exception Zagreb and the Zagorje, there virtually no industrialization in Croat lands. Neither were the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom or Dalmatia was well integrated into European trade networks. Small land holdings, obstruction from Hungary, lack of secure property rights, and poor communications prevented the investment in agriculture that would have enabled Croatian landholders and tenants to improve yields and export excess produce. Transport links were so bad that when bumper crops were produced, these would rot before reaching large markets (Lampe and Jackson 1982, 68). Proposals for railway links to connect Dalmatia and Slavonia with urban centers in Hungary were only put forward in the 1840s, towards the end of the Illyrian movement.

To sum up, at the time of the Illyrian movement’s birth, the traditional Croat lands were politically fragmented as well as socially and economically backward. State-initiated modernization, prompted by the Hungarian government, only began in the mid-1840s, shortly before Illyrianism’s decline.

**Agents of Illyrianism**

The motivations of nationalists is an issue of contention among theorists of nationalism, as is the importance of individual agency. Is nationalism the product of impersonal social forces or do active agents use nationalism as a means to further their own power? Answering this question requires some knowledge of major Illyrians and their contributions.

Members of the “Gaj Circle” were mostly young—in 1832 the oldest was 27—and mostly commoners (i.e. not nobles) (Leksikografski Zavod 1955a). The latter fact calls into question whether they saw their movement as a route to political power; before 1848 only nobles could aspire to legislative office. The Illyrians did
certainly form an elite, however. Many had received their education at the best institutions within Croatia and in the wider empire; “trained to become lawyers, civil servants, teachers and priests, they would one day hold positions of influence.” (Despalatovic 1975) However, relatively few pursued politics professionally—only two of the Gaj Circle reached major office—while many choose literary or scientific professions. Gaj himself was late in attempting to gain office; he did not apply for a grant of nobility, required for a seat in the Sabor, until 1847 (Despalatovic 1975, 181).

Despite Gaj’s importance in the Illyrians’ linguistic and political activities (Thomas 1988, 19), other Illyrians made major contributions to the movement, suggesting that in Gaj’s absence a similar movement still would have arisen. Some of the original circle (Derkos, Drašković) had even published nationalist works before Gaj. Several Illyrians “only began to develop their full potential in the 1840s when their achievements were no longer likely to be eclipsed by those of Gaj” (Thomas 1988, 20). The movement became less associated with Gaj after 1842; “Gaj would remain an important figure in the party and the movement, but the initiative in cultural and political life would now pass to others.” (Despalatovic 1975, 151) This supports the counterfactual supposition that if Gaj had not existed there were others to take his place, implying that Illyrianism was at least as much the product of the times as it was a product of one or a few individuals.

**Language as a Cause of Nationalism**

Language was the major cause of the emergence of Illyrianism; protecting and improving the status of Croatian in the face of Magyar efforts at assimilation was by far the most important goal of the movement. Illyrian linguistic efforts preceded their major forays into political organizing by about four years; their major journal *Danica* focused primary on language and culture from its 1835 founding until 1839, when political issues began to be discussed (Despalatovic 1975, 90).
The split between the more politically oriented Gaj faction and those who wished to remain focussed on language and culture (e.g. those involved with *Matica Ilirska*) or economic development (e.g. Drašković and his agricultural society) also indicates that language issues were the primary motivation of the early Illyrian movement (Thomas 1988, 19). Had the Illyians’ goals been purely political from the outset there would have been no disagreement over Gaj’s increasing focus on political activities or over the best way to proceed in promoting Croatian and stopping Magyarization. Language’s importance is also shown in the Illyrians’ uncompromising view of pro-Hungarian nobles, exemplified in an 1843 speech by Dragutin Rakovac to the Croatian Sabor: “That Party [the Magyarones] lets their children be brought up in the Magyar spirit and the Magyar language, so that from the cradle the sound of our speech is foreign to them.” (Rakovac 1998 [1839])

Croatian’s status was not used instrumentally to rally political support; rather, politics was a means to protect the language.

**The Goals of the Illyrian Language Program**

Understanding the specific goals of a language program gives insight into the role language plays in a national movement. In the Illyrian case, the prime motivation was to prepare the language for competition with Hungarian; their efforts at corpus planning reflect this. The program emphasized technical and academic vocabulary, preparing the language for service as a medium of governance and economic advancement. It also was tailored to the strategy of wider South Slav unification. Only in the 1840s, after nearly a decade of Illyrianism, did major literary works based on folkloric and mythic elements of South Slav culture appear.

Croatian as it stood in 1800 was not ready to serve as a language of instruction or government. It lacked a standardized literary form, stable orthography,
and graphization. Its vocabulary could not convey modern concepts. Work on the corpus was a means to an end; standardization and codification prepared the language for wider use, making it a fit “tool to defend against Magyarization.” (Maissen 1998, 62) Analysis of texts from the journal Danica against contemporary dictionaries shows that Illyrian efforts strengthened the language’s capacity to express technical terms (Thomas 1988). Naturally linguistic terms were prominent, but the basics of scientific vocabulary was also well represented. Russian and Czech, two Slavic languages with richer technical vocabularies, served as major sources of loan-words. Calques from German also figure prominently, as that language was emerging as the language of science (Thomas 1988, 102). All of this is in keeping Kloss’s view that technical abilities are key to a modern language’s survival (1978, 151).

The Illyrian language program was designed to embrace as many South Slav speakers as possible. The name itself was neutral, allowing Serbs, Bosnians, Slovenes and others to gather under the Illyrian banner. Gaj and his colleagues chose Shtokavian as the base dialect because it was both geographically central in the South Slavic area and it was shared by Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians. The Illyrian desire to enrich the language with words from various dialects shows a tendency to Einbau, the “building-in” of several dialects to create one language. This coincides with building a polity with a population and territory large enough to be viable, thus meeting the “threshold principle” of liberal nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992, 343).

The technical and strategic focus of the Illyrian language program contrasts with the of lack of emphasis on folklore and myth. New vocabulary reflects little in the way of a drive to recover a past “golden age” or to pursue ethnographic purity through language itself. There were relatively few attempts to revive old words (Thomas 1988, 102). Multiple dialect or archaic words for the same concept were
pruned; dialect words were not kept for mere decoration. As playwright Dmitrija
Demeter put it:

[I]t is necessary to hold on to only one form—and at that the most useful -
if we want to have in our language strength and precision in the naming
of all possible nuances of learned subjects (Thomas 1988, 105).

The Illyrians’ overall aim, then, was a literary language that “would serve as a
medium of intellectual discourse for speakers of all [Croatian] dialects,” and that was
oriented to practical and technical needs (Thomas 1988, 102). This is not to say the
Illyrians ignored literature or history. Danica frequently carried articles on Croatia’s
literary and political history (Despalatovic 1975, 90). However, major new literary
works based on Croatia’s past were not produced until the 1840s, when Demeter
and Ivan Mazuranić published updates of South Slavic epics. More mundane efforts
such as dictionary making came first. The chronology and the bulk of textual
evidence shows that the Illyrians’ first goal was fashioning a language capable of
conveying the technical concepts necessary for a modern government and
economy.

Premodern Roots of Illyrianism

Scholars of nationalism are deeply divided over whether or not modern
nationalist movements are rooted in premodern identities. The preceding analysis of
the Illyrian language program indicates that premodern roots were relatively
unimportant. Yet the Illyrians were influenced by the premodern Croatian heritage
in three ways: literary tradition, religious tradition and state tradition.

In contrast to the creators of modern Czech, the Illyrians did not stress the
revival of archaic words. They did, however, draw from the 1801 dictionary of Jacob
Stulli, and Stulli himself was influenced by earlier lexicographers (Thomas 1988,
41,68; Vončina 1993). These writers had been working towards the unification of
Croat dialects; “... [G]aj brought centuries-old trends to a victorious conclusion by
bridging the linguistic gap between Kajkavian Croatia and the rest of the Croat
lands.” (Banac 1984b, 216) Moreover, the Dalmatian literary tradition was important to the Illyrians. Quite apart from its geographic and demographic advantages, Shtokavian’s being the dialect of the Dalmatian writers of the Counter Reformation and Enlightenment recommended it to Gaj and his followers (Thomas 1988, 22).

Catholicism also made its mark on the Illyrians. The Counter-Reformation literature that influenced them was deeply connected with the Roman church. For example, Gundulić’s Osman (translated by Mazuranić in 1844) is in part a vindication of the Catholic Church in its struggle with Ottoman Islam (Vončina 1993). Most of the premodern lexicographers (e.g. Jambresić and Habledić) whose work influenced the Illyrians were clergymen. Their publications included religious tracts as well as their lexicographical efforts. The use of Glagolitic script, unique to Croatian worship, further linked religion and language. Illyrianism itself had a Catholic character, exemplified by Rakovac’s “Little Catechism for Big People.” The work was written in the question and answer format traditional in Roman Catholic religious instruction. In it Magyarization is seen as a religious threat: “they want this [linguistic Magyarization] so that on the graves of all the other religions in Hungary Protestantism will bloom.”(Rakovac 1998 [1839], 272)

The final premodern influence on the Illyrian movement was the historical and institutional legacy of the Medieval Croatian state. While Croatian territory was divided between empires and even between different legal regimes within empires, the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom did have a continuous, if largely nominal, existence. The Illyrians differed over how politically oriented their broad ideal of South Slav unification should be. The minimum goal, however was the restoration of a unified Croatian state including Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia—roughly the borders of the medieval state (Maissen 1998, 28).

In terms of practical politics, the feudal Sabor provided a forum for nationalist sentiments such as Kukuljević’s speech (1843) urging the adoption of Croatian as
official language. The medieval legacy shaped the Illyrians’ idea of what was “Croat land” and thus the territorial goals of the movement. Perhaps most importantly, the Sabor represented the institutionalization of the Croatian nobility’s interests against Hungarian interests, providing Gaj and associates with a group of potential allies. This meant, however, tailoring the Illyrian program to gain support from these landowners. In the mid-1840s, Gaj downplayed political Illyrianism and emphasized protecting Croatian rights vis-à-vis Hungary, adjusting to accommodate the interests of the Croatian nobility.

This section has drawn in sharper relief certain aspects of the Illyrian phase of Croatian nationalism. These included the conditions into which Illyrianism was born, the participants in Illyrianism and their motivations, the causal role of language in motivating the Illyrians, the goals of their language program, and finally the role of premodern Croatian history and literature in the movement. The following section will compare the facts described here with expectations drawn from theory.

**Evaluating Theory**

To this point I have presented a narrative history of the Illyrian movement analyzing the movement in terms of variables salient to theories of nationalism and its relation to language. It remains to examine how well the case data matches implications derived from each theory. Table 3 shows the results of this exercise. Here, I explain and expand on these results and also explain how a priori beliefs about a theory’s truth are shifted after examining the Illyrian case.

**Gellner: Failure on a Primary Causal Factor**

Expectations derived from Ernest Gellner’s model of language’s relation to nationalism match well with the Illyrian/Croatian case. Most of the necessary political, economic, and social conditions posited by Gellner are present at the start of the Illyrian case. Moreover the theory leads to the expectation that nationalism
### Table 3. Evaluating Theory Against the Illyrian Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key condition(s) for the emergence of linguistic nationalism</th>
<th>Gelser</th>
<th>Deutsch</th>
<th>Hobsbawm</th>
<th>Anderson</th>
<th>Smith</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
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<td>Two or more non-mutually intelligible languages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uneven Economic Development</td>
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<td>Elementary education in dominant language introduced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensifying communication networks</td>
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<td>Population “mobilized” through exposure to national media</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of sufficient dominant population to assimilate non-dominant population (Slavic speaking population concentrated geographically)</td>
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<td>State modernization</td>
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<td>Democratization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization of mass populations by elite manipulation of supposed symbols of nationhood (Latter two conditions apply to late nineteenth century nationalism)</td>
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<td>Emergence of “print capitalism” or State sponsored press operating at provincial capital</td>
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<td>Primary Agents of Nationalism</td>
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<td>Minor intellectuals, Teachers, Writers</td>
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<td>Dominant Group</td>
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<td>Government Officials</td>
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<td>Non-dominant group</td>
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<td>Rival language media</td>
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<td>Politicians or would-be political leaders (i.e. politic power is actors’ primary motivation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profit-seeking printers, publishers</td>
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<td>State-run press and officials</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impersonal forces or individuals drive nationalism?</td>
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<td>Impersonal forces</td>
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<td>Individual actors</td>
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<td>Language a cause or effect of nationalism?</td>
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<td>Cause</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language’s role in nationalism functional or symbolic?</td>
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<td>Functional role</td>
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<td>Symbolic Role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goals of language planning</td>
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<td>Establishing official/educational status of the non-dominant language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase economic opportunities for non-dominant group</td>
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<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishing national speech community, linguistic assimilation</td>
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<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subordinate group recognition of language, eventual displacement of dominant language</td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building adequate corpus for running a modern state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language Planning is largely laissez faire, left to “print capitalists”</td>
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<td>Recovery of “National” Myths, Narrative</td>
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<td>Important Premodern Roots to Nationalism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents implications derived from several major theories of nationalism and its relation to language, and how the Illyrian case measures up against these predictions. Checks ‘✔’ denote matches, black squares (□) denote misses, NA for not applicable.
will be sparked by struggle over the language of elementary education, precisely as happened in this case. However, in Gellner’s model the key factor driving the need for literacy— and in turn linguistic nationalism—is industrialization. The Croatia of the nineteenth-century was not industrializing nor even moving much beyond local subsistence economies, in contrast to the expectation derived from his model.

Moreover, there was a pronounced a lack of interest in economic issues among Illyrians until the middle 1840s, when their movement was already in decline. Even when they took up such matters—for example Gaj’s conflict with Kossuth over the building of Hungarian railroads in Croatia—economic concerns where linked with national ones. The Illyrians’ failure to put forward a program for improving the material situation of a downtrodden, linguistically marginal group is contrary to what Gellner’s model would predict. The case shows the Illyrians were interested in preserving the Croatian language for its own sake; language was a symbol of nationhood rather than merely a functional means of communication.

From a Bayesian perspective, the Croatian case shifts our beliefs away from belief that industrialization is necessary for nationalism. Taking Gellner’s “Ruhritania” to be a thinly disguised exposition of the Czech case, an empirical example of industrialization driving linguistic nationalism, the Croat/Illyrian movement offers a counterexample of linguistic nationalism without industrialization. Given no further information from empirical cases, the chances are even (i.e. fifty percent) that given a nationalist movement, the area concerned will be industrializing. This moves expectations away from Gellner’s certainty that industrialization is a necessary precursor nationalism. Further case studies, when put into this framework, might push the probabilities closer to providing support for Gellner, or further away.

Deutsch: Another Absence of a Critical Cause

Expectations derived from Deutsch’s theory vary whether the case under consideration is that of a dominant or subordinate people. The Croatian Illyrians
purported to represent a subordinate people; looking at the matrix the Illyrian case exhibits five matches with the implications of Deutsch’s theory for such cases. Like Gellner, however, Deutsch misses on the key causal condition, although in his model it is the expansion of communications networks rather than industrialization that is critical.

The dispute between Hungarians and Croats, as Deutsch would predict, was over the assimilation (i.e. Magyarization) of a subordinate Croatian population. The case does differ subtly from the model; Deutsch’s examples present hinterland populations with no political institutions of their own dominated by urban elites which spoke different languages (e.g. Finns dominated by Swedes, Czechs dominated by Germans) (Deutsch 1966, 131-132). In the Illyrian case the non-dominant population was concentrated in an existing polity—the Croatian kingdom—with vestigial political institutions. This aided their resistance to Magyarization. Nevertheless, in positing assimilation to be the major issue of contention, Deutsch’s model proves correct.

The model fails, however, because its key prerequisite to the emergence of nationalism is missing. There was no intensification of communications in early nineteenth century Croatia; roads were poor, railroads nonexistent (Lampe and Jackson 1982, 65). The dispute over Hungarian plans for a railroad through Croatian territory in Slavonia and Dalmatia may seem to support Deutsch’s model, but the dispute, which arose long after the rise of Illyrianism, was about the legal rights of the Croatian state, and obviously could not be about assimilation along a communication route that had yet to be built (Jukić 1965). Finally, the Illyrian movement arose in 1830s Croatia despite the lack of a literate and mobilized population, contradicting the implications of Deutsch’s model. The facts shift beliefs away from Deutsch’s certainty that, given an identifiable nationalist movement, communications networks must be intensifying in the territory involved.
Hobsbawm: State Modernization is Key

Observable implications derived from Eric Hobsbawm’s model depend on the historical period under consideration. Illyrians were operating before the advent of mass democracy, an era when—according to Hobsbawm—nationalists were elite actors using nationalism as a means to power. The empirical evidence matches three of seven implications derived from the model for this era. State modernization (in Hungary) provoked a nationalist resistance from members of an existing “political nation” who possessed vestigial political institutions and the ‘memory’ of a historical state (the Croatian Kingdom). This matches expectations on Hobsbawm’s critical factor in nationalism, the influence of states or state-like structures. As expected from his theory, as well as from Kloss’s position that modern language planning is about a language’s practical capabilities, the Illyrian language program concentrated on giving their South Slav tongue terms for the concepts necessary to govern a modern, technology-oriented society.

The Illyrian/Croatian case offers some evidence which is ambiguous or contradicts Hobsbawm’s model. The Illyrians’ retreat from maximalist Pan-Slavism to traditional Croatian rights has mixed meaning for his theory. It shows the importance of a premodern legal legacy in shaping an emergent nationalism, contradicting Hobsbawm’s modernism but at the same time supporting the importance he gave to the role of the state in the rise of nationalism. Hobsbawm is also wrong on the Illyrians’ motivations. Chronologically, they first sought to protect the South Slavic language; their linguistic project began well before most Illyrians, including Gaj, would seek office. Politics was a way to promote their linguistic aims, not vice-versa. Moreover, the influence of premodern Croatian lexicography and literature on the Illyrians contradicts both Hobsbawm’s modernism and his Realpolitik view of nationalism. Finally, the case contradicts the theorist’s emphasis on individual agency; Illyrianism did not depend on Gaj or any other particular Illyrian.
Hobsbawm’s model agrees with the empirical data with regard to initial conditions and the aims of the language programs; analysis of the Illyrian case increases confidence that Hobsbawm is correct in these areas and more generally on the importance of political structures in originating national movements and shaping their trajectories. However, expectations drawn from the model do not match the case data on the motivations of nationalists, the existence of premodern roots to nationalism, or the importance of individual actors. Analysis of the Illyrian case decreases confidence that Hobsbawm is correct in these areas.

**Anderson: Reversed Causality**

Two of the eight implications drawn from Anderson’s theory match the data from the Illyrian case. Aside from a low number of matches, his model has the causality reversed with regard to the proposed factor behind nationalism: print capitalism. It was Gaj’s commitment to the Illyrian language project that lead him to establish his press, rather than print media leading to a national project. In the event, his publications eventually bankrupted him (Despalatovic 1975, 104). Nor was there a state-sponsored press in Croatia to create an image of a national community. The main newspaper in Croatia was the German-language *Agramer Zeitung*, hardly a publication which would provoke the imagining of a South Slavic nation (HKD 2006). In Bayesian terms, data from the Illyrian case decrease the likelihood of Anderson’s print-media based model of nationalism being true in general.

There is an element in Anderson’s theory that does find strong support in the Illyrian data, the idea that “pilgrimages” of “native” colonial officials often lead to a sense of national identity among elites. This prong of Anderson’s theory was not discussed in the literature review as it does not deal with language and nationalism directly. Yet biographical sketches of the Illyrians show Anderson’s pilgrimage pattern (Despalatovic 1975, 64; Thomas 1988, 17). Many, like Gaj himself, traveled from village to provincial capital (Zagreb) for secondary education, and then on to
universities in major imperial cities, associating with their countrymen along the way. It is notable that the first Illyrian club was formed at a “station” on the pilgrimage route, namely the University of Graz (Austria). The Illyrian case lowers confidence in Anderson’s theory of nationalism and print media, but raises the likelihood that his pilgrimage theory is correct.

**Ethnosymbolism: Cultural Revival not Causal**

Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolism acknowledges economic and political modernization as a cause of nationalism. It focuses, however, on the interaction between preexisting ethnic identities and the standardization of culture which occurs during modernization. In the case under consideration, cultural standardization meant Magyarization, and resistance to Magyarization was the main motive behind Illyrianism. However, the sort of cultural activity stressed by ethnosymbolism as characteristic of the early stages of ethnically-based nationalist movements, such as the “rediscovery” of sagas and origin myths of the group, came later to the Illyrian movement and remained relatively rare. The Illyrians’ first activity, in the 1820s and early 1830s, was corpus building, and this focussed on technical and scientific vocabulary rather than ethnography and literature (Thomas 1988, 158). Only in the 1840s, once these activities were well underway, did attempts to construct a heroic ethnic past for the Croats and larger Illyria emerge. Here the political stages of the national movement precede cultural revival. Thus the Illyrian case makes it less likely that the ethnosymbolist position—that ethnic myths and “golden age” literature are *necessarily* main components of nationalism—is correct.

On the other hand, ethnosymbolism is correct in its expectation that Croatian nationalism would have premodern roots. The Croatian lexicographic tradition, the prestige of glagolitic liturgy, the legacy of the Medieval Croatian Kingdom, and the Croats traditional role as defenders of Christianity—more specifically Catholicism—
all influenced the Illyrian idea of who was a Croat. From the Bayesian standpoint, examining the Illyrian case increases confidence in the ethnosymbolist position that premodern legacies of various sorts shape modern nationalism.

In the theory-by-theory analyses presented above, I evaluated how well the implications of each model fit the Illyrian case on a set of common variables. I also weighed how this analysis affected *a posteriori* confidence in each theory or parts of theories. The results show that no model exactly matches the historical data from the Illyrian case. Hobsbawm’s state-centered theory emerges as the “best fit” because of the key role it assigned to state modernization; modernization of the Hungarian state led directly to the reactive Croatian nationalism that was Illyrianism. Hobsbawm’s strict modernism, however, means that his model ignores the significant premodern legacies of the Illyrian/Croatian movement. I review the findings of this pattern matching exercise in the chapter’s conclusion. First, however, I analyze the ability of each theory to account for salient facts beyond the theory matrix used in this section.

**EXPLAINING ADDITIONAL FACTS**

Here I discuss which theory best accounts for three salient facts of the Illyrian case which do not fit into the previous analyses: its inability to gain adherents among non-Croatian South Slavs, opposition to Illyrianism among the Croatian “peasant nobles”, and finally the Illyrians’ concern for Croatia’s status in Europe.

**Failure to Attract Non-Catholic South Slavs**

The Illyrians initially tried to attract other South Slavic speakers to their movement; their failure requires some explaining. In Gellner’s theory, the main cause of linguistic nationalism are the obstacles to economic advancement experienced by individuals and groups unable to communicate in the dominant language. As the Illyrians based their standardized language on the Shtokavian dialect precisely to avoid creating communication barriers with the Serbs (or
Orthodox South Slavs) and the Bosnian Muslims, lack of a mutually intelligible language cannot account for these groups’ rejection of the Illyrian program.

In one sense, the models of both Deutsch and Anderson are inapplicable to much of the South Slav area before 1850, especially the Ottoman regions, as communications were limited and exposure to print media was almost nonexistent. The bulk of the population would simply be unaware of Illyrian ideas. However, even among the better educated Orthodox South Slavs living under Hapsburg rule there was little support for the Illyrians, as these were already turning to a Serbian identity (Thomas 1988, 16-17; Sugar 1963). Both Deutsch and Anderson could explain this latter development convincingly by noting that the Hapsburg Serbs already had an emerging standard language thanks to Vuk Karadžić’s work. From Deutsch’s perspective, they were forming communications networks amongst themselves—solidifying an Orthodox Serb identity. From Anderson’s perspective educated Serbs had a standardized print language using the Cyrillic alphabet, helping them to imagine Serb national community.

Hobsbawm’s state-centered view offers a realpolitik explanation for lack of enthusiasm for Illyrianism among non-Croat South Slav speaking elites. Cooperation with the Illyrians gained Serb elites nothing, as the Orthodox Shtokavian speakers in the Ottoman empire had already achieved an autonomous state. Their co-religionists under Hapsburg rule could look to the principality of Serbia as a possible national home rather than adopt an amorphous Illyrianism (Djordjevic 1981). The Illyrians also had little to offer Muslim Bosniaks—this most powerful group in Bosnia was at the time more concerned with defending their privileges, which were under threat from Ottoman reform efforts (Aličić 1996). Nothing in the Illyrian program would help with this struggle.

The exception to this lack of support outside Croatia was the Franciscan clergy of Bosnia. This accords with the ethnosymbolist view that premodern
institutions and ties (here religion) determine the trajectory of nationalisms. The Illyrian’s connection to Catholicism suggests that this religion’s premodern legacy performs a role analogous to the role Hastings (1997) proposed that Protestantism played in nationalisms in Northwest Europe. That is, religion was one way of distinguishing a population, and narratives connected—stylistically or substantively—to religion resonated with populations. Ethnosymbolism would also predict that peoples with quite different premodern histories and symbolic systems—Muslims and Orthodox slavs—would not be attracted to a movement founded by Catholics and based largely on the legacy of Catholic writers and a Western state. In sum, the ethnosymbolist model can explain the non-Croats’ lack of interest in Illyrianism, but the modernist theories of Hobsbawm, Anderson, and Deutsch also offer plausible explanations.

**Lack of Support from Peasant Nobles**

A second fact to be addressed, the opposition to Illyrianism among the majority of “peasant nobles” of Croatia, supports the modernist position that most premodern, preliterate populations are uninterested in language issues. In the first years of Illyrian political activities, peasants and smallholders who had suffrage generally supported the pro-Hungarian Magyarone party in Sabor elections (Despalatovic 1975, 137). Just as modernists would predict, rural people living in a pre-literate, preindustrial situation did not share the the educated, urban Illyrian activists concern about the encroachment of Hungarian.

Peasant opposition to Illyrianism is in agreement with Gellner’s view that nationalism develops only in industrial and literate societies—the peasant nobles’ society was neither. The corollary is that the peasant nobles’ support for the party of Magyarization is evidence against the ethnosymbolist view that ethnic identity is important to a broad section of premodern populations. The models of Anderson and Deutsch do not apply; a rural peasant population was likely not exposed to print
media or subject, via communications networks, to rival assimilatory pressures. Indeed most convincing is a small scale realpolitik explanation: the Magyarones were simply able to offer the peasant leaders more in financial or other terms in exchange for their support. This again supports the Hobsbawmian view that matters of national identity are largely contingent on more subjective calculations of political and economic benefit.

**Croatia’s Status in Europe**

The final fact to be explained is the Illyrian concern with how Croatia and Croatian is viewed in Europe. Kurelac’s early statement in favor of Croatian-language education is concerned that Europe will mock Croats if they speak Hungarian (see page 58). Kukuljević, in his speech promoting official use of Croatian in the Sabor, exclaims: “our language lags behind the example of other European languages in statecraft and business.” (Kukuljević 1843) In Illyrian corpus planning, “new words of the Illyrian period ... do not reflect anything specifically ‘Illyrian’ but rather provide a link with the conceptual world of Europe generally.” (Thomas 1988, 157)

Unfortunately, the theories I have addressed view nationalism largely as an internal phenomenon, few directly address the international context of nationalism. However, Gellner’s thought on nationalism was prompted by his efforts to refute the theory, proposed by Elie Kedourie (1985), that nationalism is an ideology whose spread caused specific cases of nationalism (Gellner 1964, 152). Consistent with Kedourie’s view, the concern shown by the Illyrians for European opinion could be the internalization—conscious or unconscious—of the new value of nationalism which had arisen in the West. As the ethnosymbolists and Anderson both give the spread of nationalist concepts a causal role in the development of nationalism, this explanation is consistent with their models, and from Deutsch’s perspective the elite Illyrians would simply be assimilating to Europe on an ideological level—though not
at the level of day-to-day communication. On the other hand, Gellner denied the causal role of ideology and would oppose such an explanation, but it is difficult to see how he himself would explain the Illyrians’ concern with European opinion.

It may be the case, however, that Kedourie’s theory really does not apply. Supporting this view is Pan-Slavism’s decreasing importance to the Illyrians over time, something which would not be expected if ideology were the driving force behind both nationalism and worries about European opinion. An alternative explanation is that practical politics, not ideology, led to the Illyrians’ anxiety over Croatia’s international status; only recognition as a nation guaranteed a people, or their representatives, a measure of participation in the affairs of Europe. This perspective is in line with Hobsbawm’s state-centered model.

Hobsbawm’s state-centered model best accounts for all three issues discussed here: the lack of support for Illyrianism among non-Croatians, the lack of support for Illyrianism among the peasant nobles, and the Illyrians’ concern with European opinion. While the ethnosymbolist view is more exact in its explanation of non-Croatians’ failure to rally to Illyrianism, and Gellner’s version of modernism is the best explanation of the Croatian peasant nobles’ indifference to the danger of Magyarization, only Hobsbawm’s theory can offer a plausible explanation for these phenomena as well as the Illyrians’ desire to justify their place in Europe.

**CONCLUSION: MODERN AND PREMODERN**

This chapter has described the case of the Illyrian movement, the first national movement among the Croats. After providing the reader with historical background, I gave a detailed narrative history of the movement, an analysis of that narrative, and finally used the case to evaluate major theories of linguistically-based nationalism.

A theory-by-theory analyses matching implications drawn from various models against the historical data shows that no theory’s predictions perfectly match
the facts of the Illyrian case. Gellner’s theory has the highest percentage of matches. However, as the Illyrian movement came into being well before the beginning of industrializing in Croatia, analysis of the Croatian case shifts beliefs away from Gellner’s certainty that industrialization is the critical condition for the emergence of nationalism. Gellner described correctly the mechanism for the emergence of linguistically based nationalism, but he wrongly identified the underlying cause in the Illyrian case. Deutsch’s and Anderson’s models also “miss” on their critical conditions, intensifying communications networks and increasing exposure to print media, respectively; these theories do not match the case as well as Gellner’s model.

Hobsbawm’s state-centered theory emerges with an ambiguous pattern of matches. Crucially, however, his critical driver of nationalism—state modernization in the form of centralization and cultural homogenization—was indeed happening to the Illyrians’ Croatia. The Illyrians’ linguistic efforts match what Hobsbawm’s model would predict; corpus building activities were precisely aimed at building a idiom suitable to governing a modern society and expressing modern technical concepts. That is, Gaj and others were building a South Slavic language capable of resisting the imposition of Magyar.

Yet the premodern influences on Illyrianism mean that the case contradicts Hobsbawm’s assertion that nationalism is wholly modern. Moreover, a modernist interpretation of the Illyrian movement gets motives, and thus causality, wrong. The Illyrians primary goal was to defend South Slavic from Hungarian; the building of a modern Illyrian language was in service to that goal, as was Illyrian political mobilization. Language was a symbol of the Croatian nation; that symbol was constructed using premodern legacies and derived its power from its connection with the Croatian past. The ethnosymbolist model has a good pattern of matches because it allows a role for these premodern factors in the emergence of nationalism, though its emphasis on nationalists engaging in the rediscovery of
ethnic roots and constructions of “myths” of origin do not accurately describe the Illyrian program.

The Illyrians were influenced by the Croatian past, but their language planning and literary activities emphasized practicality. *Realpolitik*, namely the population numbers and its being shared by the three South Slavic religious communities, drove their choice of standard dialect. Language reforms concentrated on technical and political vocabulary. Finally, Illyrian politicians tailored their demands to appeal to the Croatian nobility. It may be objected that the Illyrian movement was not a truly nationalist movement. Even considering those that were simply passive members of reading clubs, the number of Illyrian was few. It is unlikely that their language-centered program would have much appeal among a largely illiterate peasantry—the overwhelming demographic group at the time. Moreover, their political plan was vague beyond the assertion of Croatian language and legal rights. Nevertheless, by the definition of nationalist movement offered in the first chapter, the Illyrians clearly qualify. Their movement sought cultural and, increasingly towards the end of the period, political and economic autonomy.

I conclude this chapter by returning to one of the thesis’s central questions: Why a linguistic nationalism when there is little to differentiate rival languages? In a sense, the evidence in this chapter shows that the premise of the question is wrong. The first Croatian national movement was indeed formed in opposition to the imposition of a language very different from South Slavic, namely Magyar. Croatian and its rivals in the twentieth century, Serbian and Serbo-Croatian, are so close linguistically in part because of the strategic decision of the Illyrians to seek a wider South Slav unity. The Illyrians tried to unite a group of related dialects to fend of the Hungarian challenge. In doing so they papered over real differences in both language and historical experience among South Slavs. Those fissures would emerge quickly, and would reemerge persistently, as will be seen in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 4

POST-ILLYRIAN LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM

In this chapter I describe and analyze the association of language policy with Croatian nationalism in three distinct, post-Illyrian, eras: the “second wave” of nationalism from 1860 to 1900, the period of fascist rule in Croatia during World War II, and the post-Yugoslav era from 1991 to 2002. The cases will be used to evaluate major theories of nationalism—those of Gellner, Deutsch, Hobsbawm, Anderson, and Smith.

The analysis here is carried out differently than that of the preceding chapter. The Illyrian movement was the first Croatian national movement and it took place as modernity was beginning to reach South East Europe. It is almost an ideal test of what theories of the emergence of nationalism purport to explain, thus the models’ implications could be evaluated directly against historical experience. Later waves of Croatian nationalism, however, were influenced by the Illyrians’ example. Using the cases directly to test theories which were focussed on the initial emergence of nationalism is of dubious validity. In this chapter, therefore, I use only the inference to best explanation (IBE) approach (see “Epistemology”, chapter 1, page 13), asking how well each theory can account for the trajectory of Croatian nationalism and in particular language’s role in each national movement.

THE SECOND WAVE: RIVAL CROATIAN NATIONALISMS

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Croatian nationalism took on two rival forms. Yugoslavism was a continuation of the Illyrian political program, but its adherents supported a closer, Serbian-led linguistic unification. Opposing Yugoslavism was the movement for “state right”; these Pravaši (from prava—right)
parted from the Illyrian political program in rejecting South Slav unification. They also resisted linguistic unification, but ironically the Prvaši were closer than their Yugoslavist opponents to the Illyrians’ conception of the Croatian language.

**Political Background**

By 1850, Illyrianism as originally conceived was largely a spent force, due in part to its successes. In 1847, the Sabor adopted Croatian as national language. Illyrian demands—an end to Magyarization, reunification of traditional Croat lands, and a new political demand for a provincial government responsible to the Sabor—had wide support in Croatia’s political class. However, the events of 1848, including an armed nationalist revolt Hungary, overtook the Illyrians. A conservative, non-Illyrian Croatian—Josip Jelačić (1801-1859)—gave Vienna critical military support against the Hungarians and was rewarded by promotion to governor (Görlitz 1992).

Jelačić’s administration moved towards meeting the political and economic demands of Croatian nationalists. He established a new, more liberal constitution for Croatia which abolished feudal legacies such as the military frontier and the tax privileges of the nobility. However, he was not a supporter of political autonomy, rather he was devoted to the House of Hapsburg. He worked closely with the reactionary interior minister Alexander von Bach (1849-1859) and did not object to the increasing Germanization of Croatian cultural and economic activity or to Hapsburg political centralism (Gross 1993). Jelačić did implement much of the Illyrian language program, but took their ultimate political goal—an independent South Slav confederation—off the table (Görlitz 1992).

**Linguistic Unitarism and its Discontents**

Outmaneuvered politically, the remainder of the Illyrians looked to other ways to move South Slav unification forward. Their most significant step was the creation of a single, standardized literary language with the Serbs, formalized in the
Vienna agreement of 1850 (Barić et al. 1997). This meant the former Illyrians had to reckon with the work Serb linguist Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), whose version of a standardized Shtokavian had already displaced the traditional, archaic Serbian literary language. The Serb’s philosophy of standardization was the opposite of Ljudevit Gaj’s; Vuk (as he is referred to in most Serbian and Croatian writing) strove to reproduce in writing the speech of a specific region, that of rural eastern Herzegovina, which he considered an ideal (Barić et al. 1997).

The Illyrian project of constructing a composite language based on many dialects could not be reconciled with the Vukovian view. In the end the Croats, including writer Ivan Mazuranić (1814-1890) and playwright Dimitrija Demeter (1811-1872), reached an agreement with Vuk and his follower Djuro Danić (1825-1882) based on the Vukovian paradigm of standardization; “it is not worthwhile, though, to mix dialects to construct a new idiom which does not exist among the people.” (Vienna Agreement in Greenberg 2004, Appendix A)

Opposition to a linguistic union on Karadžić’s terms arose immediately. The publisher, writer and politician Ante Starčević (1823-1896) criticized Vuk’s idea of peasant speech as and ideal; it resulted in an orthographer writing “like his closest swineherd.” (quoted in Banac 1984b, 32) Starčević (see Figure 7) believed that Croats had a distinct language defined by its literary legacy, a legacy not shared by the Serbs. He first made this case via an analysis of the Istarski Razvod (See Chapter 3, page 51), a feudal land agreement between Slavic nobles and Venice which was written in Glagolitic script (Gross 1973). His 1851 article (published in Gaj’s Narodne Novine) argued that the document showed that “among our fathers, the Croatian language was completely official, and not only official, but used for diplomatic purposes.” (Starčević and Ladan 1971, 17) He claimed the Razvod used all three Croatian dialects—Shtokavian, Chakavian and Kajkavian—and therefore use of the three Croatian dialects was a deeply rooted tradition (Gross 1973).
Soon after his analysis of the Istarki Razvod, Starčević directly attacked Vuk’s orthography and the new, joint Croatian and Serbian literary language (Gross 1973, 606). According to Starčević, the true Serb literary tradition was based on Old Church Slavonic. By allowing the Serbs to claim the writing of Renaissance Croats as a source of literary tradition—as the Vukovians did—the Croats would forfeit their right to that heritage. He was convinced that Croatian Vukovians planned not only to eliminate the Croatian language as a distinct idiom but also the very name “Croatian.” (Starčević 1971)

Starčević’s belief in the importance of language for Croatian identity led him to create an alternative orthography based on morphological spellings, a word root
orthography (korijenski pravopis) to rival Vuk’s phonological system. He also
retained a neutral ‘ě’ for the three variations of the ancient Slavic letter jat, thus
avoiding the problem of the varying pronunciation (e in Serbia, je or ije in Bosnia
and Slavonia, i in parts of Dalmatia, or ekavian, jekavian, and ikavian respectively)
of this phoneme across the Shtokavian area. Starčević viewed himself as a linguistic
conservative guarding a long-held Croatian traditions: “As far as methods of
writing, language, speech, I stay as much as I know how to our 800 year old
literature, and I will never turn from that track.” (quoted in Ladan 1971).

**Rival Conceptions of South Slav Nationhood**

Starčević’s ideas on language were part of his wider view of Croatian
nationhood. The son of a poor peasant family from a small village, he had studied at
his local school, received a scholarship for study at the Zagreb Academy (that is,
high school), and then on to Pest to study for the (Catholic) priesthood. Not suited
to the priestly life, he was dismissed from seminary. He returned to Zagreb, where
he joined the Illyrian circle. The period of Austrian absolutism following the
revolution of 1848 made him more radical in his views; he began to see Austria-
Hungary, particularly Magyar officialdom, as an enemy of the Croatian nation. 
Ironically, his ideology was based on “state right”, a concept inherited from the
feudal structure of the Hapsburg (i.e. Austrian) Empire. More specifically, his
program was to return to Croatia the rights and privileges it had retained when it
recognized Ferdinand I as king in 1526. Starčević legitimated his case through old
agreements, acts of the Crown, and acts of the Sabor and Hungarian parliaments
(Ladan 1971).

Starčević’s politics were a challenge to Yugoslav movement led by Zagreb
bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905) and academic Franjo Rački (1818-1894).
These men entered the Croatian political scene in 1861, after the fall of von Bach and
Hapsburg absolutism. Both stressed unity of South Slavs—linguistically and
politically—making them the direct successors to the Illyrian movement. Neither Strossmayer nor Rački were linguists, however, and did not directly participate in the language debate. Strossmayer did promote Yugoslavism by fostering the cult of Cyril and Methodius and supporting the ecclesiastical use of glagolitic; the two Slavic saints and the alphabet they created were important to Slavs of both Eastern and Western Christianity (Koščak 1971). More importantly Strossmayer was chief patron and Rački first president of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences (JAZU), founded in 1866 (Kosćak 1971). The scholars chosen by Rački to conduct JAZU’s linguistic efforts would determine Croatian’s course of development.

The other rival of Starčević’s “state right” ideology was Vuk Karadžić’s “greater Serbia” idea. The Herderian concept that a single language implied a single people led Vuk to claim that regardless of religious or political division all Shtokavian speakers were “really” Serbs; “Serbs All and Everywhere” [Srbi Svi i Svuđa] in the title of Vuk’s famous 1836 essay (Ladan 1971). For Vuk the only true Croats were Chakavian speakers, the descendants of the Croat tribe who populated the coast and islands of the upper Adriatic; he classed Kajkavian speakers as Slovenes (Gross 1973).

Vuk’s ideology was in direct conflict with the greater Croatianism of Starčević; where Vuk claimed that a large number of Croats were “really” Serbs, Starčević claimed that many who identified as Serb were “really” Croats (Biondich 2000, 16). As a matter of practical politics, however, Strossmeyer and Rački’s Yugoslavism had more of a chance of attracting a large number of Croats. Croats were not likely to adopt the quite distinct Serbian identity, but their second-generation pan-Slavism was a plausible alternative to a narrow Croat identity. If other South Slavs (Serbs mainly, but also Slovenes) could be persuaded to adopt a Yugoslav identity, a potentially powerful state could be created. Starčević feared this would lead to the end of the Croats as a distinct nation, and also feared that the
entire program was merely a cover for Serbian state interests.\textsuperscript{8} Precisely because the Yugoslavs were a greater threat, he reserved his greatest enmity for them, calling them “Slavo-serbs” to emphasize what he saw as their pro-Serb, anti-Croat plans (Ladan 1971, 39).

Starčević’s political goal was maximum autonomy, if not outright independence, for the Croatian state. He totally rejected Magyar or German dominance. His only concession was accepting the imperial crown’s sovereignty, but only if Croatia had its own institutions. His believed that identity as a people was contingent on the existence of a polity which represented that people; “Truly, without independence and sovereignty a nation cannot be a nation but just a group of people.” (quoted in Uzelac 2002, 41) Pursuing political and linguistic unity with the Serbs could only hinder the assertion of the Croatian polity’s rights within (or without) the Austro-Hungarian empire (Banac 1984b). Starčević’s linguistic program—adopting morphological orthography and the Illyrian idea of incorporating words from all Croatian dialects—was designed to create Abstand from Serbian as codified by Karadžić. Had it been successful, it would have aligned language boundaries with his conception of Croatia’s political boundaries.

**Victory of the Vukovians**

Starčević concentrated on political activities, and failed to fully develop his alternative orthography and grammar (Banac 1984b). With no full-fledged alternative, Vuk’s ideas became dominant in Croatian literary circles (Babić 1992). His protégé Djuro Danićić promoted the Vukovian program in Zagreb, having been brought to Zagreb by Rački to become General Secretary of JAZU. Taking up the position in 1866, Danićić influenced younger Croatian linguists and published a “Dictionary of Serbian or Croatian” in 1877, ensuring that the development of a

\textsuperscript{8} Serbia had been declared a principality within the Ottoman empire in 1830, and its autonomy had grown steadily since that declaration.
literary language for the South Slavs in Croatia would reflect Vuk’s principles (Segedin 1971). Alternatives to the Vukovian linguistic system, including a strictly Croatian grammar by Gaj’s protégé Adolfo Tkalčević- Veber (1825-1889) and a compromise between a strictly Vukovian system and the “Croatian” system Croatian educational establishment, were marginalized (Banac 1984b).

The victory of the Vukovian, or unitarist, position had political implications. The introduction of Tomislav Maretić’s (1854-1938) grammar and dictionary of “Croatian or Serbian” in 1899 brought unitarist language politics into the elementary classroom (Babić 1992). The state-sponsored, “official” position now was that the languages were one (Kačić 2001). Aside from his linguistic activities, Maretić was also a politician. He was twice (1892 and 1900) elected to the Hungarian parliament—the body which had jurisdiction over Croatia—and favored close cooperation between Serbs and Croats within the Austria-Hungarian empire (Brozović 2000). His linguistic ideas facilitated that cooperation. Another politician, the Serb Dusan Popović, pressed the Hungarian authorities to recognize a single Serbo-Croatian language, a step which in the late Hapsburg context implied not only the linguistic but the political unity of the peoples (Zanić 2007).

Linguistic Unity, Political Division

While linguistic unification was proceeding, some of the proponents of Yugoslavism were losing confidence in the program. In the 1860s Strossmayer had proposed that Serbia would lead the way to a wider South Slav state. Serbian relations with Hungary, a vociferous opponent such a state, meant that the idea went nowhere. Austria’s occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878) was a setback for Yugoslavism, and Strossmayer turned to purely Croatian affairs. In the 1880s he and former rival Starčević formed a united front against Croatia’s pro-Hungarian (Magyarone) parties. Basing their program on “Croatian state right and the national principle,” they agreed on three demands: unification of traditional
Croatian lands; a financially independent Croatia; and a governor who was responsible to the Sabor (Košćak 1971). This retreat showed that Strossmayer’s and Rački’s late nineteenth century Yugoslavism, like Illyrianism, had failed to build a wider South Slav political identity. Indeed, even within the historical Croatian lands, there were tensions between Serbs and Croats. The Orthodox population founded a political party (Sprska Samostalna Stranka – SSS) and a newspaper (Srbobran—literally Serb Defender) in 1881 in part due to the incorporation of the former military frontier into Croatia-Slavonia proper and a perceived need to defend the interests of the large Orthodox population in the region. In a policy of “divide and conquer”, such tensions were encouraged by the Hungarian governor (ban) of Croatia, Karoly Kheun-Héderváry (r. 1883-1903) (Biondich 2000, 12).

Despite the setbacks for political Yugoslavism, Vukovian-based linguistic unitarism continued to gain ground. Unitarist thought dominated language policy and remained alive as a political ideology. Yet Ante Starčević’s ideas also lived on in the Croatian Party of Right (Hrvatska Strand Pravasi—HST), which he had founded in 1861. In addition, divisions arose among Croatian linguists. Ivan Broz (1852-1893) produced an orthography (1892) and began work on a dictionary which, though Vukovian in philosophy, emphasized specifically Croatian usage more than did the Daničić/Maretić tradition (Brozović 1998). Broz’s work was continued after his untimely death by Franjo Iveković (1834-1914) and Dragutin Boranić (1870-1955), forming an alternative tradition of language standardization for anti-Unitarist politicians and linguists.

Analysis: Croatian Nationalism’s Second Wave

The “second wave” of Croatian nationalism is clearly divided from Illyrianism by the revolutions of 1848 and the absolutist reaction. In contrast to the Illyrians, language no longer was a central focus for either of the rival factions—Yugoslavism and Starčević’s “state right” movement—which emerged in the 1860s.
This is in part because many of the Illyrian linguistic goals had been achieved. South Slavic—whether called Illyrian or Croatian—had a secure place in Croatia’s government and its educational system. Cultural Magyarization was a less imminent threat, though as late as 1907 the mandatory use of Hungarian on railroads in Croatian territory provoked resistance from Croatian politicians (Biondich 2000, 96). Nevertheless, during the second half of the nineteenth century the main dispute became Croatian’s linguistic relation to Serbian—mirroring the political polemic over whether Croatia should unite with Serbia and, if so, on what terms.

The theories under consideration in this thesis do not discuss to any great extent the development of rival nationalist factions with different conceptions—cultural, political, or territorial—of the putative nation. John Hutchinson’s (2005) relatively recent work exploring how national identity is often shaped by conflicts between rival ideas of the nation themselves is one of the first book-length treatments of the subject. However, Hutchinson focusses on polities with well-defined territorial borders. In the Croatian case the rival factions disagreed as to how far the borders—both physical and cultural—of the projected national state should extend. The lack of theory which addresses the emergence of rival nationalist programs makes matching case data against the observable implications of theory is of little use in analysis. Instead, I examine which theory or theories can best explain the emergence of the two rival nationalisms as well as the role language plays in the rivalry.

The appearance of Starčević’s alternative to the Illyrian/Yugoslav program cannot be explained by Gellner’s model of a communication barrier hindering economic advancement and thus becoming a counter-entropic factor. The Illyrian struggle against Magyarization can be explained by this model, as Hungarian is utterly different from slavic languages. And just as Gellner would predict, during
this second wave period the elementary school system was strengthened and removed from ecclesiastical control, resulting in increased literacy rates—20 percent in 1869, 33 percent in 1890, and 46 percent in 1910 (Biondich 2000, 14). However, in the clash between Starčević’s program and the Yugoslavist vision of Strossmayer and Rački, there was no struggle between mutually unintelligible languages. Both visions called for some form of South Slavic as the language of bureaucracy and school in Croatia and Starčević accepted the Illyrians’ (and Vuk’s) choice of Shtokavian as base dialect, meaning even under the Pravasi language program standard Serbian and standard Croatian would remain mutually understandable. The rival nationalists’ language programs had more to do with a symbolism than practical communication. Coupled with a continued lack of industrialization in Croatia, Gellner’s model fails to explain the second wave of Croatian nationalism.

Hobsbawm’s model offers more promise in explaining the diverging forms of Croatian nationalism and their accompanying language policies. His emphasis on the state’s role in the creation of nationalism fits well with Starčević’s “state right” ideology. Hobsbawm’s (1996) idea that “languages multiply with states” accords with Starčević’s attempt at the Ausbau of Croatian via the introduction of minor differences from Serbian. It also accords with Strossmayer’s giving linguistic duties at JAZU to Daničić, a scholar who would pursue linguistic unity. Both actions show politicians attempting to align linguistic divisions with preferred territorial ones. The language policies of both factions are explained by Hobsbawm’s theory that in the drive for political power, politicians manipulate markers of national identity. However, Hobsbawm’s position cannot explain why Starčević and his followers reacted to the unitarists in the first place. Another strike against Hobsbawm’s model is the emergence of Starčević’s more narrow, historically rooted nationalism occurred before widespread suffrage. Hobsbawm holds that these ethnically-based nationalisms are the result of increased political participation. However, Croatia’s
1880 electoral law, pushed through by the Magyar governor, sharply limited suffrage; in 1910 only 45,000 men were eligible to vote out of a population of 2.6 million, and these electors were disproportionately urban and connected with the Austro-Hungarian administration (Biondich 2000, 16).

Deutsch and Anderson would have difficulty explaining the divergence between the two Croatian nationalisms. Communications links did begin to intensify in Croatia in the late 1860s, but this was after Strossmayer’s and Starčević’s positions had solidified. The primary division in elite communication in this period was not between the Croatian and Serbian languages but between the German (in Croatia and Slavonia) and Italian (in Dalmatia) and South Slavic. The German-language daily *Agramer Zeitung* was founded in 1830 and operated until 1912 and the Italian language *Gazetta di Zara* operated from 1833-1850. The early years of these periodicals coincided with the 1835-1867 run of Gaj’s *Danica Ilirska* (HKD 2006).

According to Anderson’s model this situation should cause rival imaginings of the nation, with those who read the German or Italian press on one side and those who read Gaj’s publication on the other. Likewise, according to Deutsch’s model the language battle should have been between assimilation into German or Italian communities—both having the advantage of being languages of bureaucracy under Austro-Hungarian rule. Neither model can explain the emergence of rival South Slav languages. A split between Croatian and Serbian papers did emerge in the late 1870s with the founding of *Hrvatska Sloboda* (1878-1929) and *Novi Srbobran* (1884-1902) (HKD 2006). This is, however, well after the emergence of Starčević’s *Pravatiš* movement and indeed just when Strossmayer tacitly abandoned Yugoslavism. The chronology suggests that the emergence of more ethnically oriented newspapers is a symptom of the breakdown of the Yugoslavist ideal, rather than a cause of the two rival linguistic and political factions developing.
Ethnosymbolism offers a partial explanation for the rise of Starčević’s party; the Party of Right’s emphasis on Croatia’s historical rights certainly is in accord with Smith’s emphasis on the premodern roots of nationalism. The Pravaši focussed almost exclusively on the political aspect of Croatian identity, however; it is difficult for the ethnosymbolist paradigm to account for the Pravaši’s disinterest in myths of origin. Moreover Starčević was anticlerical, specifically rejecting the premodern Croatian heritage of Catholicism (Ladan 1971, 40-41). In contrast, the clergyman Strossmayer’s attempt to bridge the gap between Catholic and Orthodox—for example through reinvigorating of the use of Glagolitic—is explicable from the ethnosymbolist perspective that symbols with deep historical roots have the strongest power in creating national identity.

To conclude the analysis, the emergence of two rival forms of Croatian nationalism, with two different views towards language, after 1860 is not something which is predicted by the major theories of nationalism. Hobsbawm’s politics-centered theory of nationalism offers the most plausible explanation for the manipulation of language seen in Croatia among these two movements. Both Starčević’s Pravaši and Strossmayer’s Yugoslavs attempted to make linguistic and territorial conceptions of the nation congruent, though of course they differed as to where both sorts of boundaries should be drawn. This development is best explained by Hobsbawm’s view that language-based nationalisms are in most instances created by political movements rather than arising spontaneously as a side effect of print capitalism, patterns of linguistic assimilation, or economic disadvantage experienced by linguistic minorities. At the same time, Hobsbawm’s theory has difficulty in accounting for the Pravaši’s rejection of the Illyrian project in the first place, as that rejection was based on aspects of Croatia’s premodern legacy.
The Yugoslav/unitarist position had prevailed in Croatia in the early 1900s, and political unity of South Slavs under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was achieved in the aftermath of World War I. Linguistic unity had elite support. Some Croatian writers went further than even the most ardent nineteenth-century Vukovians, writing in Serbian ‘ekavian’ subdialect of the Belgrade area rather than the ‘ijekavian’ that was typical of Croatian Shtokavian (Anić 1998). However, the trend towards linguistic unity reversed as political friction between Croats and Serbs increased in the 1930s. This is demonstrated by Matica Hrvatska’s 1940 publication of the influential Razlike Izmedju Hrvatskoga i Srpskoga Književnog Jezika [Differences between the Croatian and Serbian Literary Languages] by Petar Guberina (1912-2005) and Kruno Krstić (1905-1987)(Anić 1998).

The German invasion of Yugoslavia and the creation of the Nazi sponsored Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) under fascist dictator Ante Pavelić (1889-1959) gave the anti-unitarist, anti-Yugoslav faction an opportunity to radically manipulate the Croatian language in an attempt to create distance from Serbian. The regime (1941-1945) provides an opportunity to examine the link between nationalism and language under extreme conditions. Moreover, as the only modern period of independence before the present Republic, it is the sole example with which to compare language policies in today’s Croatia.

**NDH Language Policy**

The NDH regime offered a chance to undo what many Croats saw as decades of Serbian-sponsored centralization of both politics and language. The state was proclaimed on 10 April 1941 and its government instituted on 17 April. On 18 April the culture and religion minister, Mile Budak, issued a decree that all courts should use “pure Croatian language … foreignisms must be avoided at all times where
possible, by substituting Croatian national (*narodnim*) expressions.” (quoted in Samardžija 2008, 35) The use of the Cyrillic alphabet was banned the same week. This direct government involvement in language planning impacted both public and private communications (Samardžija 2008, 35).

To further shape language use, the dictatorship set up the Croatian State Office for Language (*Hrvatski Drzavni Ured za Jezik—HDUJ*) on 28 April 1941. It was tasked with producing a new Croatian orthography, giving official advice on written and spoken language, answering lexicographic and terminological questions, and reviewing manuscripts for language and orthographic correctness. The Office’s work was carried out with the cooperation of the Croatian Academy of Science and Art (HAZU—formerly JAZU) and Zagreb University (Samardžija 2008, 40).

Budak made the new orthography a priority for HDUJ; “Croatian orthography must answer to the spirit of the Croatian language, therefore it must be given special attention.” (quoted in Samardžija 2008, 46) Moreover, he had very specific ideas about the project. His decree of 23 June 1941 gave twelve rules that the new orthography should follow, including five which threw out changes instituted in the “unified” orthography of the 1920s and 1930s and four promoting morphological over phonological spelling—that is, favoring Starčević’s system over the Vukovian one (Samardžija 2008, 43).

Despite the decree from the government, the head of the Office for Language, Blaz Jurišić (1891-1974) insisted that differentiation of Croatian from Serbia must “depend more on natural development, and less on artificial demands.” (quoted in Samardžija 2008, 45) Yet he also insisted that “Serbisms” introduced in the 1918-1940 unitarist period be eliminated and that the basis for a new writing system be Dragutin Boranić’s 1918 orthography, a moderate alternative to the major Yugoslav/unitarist works. On the key issue of whether a completely
morphological orthography should be developed, Jurišić held that such a move would cause educational and economic damage to Croatia. Overall, Jurišić pursued a moderate course of returning to the earlier, Vukovian-influenced versions of Croatian orthography rather than undoing the several previous decades’ effort in standardizing Croatian (Samardžija 2008, 46).

Jurišić’s moderation clashed with the Ustaše government’s desire for a radical reform of the language. In April 1941 it directly commissioned the authors of Differences Between Croatian and Serbian Literary Language, Guberina and Krstić to write a new orthography, to be ready for the 1941-42 school year. Yet even these linguists, like Croatian linguists more generally, resisted radical reform. The regime saw the linguistic experts as dragging their feet over reform. Its response was the Legal Declaration on the Croatian Language, its Purity and Orthography (10 August 1941), drafted without the language commission’s participation.

Signed by the dictator Pavelić himself, the Legal Declaration’s conception of the Croatian language similar to the Ustaše movement’s conception of the Croatian people as presented in their journal Hrvatski Narod: “the Croatian people] is a nation [narod] in itself, and is not identical to any other people nor is it a part or tribe of any other people.” The first article of the Legal Declaration asserts the Croatian language’s uniqueness in parallel terms:“The language which Croatians speak… is original and peculiar to the Croatian people and is not identical with any other dialect or language of any other national language community.” (quotes in Samardžija 2008)

A major key in ensuring the written language reflected Croatian distinctness and was a morphological (or word root) orthography, and this was required by Article 7 of the Legal Declaration as well as by the act that created the HDUJ. The NDH was adopting Starčević’s old program of “building away” (i.e. Ausbau) from the Vukovian system of phonological spelling. But the new principles caused chaos as individual writers, lacking an official orthography, began devising their own way
of writing according to morphological principles. Matters were made worse when the orthography produced by Guberina and Krstić did not meet official approval—according to Guberina because it was not radical enough, and the project was buried (Galić and Guberina 2007; Samardžija 2008).

The difficulties of Guberina and Krstić were matched by those of other language “gatekeepers.” A council established by the Office for Language to continue work on the new orthography met between October and December 1941, but was divided on how far to take the legal requirement mandating the morphological system. The Zagreb gymnasium professor and linguist Marijan Stojković (1879-1965) promoted close adherence to the “root-spelling” ideal of the regime. Lexographer Krstić, on the other hand, stressed that the council was a scientific body which was morally obligated to try to change law or policy for the good of Croatian society, specifically to avoid the confusion that would be felt by literate Croatians if the radical reform envisioned in the Legal Declaration were instituted. Just as Jurišić had done earlier, the council chose a moderate course, keeping the Boranić orthography (Samardžija 2008, 138).

The fascist NDH regime’s use of both direct decree and the State Office for Language to institute far reaching language reform provides an excellent opportunity for within case comparison between politicians and an expert community. For the government language was an ideological battlefield; it issued decrees that were clearly too radical for most linguistic experts. These language gatekeepers objected to radical reform on practical and linguistic grounds and adopted relatively low-cost changes such as the prohibition of Cyrillic—never widely used in Croatia—and the “purification” of legal and technical jargon. Both projects were limited in scope and the number of people affected. On the other hand, Vuk’s thought had influenced the Croatian standard language for decades; rooting out his concepts and standards derived from them would mean a costly
disruption to the language and communication. Most Croatian language gatekeepers therefore preferred simply to assert the language’s distinct identity and support minor changes instead of radical reform.

Explaining NDH Language Policy

The Ustaše-governed NDH represents the third wave of Croatian nationalism, quite far in time and international context from the days of the Illyrians. If the second wave nationalisms are little discussed by theorists of nationalism, a third wave is even more distant from what they were seeking to explain. Again the best epistemological approach is to evaluate which theory can best explain the trajectory of nationalism and language policy in fascist Croatia.

At first glance Gellner’s classic theory cannot get much purchase in explaining the Croatian fascists’ proposed language policies. There was no linguistically disadvantaged minority which the new language policy sought to aid by making communication easier for them. Quite the opposite, the NDH’s policies had the potential to introduce obstacles to normal written communication for all Croatians. On the other hand, the resistance of Croatian linguists to the more radical elements of NDH policy can be seen as a vindication of functional, communication-based theories of nationalism such as those of Gellner and Deutsch. The gatekeepers resisted the introduction of radical reform because it would disrupt communication.

Hobsbawm’s theory of nationalism and language explains the NDH language effort well. As the historian would predict, nationalist movements seek to reshape the language in accordance with political ideology. Yet the Croatian linguists’ success in mitigating the NDH government’s more radical proposals also calls into question Hobsbawm’s belief in the state’s ability to mold national identity relatively easily. The case shows language policy to be path dependent even under extreme pressure for change; the Ustaše government’s attempt to undo ninety years of planned
convergence between Serbian and Croatian would disrupt communication and thus language planners declined to implement most of them.

Anderson’s model of print capitalism creating the “imagined community” cannot offer a convincing explanation of NDH language policy. Despite ninety years of movement toward a unified Serbo-Croatian in print media, many Croats did not imagine themselves as belonging with the Serbs to a Serbo-Croatian speaking Yugoslav nation. Ustaše opposition to linguistic unitarism matched their opposition to political unitarism; it is difficult to see how these ideas were formed by print media in the unified language. Instead, the unified language became something to be resisted, a source of conflict. Serbian and Croatian were, in fact, historically and linguistically entwined; despite this both political elites and language elites rejected Yugoslav identity and the Serbo-Croatian language designed to reinforce that identity.

At first glance it would seem that ethnosymbolism can explain the NDH regime’s emphasis on language as a symbol of Croatianess and the importance of “purifying” it after its “pollution” at the hands of unitarists. Moreover, culture minister Mile Budak had himself written epic-style literature about his homeland. However, the fascist regime’s language policy was largely concerned with reflecting the Ustaše conception of a pure and unique Croatian nation, a conception which was simply asserted rather than justified through appeals to a mythic past. Ante Pavelić did engage in idiosyncratic attempts to connect the Croats with the ancient Goths (Pavelić 1931). This connection would, if true, link his regime with his Nazi patrons, but it would also undermine any attempt to seek a glorious past in the obviously Slavic bulk of Croatian folklore and literature (Sadkovich 1987, 146).

Hobsbawm’s theory of nationalism and language is the most convincing of the theories under discussion here at explaining NDH language policy. Yet even Hobsbawm’s theory is not a very accurate fit; in this case at least, Hobsbawm’s
model seriously overestimates the ability of political leaders to manipulate a language at will. Although the case of language policy during the Croatian fascist regime does not confirm the correctness of any particular model of the origin of nationalism, it can be examined as a stage in the continuing development of Croatian nationalism. The Ustaše program represents a reaction against the Yugoslav state; its political program drew on Starčević’s opposition to Yugoslavism, and its language policy represents a continuation of his desire to ensure the Croatian language’s distinctness.

The Ustaše regime differed significantly from the old Pravaši, however. Where Starčević and his followers were anticlerical, the Ustaše saw Catholicism as an important facet of Croatian identity—even including priests in its ranks. Where Starčević had been opposed not only to Serbian influence on Croatian, but also the continuing cultural and political influence of Hungarian- and German-speaking imperial officials, the Ustaše viewed Croatia as a bulwark of the Catholic West against the Slavic East (Payne 1995). Because of this devotion to Catholicism, the traditional premodern markers of Croatianess—language, state, and religion—are more tightly aligned in Ustaše ideology.

**LANGUAGE AND NATION IN MODERN CROATIA**

The role of language and language policy in the NDH can be compared with their role in modern Croatia, both before and after its 1991 secession from Yugoslavia. After fascism’s defeat in 1945, Yugoslavia was reformed under a socialist government, a regime which held power until the country broke up in 1990-91. In this section I recount developments on the language front during the run-up to Croatia’s independence. I then describe in detail post-independence language policy in the Republic and compare it with NDH policy. As in previous sections the case data is used to evaluate theories of nationalism, using the logic of inference to the best explanation (IBE).
Language Polemics and Independence

The fall of the fascist NDH regime brought discredit to the movement for recognition of a distinct Croatian language. The 1945 constitution of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia guaranteed the equality of Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian, but the socialist government encouraged a single, unified Serbo-Croatian (Babić 1969). The 1956 Novi Sad Agreement between Serbian and Croatian linguists created a unified literary Serbo-Croatian with two “variants,” Eastern and Western. The Croatian linguist Ljudovit Jonke later claimed that this device enabled Croatian to survive under the Western “variant” label (Babić 1992).

Liberalization in the mid to late 1960s opened up space for dissent not only in the political and economic spheres, but also on cultural and language issues. In response, the Croatian linguistic and literary community made a public case that language unitarism was going too far; in 1967 the Croatian cultural organization Matica Hrvatska published the “Declaration on the Name and Situation of the Croatian Language” which demanded that Croatian be recognized as a language and that it be protected from the continuing influence of Serbian (Hekman 1997 [1968]). The Croatian Spring of 1971 marked the height of Croatian political, economic and cultural demands; the Tito government then cracked down—exiling or jailing the movement’s leaders. Matica Hrvatska was banned and an orthography of Croatian (not Serbo-Croatian) was withdrawn from public circulation. A single copy found its way to London. Reprinted in exile in 1972, the Londonac (Londoner) became a symbol of Croatian linguistic identity (Babić, Moguš, and Finka 1971).

The crackdown temporarily halted agitation centered on the language issue. However, the 1974 constitution of the Croatian Socialist Republic acknowledged Croatian as an official language (Jezicne odredbe 1974). In the 1980s, linguistic controversies resumed as the overall political situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated. Linguists—both Serbian and Croatian, nationally-oriented and unitarist—debated in the journal of the Croatian Philologic Society, Jezik (Ilić 1989; Babić 1990).
While language gatekeepers engaged in polemics, governmental agencies, local businesses, and trade groups had begun to adopt differing terminology for new technologies. Organized on the basis of self-management (samouprava), these entities tended to conduct business within republic borders. Thus adopting differing technical terms had the effect of augmenting lexical difference between Serbian and Croatian. The American slavicist Thomas Magner (1992) gives a few examples of divergence in computer technology (See Table 4). According to Magner, it was precisely this sort of divergence that the Novi Sad agreement was supposed to prevent (Magner 1992).

Table 4. Divergence in Serbian and Croatian Technical Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Zagreb (Croatian)</th>
<th>Belgrade (Serbian)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>byte</td>
<td>oktet</td>
<td>bajt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>computer</td>
<td>racunalo</td>
<td>racunar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distributed system</td>
<td>raspodjeljeni sustav</td>
<td>distribuirani sistem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Serb unitarist linguist Pavle Ilić (1992) believes that language divergence along national lines was spontaneous. In 1980s, Yugoslavian vocabulary was a marker not only of nationality but of political stance; using *fudbol* (soccer) instead of *nogomet* (literally foot-ball) marked the speaker as a Serb; a Croat using *fudbol* would be labeled a unitarist or even a traitor. According to Ilić, this sort of divergence was an expression of nationality in defiance of government policy.
Post-Independence Language Status Planning

The evidence shows that the majority of language gatekeepers believed that Croatia should have its own linguistic identity, and that this belief was shared by much of the general public. It is logical to assume that language reform would be a priority for the Croatian government after its 1991 independence. However, there is relative paucity of laws specifically regarding language, particularly in comparison with the NDH period.

Between December 1990 and July of 2005, 223 laws with an explicit language component were promulgated, excluding international treaties and laws on the standardizing of weights and measures. In these latter the “language” always refers to translation of a treaty or measurement term and has little relevance for substantive policy. Even if these latter two categories are included, the total is still under 400. Considering that the Sabor produced tens of thousands of laws over the fifteen years of my search, the legislators’ concern with language is minimal. Most tellingly, my search found no laws promoting language reform or directing changes in the corpus of the Croatian language itself. This supports a Croatian linguist’ view that even the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajedinica) regime (1991-2000) initiated by Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999) did not put priority on language issues. Still less did the successor (and current) government of liberal Stjepan Mesić (b. 1934).

The Croatian legislature has directly engaged is status planning, however. In adopting the first Constitution (1990), the Sabor explicitly put Croatian in the center of the linguistic ecology of the Croatian republic. “In the Republic of Croatia the Croatian language and Latin script is in official use.”

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9 Two search engines, Google (www.google.com) and Altavista (www.altavista.com) were used to search the website of Narodne Novine (www.nn.hr), the official gazette of the Croatian Republic. Each unique html document with a title of the form xx-dd-mm-yyyy “Title” (e.g. 117-23-07-2003 Zakon o Hrani, a law found Narodne Novine number 117 for 2003, published 23 July) was tallied.
10 Interview with Mark Tadić, Zagreb University linguistics department, April 12, 2002.
the Republic and is required no matter what other official languages are recognized by local officials; this provision has remained through four substantial revisions of the constitution (1997, 1998, 2000, and 2001) (Croatian Republic 2001).

The 1990 constitution also guaranteed rights for language minorities, however. Article 14 protects individuals from discrimination based on language, while Article 15 guarantees members of “nations and minorities free expression to belong to a nationality, free use of their own language and script, and cultural autonomy.” This provision underwent a slight but significant change in later revisions to the constitution, when “nations and minorities” (narodi i manjine) was changed to “national minorities” (nacionalne manjine). In the ex-Yugoslav context this implies that non-Croatian groups have less status, even if they were former “constituent nations” such as Serbs or Slovenes. (Croatian Republic 2001)

Articles 12, 14, and 15 taken together imply that Croatian is central to the state. Linguistic minorities, though guaranteed certain rights, are peripheral in the Republic. This parallels the Constitution’s preamble, which states that “The Republic of Croatia is constituted as the national state of the Croatian people and the state of members of autochthonous national minorities.” [my emphasis] (Croatian Republic 2001) The Croatian people and language are at the core of the state’s identity, but peripheral groups enjoy language and cultural rights.

In keeping with this constitutional mandate, Croatian has been made, via legislation, the central language of economic and political life in the Republic. Bank and business regulations show the government putting Croatian at the center of economic activity. At least one member of the local board of directors of foreign banks must speak Croatian. Financial reports, applications for mergers, bids to lease part of the radio spectrum, firms’ tax documents and any evidence of business income and expenses must be submitted in Croatian and must all be submitted in Croatian (Sabor 1999; 2002b; Ocean Ministry 2004). These and similar directives are
not specifically language legislation, but they do regulate language use in key industries and specify Croatian as the official means of communicating with the government. This did not necessarily have to be the case; for example, an option for keeping business records or submitting bids in English – the lingua franca of business today – might have been instituted. The Croatian government insists, however, that businesses communicate with it in Croatian.

Perhaps more telling are language restrictions on names of foundations, political parties, and associations. According to a 1993 law, charitable foundations must have a Croatian name, although foundations set up to benefit a minority groups can also have a name in the minority group language (Sabor 1993b). Political parties too must have a Croatian name. They may also have a minority language name, but it can be used only along with the Croatian name, and the Croatian name (or abbreviation) must be written in letters at least as large as the foreign name of the party and in the top position (Sabor 1993a), as in Figure 8.


International entities such as human rights, business, and educational associations must have a Croatian name as their official title while operating in
Croatia (Sabor 1997; 2001). There is no sign of relaxation of these regulations; the law governing political parties was amended in 1998 and again in 2001, but the language provisions were left intact. This legislation has solidified the status of Croatian as central to the political and economic life of the Republic and has pushed minority languages to the periphery, despite their constitutionally guaranteed status.

There has been conflict over language status in the new Croatian Republic. The central government went to court to stop the region (županija) of Istria from instituting official bilingualism (Italian/Croatian), disputing “the equality in law between Italian and Croatian.” (Ustavni Sud 1995) Bilingualism was seen a threat to the cultural integrity of the state, particularly as Istria had been under Italian control as late as the 1947. At least one Croatian Justice had this historical conflict on his mind: “Not so long ago, and even today, names and surnames were changed by decree [on Croatian] territory (especially under Austria) in order to falsely show their nationality as Italian.” (Vuković 1996) The government argued that the rights of minority language communities were to be decided at the municipal (opština) level and thus region-wide bilingualism interfered with local language rights. Istrian Bilingualism remained an issue long after independence, playing a role in the 2001 local elections and conflicts with the central government in 2003.\(^1\)

However, it is not Italian but Serbian speakers who are the largest linguistic minority, one created by the government’s insisting that Croatian is distinct from Serbian. In the late 1990s, the Serbs of Eastern Slavonia demanded that schools educate their children in the Serbian language. The United States State Department, which included language issues in its 1998 report on human rights issues in Croatia, said the Croatian government had failed to live up to an agreement to provide textbooks and instruction in Serbian. In addition, a number of Serb teachers were

dismissed, under pressure from Croats who had been resettled in the area (United States Department of State 1999). The Croatian government responded, denying some charges and putting others in mitigating context (Croatian Republic 1999).

With time and continuing pressure from the Council of Europe and the United States, the situation was resolved with the establishment of schools for the Serbian minority. As of August 2003, there were thirty-one schools in which Serbian was the language of instruction in Croatia, and another thirty-one schools in which another minority language was the language of instruction (Spajić -Vrkaš 2003).

With the end of nationalist HDZ rule in 2000, the Croatian parliament passed a law specifically addressing linguistic minority rights (Sabor 2000) and in 2002 another which detailed minority rights in general (Sabor 2002a).

An final aspect of status planning is the role of what Croatian legislation terms “world languages”, a term not specifically defined in law but which customs legislation identifies as including French, German, Italian and English (Finance Ministry 2004). Most references to world languages deal with practical concerns such as the safety of international transport and cargo vessels. Others show the importance of world languages to the Croatian economy; examples are laws requiring English signage in national parks (for the benefit of tourists) or proficiency in a world language for certain professions or government posts (Tourism Ministry 2004; Sabor 2003c; Sabor 2003d). Croatia is also training its officials in world languages in order to prepare for entry into the European Union (Sabor 2003a).

**Government Involvement in Corpus Planning**

In contrast to status planning, there has been no explicit legislation concerning corpus planning in post-independence Croatia. Here political action has been indirect; the government has funded institutes and organizations which have Ausbau as their corpus planning objective—building out Croatian in such as way as to make it more distinct from both Serbian and from socialist-era Serbo-Croatian.
Even before independence Croatia possessed a set of institutions outside of government capable of formulating and disseminating ideas about linguistic identity and language policy—a legacy of the historical Croatian concern with language going back to the founding of JAZU in 1866 (see page 95). After independence the government supported this expert community of linguists through financing, official status, or both. This indirect means of shaping linguistic identity avoided the unpleasant connotations of the NDH and its State Office for Language (Anić 1998). As linguist Josip Silić stated: “Such an office, which we had in other times, turns out to be useless or even damaging.” (Hekman 1996).

Croatian corpus planning thus falls into a “middle way.” Direct legislative involvement in corpus planning has been rejected, as has the “language market” approach proposed by publisher Ivo Goldstajn, in which standards emerge from competition between different systems of language norms (Tunjić 2001). Reshaping the language’s corpus to make it both a distinct marker of Croatian identity and capable of functioning in the modern world has been left to experts ensconced in institutions, an arrangement which suits Silić:

I am for the “hand” of the state, but in the sense of offering help to experts and expert bodies to continue their study of linguistic communication sufficiently…. Language policy planning needs the equally weighted participation of government and institutions which work with the language (quoted in Hekman 1996).

Croatia’s language institutions operate at a variety of levels. Matica Hrvatska disseminates ideas about Croatian to an educated but non-expert audience through its publication Vijenac as well as through activities at chapters throughout Croatia and beyond (Bratulić 2008).12 The Croatian Philological Society’s Jezik is a more technical journal aimed at educators, students and others interested in the details of language issues (Babić 1997).

The ideas Vijenac and Jezik disseminate often originate with the scholars of the Croatian Academy of Science and Art (HAZU) or the Miroslav Krleža

12 Also, personal communication (email) with Ante Knežović, April 2002.
Lexicographical Institute. The first is the successor to Strossmayer’s JAZU, tasked with promoting “Croatian cultural heritage and its affirmation throughout the world.” (HAZU 2004). The Krleža Institute publishes works on Croatian language and literary history (Krleža Institute 2005).

Another organization, the Institute for Croatian Language and Linguistics (IHJJ), establishes norms for Croatian through the compilation of dictionaries, lexicons, and grammars (Rončević 2004). While the linguistics department at the University of Zagreb focuses on preparing the Croatian language for use with modern information systems, including compiling of electronic Croatian corpora (Faculty of Philosophy 2002). All the above institutions receive state funding either directly or through grants for specific projects (see for example Moguš 1996; Macan 2001). The state also has a role in the governance of the Krleža Institute and HAZU, institutions of “special significance” for the Republic (Sabor 2003b). According to a former editor of the Matica Hrvatska publication Vijenac, dependence on the state makes it possible for political parties to “penetrate” these organizations; Matica Hrvatska has been subject to political pressures, including pressure to dismiss editorial staff.13

Interviews I conducted with linguists at the above institutions, as well as their scholarly publications and articles in the popular press, show that they are generally disposed to a moderately nationalist position; they are nearly unanimous in the belief that Croatian is a language separated by its historical development from Serbian. One linguist proudly showed me the 1998 edition of the Polish Review of Slavic Linguistics, the first in which Croatian was given its own section and told me the publication was an affirmation of her and her colleagues work since independence.14 On the other hand, the linguist Dubrovko Škiljan proclaimed the

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14 Interview with Maria Znika, 13 April 2002, at the Croatian Institute for Language and Philology [Hrvatski Institut Jezika i Jezikoslovia], Zagreb.
situation was so biased to the nationalist side that “it was impossible to do scholarly work in Zagreb.” (Pulig 2001) Likewise, the late linguist Vladimir Anić engaged in a polemic against what he saw as political and over-nationalistic reforms being made to Croatian (Anić and Silić 2001; Mostarkić 2001).

Being ensconced in key institutions means that Croatian linguists who see the language as distinct from Serbian promulgate their ideas with state help and approval. For example, from 1996-2001 the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sport (MZOS) funded the production of several dictionaries of modern Croatian and its dialects through the IHJJ (MZOS 2005). The project director was Miro Kačić, a main proponent of differentiating Croatian from Serbian (Kačić 1997). It is likely the dictionaries reflected his ideas, helping to create maximum distance between Croatian and Serbian and reflecting the language purism he saw as essential to the Croatian linguistic system (Kačić 2001).

Other Croatian linguists have benefitted from government funding. Already in 1991, even before formal declaration of independence, the Croatian Ministry of Science and Technology (MZT) was funding Božidar Finka’s team of twenty three linguists.15 Their aim was laying the groundwork to produce a new standard dictionary, including an electronic edition, which would include recently coined words (Finka 1991). Two linguists from Zagreb University were funded to produce an etymological dictionary showing Dalmatian influence in standard Croatian (Vinja 1991). At the same institution, twelve scholars were funded to produce an encyclopedia of Croatian literature (Franges 1991). Other representative projects include an atlas of Croatian dialects (Lončarić 2002), a dictionary of literary Kajkavian (Vajs 2002), an encyclopedia of Croatian glagolitic writings (Damjanović 2002), and a new edition of the work of Jesuit priest Jakov Mikalja (1601-1654), a Counterreformation lexicographer (Gabrić-Bagarić 2001). These representative

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15 The MZT is now the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sport (MZOS).
Language Debates and the Public

The public has been exposed to the ideas of the mainstream (i.e. more nationalist) school of Croatian linguistics. For example, the traditional controversy between morphological and phonetic orthography played itself out in the media.16 (Morić 1999) The issue was invested with extra significance because the more “nationalist” (i.e. more inclined to the morphological system) orthography was an updated version of the Londonac (Babić, Moguš, and Finka 1994), competing against an orthography by linguists Anić and Silić (2001), which maintained the Vukovian system. Book-length works aimed at influencing the lay public, even the foreign lay public, have also been published. One such volume is Kačić’s Croatian and Serbian: Delusions and Distortions (Kačić 1997) which holds that lexicon from non-Shtokavian dialects should be included in the standard language as the dialect “system” of Shtokavian, Kajkavian, and Chakavian differentiates Croatian from Serbian.

The mainstream nationalist conception of Croatian has also been introduced to the schools. For example, the high school grammar textbook by Stjepko Težak and Stjepan Babić presents Croatian literary and linguistic history as a narrative of progress in standardization from the Renaissance through Gaj’s nineteenth century reforms (Težak and Babić 1996). The Yugoslav period is then presented as a regrettable detour from this path, but with independence:

[...in one sense as if we have returned before 1918 to continue from that era where, because of the Serbian dominance in the first Yugoslavia, the Croatian linguistic tradition was broken; and in another to before 1945, in that those linguistic characteristics which were suppressed or eliminated are now returning (Težak and Babić 1996).]

These sentiments echo Kačić (2001), who saw the adoption of a Vukovian grammar for Croatian schools in 1899 or the 1956 Novi Sad agreement as interfering with the language’s natural development.

The compilation of a new electronic corpus of the language is another area where linguists impact the public perception and use of language. This project samples the frequency of use of words in Croatian and literature, with most source material being published after 1991. This data is used for the production of new dictionaries and grammars as well as to facilitate the integration of the language into modern information systems (Tadić 2008). At the initial stages, those involved in the project made the case that the corpus benefitted the entire language community, and therefore their work should be supported by the Croatian state, the political manifestation of the language community (Tadić 1996). Eventually the government did support the project, as well as several others in the area of computer processing of Croatian, including one headed by former President Tudjman’s son, an ex-intelligence official turned linguist (Tudjman 2002; Dovedan 2002; Tepeš 1996).

**Linking Language with Croatian Political History**

Efforts to mold linguistic identity have included not only status and corpus planning, but also efforts to shape how the language and its past are conceived. Historian Andjelko Mijatović, a longtime cultural advisor to Franjo Tudjman and member of his cabinet (Vuković 2005; Sadkovich 2005), emphasizes the Croatian state’s membership in the Western European cultural and political sphere going back to the Middle Ages: “Croats achieved great political and other successes and managed to consolidate their national identity, their statehood, and to follow the civilized achievements of the contemporary Europe.” (Mijatović 2000) As Croatian politics develops so does the language. Mijatović notes that diplomatic documents of the Medieval Kingdom are written in Croatian as often as German and Latin. Croatian is standard also for statutes, regulations, and legal treatises, showing that
Croatia was culturally distinct and had a legal existence (Mijatović 2000).

The bilingual work by Vlatko Pavletić, Milan Moguš, and Niksa Stančić, *Hrvatski Jezik u Hrvatskom Saboru/ The Croatian Language in the Croatian Parliament* (1997), emphasizes even more strongly how both the Croatian language and the polity developed in the Western cultural sphere. “The role of Latin is important, as evidence of centuries for Croatian involvement in Western civilization and culture.” (Pavletić, Stančić, and Moguš 1997, 14) The authors—Pavletić was president of the Croatian Parliament from 1995 to 1999, Stančić a member of Parliament, and Moguš president of HAZU —also interpret Latin as a shield against encroachment from German and Hungarian in the early nineteenth century: “Latin as the language of science and administration, was their [the Croatian political class’s] best defense against the pressures of Germanization and Hungarianization for a long time.” (Pavletić, Stančić, and Moguš 1997, 15) South Slavic—Croatian to the authors—plays a role alongside Latin:

From the beginning of written Croatian, texts were composed in the Croatian language in addition to Latin which was the language of documents such as Trpimirova *Darovnica* [Trpimir’s Donation] and *Branimirov Natpis* [Branimir’s Inscription](Pavletić, Stančić, and Moguš 1997, 18).

By connecting their language with Latin, and tracing the link back to the early Middle Ages, these politically influential authors seek to establish a long pedigree for a distinct Croatian language and polity, and to place both in the West as opposed to the Slavic East. Other government-funded scholarly studies provide additional evidence of an effort to connect the language with Western culture and civilization, as shown by studies of literary links between Croatia and Germany, Italy and Western Europe generally (Pavličić 2001; Zorić 2002; Glovački-Bernardi 2002).

**Analysis: Language Policy in Independent Croatia**

Can the role of language in the emergence of an independent Croatia help evaluate or add to general knowledge regarding the origins or characteristics of
nationalism? This latest wave of nationalism is far removed from the conditions that
the major theories of nationalism were trying to explain. As in previous analyses, I
ask which theory can best explain the case. I focus on three salient facts to be
explained: the Croatian government’s position on minority language rights and
bilingualism, the reemergence of the dispute over the orthography of the language,
and finally the attempt to link Croatia and Croatian language to the politics and
culture of Western Europe.

The Croatian government’s resistance to language minority rights and
pronounced hostility to official bilingualism is amenable to a Hobsbawmian
explanation. The state simply wants to avoid creating groups which can threaten its
integrity, particularly since most Croatian politicians will remember that language
issues helped to fragment Yugoslavia. By similar reasoning Deutsch’s model can also
explain the facts; the government fears bilingualism—particularly in Istria—will
reduce its ability to assimilate different language groups. This hostility to
bilingualism can also be explained in Andersonian terms; the implied equality of
languages violates the Croats’ image of the Republic being their community in a
way that granting linguistic minority rights, with its notes of dominant-subordinate
relations, does not (Croatian Republic 2001). Ethnosymbolists might suggest that
opposition to Italian bilingualism and Serbian language rights are rooted in historical
conflicts between those groups and those identifying as Croats. Only the Gellner
model has difficulty accounting for opposition to bilingualism; there is no clear
economic stratification between Croatian and Italian or Croatian and Serbian
speakers and so the whole Gellnerian mechanism breaks down.

The second fact under discussion, the reemergence of the orthography issue
in post-independence Croatia, can be explained by Hobsbawm’s state-centered
theory in that the writing system was the easiest aspect of language for the state to
control—much easier than patrolling speech. The persistence of the issue agrees
with the ethnosymbolist position that national identity is deeply rooted, with the morphological system symbolizing the “true” Croatian language over a century and a half. Benedict Anderson’s view that a single printed language leads to an imagining of the national community seems to be contradicted here, however; the periods of dominance of a single, printed Serbo-Croatian—approximately 1900-1939 and 1945 to 1965—did not lead to the adoption of a Yugoslav identity. Rather, the very way the language should be written—and hence printed—became a point of contention. Finally, the Gellner and Deutsch models—with their emphasis on the functional aspect of language—cannot offer a convincing explanation for the dispute over orthography; though changes in orthographies entail significant costs, the differing systems represent only a minor hindrance to communications.

The attempt to link Croatian with the West is explained best by the ethnosymbolist model; it is an attempt to connect Croatian culture, including language, with a long premodern tradition. At the same time, this conception of Croatian and Croatian certainly fits with the goals of the Croatian state both in distancing it from the “East” and positioning itself for membership in Western-led multinational institutions such as the European Union (EU) and NATO. Thus a state-centered model also explains the phenomenon. An Andersonian would note that Croatia is being imagined as part of the West, although the process is more active and intentional than Anderson’s model would predict. Gellner or Deutsch’s theories, both of which focus on the functional aspect of language and nationalism, simply do not offer insight into this entirely symbolic development.

Overall, it appears that Hobsbawm’s model best explains the current relation of nationalism and language, and thus language policy, in Croatia. However, as noted these theories were developed to explain nationalism as it first emerged in very different circumstances. The case of contemporary Croatian linguistic nationalism is better suited to illustrating how a national movement has adapted
their language policy to suit today’s globalized era. Certainly the government was directly involved in status planning, asserting Croatian’s central place in the new republic. However, international norms and agreements constrained the government from following a more extreme language program; being part of the West required avoidance of open linguistic nationalism. The negative example of the NDH government and its radical language reform also stood as a warning to the new Croatian government. Despite these constraints, the Croatian government has attempted, through funding those involved in reforming the language, to influence the reshaping of Croatian and conceptions about the language’s history. Finally, while information technologies are usually seen as helping dissolve borders, the Republic of Croatia’s investments in the Croatian National Corpus and other informatics projects became a means of asserting and defining Croatian identity.

**CONCLUSION: PERSISTENT LANGUAGE CONFLICTS**

Overall, Hobsbawm’s state-centered model best explains the three cases discussed in this chapter: the struggle between the Yugoslavs and the Pravaši over both political and linguistic union with the Serbs, the period of radical nationalist government under the NDH, and finally language policy in post independence Croatia. Croatian nationalism, after its Illyrian initial phase, became focused on the extent of the state—how the South Slav area should be divided politically. Both those advocating a wider Yugoslavia and those advocating a smaller, more historically rooted Croatia arranged language policy to suit their political aims, rather than political aims being a reflection of language similarities or differences.

There are some caveats to this conclusion however. First, Hobsbawm, as a modernist, discounts premodern sources of identity. Yet while the Pravaši were clearly focussed on Croatia “state-right,” that very “state-right” was a premodern legacy, derived from the conditions of Croatia’s entry into the Hapsburg monarchy. Second, the modernist position generally sees national identity as contingent, the
product of manipulation. In the cases discussed in this chapter cultural factors are indeed shaped and used to promote political ends. However, the political movements are constrained by the materials they have to work with. In this case both factions, the Prvaši and their successors in a more ethnically centered Croatian nationalism and the Yugoslav unitarists work with premodern legacies. The Prvaši worked with the political legacy of the Medieval Croatian state and premodern literary heritage, and the Yugoslav unitarists with the linguistic legacy of the earliest Slavic migrations.

Modernists believe that identities—national and linguistic—are easily malleable. Yet more than a century and a half of polemics over specific linguistic issues in Croatia, e.g. the orthography and the role of dialect words in the standard language, point to a different conclusion. That such issues resonate with a portion of the Croatian public across different historical eras shows that linguistic identity is not easily malleable. Rather, there is a path dependence—once the two strains of Croatian nationalism were established and became associated with a representative position on language—for example morphological orthography for ethnically specific Croat nationalism, Vukovian orthography for adherents of Yugoslavism—the issue would resurface whenever nationalist mobilization occurred. This suggests that premodern aspects of identity are more persistent than modernists allow. Even in the age of modern electronic communications, linguistic nationalism has persisted in Croatia, and indeed the preparation of an electronic Croatian National Corpus has become a means of reinforcing Croatia’s linguistic identity. Even in an age of globalization—or more accurately Europeanization—Croat linguists, literary figures and politicians work to portray a very specific national identity, one which is tied to language and which connects them with the West and downplays their connection with the Slavic, Orthodox East. These ties reinforce rather than attenuate national identity, at least for the time being.
Despite these caveats, it is clear that since the mid-nineteenth century, linguistic differences in themselves did not drive Croatian nationalism. Rather, they became a symbol and both factions of Croatian nationalists pursued language policies which would reinforce their own ideologies. In the concluding chapter, I will explore how this finding can be reconciled with the conclusion in chapter 3 that language was the primary causal factor in the rise of the Illyrian movement.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis was motivated by two apparent paradoxes: the importance Croatian nationalists placed on distinguishing their language from Serbian—despite few problems of intelligibility between the languages, and the lack of an interventionist language policy after Croatia’s 1991 independence—despite the apparent persistence and significance of the language issue. I gathered historical evidence about the case which I used to five major theories of nationalism: Ernest Gellner’s functionalist model of nationalism, Karl Deutsch’s communications-based perspective, Eric Hobsbawm’s state-centered model, Anderson’s soft-constructivist theory of nation as Imagined Community, and finally the Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolist school of thought. Focussing on each theories’ view of language’s role in nationalism, I used three loosely related epistemologies and methodologies to judge which one offered the best insight into the Croatian case and possibly other cases of linguistic nationalism.

In this final chapter, I first review the thesis’s structure and general conclusions. Then, after brief remarks on the experience of applying Campbell’s approach of matching multiple expectations derived from theory to a single case, I focus in greater detail on each model’s fit with the historical facts of Croatian linguistic nationalism. I then use these findings to develop two extensions to the theory of nationalism—one a synthesis of existing theories and the other a model of how nationalism adapts to political and technological changes. I conclude by suggesting further research which might be fruitful in testing the thesis’s findings on the role of language in nationalism and why such a program is important.
OVERVIEW AND GENERAL FINDINGS

The thesis’s introductory chapter explained the motivations for and methodology of the project. In chapter two I described the five theories to be evaluated and, following a method of case study research proposed by Donald T. Campbell (1975; see also Hall 2003), I derived observable implications from the theories, emphasizing each model’s view of language’s relationship with nationalism. In chapter three I detailed the emergence of the first Croatian national movement, Illyrianism, and then evaluated how the various theories’ fit this case (or sub-case). I also applied a Bayesian perspective by noting how information from the case shifts beliefs about the truth of a theory or its sub-theories. Lastly, I evaluated each theory on how well each could explain salient facts of the Illyrian case, especially facts not directly related to the theory’s proposed causes.

The fourth chapter dealt with language’s role in three subsequent periods of Croatian nationalism: the “second wave” of the latter half of the nineteenth century, characterized by the split between the unitarist Yugoslavists and the Pravaši proponents of a narrow Croatian state; the fascist Ustaše regime of the World War II era; and the period of struggle for and consolidation of an independent Republic of Croatia lasting from the late 1960s to approximately 2005. I evaluated the five theories on how well they could account for these subsequent developments and the changing role of language in Croatian nationalism. In addition, the data concerning language policy in the post-independence era was used to investigate how states adopt their language policies to external circumstances, specifically transnationalization and globalization.

In summarizing my findings, I first note that the questions motivating the thesis contain erroneous assumptions. It is true that for a century Croatian linguistic nationalism has been centered on strengthening the status of Croatian in relation to closely related Serbian and unified Serbo-Croatian languages. However, the Illyrian
movement was initially a movement against the Magyarization (Hungarianization) of Croatia, that is, against the imposition of a radically different language on the Slavic-speaking population. In its initial instance, Croatian linguistic nationalism was not focussed against a mutually intelligible language, and thus the case does not *prima facie* eliminate the functional aspect of language as a causal variable.

Nevertheless, further investigation of the Illyrian period shows that language’s functional role as a medium of communication is not causal in the way Gellner’s proposed in his seminal model of language and its relation to nationalism (see chapter two, page 26-29). His underlying cause—industrialization and the consequent societal need for workers educated in a standard language—is simply absent in Croatia until the close of the nineteenth century, long after the rise and fall of Illyrianism. Furthermore, in post-Illyrian Croatian nationalist movements, beginning with the rivalry between unitarist Yugoslavism and the “state right” faction, language takes on a more symbolic role as the closely related Serbian and the unified Serbo-Croatian become the chief “rival” languages. The lack of the proposed underlying causal variable also applies to Deutsch’s and Anderson’s models, as will be explained in detail below. In contrast, the trajectory of Croatian nationalism leads me to conclude that Eric Hobsbawm’s state-centered model (1992, 10) is the best fit for the historical facts of linguistic nationalism in Croatia. (see chapter 2, page 32-33) As in Hobsbawm’s model, state action (Magyarization) provokes the initial incidence of Croatian linguistic nationalism. Further occurrences are driven by movements wanting to control a state, though there is disagreement on what the extent of that state should be.

Despite this, Hobsbawm’s strict modernism is a bar to accepting his theory outright. State modernization was certainly a catalyst which spurred the initial phase of Croatian nationalism (Illyrianism). Specifically, state involvement in and modernization of education became an area of conflict regarding language issues.
However, premodern linguistic legacies are a significant influence on the trajectory of Croatian nationalism from the Illyrian movement onward. The Illyrians drew on the work of premodern Croatian lexicographical tradition when creating a standard language capable of expressing modern concepts. Moreover the premodern linguistic legacy aligns, over time, with two other premodern legacies, traditional Croatian “state right” and the Croats’ customary Catholicism. This suggests a synthesis of the state-centered model with a theory such as Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolism which allows for continuity between premodern cultures and institutions and modern nationalism, an idea which will be explored below. First, however, I present a more detailed review of each of the five theories and how they measure up against Croatian language-based nationalism.

**EVALUATING THEORIES ACROSS PERIODS**

This section contains a detailed evaluation of each theory against all four periods of Croatian nationalism. First, however I offer a brief comment on my experience of using Campbell’s pattern-matching method to conduct a historical analysis.

Campbell proposed matching multiple, observable implications of a theory (or theories) against case data, and Hall (2003) later added a time dimension, taking into account the expected sequence of events if a theory is correct. Each theory discussed here proposes a main factor which causes the emergence of linguistic nationalism (e.g. industrialization in Gellner’s model). Therefore when evaluating a theory I found it necessary to assign most weight to whether the case data matched the observable implications which directly related to the theory’s proposed main factor. This does not reduce the evaluation to a one factor or variable analysis; applying Campbell’s approach makes it possible to see where a case “fits” a particular theory and where there is a mismatch. This in turn facilitates conjecture about confounding factors which might cause the mismatch. For example, from the
matrix found on page seventy-five (75) of chapter three it appears that Gellner’s model fits the Illyrian case well. Yet as discussed above, the low level of industrialization—Gellner’s critical causal variable—in Illyrian-era Croatia means that the theory must be either discarded or significantly qualified or modified to explain the case.

Campbell’s approach to evaluating cases shows precisely where theory does not match reality, making it possible to propose mechanisms which could account for apparent discrepancies between the model and historical experience. Turning again to Gellner’s theory, it might match the Illyrian case without significant modification if it could be shown that planned economic modernization leads government to institute elementary education before an area becomes industrialized. This would lead to the events Gellner proposes—for example, the introduction of elementary education and subsequent conflict over the language of instruction—before actual industrialization of a territory, accounting for his theory’s generally good fit with aspects of the Croatian/Illyrian case. However, the literature shows the Hungarian ideology and policy was about loyalty to the state and assimilation of non-Magyars to Magyar culture rather than developing industry in peripheral areas such as Croatia (Denes 1993; Tihany 1969). Coupled with a lack of industrialization in Croatia until the twentieth century, eight decades after the Illyrian movement’s beginnings, there is no evidence that planned industrialization caused Croatian nationalism and thus no support for his modification of the Gellnerian model.

Moving beyond the Illyrian era, the Gellnerian model fails because its stress on the functional aspect of language means it cannot account for the changing goals of Croatian nationalists. The drive to end Magyarization certainly could be explained in terms of functional communication, as Hungarian and Croatian were not mutually intelligible. But because Croatian was (and still generally is) mutually
intelligible with Serbian, Croat opposition to political and linguistic merger with the Serbs cannot be the result of functional linguistic disadvantage. Resistance to the joint South Slavic, shtokavian-based standard language was due not to any economic or political disadvantage caused by difficulty in communicating in the unified Serbo-Croatian, but rather to the perceived need to defend an important symbol of Croatian nationhood: the language.

The evaluation of Deutsch’s model follows much the same logic as that of Gellner’s. For Deutsch communications networks are key to the emergence of linguistic nationalism. As such links expand, a battle emerges between peripheral language groups and the more economically advanced urban populations which speak the dominant language. The result of these struggles is largely determined by demographics; language groups in the hinterland that possess sufficient numbers of speakers will be able to resist assimilation—linguistic and otherwise—into the dominant group. In Croatia, both during the Illyrian era and well into the latter nineteenth century, the communications infrastructure was rudimentary, with railway lines reaching Zagreb only in 1862 and Rijeka in 1873 (Lampe and Jackson 1982). Just as the case with physical communications, population mobilization (in Deutsche' meaning of a literate public exposed to large-scale media) remained low in Croatia well past the emergence of Illyrianism and even during the battles between Yugoslavism and the “state right” movement. Moreover, for Deutsch the ability of a dominant group to assimilate a linguistic minority is largely a matter of demographics, with small groups being swallowed up by numerically dominant populations. In the various phases of the Croatian case, however, the Croats have been able to resist being absorbed by populations—first Hungarians and then Serbs—several times bigger than their own (Vocelka 2003). While this successful resistance is easily explained—Croats were concentrated in their historical territories—Deutsch’s model does not account for such subtleties.
Anderson’s theory of the nation as “Imagined Community” fails because Anderson’s most important language-related factor, the emergence of mass print media—is in the Croatian case the result, not the cause, of nationalism. The printed word did not lead to a passive build up of a sense of national identity, rather print was used actively to promote national ideology. Publishing in South Slavic languages was not a profitable venture but rather one driven by ideology, the most significant examples being Gaj’s newspaper and literary review. Likewise, Serbs in Croatia set up newspapers such as Srbobran (founded 1881) in order to promote their vision of national identity (Biondich 2000).

Moreover, the logic of Anderson’s “print capitalism” would indicate that printed languages expand to sharp linguistic borders; in the South Slavic case to boundaries with Magyar and German speaking areas. The failed Illyrian language would have conformed to this model, especially if Slovenian and Bulgarian could have been included. In actuality, rather than various dialects merging into a common standard language spoken over a wide area, South Slavic became differentiated to the point were even very similar, Shtokavian-based South Slavic tongues are considered separate languages. This is precisely the opposite of what the “print capitalism” model would predict. One aspect of Anderson’s model does fit the Illyrian case—the idea that the career trajectories of promising students and young professionals creates a sense of national identity among this provincial elite. However, the Croatian data make it less likely that the language-related aspect of Anderson’s theory, that the printed word brings forth the “Imagined Community,” is a general phenomenon.

I explained above why I conclude that Hobsbawm’s state-centered theory of nationalism and language’s role in nationalism has the best overall fit with developments in the various eras of Croatian nationalism. Yet this model too has difficulties. Language persists as an issue in Croatian nationalism in both its unitarist
and nationalist manifestation. This calls into question Hobsbawm’s assertion that language is used instrumentally by politicians to create divisions where none otherwise exist. The Illyrian movement’s initial version of Croatian linguistic nationalism did exhibit practical concerns such as improving the technical capability of the language and choosing a dialect which could unite various confessional groups, thus meeting their era’s threshold requirement for national population (see chapter three, page 71). The same, however, cannot be said for Starčević’s reaction to unitarist South Slav language politics. Language is not used instrumentally as a unifying factor in Pravaši ideology; rather it is a reflection of Croats’ history as a people. Adherents of both ideologies developed language policy to conform to their political ideologies, but at the same time they saw politics as a way to preserve an important national characteristic—the language.

Hobsbawm’s model also dismisses premodern roots to modern nationalist movements. This contrasts with Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolist theory, which emphasizes the importance of deeply rooted ethnic myths and memories. In all periods discussed in this thesis, various Croatian nationalisms drew on premodern legacies to delimit what the eventual Croatian (or alternatively, South Slav) state would look like. The similarity of the South Slavic languages, the basis for the Illyrian program, is a legacy of the Slavic migrations into South East Europe. The Illyrians also drew on the tradition of South Slavic lexicography and literature of the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation in creating their language.

The “state right” faction, on the other hand, looked mainly to Croatian political history—a history they saw as stretching back to the Middle Ages—to justify their drive for an autonomous Croatia. Its language policy was influenced by that political history. The fascist Ustaše movement of the World War II era did not put much emphasis on history. They did, however, align their politics with Croats’ traditional Roman Catholic religious identity. In general, however, they simply
asserted that the Croats were separate from other South Slavs, and that just as the Croats were a distinct people, the Croatian language was a distinct idiom. Looking at the post-independence period, nationalist Croats have stressed the roots of Croatian political and linguistic identity, roots which are entwined, in the early Middle Ages. They also connect this legacy to what they see as Croatia’s longtime membership in the Western European cultural sphere.

In all the periods discussed there is a premodern element to the nationalist program. Ethnosymbolism is only theory of nationalism under investigation here which attributes significance to premodern identities; therefore, only ethnosymbolism matches the Croatian case in this important area. The trajectory of Croatian nationalism clearly shows that language’s role as a symbol became more important over time. Ethnosymbolism sees language as having a symbolic role in national movements, connecting the putative nation with its past; ethnosymbolism’s implications therefore match the Croatian case in this area.

However, ethnosymbolists position that language is not a primary cause of nationalism but a secondary phenomenon does not accord with the significance of language to Croatian nationalists across history. Moreover, the path of Croatian nationalism does not fit with the ethnosymbolist emphasis on revival of folklore and the (re)discovery of epic literatures. Rather, the Illyrian movement drew on Croatia’s linguistic legacy to produce a modern language fit for the tasks of governance. The sort of epic and folkloric literature which the ethnosymbolists see as creating an ethnonational consciousness did not appear until relatively late in the Illyrian movement. Even post-independence, the Croatian nationalist narrative is more tied to premodern Croatian political history than to a mythic past.

The forgoing findings point to a possible synthesis of Hobsbawm’s state-centered model of nationalism with elements of ethnosymbolism. The following section sketches such a synthesis, focussing on language’s role in the model.
My analysis of the role of language and nationalism in Croatia concludes that Hobsbawm’s theory should be supplemented with the ethnosymbolist insight that there is continuity between premodern social structures and modern nations. Language is an element that ties the inhabitants of a modern polity to a collective past. Along with religion and premodern political legacies, it plays a key role in the alignment of politics with culture that characterizes nationalism, both shaping and reflecting the trajectory of national movements. The state is central to national movements. But judging from the Croatian case, national projects which ignore premodern legacies face an uphill battle.

The historical data presented earlier show that the Illyrian movement did place a great importance on language, and did draw on premodern linguistic legacies—especially the work of Catholic, South Slavic-speaking lexicographers. Yet in their zeal to oppose the expansion of Magyar at the expense of Slavic they ignored the reality that Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs, and Muslim Bosniaks—the three peoples who share the Shtokavian South Slavic dialect—had divergent political and religious legacies. In reacting to Illyrianism and its successor Yugoslavism, Starčević and the Pravasi sought to align the Croats’ premodern political legacy with linguistic boundaries, devising a Croatian which would clearly separate Croats from Serbs. However the Pravasi were hostile to a third source of Croatian identity, Catholicism. Only with the rise of the fascist Ustaše did Croatian nationalism align with Catholicism; they dropped the anticlericalism of the Pravasi but embraced Starčević’s views on a distinct Croatian people with their own distinct language.

In the postwar period the assertion of specifically Croatian religious and political legacies was tainted by its association with fascism, as was the advocacy of a distinct Croatian linguistic identity. Yet, by the late 1960s, within a generation of the end of the war, intellectuals were confident enough to defend the language against
what they saw as creeping Serbianization, part of a larger assertion of Croatian political, cultural and economic interests. This shows the continued resonance of the language issue. By the time of socialism’s collapse and the emergence of an independent Croatia, however, the international situation had changed. The socialist world had always looked upon Nationalism with suspicion; by the 1990s the West also viewed its overt expression with alarm.

Croatian nationalists, as members of the independence movement and later as government officials, had to adapt their program to this new external reality. They did not abandon a narrative of a distinct Croatian language and polity which was deeply rooted in the past—a message similar to that of the Ustaše. Rather, they modified the national discourse to emphasize how the Croats had long been participants in Western intellectual, cultural and political history, and how that participation was often in the medium of their South Slavic language. They found ways of using non-governmental or quasi-governmental institutions to propagate this message, as well as to carry out an Ausbau program to heighten distinctions between Croatian and Serbian. Such indirect language planning helped the Croatian government to avoid accusations of excessive nationalism and associations with the direct language planning (through the State Language Office) of the fascist era (chapter four, page 133).

The above analysis shows the importance of the state in using language policy to align linguistic identity with other aspects of national identity, exactly as expected from Hobsbawm’s model. Furthermore, the state must also adjust its language policies to reflect international realities. Yet nationalist actors in or out of governments are also constrained by factors originating before the advent of modernity. The Illyrian program and its unitarist progeny sought to create a linguistic identity which overrode premodern Croatian legacies. These programs eventually failed, while the strain of Croatian nationalism which reflected these
factors succeeded. This finding, if repeated in studies of comparable cases, shows that Hobsbawmian theory needs the addition of an ethnosymbolist appreciation for the power of the premodern in shaping political reality.

**FURTHER RESEARCH: RATIONALE AND PROGRAM**

Having argued that the case of Croatian linguistic nationalism shows the need for a synthesis of Hobsbawm’s state-centered model of nationalism with elements of ethnosymbolism, I now present a brief explanation of the practical importance of this finding and a sketch of a research program which might confirm or refute it.

“The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism.” (Hobsbawm 1992) Hobsbawm’s statement is an explicit, if slightly obscured, presentation of the modernist assumption that because nationalism is the product of modernity, its power will fade as societies move into the postindustrial, postmodern age. Conversely, if nationalist sentiments are based on premodern aspects of culture, if they are formed over the longue durée and persist across varying regimes, it seems likely that nationalism and its associated problems will continue even as the Western world, and others, abandon the industrial economy.

This case study has shown that Croatian nationalism, in its linguistic program as well as in other aspects, is indeed rooted in premodern elements of culture. Moreover, the eventual winning version of Croatian nationalism (i.e. a narrow, non-unitarist nationalism) had stronger congruence to the premodern culture than the rival unitarism, a congruence that became tighter over time. Despite radical changes in economic and social structure, the narrower, more rooted view of the Croatian nation persisted. This gives cause to doubt a key modernist tenet. National identities are not so changeable as modernists believe, and have a force independent of relatively transient economic and social structures. Indeed, the previous chapter
shows that nationalist actors can adapt language programs to meet externally imposed constraints. Presumably they can adjust to internal economic and social constraints if so required.

Does the Croatian case reflect general tendencies in the connection of language to nationalism? As noted in the introductory section on epistemology in the first chapter, the creation and politicization of national identity is a big and slow-moving phenomenon (Pierson 2003). In-depth case studies that examine individual national movements over the course of decades or centuries will be particularly fruitful in discovering the answers to that question.

Several journals—among them Nations and Nationalism, National Identities, and Nationalism and Ethnic Politics—frequently publish such studies, and monographs offer even more in-depth material on individual cases. Yet much of this scholarship is descriptive; one way forward in accumulating knowledge would be to review such cases with an emphasis on critical variables derived from theory, as I have attempted to do here. Students of nationalism might increase the value of such work by conducting meta-analyses of cases along the Bayesian lines suggested by Jack Goldstone (2003), with each case shifting or strengthening a priori expectations regarding factors suspected of contributing to or shaping nationalism.

More specifically related to this thesis, further research might seek to examine cases of linguistic nationalism that are, at first glance, similar to the Croatian. The case of Slovak and its status within Czechoslovakia would be one such case; did language play as large a role in the creation and eventual breakup of that polity as it did in the Croatian case? Did linguistic nationalism emerge in Slovakia before or after the advent of industrialization in that territory? Were Slovaks disadvantaged economically or politically within Czechoslovakia because of their language? Was language used instrumentally by Slovak national leaders to mobilize the population, or is there evidence that the primary goal of nationalist politics was to preserve
Slovakian language and culture? All of these questions involve variables discussed in this thesis with regard to Croatian linguistic nationalism. The Slovak case also has the advantage they were an ‘non-historical’ nation, with none of the Medieval state tradition of Croatia, thus helping to control for an important variable. Findings from similar cases, for example Macedonian and its relation to Bulgarian or Hindi versus Urdu in Northern India, could be aggregated to build up a more general picture of just how nationalism is related to language.

In addition to further case studies, there are opportunities for more in-depth research on the Croatian case. I have focussed on Croatian and South Slav nationalists and their programs; comparison of both movements with anti-nationalist supporters of Hapsburg rule and their views of language would isolate factors which were important for nationalists rather than for nineteenth century politicians in general. It may be, for example, that both groups saw economic advancement through industrialization to be necessary, but disagreed as to whether such advancement was possible under Austro-Hungarian rule. Likewise comparison of attitude towards language of the moderately nationalist Croatian Peasant Party during the 1930s with those of the Ustaše movement could provide insight into the relative importance of economic and cultural factors in promoting national solidarity.

From the perspective of policy-oriented political science, a quantitative study of how language legislation has changed after the initial nationalist phase of Croatian independence—i.e. after the electoral defeat of Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union in 2000—would give insight into the pragmatic politics of post-Cold War nationalism. A more linguistics-oriented perspective might build on the work of Maciej Czerwinski (2003), which uses content analysis to determine in what areas of Croatian society and among which ideological factions neologisms and other linguistic innovations are being adopted.
F**inal Thoughts

Two decades ago the breakup of the socialist bloc thrust nationalism into newspaper headlines. Since that time other social phenomena—globalization, migration, religious fundamentalism—have eclipsed nationalism in the public’s attention, and even scholarship on nationalism has receded in importance. Nevertheless the Croatian case shows both that cultural identities, especially linguistic identities, have important consequences for politics. Indeed such consequences can be deadly. The Croatian case also shows that nationalism can emerge, subside, and reemerge. It shows that one version of nationalism can provoke a rival vision of the nation, and that these rival views can contest against each other over an extended period of time. In the Croatian case at least, the more conception of the nation with closer connections to premodern legacies emerged victorious. This vision aligned the political, religious, and linguistic conceptions of the Croatian nation. Scholars and policy makers would do well to heed the durable attachments to language that many peoples display, and how that attachment can shape political outcomes.
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