Show simple item record Neuburger, David Thomas Jerome en 2013-05-07T16:52:39Z en 2013-05-07T16:52:39Z en 5/7/13 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (pages 42-43). en
dc.description.abstract Philosophical theories of personal identity often tacitly assume that either the properties which make us Persons are easily divorced from our bodies, or, that our being Persons is one-and-the-same with our being human beings. While there is broad support both scientifically and philosophically for the contention that our being Persons is at least in part contingent on the proper development and functioning of our brains, the lack of consensus as to the manner in which the brain and mind relate to engender a Person has made the question of personal identity particularly intractable. One theory, called Emergence, posits the mind is engendered by, but not reducible to, the actions of the brain. In this thesis, the consequences for our conception of personal identity are explored given an Emergentist conception of the mind/body relationship. Mainline psychological and bodily continuity theories are rejected in favor of the Systemic Approach, which contends there must exist both psychological and bodily continuity for a Person to remain the same Person over time. en
dc.format.extent vii, 43 p. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Arts and Letters en
dc.relation.hasversion MICROFICHE COPY, no. TH-17366, available in Archives. -- 1 sheet en
dc.relation.requires Mode of access: World Wide Web. en
dc.relation.requires System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. en
dc.subject.lcc B9.2 en
dc.subject.other TH-17366 en
dc.title Emergence and the problem of personal identity en
dc.type Thesis en
dc.contributor.department Philosophy en Master of Arts (M.A.) San Diego State University, 2013 en
dc.description.discipline Philosophy en
dc.contributor.committeemember Francescotti, Robert M. en
dc.contributor.committeemember Weston, Thomas en
dc.contributor.committeemember Armor, David en

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