

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN REVOLUTIONS

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

San Diego State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Political Science

by

Arby Eivazian-Tabrizi


Fall 2012

SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY


The Undersigned Faculty Committee Approves the

Thesis of Arby Eivazian-Tabrizi


The Role of Foreign Intervention in Revolutions



Ahmet Kuru, Chair
Department of Political Science



Ronald King
Department of Political Science



Hank Johnston
Department of Sociology

8-13-12

Approval Date

Copyright © 2012
by
Arby Eivazian-Tabrizi
All Rights Reserved

Restoring the Kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us...I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have no choice but to wipe them out.

– Otto van Bismarck, 1st Chancellor of the German Empire 1871-1890

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Role of Foreign Intervention in Revolutions

by

Arby Eivazian-Tabrizi

Master of Arts in Political Science

San Diego State University, 2012

The intention of this thesis is to use qualitative methods to investigate the role that foreign interventions play in revolutions. Within the thesis, I assert foreign intervention as the primary independent variable to explain the outcome of revolutions, which is the dependent variable. Bahrain, Libya, and Syria are used as case studies to illustrate this phenomenon. How did the Libyans successfully oust Qaddafi while the Bahrainis failed to overthrow their monarchy? I argue that the Libyans succeeded because they had help from foreign states during their revolution; whereas in Bahrain, the protesters and revolutionists worked against foreigners who supported the government and were subsequently forced to cease their efforts. Syria is an unusual case because there is foreign intervention and support for both sides, rebels and state, which helps explain why the situation has become a stalemate. I employ structural realism to analyze the power of strong states and explain why the revolutions ended with such acutely different outcomes. The theoretical claims put forth by structural realists illustrate that strong nations will take action to increase their regional and international security. During a revolution, these states pursue their own interests by interfering in the domestic affairs of others and offering support to their allies and opposition their foes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	v
LIST OF TABLES	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	viii
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION	1
Different Explanations	2
Limitations	7
2 METHODOLOGY, MEASUREMENT AND TERMINOLOGY	9
Explanatory Variable Operationalized.....	9
Concepts.....	13
Cases	17
Methods.....	18
Contributions to Existing Knowledge.....	20
3 AN EVALUATION OF EXISTING LITERATURE.....	22
Revolutionary Theory	22
Realism	33
4 CASE STUDIES	37
Libya	37
Bahrain	43
Syria	46
5 CONCLUSION.....	55
REFERENCES	60

LIST OF TABLES

	PAGE
Table 1. The Side a Foreign State will Support During Times of Instability	5
Table 2. Factors for Success for Foreign Intervention.....	6
Table 3. Levels of Support	12
Table 4. Deaths in the Arab Awakening.....	15
Table 5. Depravation Constant and Controlled.....	16
Table 6. Skocpol's Analysis of a Social Revolution in Sequence	25
Table 7. Analysis of Libyan Revolution	38
Table 8. Analysis of Failed Bahraini Revolution.....	46
Table 9. Analysis of Ongoing Syrian Revolution.....	50

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A small group of professors have made a tremendous impact on my academic life. I would not have pursued and successfully completed a graduate degree had it not been for their guidance and expertise. I would like to recognize them for their contributions starting with my committee members, Professor Ahmet T. Kuru, Ronald King, Hank Johnston, and professors that influenced me prior including Manoutchehr Eskandari-Qajar, Rachel Howes, and Jennifer De Maio.

In addition to the professors, I would like to acknowledge the people in personal life. Writing a thesis is a lonely and, at times, strenuous endeavor. I am greatly grateful for my family and beautiful fiancé who have supported me unconditionally with their moral and intellectual support during this process.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In today's complex world there are many intricate links that connect us to major phenomena all around the world; or as Thomas Friedman (2005) wrote, the world is flat. Thanks to technological advances, information instantaneously circles the globe—something that has never before been done in history. It was only a hundred years ago that communication between continents took several weeks. Yet, during that same course of history, there was something monotonous about the way the world operated. Arguably, the world operates today in a similar fashion to how it operated before. The protests associated with the *Arab Spring* are similar to those that took place after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Anderson 2011). The Industrial Revolution, the discovery and utilization of fossil fuels, and democratic principles all spread throughout the world relatively quickly—many times through revolutions. Religion, language, and race have not acted as barriers to change and neither have borders. Today, like in the past, revolutions are fought between two sides: governments and the local populations. What has changed is the level of support from foreign powers and the sophisticated methods in which they are executed.

In contrast to the past, foreign actors, rather than foreign ideas frequently influence today's revolutions. Martin Luther questioned and resisted the Church's hold on political power. "Protestantism provided the ideology both for the rejection by the rising middle classes of the claims of monarch and aristocracy, and the acceptance of different states, each sovereign in its own domain" (Halliday 1999, 194). He instigated change, and the tradition of divine right of kings vanished shortly thereafter. Adam Smith's (1776) theories on economic mechanisms helped spread capitalism throughout new governments that were recently born. Political change however, came through rebellions and oftentimes violence.

Ultimately, the only thing that has changed is the rate at which change takes place – it happens much more quickly today. Due to increasing efficiencies in information flow, foreign aid can be better tailored toward allies. In addition, global power is centralized more now than it has ever been before; there is only one superpower remaining, making it

unipolar world, and making the desired direction of change more attainable. Power is imperative to survival because all states experience a certain degree of insecurity. At any given point, a state may face various forms of threats against its sovereignty, which is why it strives to expand its power in order to send the message of deterrence to its competitors and quell its domestic unrest. Once the beginning stages of change are set in motion, outside states today are able to act quickly and more effectively than ever before, which results in increase of the probability that the outcome will end in their favor.

This thesis serves as an assessment of revolutions' international dimensions and implications. A revolution has many domestic causes; in fact, it is nearly always a native phenomenon at the beginning, yet it is never an occurrence entirely isolated from the rest of the world in its later stages. Global foundations always influence domestic policies and issues, and as a consequence there are repercussions to other states not directly involved. Protest movements frequently spread to other nations with similar institutions and demographics. Global causes can range from non-direct factors such as fluctuations in market commodity prices, economic crises, and industrial competition on one end to more hands-on methods like foreign intervention. Foreign intervention can include political, economic, and material support for allies, and/or executing blockades and sanctions against foes on the other hand. An even more direct approach includes military backing. The following research will specifically analyze a selection of dimensions of the international relations' arena with respect to revolutions – including how and why states support various groups during rebellions and what they hope to achieve from doing so.

DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS

There are two lenses through which one can examine the dimensions of a revolution. As previously stated, one is domestic, or state-centric approach, and the other is through the lens of power, or realism. Both will be considered and reviewed in following study. For the state-centric approach, theories regarding domestic protest movements and rebellions will be applied, while realist theories will be used to analyze the international factors, specifically foreign intervention by the strong states.

Insecurity exists in the world partly because there is no world government with the coercive capacity to prevent aggression and usurpation (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979;

Zakaria 1998). It is, in essence, an anarchic world, similar to the wild, where the strong survive and the weak accept the conditions that are forced upon them. Also, when one state increases its military capabilities, its relative strength is increased compared to another state. This environment makes states even less secure. The state, the sole actor in global events, is placed in a framework of continuous self-help. In the steady state of suspicion, states act strategically to increase their security by modernizing their economy and military, while diplomatically they hope to gain more friends and decrease foes. The ultimate goal is always to gain relative power (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). In order to achieve this, powerful states take action against or on behalf of states that are facing a revolution – with the ultimate goal of shaping the outcome in their favor. In other words, they meddle in other states' affairs for their own sole benefit. During intervention, the state will either involve itself with the central government or with the protesters and rebels. If the intervening state is allied with the government facing uprisings, it will help to maintain the status quo. If not, the intervening state will offer support to rebels through various means. Regardless of the foreign state's domestic politics, the end goal of meddling is always to increase security by extending power and gaining regional hegemony – during a revolution outside of a state's borders, a prime opportunity awaits.

Therefore, in many cases, the best way to explain the outcomes of revolutions is through foreign interventions. Great powers vary by size, but they all act similarly – regardless of what their domestic political structure looks like. States seek to maximize their power by helping their friends, whether through a central authority or a rebel movement. Likewise, they will oppose their foes, regardless of whether they are the government or protesters. The foreign state takes whichever side is in its best interest. The structural realist authors explain the phenomena of revolutions most accurately when looking at the international dimension. Writers such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), Stephen Walt (1996) and John J. Mearsheimer (2001) most accurately depict the dilemma states face when there are protests taking place in various nations. According to the structural realist, a state's leaders and its institutions do not matter much, if at all. As long as they are strategic about it, they will act to increase their security and international standing according to their power. As such, during a protest the foreign state, which is acting in its own interests, will meddle in the affairs of the troubled state to obtain a favorable outcome. If the foreign state's friends are in

the government, they will seek to subdue the volatility. On the other hand, if the central government is the foe, the foreign state will search for ways to increase instability. The foreign, or intervening state hopes to influence the outcome of a rebellion to its liking by playing whichever side, the government or rebels, it deems necessary to achieve that goal.

There is a cold war, or proxy war, that occurs at this time. The central governing authority, when required, will resort to violence, psychological warfare, and other methods in order to squash any challenge to its power. In addition, it will seek assistance from neighbors and friends abroad. Likewise, the protest movement will do the same. The success of a protest movement depends on whether the rebels receive support from a benefactor (O'Neill 2005). Therefore, the best method to explain the phenomenon of revolutions, at least in some cases, is through realist theory, and specifically, foreign intervention, where nations are caught in a world of "no world" government and every state has to fend for itself. In order for a state to increase its strategic security in this environment, it must support its allies and fight its foes. As long as the state has the capacity, when a rebellion takes place in another state, whether the government is a friend or a foe, the aid sending state will always seek to influence the results in order to maximize its regional and global position.

As realists argue, the anarchic global system promotes individual states to act aggressively and seek opportunities to increase their power through other states (Mearsheimer 2001). However, they sometimes cooperate, too, when it suits their interests. "State rationality means that states possess consistently ordered goals, and that they select strategies with the purpose of achieving these goals in the largest possible measure. International cooperation involves the voluntary adjustment by states of their policies in such a way as to help each other reach a mutual desired goal (Keohane 1984). Each state experiences constant insecurity; because of this feeling of inferiority, it persistently seeks to increase its advantage in the international realm. It can do this alone, but when cooperation seems the best way to increase its position within the international political sphere, it will create economic cooperation regimes and military coalitions. This is the argument that realists put forth with respect to revolutionary situations. One way to increase one's status is to intervene in another state's affairs; any state will constantly look to interfere in a vulnerable nation's affairs, during times of instability, in order to bring about a more favorable political climate. The aid sending state will seek to aid its allies, as illustrated in

Table 1. A state does this simply because meddling is another tool in its arsenal against insecurity. The urge to gain more power occurs naturally within states, and it is in their best interest to pursue such power because gaining more power deters aggressors and increases political security.

Table 1. The Side a Foreign State will Support During Times of Instability

Environment	In Power	Protesters/Rebel	Beneficiary
Revolt	Allies	Foe	State
Revolt	Foe	Ally	Protesters/Rebels

Conventional wisdom tells us that there are repercussions to political authorities if they do not respond to their subjects' wishes. Research suggests this is not the entire picture. Revolutions do not occur solely because leaders are incompetent or intransigent, although it increases the likelihood in many cases. Another important link is between the degree of social deprivation, which I assume is always there to varying degrees, felt by its citizenry and the level of unrest. The greatest factor that contributes to whether or not a government is dismissed is whether or not it receives support from a foreign state, once an insurrection has begun. When a relatively strong state has not sent support to the government that is in trouble then the likelihood of a revolution will increase. The troubled state's internal politics do not matter, but what does matter is whether there is one, two, or many superpowers involved. The strong states' relative power compared to the others matters as well. These factors, which are external, will affect the way in which a state acts. Its internal political structure will not affect its actions.

The cases popularly called the *Arab Spring* are important to examine. The observations selected from the *Arab Spring* for this research are Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. These observations have been chosen based on the variability of their outcomes (failed and successful revolutions) and the similar time in which they took place (during the *Arab Spring* beginning December 2011). They are relevant to today's geopolitical atmosphere, and if there is a clear victory, the balance of power will substantially be affected in the Middle East. These states are not the only ones that will be affected by the turmoil.

More research should be done regarding revolutions with respect to what makes them more successful and what makes them fail. This study is specifically about how foreign states seek to control the direction of a revolution and the way the revolution is dispersed and exported, rather than its original inception. Most studies on revolutions have focused on what causes their successes or failure, in addition to their sociological and political implications. The contribution of this thesis into the literature is its elaboration of the mechanisms through which the major power intervention during a particular point in the revolt causes the government to either stay in power or to collapse. Outside powers can control whether the revolt crosses the threshold – causing a revolution or on the contrary, suppressing the people’s wishes of reform and revolution to maintain the status quo.

There is a potential for larger inferences despite this study only having a small number of cases. Nearly all studies on revolutions rely on domestic politics, economics, and sociology. The focus should be shifted to external factors, such as powers vying for greater influence. This is significant because a revolution is very complex and has many nuances. There needs to be studies that examine more angles. Studies conducted in this manner have the potential to educate opinion-makers and the public in what the best course is during turmoil. For example, in a revolutionary situation, a thorough study needs to take place before judgments are made. The neighboring states in most scenarios will be involved in order to support their friends and oppose their foes. The outcome of the fight usually involves a winner who is best able to balance three factors: (1) support from home, (2) support from abroad, and (3) lack of opposition from home and abroad, as shown in Table 2. If the movement, or government, is able to garner support from home and abroad, while simultaneously fending against opposition domestically and from abroad, it is much more likely to succeed.

Table 2. Factors for Success of Foreign Intervention

Population’s Sentiment Toward the Regime	Foreign Support Toward the Regime	Likely Outcome
Support	Support	Regime Survival
Oppose	Support	Will Vary
Support	Oppose	Will Vary

As currently constructed, a revolution is an overthrow of a regime through various means. Maybe it is because of the definition that the true cause of revolutions is unknown. However, there are many variations to this. A revolution can be exported through different means. A foreign state can impose sanctions to hasten the collapse of the institution, and to give protesters and dissidents an upper hand. Other methods of forcing revolutions, which can be more overt or covert, are also employed and depending on the study, they may or may not be considered in the study based on the author's definition of a revolution. Incidentally, the domestic causes, as well as the international dimensions for revolutions and its methods are just as important, when they are coupled together in a study, yet they are rarely studied that way. Additionally, at what point does a revolution, which nearly always has a degree of foreign influence, whether due to inflation from international commodity prices, sanctions, or direct foreign intervention, become a war or civil war? When a covert operation fails, the intervener will seek more overt methods to unseat the ruling regime. As escalation increases so do the chances for protracted wars and civil wars. Therefore, the question arises, at what point does support for revolution become an act of aggression and war? The so-called *Arab Spring* has all the components of a revolution and war.

LIMITATIONS

There are some limitations to this study. The thesis is focused on macro-state level foundations. There is not a unit level of analysis or any analysis focused on the agent. In other words, the specific leaders of each country are not at the heart of this project. This study has no variation in outcome if a specific leader is better at what he does than someone who is awful. For example, in the case of Syria, if Bashar al-Assad was a military genius and could effectively squash any movement against his regime with limited assistance from foreigners, then the theory I have laid out here would have a valid counterpoint. The theoretical foundations I have used do not factor in the agent. Second, just as Neo-Classical Realists argue, a unit level of analysis as well as the global power structure should be part of the equation. There are some variations in how a state develops its foreign policy. If a state is strong and has the ability to gain a footing in a particular aspect of foreign policy, the domestic state structure, or legislatures and president, needs to come to an agreement and effectively devise a plan in order to capitalize on it. A leader like Stalin would not have had

to deal with these constraints on democratic institutions. Structural Realists are not concerned about the domestic features, other than their economic and military strengths in relation to others in the region and the world. Therefore, this thesis is limited because it does not factor in the agent and does not utilize a unit level of analysis.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY, MEASUREMENT AND TERMINOLOGY

In this study, foreign interference is the explanatory variable; it determines the outcome, or the dependent variable, which is revolution. Regardless of whether the intervening states support the government or the dissidents, the amount of foreign intervention is positively related to the outcome of the aid sender's interest. Foreign intervention also works in conjunction with relative power—the foreign state's power, the domestic state's power, and the power of the rebel movement. For example, the more state A interferes in state B's domestic affairs, the higher the likelihood, as long as everything else is equal, such as state C and D are not interfering, that state A's goals are achieved. This was the case for Libya and Bahrain. In both scenarios, the foreign aid was successful in achieving its goal, partly because there was not significant foreign support for the opposing side.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZED

The outcomes of revolutions (dependent variable) are determined, at least to a large extent, by foreign intervention (independent variable) from strong states seeking security. These cases are selected based on the variability on the independent and dependent variables. They are different in outcomes, in methods, geography, and ideologically. Bahrain was a failed revolution, Libya was successful with varying foreign intervention, and the study of Syria is ongoing. It is a small-n study. As such, each observation includes a detailed analysis. It is simply not enough to say revolutions take place when people are upset. There are numerous problems with that statement because there are citizens distressed in every country, yet the state continues to function smoothly – many times without protests. When the foreign state supports the domestic government, the revolution is more likely to be thwarted. When the foreign state supports the rebel movement, the revolution is more likely to succeed. The interference can take different forms and intensity. The intensity ranges from low to high: for example, (1) low level of meddling is verbal condemnation or support of the authority's legitimacy or conduct of the rebels during a conflict. A more intense category is (2) medium

level, which includes economic sanctions, spy networks and no-fly zones, and a propaganda war to decrease support for one side and increase support for the other. The (3) strongest level of international interference in a rebellion is overt operations, which has the aspiration of either materializing or quelling the revolution. Overt operations occur in many forms. Foreign soldiers within a country's borders can assist in a government overthrow or the foreign state can provide sophisticated weaponry to the governing body. Therefore, it is not sufficient to argue that rebellions are a result of a disenchanting community; there are many more factors involved.

Foreign support comes in many shapes and sizes, and it can be geared toward the central government, the rebel movement, or in some cases, both sides receive aid from different states. The methods of intervention and their level of intensity, derived from *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* by Bard O'Neil (2005), increase the likelihood of a revolution, when support is directed toward the rebels, regardless of how much popular support a government has. The opposite is also true; the likelihood of a state's ability to survive an insurrection increases when the government receives aid from a foreign entity. O'Neil writes that unless the central authority's repressive mechanisms are paralyzed, due to international sanctions, incompetency or other reasons, an insurgency will need foreign support in order to compete with the government. The state is nearly always better equipped with weapons, has better soldiers, and has more money than any group seeking to oust a standing regime. "Unless governments are utterly incompetent, devoid of political will, and lacking in resources, insurgent organizations must normally obtain outside assistance if they are to succeed" (139). However, the efficacy of foreign aid is relative to the strength of the state versus its rebels. In the 1980s, both Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from an attack by rebel movements. The Kurdish rebels received aid from Iran in their fight against Saddam Hussein who was receiving foreign aid from the U.S. In Afghanistan, the government was supported by the Soviets while the U.S. supported the insurgency. In both cases, the side receiving stronger foreign aid won. Foreign support is needed in nearly all revolutionary situations to either follow through with the revolution or quell the rebellion.

Providing moral support is the lowest way in which a foreign government can assist a protest or insurgency movement. Moral support is considered to be public or private statements made about the actors that show a bias toward one side or the other. If the

statements are in favor of the insurgent movement, they can include an exact description of the grievances by the agitators, which the movement itself may not have the means to do. It can also include condemning the government for injustices built into the system and for the way it is treating the protesters. Through moral support, the outside body that is supporting the protesters can verbally articulate significance of the movement by paralleling it to a larger global force that includes ending government abuses (O'Neill 2005). Moral support is currently being provided in abundance to those partaking in the *Arab Spring*. Leaders of nations, even those that may be susceptible to domestic protests themselves, are blessing the movement by morally supporting the cause. However, moral support is a low intensity measure of interference in a foreign state; political support is one level higher.

Interfering in a foreign state by providing political support to protesters or insurgents is the second level in which an outside body can provide foreign assistance. It is far riskier to the provider but more damaging to the targeted state. By providing political support to a protest or rebel movement, the provider jeopardizes future political concessions and negotiations, especially if the movement is unsuccessful. Politically supporting a movement can include United Nations declarations or statements that establish an alliance with the movement. This type of support is considered medium level on the scale of interference because it is not as direct as foreign support can get. It is certainly more assertive than staying passive through moral support, but it is not as invasive as material support, which typically results in providing communication technology, surveillance, money, and weapons.

Assisting in an insurgency is at its highest level when the foreign state provides the protesters with material support and sanctuaries. This type of support includes weaponry and also more basic needs such as food, medicine, housing, communications, radio stations, financing, as well as political, ideological, and administrative training (O'Neill 2005). Interfering in a state's affairs by providing material support is a serious action. However, in many cases, it is less aggressive than taking direct action against the adversary—the chance of interstate war is low. A country can also provide a protest or insurgency group with a sanctuary. After fighting, it is advantageous to have a safe place to retreat to where the domestic government forces cannot cross. Many times a border serves this purpose because a the revolution-facing state may not want to cross into its neighbor's territory; the sanctuary state will see that as an abrasive act of war. Many Afghani rebels seek safety in Pakistan;

U.S. troops usually refrain from crossing the border. Providing material support and a sanctuary for protesters and rebels can most directly help the movement achieve its revolution. Table 3 summarizes the three levels of foreign support, low, medium and high.

Table 3. Levels of Support

Low (1)	Moral support, showing sympathy for cause, e.g., public statement justifying the allied party's cause
Medium (2)	Definite and vigorous support for the allied party's ultimate goals in diplomatic field and media, sanctions on party of enemy
High (3)	Material support such as weapons and communications equipment providing a sanctuary, military support

Foreign support is more effective in the outcomes of rebellions when it is coming from states that have power. The term power is relative in its context. John Mearsheimer (2001) emphasizes how great powers seek to “maximize their relative power” (21). One can only measure a state's power, or relative power, when it's compared to another state. When a state has relative strength over others in the region, it can impose its will onto the weaker states. Relational power is measured by comparing various states' strength in resources such as “population, industrial and military capability, raw materials, endowment, etc.” (Walt 1996, 55). A nation with a greater population, a stronger military, and abundant resources is likely to be the superior state who can impose its will and possibly encourage or defeat a revolution within other nations.

The concept of revolution that will be used in this framework, needs to be clearly defined. Samuel Huntington (1968) says, “A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence” (264). Huntington's definition not only includes a regime shift but also fundamental shifts in the country's beliefs and structure. It is very narrow, and one can hardly apply this very strict definition to many revolutions, as he clearly delineates that a war of independence, like the American Revolution, is not in fact a revolution. Hank Johnston (2011) uses a more

favorable definition than Huntington, but it is still not perfect. Johnston asserts, “revolutionary movements seek to replace the state, not simply influence it. Because states are not easily moved, because they have armies, because they occupy territories, and because they represent powerful entrenched interests” (136). However, it does not account for a shift in political order. Crane Brinton (1938) utilizes a more encompassing definition. He describes it as “a drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto not running the government” (4). Brinton’s description fails because it assumes revolutions occur within a specific time frame. Stephen Walt’s (1996) definition of revolution has a wider breadth and is therefore satisfactory for this study. Walt states that, “a revolutionary *outcome* occurs when the challengers are able to defeat the old regime and erect a new and fundamentally different political order” (20). What all authors agree on is that at some point, there is a struggle between a government and its dissidents that results in the replacement of the head of state. However, Walt’s definition proves to be better when juxtaposed to the others because the others fit only a slim amount of cases or leave an aspect of revolution out. In this study, I will use Walt’s definition because it is more exhaustively comprehensive and mutually exclusive than other definitions.

CONCEPTS

Grievances and a certain extent of deprivation exist within all protest movements, and are therefore, not good measures of revolution success. Deprivation in the form of unemployment, a wealth gap, and limited access to political office is always present, albeit at different levels, in almost every country. As a result, angst is sure to follow, but a successful revolution is not guaranteed. These topics are an underlying theme in all revolutions and present throughout all case studies analyzed in this thesis. Assuming grievance and deprivation are always constant, they are controlled throughout this study. Rather, a state’s strength and its ability to utilize its security forces is far more important in deciding the fate of a revolution than the degree of grievance or deprivation. A state finds its strength in its ability to stay united against domestic and foreign threats. A strong state can weaken if the ruling elite is undecided on how to properly respond to dissidents, rebels, or protesters. As Skocpol (1976) writes, “not oppression, but weakness, breeds revolution. It is the breakdown of a societal mode of societal control which allows and prompts societal revolution to

unfold” (181). Aside from grievance and deprivation, which are always present, the domestic state’s ability to quell the protests, or in other words its relative power, is a better predictor of the outcome of a revolution.

The three observations in this study have other similar traits being controlled. All the countries included have a large youthful population. “Sixty percent of the region’s people are under thirty, twice the percent of North America” (Hoffman and Jamal 2012, 169). Of that population, a growing amount uses the internet. “Youth groups were able to create secret cyber communities away from the eyes of the authorities” (171). They have unelected leaders and Arab-Muslim majorities. “Having witnessed the failures of Islamist authoritarian regimes in Sudan, Iran, the Taliban’s Afghanistan...they are not interested in theocracy but democracy with greater equality” (Esposito 2011).

There are other contentious issues that ought to be divulged for the purpose of this study. For example, in the literature about revolutions, scholars debate about whether to call foreign intervention simply support or when to label it a full out invasion against the alleged *oppressive* and so-called *genocidal* government. One is a humanitarian maneuver, the other an act of war. How a scholar views the actions is frequently based upon his state’s alliances with the revolution-facing domestic state and the aid-sending foreign state. The actual type of foreign intervention isn’t the problem here; it’s how the scholars and commentators are labeling the intervention (e.g.—using liberation v. invasion) that creates the controversy.

The terms ally and a foe are frequently employed when discussing foreign intervention during a revolution. They are liquid terms because an ally may be a friend one day and an enemy the next. A state’s political calculations frequently change due to the global environment, structure, and foreign policy goals. Therefore, for the purposes of this piece, an ally is a state or a group of political dissidents who are either ideologically similar to that of the aid-sending state or are simply seen as a hedge against a foe. A foe is a state or group of political dissidents that can pose a material threat to the existence of a given state. One state’s ally can be another state’s foe.

While Walt’s (1996) definition of revolution is wide, he still acknowledges that revolutions can be categorized by violence. In the case of the *Arab Spring*, violence has been used in order to achieve objectives. The rulers and the ruled have used weapons in order to reach their goals. Revolutions are sometimes violent like wars. “Revolutions are usually

characterized by violence. Force is often needed in order to oust the old regime, and even when it collapses without a fight, there are likely to be violent struggles among competing revolutionary factions” (20). As Table 4 (The Economist 2011B) displays, with the exception of Libya, the cases presented in this study are characterized by the fact that they are all the most violent struggles in the region according to deaths per million population. Libya, to date, has experienced between 10,000 and 30,000 deaths out of 6.4 million population, a conservative estimate of 1,562 deaths per million population (CBS News 2011). Although many movements begin nonviolently, they often, eventually, become violent, as state apparatuses and sponsors push the situation to where violence becomes a necessity.

Table 4. Deaths in the Arab Awakening

Deaths in the Arab awakening					
Recorded deaths during protests/clashes between civilians and government security forces					
To July 12th 2011 (Libyan figures unavailable)					
Country	Status	Population, m*	Number killed, minimum	Deaths per m population	Period of unrest
Syria	Ongoing revolution	20.4	1,300 [†]	63.7	Mar 2011 - present
Egypt	Regime toppled	81.8	846	10.4	Jan - Feb 2011
Tunisia	Regime toppled	10.5	219 [‡]	20.9	Dec 2010 - Jan 2011
Yemen	Ongoing revolution	24.1	200 [§]	8.3	Feb 2011 - present
Bahrain	Uprising crushed	1.3	29 ^{**}	23.0	Feb - Jun 2011

Sources: Amnesty International; Egyptian Ministry of Health; OHCHR; UN Population Division; press reports

*2010 estimates †Excluding security force members
[‡]Of which 72 reported linked to the unrest or in custody
[§]Excluding deaths resulting from clashes between security forces and other armed groups
^{**}Of which 16 reported linked to the unrest or in custody

Source: The Economist. 2011B. “The price of protest, so far.” July 14.

The domain of the hypothesis is the twenty-first century Middle East, specifically in countries who have experienced the most violence during the *Arab Spring*. Each case takes place in a different part of the same region. Syria is South of Turkey and in the North West Middle East, Bahrain is in the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Peninsula, while Libya is in North Africa. All of these events, in these locations, have fundamentally changed the global political landscape. Syria and Libya, to date, have been the most violent cases in the *Arab Spring*, with Bahrain being the third most violent, according to Table 4 (The Economist 2011B). Technological advances, including communication by the way of Facebook, Twitter, and mobile phones, have dramatically influenced the relationship between the rulers and the

ruled, a key feature in all the observations. Therefore, these observations have been selected because their extreme level of violence and they occur after the prevalence of these social media networks.

It is possible to generalize the outcome for other potential future cases because deprivation, regardless of the level, is easily exploited, especially by utilizing the internet and social media. News of protests now spreads in nanoseconds; in addition, foreign states are able to more-effectively fund protesters and rebels. Without adequate foreign support of their own or sufficient security measures, which include shutting down the internet, fighting propaganda wars, squashing protests and fighting armed rebels, the state is more challenged to handle situations of deprivation exploitation.

The amount of aid is relative because a protest movement needs enough aid to gain symmetry with the strength of the state in order to have a viable stake in the outcome. On the other hand, a nation is most likely to have a failed revolution when the population is feeling deprivation but do not have major backing from a foreign entity. The asymmetry of power between the protesters and the state is relevant; if a state is a hegemon facing small isolated protests that only have backing from a relatively small state, the foreign assistance will not be enough to cause the state to collapse. A nation is most likely to have a successful revolution when the population is feeling deprivation, which is nearly always felt, *and* when the protesters are backed by a foreign government, as shown in Table 5 for an illustration of concepts.

Table 5. Deprivation Constant and Controlled

Deprivation	+ Faction receiving Foreign Aid	= Outcome of Revolution
Constant	+ Government receiving foreign aid	= Revolution Failure
Constant	+ Protesters/Rebels receiving foreign aid	= Revolution Success

In the three following cases, the dependent, or explanatory, variable is the outcome of revolution and the independent variable is foreign intervention. Grievance and deprivation will be controlled along with violence—in all the observations they are present and assumed. The observations are based on foreign intervention tipping numerous contentious domestic issues between groups.

CASES

The twenty-first century Middle East is selected because the region has geopolitical significance. A tremendous amount of natural resources is extracted and exported from the region. It is significant theoretically because this area can shed light on the scholarly understanding of core-periphery relationship, or the relationship between the colonists and their former colonies. The states facing revolution are old European colonies; now, their old rulers are playing a significant role in the process of deciding the next ruling institutions. They are also experiencing intervention from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is comprised of Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The GCC is a strategic coalition that provides each other with security when they are facing insurrections or other threats. The GCC is an alliance that is quickly progressing toward self-reliance; as a result, intervention is less needed from non-GCC states. The Arab Gulf's GCC states are now funding and supporting rebel groups in regions outside of their traditional zone in order to bring about more friendly regimes.

All the cases, located within the Middle East and North Africa regions, are predominantly Arab-Muslim with unelected leaders and facing movements that are striving for a democratic government. This study answers why the revolutions succeed in Libya but failed in Bahrain. This study also discusses what the outcome may be for Syria, based on what has happened in Libya and Bahrain. The best way to find a reasonable correlation is to process trace the recent historical record and do a match comparison. There are many similarities in these nations, demographically and institutionally. Among these most-violent cases of the *Arab Spring*, foreign intervention has also been heavily prevalent. As stated, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria all had, or continue to have, extensive foreign intervention; however, they have not had the same outcomes. The UN executed strict sanctions on the Libyan government, while NATO, the Western states and the GCC funded, supported, and provided military aid that paralyzed the ruling regime and enabled the rebels to take over the institutions. As a result, the focus of this study is foreign state intervention and how its use explains the outcome of revolutions.

In Bahrain, the opposite occurred. Foreign intervention was used to support the ruling regime's stay in power. In the small island state, the GCC cracked down on prodemocracy protests. The protest movement was crushed with nearly no global condemnation. This

observation suggests that strong states can correct the course of popular revolts if they act in the interests of the domestic state's affairs. Bahrain is still the only state in the *Arab Spring* that has successfully fought off a revolution. That is because the GCC and Bahrain are allied with NATO, the most powerful international alliance; hence Bahrain was not internationally condemned for harshly cracking down on protesters.

In the third case of Syria, the *Arab Spring* protests have grown substantially and violence has escalated. On one side there is the state, ruled by the minority Alawites, who control key institutions and are allied with Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. On the other side is the majority Sunni population, who is receiving help from the GCC and Western states. During the time of this writing, the revolution in Syria is ongoing. This is the only observation that has so far been a stalemate. Russia and China rejected tough UN sanctions because they supply weapons to the ruling regime. NATO and the GCC have sided with the opposition; they hope to gain a new ally when the ruling regime is unseated. However, due to unsuccessful UN sanctions and NATO's reluctance to send military support, there is a low chance of regime change. The current regime remains united and able to fiercely repress the movement.

METHODS

The methodology used in this analysis is composed primarily of match comparisons. I use match comparisons of the countries' populations (nations) and their states (institutions). A small-n study is best because it is essential that a great deal of information be provided to the observer. These observations are similar but also unique in some ways. The independent variable is similar—all cases have heavy use of foreign intervention, but it is different because the intervention is specifically tailored in each case. The dependent variable is also different, the actual outcome of the revolution. "The use of cases from both ends of the dependent variable makes this a more sophisticated design" (Geddes 2006, 106). When studying revolutions, there needs to be variance in the independent and dependent variables. In one observation, Syria, the dependent variable is yet to culminate. However, the principals employed to analyze Libya and Bahrain can still be used to explain why Syria has yet to realize a definite outcome. The background information provided in this match comparison

study is more suitable than a large-N study that does not delve into the details of each observation (Goldstone 2003).

Here, cases are chosen based on both the dependent variable, the outcome, as well as the independent variable, how much foreign intervention is given and to whom. Foreign intervention can vary in size and strength, from simple condemnation to full out invasion. Foreign intervention can include condemnation, international sanctions, monetary and material support to opposing forces, spy networks, and no fly zones. At its strongest, it includes sending ground troops to achieve the objective of the aid-sending state. When selecting cases, the author should be careful to choose both failed and successful revolutions with varying degrees and depths of foreign intervention.

The explanatory variable directly influences the variation in the independent variable. In the case of Bahrain, foreign interference was used to support the state and quell the uprising. Libya, too, had heavy foreign interference; however, in this case, the meddling came to assist the rebels in their fight against the state, resulting in a successful revolution. In both cases, Bahrain and Libya, the foreign interference was successful in achieving its objective, supporting the state when it wanted to or overthrowing the government when it needed to. In a certain respect, the Syrian observation serves as an anomaly. The outcome is less clear-cut because there is heavy interference on both sides; the rebels and the state both receive support from outside states. The side with heavy foreign intervention comes out on top as the winner; but in cases where both side have equal foreign intervention, a stalemate exists until one side can significantly outweigh the other.

The *Arab Spring* has affected many countries in the Middle East. Yet, some countries have been immune from this phenomenon all together. GCC states have been an island of stability in a relatively tumultuous region. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other GCC states, have a very high standard of living for its citizens. These states are home to massive state-run oil and natural gas reserves. As a result, they are Rentier states (Yates 1996) and they are some of the highest GDP per capita countries (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). Aside from wealth, another reason why the GCC states have not experienced protest movements is due to Al Jazeera. The Arabic, state-run news channel portrays Qatar and its allies very positively. The Qatari-sponsored news program is hostile to states that are not allied with GCC states. They are frequently critical of Arab regimes, as they were of

Qaddafi in Libya, Mubarak in Egypt, and Al-Assad in Syria (RT 2012). While these states may experience threats of revolution in the future, their wealth and state-run news channel provide a significant cushion.

These selected observations are branded as being part of the *Arab Spring*, a term used to describe the recent uprisings in the Middle East and inspired by the 1968 rebellions in Prague against Communist rule known as the *Prague Spring*. The popular narrative about the *Arab Spring* says that it is an organic, grassroots, pro-democracy movement that should have the West's assistance in achieving new modern institutions. However, some evidence presented in this study discredits the idea that it is an all-grassroots movement. The *Arab Spring*, regardless of its origins, is turning out to be a power struggle among the states in the region and those outside of the region.

The struggle to control the *Arab Spring* is waged by two sides. They support regime change in some countries but oppose them in others, creating a hypocritical and inconsistent stance. On one side are the GCC and NATO. On the other side is a much looser coalition consisting of China, Russia, and Iran. In Syria, these two camps are set up accordingly; however, it was more nuanced in the other cases. In Bahrain, China and Russia were not overly concerned with supporting the opposition. It was only Iran providing minuscule moral support (level 1) for the protesters. The GCC, with greater strength, helped the government stop the rebellion. In the case of Libya, the GCC and NATO provided foreign aid (level 3) to the rebels, but the Libyan state did not receive much support from China and Russia, other than temporary obstruction of UN Resolution 1977, which provided justification for GCC and NATO invasion. Each side of the camp is acting strategically to increase their security, as realist theory suggests.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE

This research will contribute to the existing literature on revolutions because there are some facets that have been largely overlooked. King, Keohan, and Verba (1994) designate that this type of study ought to make an explicit contribution to the literature. Acknowledging that essential points of view are neglected in other studies, this study will contribute to the literature in a methodological manner. The present literature on revolutions is filled with a plethora of theories and ideas, mostly domestic-state-centered. Some execute quantitative and

large-N studies in order to incorporate a vast array of cases spanning continents and epochs; and, therefore, make assumptions on how to predict revolutions across the board. These studies are very important in understanding the causes of revolutions; however, they do not paint an entire picture. I believe it is important for this study to take place because it directly contributes to the literature by taking a specific and international examination of revolutions.

Many mainstream political scientists, such as Ted Gurr (1968), still believe that it is the *street* or the *people* with grievances who create revolutions, but this is not always the entire picture. Gurr concludes that the cause of revolutions is majorly controlled by deprivation. It is not that grievance is entirely absent from revolution, but grievance alone is not enough. Foreign intervention, in some manner, is also necessary. Ian Bremmer (2006) writes that nations fail because they do not reform and keep up with globalization. He is correct in many aspects, but he does not give any account of a nation's fall due to foreign intervention, like in the cases of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Mohammad Mossadeq's Iran (Kizner 2003), and the *Arab Spring*. Bremmer and Gurr both agree that the most stable countries are those that are either mostly free or mostly closed. The states that run the risk of revolutions and instability are those that are somewhere in the middle – hybrids of autocracies and democracies. Both Bahrain and Syria are moderately closed states. Bremmer and Gurr do not take into consideration sanctions, military threats, media propaganda, covert operations, or military actions. Although their research appears accurate, it is also narrow in scope because they are not telling the whole story. Therefore, the range of conclusions should be extended to include foreign factors, which this study does.

CHAPTER 3

AN EVALUATION OF EXISTING LITERATURE

One camp of scholars that I will survey looks at revolutions through the state-centric approach, which examines domestic factors; then, I will analyze the argument that realist scholars put forth to explore if whether power politics through international relations is the cause for why some revolutions succeed and others fail. The elements that encompass a revolution are studied extensively by Jack Goldstone (1991), Barrington Moore Jr. (1966), Said Arjomand (1988), Theda Skocpol (1976; 1979), Fred Halliday (1999), and Ted Gurr (1968). They examined various stages of revolutions, using the methods of quantitative and qualitative match comparisons to explain the phenomenon. These authors focus largely on domestic factors, using state-centric methods to analyze revolutions. They study a state's ability to compete internationally in economic and defense sectors. Yet global influences like foreign intervention have, by and large, been omitted from their studies. Skocpol accurately describes the international features of successful revolutions in terms of competition and state collapse. Yet, she, along with the others, falls short of focusing on the scope of direct hands-on methods used by foreign states to promote revolutions. The other method of analysis is of those who study international relations through the lens of power politics, in other words, realism. Kenneth Waltz (1979), Robert Jervis (1978; 1993), Fareed Zakaria (1998), and John Mearsheimer (2001) argue that relatively strong states force their control onto weaker states. Weak states will attempt to resist, but unless they have adequate alliances, they will succumb to the will of the strong.

REVOLUTIONARY THEORY

The first of the scholars who uses the state-centric approach, Jack Goldstone (1991), studies revolutions in a more nuanced way. He analyzes revolutions in England, France, the Ottoman Empire, and China. He believes that there is a link between revolutions, population growth, and inflation. In *Revolution and Rebellion*, he focuses mostly on domestic factors. According to his theory, those in the upper class fight to maintain their position and survive

in the status quo. A revolution is “likely to occur only when a society simultaneously experiences three kinds of difficulties...Financial crisis...elite divisions... and high potential for mobilization of popular groups” (xxiii). More recently, in an article for *Foreign Affairs*, Goldstone (2011) touches on the key ingredients of a successful revolution. Goldstone references how U.S. intervention caused the Philippine president to lose power in the 1980s. “International pressure can also turn the tide. The final blow to Marcos' rule was the complete withdrawal of U.S. support... When the United States turned away from the regime, his remaining supporters folded, and the nonviolent People Power Revolution forced him into exile” (12). Many peripheral states rely on foreign support to stay in power, and when the power is pulled, the structure crumbles. He later states that in order for a revolution to be successful, a state must look

irremediably unjust or be ...[seen as a] threat to the country's future; elites (especially in the military) must be alienated from the state and no longer willing to defend it; a broad-based section of the population...must mobilize; and international powers must either refuse to step in to defend the government or constrain it from using maximum force to defend itself. (Goldstone 2011, 8)

That last part of his thesis is at the heart of this project, as it alludes to the importance of foreign states in influencing the outcomes of revolutions, and the *Arab Spring*. Goldstone's statement is significant because it implies that revolutions, at least the ones in the *Arab Spring*, are not just domestic and homegrown—they have an international dimension.

It is true that there are inherent domestic problems facing many of the states in the Middle East. For instance, food prices due to global inflation have increased 32% in 2010 alone (Neuman 2011). In addition, the number of young people is increasing, as is their rate of unemployment. The subsidies that provide government jobs for the young college-educated have been pulled in the last decade, leaving them with little hope. The increase in poverty is also coupled with massive opulence by the elite upper classes.

Elite division creates an increased potential for revolution. In Egypt, which had a relatively peaceful revolution, the people, along with the security forces, became disenchanted with the regime because they were left behind while the elite got richer. “In [Egypt], military resentments made the military less likely to crack down on mass protests; officers and soldiers would not kill their countrymen just to keep the Ben Ali and Mubarak families and their favorites in power” (Goldstone 2011,13). Egypt proves that state leaders need to be unified and security mechanisms stabilized when faced with protest movements.

“Mubarak’s downfall was the result of three factors: increasing corruption and economic exclusion, the alienation of the youth, and the 2010 elections and divisions among the Egyptian elite over questions of succession” (Shehata 2011, 26). In this case, a high degree of foreign intervention was not necessary because the state crumbled cowardly under domestic pressure.

Taking a similar stance, Theda Skocpol (1976; 1979) argues that revolutions are largely a domestic phenomenon. The social revolutions of 1789 France, 1917 Russia and 1911 China emerged from political crises caused by the structures and environment of Ancien Régimes. The population overcame the monarchical governments because the governments were caught dumbfounded and unable to effectively respond. The old regimes were in a state of paralysis because they were stuck between an agitated population and increased international competition. The three monarchies had to deal with losing international prestige and declining power while simultaneously having to engage with more competitive and advanced rivals at home. These states reached a breaking point when they were unable to respond to the growing unrest at home and international pressures, when elites and the lower classes united to bring down the state.

The probability of revolution increases significantly if a society is chiefly agricultural, which indicates a state’s inability to modernize. Again, her theory of revolution is centered around a predominantly domestic cause. The theory goes on to say that fragments of the elite, usually nationalist radicals will support the peasant movements in order to bring in a fresh government that will be more responsive to modernization.

The primary orientation of these marginal elites was toward a broad goal that they were with all those, including traditionally prestigious bureaucrats, whose careers, livelihoods, and identities were intertwined with state activities: the goal of extension and rationalization of state powers in the name of national welfare and prestige. (Skocpol 1979, 202)

Skocpol places a heavy emphasis on domestic causes, like modernization or lack thereof, and how they impact both the peasantry and elite classes.

Skocpol (1979) then implies that all social revolutions follow a certain patterns, as illustrated in Table 6. Her theory is that at a critical point in the state’s life, a series of events takes place. A breakdown occurs and there are divisions among the elite, which creates political unrest; some elites choose to break away from the institution and back the rebels, hoping to secure a strong status in the new movement. Domestic politics may have played a

Table 6. Skocpol's Analysis of a Social Revolution in Sequence

International Competition	State Paralysis	Mobilization of Masses	Military Mutiny	Successful Revolution
------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------	-----------------	--------------------------

dominating part in those three revolutions. However, her findings carry less weight because the scope of her study was limited; her study looked at three events that all had the same dependent variable, a successful revolution.

Skocpol (1976; 1979) briefly mentions that a disenchanted population does not directly equal revolution. The peasants can cause some divisions among the ruling elite, but it takes more than their revolts to overthrow a government. There is a little more to her story; a state is exhausted and vulnerable amid competition directly caused by a strong foreign country. Large peasant protests occur simultaneously, and the paralyzed government is unable to respond. "Their revolts destroyed the old agrarian class relations and undermined the political and military supports for liberalism or counterrevolution. They opened the way for marginal political elites, perhaps supported by urban popular movements, to consolidate the Revolutions on the basis of centralized and mass-incorporating state organizations" (1979, 112). The competition, which can include losing a war, pushes the domestic state to strive for something it can never achieve; as a result, the people take advantage of the weak moment and overthrow their governments.

Similarly, Fred Halliday (1999) believes revolutions are more likely to occur after losing a war. He argues that inter-state wars and revolutions are related because after a war, the central government weakens, and losing decreases the morale of the citizenry. Leaders who lose wars are seen as incapable of ruling and weak. Yet, wars are frequently encouraged by elites to manage civil political conflicts – such as preventing other opposition figures from taking power. In other words, interstate wars can hasten a revolution, if lost, and can serve to consolidate a revolutionary party's hold on power.

Rivaling states can also attempt to push other states into paralysis by initiating international sanctions and embargoes. Skocpol (1976; 1979) does not include this in her study since she is primarily focused on domestic factors. Although, sanctions are not usually successful on their own. Sanctions have only a 35% success rate when unaccompanied by other policies (Hufbauer, Shott, and Elliott 1990). When they are coupled with military

threats and invasions, the state typically crumbles, allowing the rebels to take over. This is one example of how revolutions can be provoked by a foreign state attempting to create division and paralysis among the ruling elites.

Skocpol (1976; 1979) is slightly cognizant of the international dimensions, like international competition, that occur prior to a revolution. She believes that it is the competition between states to modernize that creates a systematic change in the government. The theory explains that states compete with each other to industrialize quicker, to strengthen their military apparatus, and make their government as efficient as possible; and it is through this process that some states break down. However, she is mostly concerned about domestic causes like the actual transition into modernization, or lack of, which are her primary driving forces through revolutions. At this point in her study, the international dimensions end, and her focus then turns back to domestic variables.

Today in the *Arab Spring*, things go a little further. Now, there is a draw between the rebels and the security forces that is allowing foreign meddling to tip the balance of power to one side, and not just pre-revolution. None of the authors on revolution give sufficient weight to that phenomenon. They do not account for foreign intervention throughout the revolution process and are too focused on domestic factors. In most revolutions, however, interference plays a key role in breaking the stalemate and bringing victory to one side.

Adding to the theme of modernization as a cause for revolution, Said Amir Arjomand (1988) researched and studied the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in *The Turban for the Crown*. He studied the sequence of events that led to the exile of the Shah, or king, from Iran in 1979. He and Skocpol (1976; 1979) maintain that revolutions are mostly domestic-led. Iran, under the second Pahlavi Shah, began modernization in the 1960s by increasing the strength of the central government while simultaneously decreasing the influence of civil society, which many citizens had grown accustomed to over the centuries. His single case study concludes that modernization techniques are partially to blame for the Iranian Revolution.

As previously stated, being upset at the government is rarely enough to topple it. The Shah passed laws that went against traditional culture, which infuriated the population. The catalyst however, did not come about until Ayatollah Khomeini, the main opposition figure, further increased his agitation against the state and the secular Shah. While Khomeini maintained his confrontation against the incompetent government, assailing the Shah's anti-

Islamic laws and capitulation to Western ways, the regime slowly began to collapse partly due to domestic protests and partly due to inflation. Unlike Skocpol's (1976; 1979) understanding of what may cause a revolution, Iran had not engaged in an external war, the military was still intact, and did not have a primarily peasant rebellion; it included most segments of society. The central government was unable to act decisively against the rebel and protest movement; therefore, it led to a situation where they were no match for those looking to take over.

The cases for the revolution revolve around domestic features; yet, there were some instances where foreign states had some influence. For example, the Shah's subservience to the U.S., caused state paralysis. "The Shah was seriously compromised by his close and subservient association with the United States; and the American military and economic presence and the presence of a large European work force acted as a major stimulus to mass mobilization" (Arjomand 1988, 192). When the Shah sought permission from the U.S. to fight the protesters, he received mixed signals from the U.S. national security advisor and the U.S. Ambassador to Iran. As a result, the Shah's security forces were improperly able to respond.

As the Shah weakened civil society, he simultaneously deteriorated the middle class. The Shah also dismantled any unity among the classes. "Iran's new middle class proved incapable of concerted political action and was in no way ready to assume political leadership of the nation...[F]ollowing his policy of divide and rule, the Shah had succeeded in atomizing the new middle class...[T]he intelligentsia had been kept under close surveillance by the SAVAK" (Arjomand 1998, 112). As Barrington Moore (1966) wrote, there cannot be democracy without a middle class. The Shah eliminated the middle class, which was unable to recover after the revolution. According to Moore's analysis of democracy, this would explain why Iran's new government, post-revolution, looked more fascist than democratic. The Shah's attempt at modernization left many of the rural communities in disarray and upset over the central government; since there was division among the elite, the revolution was successful without much foreign intervention.

Although it is widely believed that revolutions are not isolated incidents, many continue to study them that way. Many scholars write about revolutions as domestic events and are unconcerned about the political and fiscal environments at the time like volatile

market commodity prices or foreign intervention. A determining factor in the outcome of a revolution is from where it originates. If it comes from the bottom up, the outcome will be communist. If it comes from the top down, it will be fascist. If it is done through the consent of the governed, it will be democratic. Moore (1966) assumes modernization is a given; it is bound to occur. He explains that there are alternative routes to modernization, and the way in which a state modernizes its agrarian sector greatly affects how it will face a revolution. He argues that when the bourgeoisie are weak, the revolution's outcome will likely be fascism; when the bourgeoisie are strong, the outcome will be a democratic, capitalist system. Therefore, to Moore, revolution is the mechanism through which modernization takes place. In other words, the system of government and agrarian influence are factors that will determine what the state looks like after the revolution; therefore, he is more concerned about the outcome of a revolution rather than the causes for it.

Continuing with the domestic factors of revolutions, Gurr (1968) focuses on the amount of deprivation felt by the citizenry and the options from which a state can choose to counter the protests. When a state is faced with large protest movements, research shows that the state must act decisively. The best way to respond is by offering a limited level of reform while severely suppressing the protests; a light crackdown will only make matters worse. It will reinforce the protestor's argument that the ruling class is hostile to public discontent.

Great importance is attributed in psychological theory and equally, in theoretical and empirical studies of revolutionary behavior, to the inhibiting effects of punishment or coercion, actual or threatened, on the outcome of deprivation. The relationship is not necessarily a linear one whereby increasing levels of coercion are associated with declining levels of violence. Psychological evidence suggests that if an aggressive response to deprivation is thwarted by fear of punishment, this interference is itself a deprivation and increases the instigation to aggression. Comparative studies of civil strife suggest a curvilinear relationship whereby medium levels of coercion, indexed for example by military participation ratios or ratings of regime repressiveness, are associated with the highest magnitudes of strife. Only very high levels of coercion appear to limit effectively the extent of strife. (1105)

Gurr focuses on the state's capability to quell protests through coercion. If there is a harsh reaction to civil strife, e.g. security forces open fire indiscriminately into a crowd, empirical data shows that it is effective in reversing the effects of deprivation. In other words, it squashes the movement similar to *shock and awe*. Ineffective, or low level coercion has a positive relationship with deprivation; it increases the amount of deprivation felt by the citizens and increases civil strife and protests. Therefore, in order to stay in power, the ruling

class must not waiver and must show extremely stiff resistance by exemplifying zero tolerance toward the protesters if it wishes to stay in power.

Yet, the problem of deprivation is that it is difficult to gauge and a challenge to measure. For instance, if a nation is facing a dual phenomenon of high inflation and increased wage gains, the effects of inflation will be subsided. Moreover, if the government is not seen as incompetent in the face of difficult challenges, the effects of deprivation are minimalized. That is why deprivation is a control variable and present in all the observations. Consumer sentiment and consumer confidence may be reliable methods to measure some sort of deprivation and may be loosely linked to living conditions, which may be a precursor to revolts; however, a thorough study has not been done, and this study does not seek to find that link. Nonetheless, Gurr (1968) describes deprivation as follows:

the theoretical proposition is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form. Relative deprivation is defined as actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep). The underlying causal mechanism is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response. (1104)

Deprivation is a key element of creating protests and civil unrest. If there is no deprivation and everyone is happy, it will be very difficult for a revolutionary movement or protest to take root. Nearly all foreign intervention will fail in a political revolution if deprivation is not present. While difficult to measure, there is a generally positive correlation between the number of protesters, their intensity, and deprivation.

Deprivation played a role in increasing support for the 1979 revolutionary movement in Iran. The price of the number one export product of Iran, petroleum, had been significantly reduced since the 1974 Yom Kippur war and the oil embargo ended. Iran benefited considerably from the war and embargo because it was one of only a few oil-producing countries that continued to sell oil to Israel and the United States, gladly at inflated prices. That boom drove a large amount of speculation and inflation. “The boom was short-lived. In just over two years, by mid-1976 expenditure overtook revenue and accumulated bottlenecks curbed the hectic pace of development. Official recognition... was a complete reversal of the arrogant self-confidence of December 1973 at the time of the Tehran OPEC Meeting”

(Graham 1980, 19). By the late 1970s, oil prices plummeted, and the rapid modernization plans of the Shah had deteriorated in the eyes of the public. Deprivation, in the form of inflation, was high, as benefits from modernization and state centered programs were unevenly distributed, and the protesters gained substantial momentum. Although deprivation alone cannot be attributed to revolutions, when it is coupled with incompetent leadership it can increase the likelihood of revolution.

In addition, the theory does not include, due to its scope, is the complications of geopolitics. Not every leader has the option to use every means at his or her disposal to stifle the protest movement, despite the monopoly on violence. There are external variables such as international norms by which weak states must live by. That is the circumstance when a state is outmatched by massive protests, a foreign state can bring the balance back by providing help to the state. On the other hand, if a state is receiving aid from a foreign power that supports the rebel movement, the aid may be pulled from the state as a consequence; or under the pretext of a *humanitarian mission*, foreign intervention can take place and bring back stability to the state. Additionally, sanctions can be executed to further hurt the state's economy. There can be international repercussions to a state for using force against a political uprising.

Cases of the satellite states of the former Soviet Union are prime examples of foreign intervention, not deprivation, determining the outcome of the revolutions. In Hungary, the democratic movement was crushed militarily by the Soviet Union. The U.S. did not intervene except by moral support, which was only in the very early stages of the revolution. Once it was clear that the Soviet Union was going to defeat the movement with a heavy hand, the U.S. stayed away in order to prevent a nuclear war.

As the events of 1956 proved, the Chinese not only supported but advocated Soviet intervention in Hungary...Ho [the Chinese ambassador to Hungary,] was forced to conclude that communist control over Hungary had ceased and that Imre Nagy's [the leader of the revolution,] policy of coalition with bourgeois parties would lead to the restoration of capitalism. (Radvanyi 1972, 23)

The Chinese, along with the Soviets (after being persuaded by the Chinese), decided that Hungary was moving too quickly toward the center. When they left the Warsaw Pact, Hungary had gone too far. The Soviet tanks came back for the second time, and this time they were not going to negotiate with the Nagy regime. Instead, they crushed the movement and replaced the government with one that was substantially friendlier to Moscow.

During the Revolutionary War in the United States, France supported the rebels, or the founding fathers, with money and some soldiers. Lafayette, the French Revolutionary, played a role in the American Revolution (Payan 2002). Had it not been for the physical support and funding from some European countries, the American Revolution may have taken a different turn. There are various important explanatory variables, such as foreign intervention. This is another example of how revolutions are not isolated to domestic politics.

The case of Iran is also viewed through an international dimension. The former Iranian government relied on political advice and material aid from the U.S. in order to stay in power and defend against opposition figures. Jimmy Carter provided moral support on New Year's Eve 1977 when he called Iran "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world" (The Justice for Iran Society 2009). However, support during the most treacherous time, late 1978, did not come and the regime withered away. With the new transitory government in place, the clerics and democrats vied for influence. America did not cut off relations right away because it believed doing so would only benefit the radicals. Rather, it maintained relations with the liberals and continued material support. As the radicals saw this taking place, they created another revolution by seizing the U.S. Embassy—where much of the communications between the Iranian democrats and the U.S. was taking place. Mehdi Bazargan and other liberals stepped down. The hardline clerics were able to write the constitution on their own, and they made it an Islamic Republic. The revolution succeeded, in the view of the clerics, because they interfered with the international scene by seizing the embassy and taking the occupants as hostage.

The consolidated Iranian regime afterwards attempted to export its revolution to other states, by means of foreign intervention. Aid was provided to groups of similar Islamic beliefs in order to gain new international allies. It began by offering moral and political support to various Shiite movements across the Persian Gulf and Lebanon. Saddam Hussein killed one of the beneficiaries, Sadr, a leading Shiite Cleric who was politically challenging the ruling Iraqi Baathist regime (Cockburn 2008). In Lebanon, forces of Hezbollah emerged out of the resistance movement against the Israeli occupation and were (and to certain extent continue to be) trained and equipped by the Iranian regime. Yet, despite Iran's attempt at foreign meddling, their relative strength was not a match to regional and international

powers. All of the revolutions failed because the domestic states aggressively countered the insurrections with Western support in some cases.

The independent variable throughout the cases in this study is that revolution success or failure depends on foreign support. The only time foreign support is not needed is when the opposing force (usually the central authority) is weak or paralyzed; when the government is strong, the only way to compete is with foreign aid. Regimes are typically better funded, they control or influence the media, and have sophisticated military capacities. Foreign support can cause the stalemate to breakdown or provide some parity between the two warring factions. In some cases, the revolutions are quick; other times, they work through attrition. The goal is always the same: change the government. The central argument is that the outcome of the revolution is dependent on foreign intervention; the more interference on behalf of the revolution, the higher likelihood of it being a success.

In today's world, the use of foreign interference influencing revolutions can be looked at in the context of the *Arab Spring*. What started in Tunisia and Egypt quickly spread to Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. A casual onlooker would believe that these movements are purely organic, from the bottom up; however, a closer look reveals that prior understandings of revolution and foreign influences apply. The event that provoked the *Arab Spring* was when a merchant set himself on fire in protest of the domestic situation in Tunisia, but despair alone does not create revolutions. In Skocpol's (1976; 1979) and Moore's (1966) understanding, there also needs to be a break with the elite or paralysis of the central government and support for the protesters. After Egypt, the wave of revolution next hit Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, cases that are worth a closer examination.

Revolutionary theorists study domestic factors, deprivation, and competition among modernizing states. They have an accurate depiction of what takes place within the borders of a state prior to a revolution and what a state can do to overcome a rebellion, assuming that they are strong enough. However, power politics and strong states frequently attempt to control rebellions in order to sway the international stage toward their end. Despite their vast examination of the nation they do not accurately apply the international realm of power into the equation.

REALISM

The other lens to view the outcomes of some revolutions is through power politics, specifically structural realism, or neorealism, because it focuses on the structure of global power. Structural realists are different from classical and neo-classical realists. They all agree that power is important; however, they disagree on why. The classical and neo-classical side consists of authors such as Hans Morgenthau (1978), E.H. Carr (1939) and Fareed Zakaria (1998), respectively. Morgenthau believes the reason why states act aggressively is related to human nature, *animus dominandi*. States compete for power, as do humans. They want power for the sake of power, and more is always better. In essence, nothing will stop a state from achieving endless power except another state. Zakaria states it slightly differently; he states his neo-classical realist argument as follows, “The best solution to the perennial problem of the uncertainty of international life is for a state to increase its control over that environment through the persistent expansion of its political interests abroad” (20). In essence, the argument is that in order to have security, a state must have offensive capabilities as well. The realist authors all agree that power dictates how a state will act in an anarchical world, but they all arrive at that conclusion in slightly different ways.

There are two types of structural realists, defensive or offensive; both are concerned with the power of the state. A defensive realist’s goal is to gain power to prevent others from taking over or having too much of an influence. States act aggressively not because it is in their nature but because the structure of the international arena provokes them to gain more strength in order to deter aggressors (Jervis 1978; 1993; Waltz 1979). They want to balance the power between themselves and others. The goal of an offensive realist is to have as much power as possible.

Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system. (Mearsheimer, 2001, 21)

Therefore, the state increasing its power capabilities is what matters most to both defensive and offensive realists. Power in this context is economic, military, and political power. Does the state have the economic capability to fund a military operation? Does the military have the advanced machinery to ward off intruders? Is the size of the military larger than the

rivals? Is the state's political position in the global community such that it can use it as an advantage in order to gain favors, or is the state a pariah? This pertains to revolutions because stronger states have more ability to overcome domestic insurrections and protests and relatively weak states can be overwhelmed solely on domestic factors. Most states fall somewhere between being too strong or too weak; therefore, foreign assistance is able to throw the balance of power toward one particular side.

There are many features of structural realism that make it different from other realist theories and how it pertains to revolutions. First, it applies the state level of analysis in examining why states act in a particular way. In other words, structural realists are not concerned about the unit level of analysis, such as deprivation and other internal political dynamics. A structural realist is only interested in the state's actions, strength, and motivations. According to a structural realist, a Republican or Democratic president will not differ much in the way they execute foreign policy; if the structural global system is the same and their relational power to others is kept constant, then the state leaders will act very similarly. Unit levels of analysis only explain miniscule events that largely do not fit into this realm of theory.

Second, structural realist theory emphasizes that there is no world government, at least not one with any real power. The international system is such that every state must protect itself against potential aggressors. They must each seek their own methods to achieve this goal (Waltz 1979). No state can call 911 and wait for an emergency response that will provide protection. "As the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must...the contest not being an equal one...but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you" (Harrison 2006, 44). It is a system of self-help. There is no guarantee that one state will defend another in any situation.

Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. (Thucydides 2000, 206)

The system of self-help leads to a security dilemma because as one state increases military capabilities, it makes the other state more insecure. As Robert Jervis put it, "many of the

means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others” (Jervis 1978, 169).

Third, structural realists look at the structure of the world to see how many great powers it includes. “Structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones” (Waltz 1979, 93). A world with only one superpower is unipolar, with two superpowers is called bipolar, and three or more is called multipolar. Each system of global condition has its implications. States will strategize and act according to the arrangement of power distributed in the world. A unipolar world is the most volatile due to inherent lack of balance of power; no state can stand up to the single-most strong power. Put simply, in a system with no global governance and a unipolar structure, the strongest state is more likely to engage in violent behavior because there is no state with the capability to stop it. The more power and resources the state accumulates, the greater its security for the future. “It has been widely accepted that bipolar systems are more stable than multi-polar systems” (Copeland 2000, 108). Realist scholars believe bipolar worlds are the most stable because there is a built in check on everyone’s power. Multipolar worlds are the most unpredictable. “In the great-power politics of multipolar worlds, who is a danger to whom, and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems, are matters of uncertainty” (Waltz 1979, 89).

Strong states dictate conditions to the weaker ones. History shows the reason they are weak is partly due to strong state manipulation. For example, a state can be shaped, at the hand of strong states, to include borders that incorporate ethnic groups who share a bloody past. Assimilating such groups can be extremely difficult, if not impossible. As a result, weak states become vulnerable to civil wars, insurgencies, and mass protest movements (Adams 2006). This unfortunate event is the result of having a history that includes the extensive intervention of great powers. Additionally, their political and economic structures are stunted in a way that prevents the state from gaining stability and power. When observing a state like Iraq, one can see the effects of having a state divided by three ethnic groups. Gertrude Bell and the victors of World War I may have intended to draw the map in a way that created weak states (Bell 2000). Therefore, the states could never gain their relative strength potential due to internal issues created by strong states.

The basis of this study lies in the fact that that revolutions are much more complex than traditionally believed. The revolutions spread quickly, as if they were timed. That may

suggest something about what these cases have in common. For instance, they have similar demographics, high unemployment, and a largely educated, sizable youth. They were all ruled by elderly, autocratic leaders who were out of touch with their populace, and the corruption infiltrated all aspects of the government, down the local levels (Anderson 2011). Specifically, the intricacies of power through the lens of international relations must be scrutinized. For instance, a relatively weak state can overcome the power dilemma by joining alliances with other states, which results in increased power. The case studies presented here seek to demonstrate, through match comparisons, that strong states can overcome protests and armed rebels when they are faced with insurrection. In contrast, a relatively weak state cannot overcome the protests and armed rebels if the movement has foreign support. As such, power needs to be added into the equation in order to more accurately understand why some revolutions succeed while others fail.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES

This study is not trying to say that *all* revolutions are orchestrated by great powers in order to increase their relative strength and attain more resources. Instead, it demonstrates, through the samples, that great powers will attempt to move revolutions in their favor when it is possible. The spread of protests throughout the *Arab Spring* began naturally in Tunisia; yet, it was influenced heavily by regional and international states in favor of creating or maintaining power. Revolutions are not always manufactured and exported, but when they jump borders, due to similarities in neighboring states and nations, they spread like wildfire (Beissinger 2006). Yet, similar to firefighters battling a wildfire, strong states attempt to manipulate the path of the fire in order for it to move in the direction they choose; they are not always successful, but many times they are.

LIBYA

States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemony, in other words, do not want peers. Thus the United States played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy.

—John Mearsheimer
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Power politics and foreign intervention ousted Muammar Qaddafi from power. The highest form (Level 3) of intervention against the Libyan central government was executed. Despite mainstream reports and general understanding, it was not domestic occurrences that single handedly defeated the tired, old dictator. That is not to say historical cleavages and discontent did not exist or that the protests were not real. The fact is that strong states took advantage of the discontent and deprivation to bring about a new government by paying, arming, organizing, and training the rebels. As Realism explains, the best way to ensure security is to increase one's strength. One of the best methods to achieve that is through military capabilities and victories. In the case of Libya's revolution, many foreign players

were involved in supporting the rebels (Barker 2011), including the GCC and NATO. One could process trace causes of the revolution back to 2003 and through the events that are more recent. The rise of Qatar, Al Jazeera, and the GCC continue to play a vital role in creating and reshaping the new Middle East/North African region. Yet, the traditional powers are still involved in interventions in the region by helping the rising states achieve new strengths (CBC News 2011).

As structural realists analyze cases, they look at two key factors. First, they examine the global power structure, as in, how many superpowers exist in the world. If there is only one, then it is a unipolar world, a term used to explain the phenomenon for which no other superpower exists to hedge the ambitions of the other. Second, a neorealist looks at relative strength; is the state stronger than its neighbors? Can the state fight rebels if foreigners assist them? These concepts are illustrated in Table 7. If it is a unipolar world and the given state is weak and unfriendly to regional powers, then the likelihood of an overthrow is increased due to power politics. The regional powers will aid rebels in order to bring a more friendly government to power. Libya found itself in this predicament; a weak state, in a unipolar world, where regional and global powers limitlessly assisted the rebels.

Table 7. Analysis of Libyan Revolution

Global Political Structure	Unipolar
Relative Power	Weak
Foreign Intervention	Aid to Rebels [High (3), material, military, UN Sanctions on State]
Foreign Belligerents	Supporting Rebels: NATO and Qatar

A rebel movement faces many problems when they are working against a government. They have less money, inferior weapons, less soldiers, and limited access to local media. Revolutionary leaders face a collective action problem when initiating beginning steps of a rebellion (Olson 1965; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). Why would an individual join a movement if they can instead free ride, avoid personal risks and gain the advantages that a revolution will bring (Goldstone 1994)? The problem is rooted in the fact that large numbers are needed to join the movement, in addition to foreign support, for it to be successful. One

of the methods of overcoming the collective action problem is through propaganda. A movement should tell its supporters and followers that victory is inevitable.

In addition to propos, a rebel movement can overcome the collective action problems by funding its members and new recruits. Monetary rewards give the individual a tangible incentive to participate in a rebellion. The collective action problem is harder to reverse if there is no money. Since rebels frequently do not control key sectors of society, they must rely on foreign monetary aid. In the effort against the central government, foreign monetary aid, in this case \$30 billion, directly funded the rebels by providing weapons (Meichtry 2011). Aid to the rebels coupled with sanctions against the central government makes monetary intervention especially powerful. The leaders of a rebel movement should tell its supporters and followers that victory is inevitable while maintaining a system of rewards for participation.

When the protesters, alone, called for the removal of Qaddafi in the early stages, it was hardly apparent to even the most adamant supporters that victory was possible. According to the International Coalition Against War Criminals, 519 peaceful protesters were killed and nearly 4,000 injured (The Economic Times 2011). The protesters and rebels were severely beaten down, killed, and brutally repressed by government forces. It was not until NATO forces, along with the GCC, provided weapons on the ground and air power surveillance to destroy government artillery that the playing field was evened. Only after foreign troops began to help did the rebels stand a chance. The leadership of the rebels would now be able to overcome the collective action problem by demonstrating battle victories and territorial gains against Qaddafi's troops. The Prime Minister of Britain was quoted during a G8 meeting in France saying, sending Apache helicopters and aiding the rebels was "the right thing to do" because that was essentially the only way to protect the Libyan people (Belfast Telegraph 2011). The foreign aid finally tipped the scale of advantages towards the rebels.

One thing that is frequently ignored regarding the mainstream opinions and analysis of the *Arab Spring* is Qatar's new role as a relatively new regional powerhouse. It is commonly known that foreign news outlets worked together to win the propaganda war. "That was why electronic media, from Al Jazeera to the internet, were so vital. They offered forms of communication beyond Mr. Qaddafi's grasp. The regime shut down the internet as

soon as the uprising started, but by then it was too late” (The Economist 2011A). Al Jazeera is a Qatari state-sponsored media outlet, and during the *Arab Spring*, it played a large role in delegitimizing enemies of Qatar, and the wider Arab Gulf States. Qatar has funded rebels in Libya. “The tiny Gulf State’s bank rolling of the Libyan rebels has given its leader a front-row seat in international politics. The *Arab Spring* is changing the political map of the region and Qatar is playing an important role in it” (Watson 2011). The state of Qatar, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, is the richest state in the world, based on GDP per capita (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). Large gas and oil reserves and increased prices in commodity value have propelled Qatar into higher standing. Qatar is ready to influence the region due to their recent increase in relative power.

In addition to funding the rebellion in Libya, the Qataris set up what is called Libya TV, a television channel that broadcasts propaganda on behalf of the rebels. “It got off the ground in just five days—no dry runs or practices. Dozens of Libyan journalists and non-journalists alike were recruited and trained at lightning speed” (Watson 2011). Qatar has much to gain by assisting rebellions. “Despite Qatar saying that its interests were solely about the welfare of the Libyan people, it is expected that Qatar’s support for the rebels will pay off economically in time, too” (Watson 2011). Qatar is meddling in the affairs of foreign states in hopes of gaining a new friend in the region. “Qatar sent a steady supply of aid to anti-Gaddafi forces, including six Mirage fighter jets, an array of military vehicles, fuel, ammunition, weapons, hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, and a team of Western-trained special forces...[and] fought beside them in Tripoli in August” (Edwards 2011). That bet is now paying off. A neutral actor has left the area, and a friend is promoted to a position of power. “By having that active role in the international arena at this point and taking political leadership, Qatar is protecting its wealth and protecting its existence,” said Ibrahim Sharqieh, deputy director of Brookings Doha Centre (Watson 2011). The Arab Gulf state wants more power because it simultaneously increases its security.

Foreign intervention in Libya began long before 2011. Qaddafi was an elderly dictator on the decline, both within his borders and in the region. In 2003, due to pressure from Washington, Qaddafi abandoned Libya’s WMD program (BBC News 2003). As a carrot, or reward, from foreign states for dismantling their nuclear program, Libya was immediately removed from the list of international state sponsors of terror. That move,

according to the tenets of realist theory, was a fatal error in judgment by Qaddafi because no nuclear power has ever been invaded. If Libya had achieved a sophisticated nuclear program, they would have far greater relative power today. Foreign states would have a drastically different cost-benefit-analysis when weighing the risks of interfering during this current revolution. In return, Qaddafi jeopardized his own long-term security. At the time, President George W. Bush even said "leaders who abandon the pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons—and the means to deliver them—will find an open path to better relations with the U.S. and other nations" (U.S Department of State 2003). Consequently, this was not the situation when U.S. military support, along with NATO and the GCC, worked with the Libyan rebels to overthrow the Qaddafi regime.

For Libya, the UN Security Council (UNSC) was successful in acquiring a legal order that permitted the use of international force to protect the opposition and eventually oust the leader of the country. The first UNSC sanction placed on Libya was resolution 1970. It called for an end to violence while imposing an arms embargo, a travel ban, and asset freeze on Qaddafi and his closest political allies (UNSC 2011a). The Arab League suspended Libya's membership and later called on the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone, which was enforced by NATO. There were no objections; the U.S., Europe, the Arab League, and the GCC states were essentially given a blank check to achieve that goal. The press release of the resolution read: "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favor with 5 Abstentions" (UNSC 2011b). Libya mostly had a population that was fed up with the ruling elite; Qaddafi had been a brutal dictator from the beginning. At first, the West only gave the rebels moral support, stating that their cause was just and that the regime was cruel and evil (Lerman 2011). Weeks later, Western states increased the stakes by providing the rebels with political support, claiming to be allied with them. Eventually, they provided them with the maximum support: materials—weapons, intelligence, training, and military support from the air. That is the only way by which the regime could fall – NATO war jets assisted even in the final ambush on the Qaddafi convoy, and rebels were fed intelligence on the whereabouts of Qaddafi as he tried to escape. In the end, it was not simply that people were upset at the ruling class that drove victory but foreign intervention to the highest level.

The Europeans, Americans, and Gulf Arab states all have an incentive to see the rebels succeed. The NATO troops worked stealthily to help the rebels with their revolution. The state collapse was hastened with international sanctions passed by United Nations Resolution 1973 and subsequent Executive Orders from the United States President. By funding and influencing the revolution, the foreign sponsors naturally get to guide the transition by offering their expertise and experience, and ultimately, the elections. Qaddafi was set to have his son take over the government after he retired or passed away, but chances of that being a successful switch was unlikely. Libya is an oil rich country and is situated in a strategic location; it has strategic importance and is in the best interests of the foreign states to have a say in the new government.

The Gulf Arab states look to gain the most from the *Arab Spring*, as they help fund the revolutions and provided much of the media support. They were directly involved in the military intervention as well. Qatar was the first Arab state to recognize the Libyan rebels (Krauss 2011). As new contracts are made, Qatar and other Arab Gulf states are there to supervise. In politics, nothing is impossible. If the trajectory continues, the tiny Gulf States could have a significantly larger role in the region in the near future. It should be noted that the Gulf States are undemocratic monarchies and will naturally be significantly less critical of governments that avoid democracy. Iran's influence in the region is still significant as it has allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria; however, the Gulf Arab States are now gaining regional power very quickly.

As a result of the foreign intervention, the rebels gained the upper hand and eventually took over the government. Qatar, the GCC, and NATO all played a key role in aiding the rebels by giving the rebels a maximum amount of physical aid, propaganda and moral support. Qatar's new influence in the region by the way of its media power (both Al Jazeera and the creation of Rebel TV), funding the rebels, and military aid are sure to increase Qatar's and the GCC's relative strength and influence in the region for the long term. Libya was not powerful enough to fight the rebels who were aided by such powerful states. It was the intervention that aided the movement and allowed for the revolution to be successful. It is difficult to model a scenario where the revolution would have been successful had it not been for foreign interference. The spark of the Tunisian revolution may have legitimately spread east to neighboring Libya; however, it is also apparent that the

Libyan protesters and insurgents would not have been able to defeat the central authority on their own.

BAHRAIN

If Bahrain is supposed to be integrated into another country, it must be Iran and not Saudi Arabia.

—Ali Larijani, Iranian Parliament Speaker

Bahrain, like Syria and Libya, has a large, young unemployed population that is technologically literate when compared to the aging political structure. Over one quarter of Bahrain's population is between the ages of 15 and 29 year olds (The Washington Post 2011). Even amongst the region, that is a relatively high proportion. They are familiar with the internet and social networking websites like Twitter and Facebook. These forms of communication and the sense of helplessness that the population feels can be a recipe for volatility. When a foreign state takes advantage of a state's inability to react to its people's demands, the domestic tranquility can be further destabilized. The situation is further exasperated because Bahrain, like Syria, is caught between two relatively strong regional foes: Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Sunni and Shiite states support their religious kind in foreign states in order to gain new allies. In Bahrain, the protest movements were large, but the Sunni support was enough to quell the rebellion before a revolution could take root.

Bahrain, like other countries in the *Arab Spring*, is caught in the midst of regional power struggles. The same players, GCC states and Iran, are vying to dominate with their influences and ultimately sway each government towards their side. As it still stands, the Bahraini government is a Sunni monarchy that rules a majority Shiite population. The population is restive and demanding democratic reforms. If democracy were to take root in the small island state, then the government would likely reflect its Shiite population and be friendly to the Iranian state. The GCC states, however, will do everything in their power to prevent an Iranian ally on their side of the Gulf.

Large swaths of Shiite Muslims, who live within the GCC, claim to be discriminated against due to their religion, and in the 1980s, Iran took this opportunity to extend their influence. Massive protests by this sect are ongoing occurrences in this region. Iran interferes by offering them moral support (level 1). Yet, it has not always been this way. After the 1979

revolution in Iran, the Islamic state was much more adamant about exporting their revolution across the region. In order to achieve that goal, Iran started "...information dissemination involving extensive radio and television programming beamed throughout the Gulf. Special attention is reserved for Iraq and Saudi Arabia. ...Of special appeal to the poorer citizens of the Gulf, the Iranian message has some attraction to Sunni inhabitants who live relatively deprived lives in the midst of plenty" (Bill 1982, 118-119). The Islamic Republic tried to exploit the deprivation in other Muslim nations, but they failed when they tried to export their own revolution.

Fast forward to 2011-2012, there is a resurgence in the populist movement in the Middle East. Again, Iran is attempting to encourage the Bahrainis to overthrow their Sunni leaders and gain some form of self-rule. The regional feud between Iran and Saudi Arabia is so strong that, according to Wikileaks, Saudi King Abdullah urged the U.S. to attack Iran. (Mohammed 2010). The Bahraini case is fascinating because it was actually a reverse *Arab Spring*. The stronger foreign intervention, in this case, was provided in defense of the seated government. The protesters, in turn, were not given any support from any major government. What happened in Bahrain is similar to what happened between Hungary and the Soviet Union in 1956 when the Soviet tanks rolled in and prevented a revolution. In the example of Bahrain, unlike Hungary, they never even accomplished reforms. The military from the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia rolled in to assist the Bahraini government and defeat the protesters (Butler 2012). The support level, or level of interference, from that coalition was at the highest intensity (level 3) to counter the material, political, and moral support that were provided to the rebels. Due to the Saudi Arabian government being an ally to the sole superpower, the global community never condemned the force used against the peaceful protesters. Only one year later, the U.S. recommenced selling arms to the small Arab Island (Chick 2012). It is difficult to tell whether the Bahraini rebels could have had any tangible results if their protests had been able to organically grow and their grievances were known; it is clear that aggressive and swift foreign intervention from the Gulf States prevented the chance.

When protests threatened the government, the leaders of the state reacted militarily, but the domestic security apparatus, controlled by the government, failed. The mass protests in Bahrain grew as civil unrest hit a new level. Its citizens suddenly learned that their leaders

had dozens of high-cost mansions throughout the small and congested island and the people had nothing?. Facing failure, the Bahraini kingdom called for outsiders to help subdue the uprising. As a result, two thousand soldiers from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait filled the streets of the small island nation. "It [was] the second military intervention by the Gulf states in a few days, but the first was on a far more primitive level: teargas grenades fired at point-blank range into the faces of unarmed demonstrators" (Butler 2012). Military force from foreign nations stopped the uproar almost immediately. Foreign intervention tipped the outcome of the revolution by supporting the troubled government. The Bahraini government was seen as needing dire assistance, so the intervening states bolstered the crackdown against the protest movement.

The Iranian state provided a minimal amount of support for the protesters. It was a category one because they only gave the protesters moral and a minimal amount of political support. In effect, Iran interfered in the affairs by publically condemning the actions of the Bahraini and Gulf Arab states. The message, given by a spokesman of the foreign ministry, said that foreign military intervention in Bahrain to confront the protests is 'unacceptable,'...[the Bahraini people have] legitimate demands that are expressed peacefully, violence should be avoided in the face of their demands and it is expected that they would be met in correct ways" (Xuequan 2011). When compared to the support provided by the other Gulf Arab states, the minimal support from Iran was not enough to give the protesters any hope of victory.

In response, the United States briefly addressed concerns over the intervention. Hilary Clinton said that she was "urging in the strongest possible terms...that they immediately begin to negotiate with the opposition" (CNN 2011). Since Bahrain is a close ally to the United States, it is not surprising that the U.S. did not use harsher terms or threaten sanctions against the small monarchy. The Bahraini government, along with its Gulf Arab states were cautioned to use restraint however, no threats were ever carried out. Power politics played out: The most powerful state did not intervene to stop the suppression of protests due to previous alliances.

The case in Bahrain demonstrates that a relatively weak state can overcome the security dilemma by allying, or Balancing, with other states. Since the U.S. is allies with the Bahraini state and has a strategic naval base on the island, they did not condemn the

repression of democratic protesters. Bahrain also received military support from their partners in the GCC. The regime endured troubled times because the U.S. stayed relatively passive on the matter and they received military intervention from the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Allies of Bahrain came to its aid and prevented protesters from overrunning the state.

The *Arab Spring* was reversed in Bahrain, or not allowed to culminate its goals as it has elsewhere, because the powerful states of the region were strongly allied with the Bahraini government as illustrated in Table 8. They acted together on behalf of the Bahraini monarchy, essentially hastening the protesters to their demise. The sole superpower, the United States, along with the Gulf Arab states wanted the monarchy to stay in power rather than see a potential Shiite leadership. Unlike Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, the popular movement in Bahrain was not given international backing; instead, the international community was largely silent in the face of foreign intervention in favor of a repressive government.

Table 8. Analysis of Failed Bahraini Revolution

Global Structure	Unipolar
Relative Power	Low
Intervention:	Aid to State [High (3), Material] Aid to Rebels [Low (1), Moral]
Foreign Belligerents	Supporting Rebels: Iran Supporting State: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

SYRIA

Syria has a considerably more powerful military than Libya. The Assad regime has 25 air defence brigades combined with a considerable number of intercept aircraft. That is a bigger challenge than anything we faced in Libya.

—Richard Williams, SAS Commander

Syria shares a number of characteristics with Libya that puts them on a similar path toward revolution. Syria is geographically ten times smaller but has three times the population (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). Additionally, Syria is significantly more

urbanized than Libya. What is also different is that the Syrian government is stronger than Libya was and has prior experience dealing with uprisings, which they brutally crushed most recently in 1982, killing between 25,000 and 40,000 people (Kifner 2012). Syria has, like Libya had, a genuine angst against the unelected government. Bashar al-Assad, the ruler since 2000, succeeded his father, Hafez al-Assad, who ruled from 1971-2000. Together they have been in power for four decades; Syria is a well-developed police state. Like Libya, the Arab League, a regional organization of Arab states formed in 1945, and NATO have an interest in fostering a change in the central government. As they did in Libya, they are working hand-in-hand to bring about a revolution in Syria.

Currently, at the time of writing, there is medium level of interference (level 2); yet, the interference is supporting both sides, the rebels, or the Free Syrian Army, and state, or the Assad Regime. The West, along with Turkey and the Arab League (including the GCC), applied sanctions against the regime and its small oil sector, while Iran attempted to even out the sanctions effects by supplying the Syrian government and military with energy and medical equipment (UPI.com 2012). As a result, it is a stalemate; even with foreign aid, the rebels do not have enough to match the aggregate power of Syria and its foreign aid. For regime change to have a realistic chance, more interference will be needed on behalf of the rebels. The same applies for the state; if the regime is to persevere, it needs a rally of foreign support. As the events unfold, this revolution will likely end in a draw of civil war, where neither side stands to gain a large advantage.

In hopes of creating state paralysis, elite divisions, and a decrease in the coercive mechanisms of the state, the state has been plagued with sanctions (CBS News 2012). Sanctions hurt the state's ability to engage in financial transactions and trade, which gravely affect the state as well as its citizens. Theoretically, amidst the impacts of sanctions, the business tycoons will break away from the state. If the state is no longer able to hold onto power and stability, they will go so far as to ally themselves the new rulers. However, methods like these may or may not be enough to topple a regime, when it is compared to the aggregate strength of the state and the aid it receives from other states. These actions alone will not cause the state to self-destruct; however, it will decrease its power when fighting an insurgency, or rebel movement. Despite sanctions against the state and aid to the rebels, the

Syrian government is still a largely united, cohesive mass that continues to fight the rebellion.

The coalition that successfully toppled Qaddafi's Libya is not as united when it comes to Syria. NATO has not yet committed to sending military aid the opposition. What aid it has sent has been largely none military, communications equipment and training. Some aid is being funneled via the CIA in a clandestine method to aid the rebels (Al Jazeera 2012). The sole superpower, in this case the United States, has unsuccessfully lobbied other states to support a UN resolution on Syria. After China and Russia vetoed the UN resolutions, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, called it "disgusting" adding, that the "the [UN Security] Council has been held hostage by a couple of members" (Snow 2012). U.S. Senators are calling for a sanctuary, weapons, and supplies. The U.S. has done it in Libya and in Afghanistan (e.g. anti-tank weapons). Lindsay Graham, John McCain, and Joe Lieberman all support a hawkish stance on Syria. They advocate arming the rebels heavily and giving them all they need in order to succeed. A realist analysis would support their stance on the region as long as there is a diverse coalition. In order to weaken the state and hasten its collapse, those on the side of the rebels have initiated individual sanctions against the country with the help of international governmental bodies like the United Nations, World Bank, and the IMF. Those sanctions include freezing assets, boycotting its oil, pulling investments, and closing consulates and embassies. Victory in Syria will not be as easy as Libya. Any attempts to topple the Assad regime will need a united stance from not only NATO but also the opposition movement, which has been largely divided on its vision for a post-Assad Syria.

Despite the lack of unity amongst those who ousted Gadhafi, the West has attempted to diplomatically support the opposition, hoping to raise the rebellion's relative power. The U.S., France and the UK have attempted to rally support repeatedly in the United Nations, yet the Security Council has been intransigent toward harsh sanctions against Syria (China and Russia have vetoed three UNSC resolutions). The sanctions that have been exerted on Syria have been largely unilateral. In the case of the U.S., they occurred through Presidential Executive Orders. For example, due to international sanctions Royal Dutch Shell has left its oil facilities in Syria, and trade with the Syrian government is blocked (Hamilton 2011). However, power politics is still at play. The U.S. wants to unseat Iran's only real ally in the

region, and the rising stars of the Middle East want to topple the weakening state, which is allied with Hezbollah and Iran, and install a Sunni government in its place. Without UN Security Council approval and an increased level of interference, the task at hand is not an easy move.

While the West is struggling to act in concert with one another, Turkey, in a highly intervening move, gave the rebels a sanctuary inside its state, sixty miles from the Syrian border in Adana (Doherty and Bakr 2012). The city is also home to a U.S. military base. A sanctuary gives the rebels a great advantage. One of the most important features of a sanctuary is that it shields the rebels from an attack by the central government. It also serves as a zone in which they can get training, aid, and supplies that can be later shipped to rebels inside Syria. Although Turkey is the host, they are not the only ones involved in aiding the rebel base. “[Qatar] has a key role in directing operations at the Adana base... Qatari military intelligence and state security officials are involved...three governments are supplying weapons: Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia” (Doherty and Bakr 2012). Coincidentally, Qatar was the first state to close its embassy in Syria (Edwards 2011). Second, the sanctuary is important to the rebels because it serves as their de facto base. Since the Syrian government continues to block the rebels’ attempt at gaining a stable base within their own territory, the rebels must rely on a base that is outside of the state’s control. “When effective government countermeasures deny insurgents permanent bases inside the target country[,]. . .the sanctuaries are literally the last fallback position of the insurgents because without them, military activity will cease or be inconsequential” (O’Neill 2005, 146). The shelter that Turkey hosts and Qatar and Saudi Arabia support is sure to help the rebels gain level footing against the Assad regime.

Despite the wide-ranging level of interference taking place in Syria, it is still limited when compared to the swiftness that overran Libya. There are various players who are partaking in this cold war, or proxy war, in order to ensure that their allies are victorious, as demonstrated in Table 9. The protesters receive moral, political, and material support from the West as well as many Middle Eastern governments. As with the other states that have faced civil wars, Syria is becoming the fulcrum between two different sides. Iran and various Shi’ite factions in Iraq and Lebanon, along with tactical support from China and Russia, are

on one side. On the other are the Western states, Turkey, and the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Political support was initially given and material support is now

Table 9. Analysis of Ongoing Syrian Revolution

Global Structure	Unipolar
Relative Power	Medium, Level 2
Intervention:	Sanctions to state, Aid to State (from certain states) Aid to Rebels (from other states)
Foreign Belligerents	Supporting Rebels: U.S., France, Qatar, Turkey Supporting State: Iran, Russia, China, and to a much less extent: Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq

beginning to materialize, but to what level is difficult to gauge at this moment. It is suspected that if the regime does not topple willingly, the likelihood is high that support will be increased to hasten regime change. The case of Syria is one of the most complex and challenging because it is so multifaceted.

Provoked by the Iranian Revolution, the GCC states created their alliance in 1981. “[The GCC] aims to boost economic cooperation between members and, through collective security, to guard against any threat from neighboring states and from Islamic extremism” (BBC News 2012). The treaty helps them deter the region’s large power, Iran, by increasing their states’ relative power. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iranian Regime attempted to export their revolutions to other Gulf Arab states and across the Middle East to Israel. The GCC alliance was a way for small, individual states to increase their strength by joining together in a treaty. Walt explains how states join alliances to balancing regional threats, “external threats are the most frequent cause of international alliances...they balance against threats...states in the Middle East most often form alliances in response to threats from other regional actors...offensive capabilities and intentions increase the likelihood of others joining forces in opposition” (Walt, 1990, 148). A calculation is made by the self-interested state before seeking to increase its relative strength via a coalition. Although the individual state does not want to lose its sovereignty, it also does not want to be wiped out. In reaction to these realities, it chooses the least bad option: lose a little sovereignty in order to gain more security. After the increasing threat of the Iranian Revolution, the GCC states chose the least bad option by forming a treaty.

In return, Iran has also meddled in the internal affairs of other states in order to grow its relative power and increase its security. In the early 80s, it sent members of its military to train Shiite guerilla fighters in Lebanon. The rebel fighters ultimately evolved into Hezbollah, an insurgent group that calls for the destruction of Israel (Hezbollah 2008). Iran continues to support Hezbollah today, especially via Syria. "Hezbollah's position in Lebanon is an important component of Iran's current quest for regional hegemony in the Middle East" (Rabinovich and Reinharz 2008, 423). Israel and Hezbollah continue to fight each other, either through skirmishes or all-out wars. As a result of Iran's aid to the Shiite rebel group, there now exists, in effect, an Iranian outpost north of Israel.

Although Lebanon and even Iraq are Iranian allies, they are not necessarily the most reliable. Hezbollah is by far the friendliest faction to Iran. However, they do not control the government because they do not have members in the presidency or prime ministry (Karouny 2011). Both Lebanon and Iraq are democratic states that have other groups they have to compete with. Hezbollah has an armed band of loyalists with considerable presence in the Lebanese parliament. In Iraq, the head of the government, Nouri al-Maliki, is a Shiite and a member of a political party that is aligned with Iran. Al-Maliki has taken multiple trips to Tehran, recently denounced all foreign intervention in Syria, and denied access to those seeking to use Iraqi territory to arm the rebels. Iran has gained relative strength by gaining friends in Lebanon and Iraq.

Iran and Syria are allies, and Iran uses them to support Hezbollah. Since the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf Arab states view Iran and Hezbollah as a threat, the best way to balance, or counter, this threat is to take out the ruling regime of Syria. To remove the Assad Regime from power, influence the transitory committee, and guide the new government are strategic goals by the other side of this proxy war. A new government, if one should come about, would be highly unlikely to continue to funnel funds and weapons to Hezbollah on behalf of Iran.

The regional balance of power has shifted toward Iran and GCC states in recent history. The power in the region has been concentrated between the two. With the toppling of the Iraqi Regime led by Saddam Hussein, the new leadership in Iraq is pro-Iranian (Al-Salhy 2012). Due to both Iran and a few GCC states, primarily Qatar and the UAE, gaining relative power in recent times, a cold war is taking shape between these regional powers. The GCC

states have seen their relative strength grow partly because the price of oil and natural gas, their major commodity exports, and their relationship with the sole superpower, the United States. Their weapons and military capabilities have been upgraded to gain superiority over their rivals. In addition, U.S. bases on GCC states increase their security because there is an implicit agreement between the state and their host in the event of an attack. The Gulf States have been the most adamant in bringing about changes in leadership in the Middle East and North Africa because they stand to gain relative power and security in light of a new balance of power in the region

A Neo-realists, or structural realist, would say the balance of power is slowly dwindling away as Iran gains more allies within the region. The blunder of the Iraq war and its repercussions have ostensibly handed the Iranian government a strategic victory. As Iraq, a former foe who fought a brutal eight-year war with Iran (Hardy 2005), turns into an ally and Lebanon continues to grow more toward Iran, as Hezbollah embraces mainstream politics, Iran now has a clear path to the Mediterranean Sea. As Iran grows in influence in the region, it poses a strategic threat to the U.S.

The big picture is the game being played by similar players. The U.S., Europe and the Arab League are supporting regime change and the rebels in the nation. Unilateral sanctions, or sanctions not mandated through the UN, are being used to weaken the country in hopes of fracturing the state's capacity to fight the rebellion (AFP 2011). However, the situation in Syria has hit a wall because there is some international support in favor of the ruling regime. China and Russia have been the larger powers that have blocked the UN Security Council resolution by not allowing any internationally enforceable measures or a legal invasion of the state. The Syrian opposition is "calling for the U.S. to "lead from behind" and let other countries, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and France, lead the campaign against Damascus. Russia, China, and Iran remain strongly supportive of the Damascus regime, drowning all attempts at regime change and curtly saying no to a military strike ...and NATO has said it bluntly, that it doesn't plan for a Libya II in Syria" (Moubayed 2012). Syria is one of Russia's largest weapons buyers and home to Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean. In comparison, the U.S. and some Europeans are giving communications technology and fiscal support to help the rebels organize and to strengthen their movement. "The delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria's beleaguered civilians is a key provision of Annan's plan. Clinton

announced \$12 million in additional aid for Syria's people – doubling the total American assistance so far. Germany, whose foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, attended the Istanbul meeting, said it was nearly doubling its humanitarian contributions to 5.7 million Euros (\$7.6 million)” (Moubayed 2012). The prospects for regime change in the near future look bleak in Syria due the array of foreign intervention that lacks the ability to act in unison.

It is fair to categorize what is happening in Syria as a stalemate. Neither side is winning. The status quo has been maintained. The state has not been paralyzed despite sanctions from many states. This may be due to foreign intervention from both sides. In this case, unlike Bahrain and Libya, Syria has minimal amount of support from China and Russia and considerable amount from neighboring Iran. Lebanon is less than a reliable ally. Various factions inside Lebanon are supporting different groups since it is a fractured state. Russia and China seem to be more tacit supporters rather than blatant ones like Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Western states. If NATO chooses to take military action without a UN mandate, the revolution will have a high probability of succeeding; the question remains, however, at what cost? As a result, there is a stalemate; until one side can come up with stronger support, no side can claim victory.

Because the Syrian territory lacks expensive resources, has semi-modern air defenses and a loyal military, the cost of battle may be high with little reward for those seeking to assist the rebels in their fight against the government, other than the reward of ousting Iran’s closest friend. The current sanctions should be maintained to prevent Syria from gaining relative strength. These sanctions include travel bans, freezing assets, boycotting oil, pulling investments, and closing consulates and embassies. Urban combat is very dangerous for all parties involved. Syria also has chemical weapons that it threatens to use if a foreign military joins the fight. These factors make the cost of direct interference high with a relatively low level of benefit. The current policy seems to have best result for the GCC and the West (Isachenkov 2012). As it stands now, it may be in the best interest of the decision makers to maintain unilateral sanctions on Syria, just to prevent it from gaining more strength.

The significance of this project is not that “power politics” is a reality. A government or an entity that has an interest in an outcome will use its resources in order to support its interests. That may include supporting a government that is being embattled by insurgents or support a rebel movement that may overthrow an adversary. Just as realism predicts, in an

anarchic global system, states will use their resources in order to ensure their long-term survival. In the modern world, states are seen engaging in proxy wars to further their own interests.

The balance of power in the Middle East has gone through a transformation in the last decade. The Gulf Arab states have gained a tremendous amount of wealth due to the increase in oil prices. The Iran state has gained in strength due to the ousting of its arch nemesis, Saddam Hussein, and replacement with Shiite allies in Iraq. China and Russia are not too concerned about Syria; their loss will be a once-reliable weapons purchaser, not much more. Syria hosts a Russian navy base, but it is hardly used. Turkey is the old regional power, looking to reassert its traditional strength as joining the EU looks less like an immediate possibility. The two sides now look to Syria to assert their influence. They will interfere as much as their relative strength will allow. Yet, the rewards for regime change are not high for either party. The GCC and Turkey, however, have the support of the sole superpower, which may help sway victory toward their side, if the U.S. takes decisive action. If the Assad regime falls, Turkey and the GCC will be the dominant powers in the Middle East.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

These cases in the *Arab Spring* clearly display how foreign interference determines the outcome of a revolution. Sometimes foreign interference supports the rebels; other times it shores up a government in deep trouble. Outside support given to a movement is imperative to its success, while intervention given on behalf of the domestic government is detrimental to it. Most theorists like Skocpol (1979) and Arjomand (1988) miss this factor. Modernization authors neglect to see that revolutions are closely linked to foreign support and fail to describe this phenomenon. Competition between states, a state's need to excel and keep up with hegemonic powers and authorities, leads to the exploitation of the peasants and further leaves them in despair. The final blow comes when the state enters a war in which it is defeated. A revolution becomes easier, almost inevitable, at this point. The authors continue to rely on domestic affairs, with some small exceptions, as the cause of revolutions. Rather than describing revolutions, they may be relating to rebellions instead. A key component of understanding many revolutions is through examining direct intervention by a foreign state, which supports either the state or the rebel movement, especially in violent revolutions. These authors on revolution focus on the causes of rebellions, which may be present in every country, but fail to effectively use those causes to predict why a revolution ended the way that it did. What allows for a revolution to succeed is quite frankly foreign assistance. Unless the state is utterly paralyzed, a revolution will need outside assistance if it is to create a viable stake in the state's future. If a state is incompetent to the point of ineffectiveness, then foreign assistance can also be provided to help the government that is unable to govern itself. It is not a path dependent on positivist theory because there can be many variations. There is no guarantee that foreign support will assist or bail out a movement because the relative strength of the opposite side can vary, but if foreign intervention is available and strong enough, its side will come out victorious.

Although the *Arab Spring* has many domestic elements, foreign influence is still a contributing factor when it comes to a revolution's aftermath. In other words, the revolutions

have not been entirely domestic, and the outcomes have been largely coordinated by international powers. However, not all revolutions are international; some have been categorized by their lack of foreign interference. Tunisia and Egypt were two instances where the major driving forces in the revolutions were domestic. The absence of intervention can also be part of the explanatory variable.

Revolutionary theory needs to be further developed because most authors' examinations of past revolutions are missing a key aspect of modern-day revolutions. As the scholars have written, there has been an international dimension within the history of modernization and revolution. Yet, the crucial aspect that has been largely left out is the interference and intervention by foreign state actors. Even in the American Revolution, which happened much before the process of globalization, the support of European countries such as France was imperative in turning the tide (Payan 2002). Today, modernization is also in effect; more people demand democracy and a market economy. States that are unable to accommodate change are left vulnerable to the disenchanted masses. A large aspect of revolutionary studies focuses on the population's psychology, yet even with those conditions described by the theorists, most of the time, revolutions do not actually develop. New studies should further the literature on revolutions by including foreign interventions as a significant explanatory variable. The current literature on revolutions would also benefit from widening the currently narrow revolutionary definition. Doing so would widen the scope and subsequently incorporate more cases from which modern-day conclusions could be drawn. As revolutions have modernized, so should the theory by including foreign factors in addition to domestic one.

If the region has geopolitical significance, big powers will get involved. If there is a lot of violence, then likelihood of foreign interference is also high. In a unipolar world, the sole superpower will do as it pleases because there is no other power in the world that can truly check its strength. As the world stands today, America is the sole superpower. It can either allow its allies to suppress protests, or it can support the protest movements and arm the rebels in cases where they are fighting an American foe. Often times a state supports the enemy of its enemy in order to bring about a more favorable political environment. It is one of the advantages a superpower has; as Thucydides and Thrasymachus said, "might makes right" (Plato 1968). In international relations, that is the basic philosophy that guides policy:

support allies and oppose foes. Although the *Arab Spring* has generally been a natural phenomenon, the strong states have used it to create a more favorable international political situation for themselves.

Consequently, the short-term gains from exporting revolutions can have negative drawbacks. The CIA terms the phrase *blowback* to describe an event that occurs during a certain time that is in direct or indirect response to operations taken by the military and intelligence services in another country, in other words, a consequence of foreign interference. Many have called the 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon an example of blowback. U.S. intelligence services, among others, trained and equipped Arab fighters in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. Their terrorist acts were well executed because they were well trained. The lesson may not have been learned, however, because many policy makers today argue that what the intelligence services did in Afghanistan is what they should be doing in the *Arab Spring*, as long as what they do meets U.S. national interests and creates a more favorable political environment.

A cogent argument on revolutions is difficult to make using quantitative methods because many of the causes are psychological. A small-n study provides the most appropriate analysis because it is comprehensive and provides necessary background information. Cases that include revolutions, both successful and unsuccessful, need to be closely scrutinized to find whether different levels of support may yield altered results. For example, when the level of interference includes sending soldiers into another nation's territory, the foreign intervention may have a nationalist backlash among the receiving country's population. Cases that prominently feature two different sides caught in a proxy war need to be looked at more closely. For example, Vietnam during the cold war had two sides fighting; the Soviet Union and China supported the Vietcong and North Vietnam, while the U.S. had troops on the ground in Vietnam in support of their own allies and interests. Another example during the Cold War was Afghanistan. The Soviets had their troops in Afghani territory, and the U.S. supported the rebels. These cases would prove that foreign intervention in the maximum level, where it leads to occupation of foreign lands, is not always successful. As the counter-insurgency field manual written by U.S. Army General Petraeus (2006) would suggest, these cases may also prove that having highly visible foreign troops on the soil may have a reverse effect in the end. A common way to manage the negative effect for occupying forces is to

leave foreign troops in bases far from the cities and maintain a very low profile. Therefore, studies that focus on revolutions and specifically on foreign interference should pay very close attention to the psychology of having soldiers in foreign territory and its link to the outcomes.

Revolutionary theorists only paint part of the picture because the parameters they use are limiting. For the most part, foreign intervention is left out of the literature. Most theorists believe that once foreign interference begins, it is no longer a revolution. Second, exceedingly violent revolutions are often classified as civil war. The theorists say it is a civil war; therefore, it should be studied differently. The cases chosen for this study have been the three most violent in the *Arab Spring*. There is no reason to believe that once violence enters the scenario, these are no longer revolutions. This project aims to expand the types of cases included in the study of revolutions in order to have a more comprehensive analysis of what determines the outcome.

Ultimately, *The Arab Spring* has been a contest among regional states to gain more relative strength. One part of the struggle exists between the two major sects of Islam, Sunnis and Shiites. Another part of the competition is between Turkey and the GCC versus Iran and Syria. Turkey has a long history of ruling the region, but they have seen that power dwindle in last century. They are now allying with their Sunni counterparts in the Arab world in order to recreate their relative power and promote friendlier regimes. In the most violent revolutions, these actors are increasing their strength while lowering the opposition's. Events in this past century have driven substantial gains for both sides. The GCC has seen its wealth grow tremendously due to high oil prices, and Iran has a high advantage since seeing its two biggest enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, be dismantled. This power struggle in the Middle East has reached a peak in recent history because both sides have been given a boost of relative power.

It still remains to be seen how the current alliances in the Middle East will play out between the GCC, the U.S., and Turkey. As Realist theory explains, states will create alliances to balance against threats, but once the threat is neutralized, they may go beyond and become more assertive. If the GCC becomes a regional hegemon, they may slowly turn against their superpower sponsor because they may not need them anymore. They may pick fights with Turkey as the two sides now battle for more influence in the region. As the U.S.

takes a more passive approach towards the region, as evident in Libya, Bahrain, and now currently Syria, it may have less influence in the overall outcome. The GCC states, along with Turkey, will shape the region toward their brand of Islam and state, and as a result, they will gain new friends. The U.S., opting to play less of an active role than it has in the past, may end up with less control over the outcome of these revolutions if it chooses to coach from the bench.

REFERENCES

- Adams, Karen R. 2006. "Structural Realism: The Consequences of Great Power Politics" In *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 18-52.
- AFP. 2011 "Canada Laments Cracks in Iran, Syria Sanctions." November 22.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ifwH6Rj9tdHUmThOq-_lTh9JJd_Q?docId=CNG.4b903d943a44b6c841ef524d2c69b432.3b1 (April 16, 2012).
- Al Jazeera. 2012. "Obama Inks 'Secret Order' to Aid Syria Rebels." August 2.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/20128264510724249.html> (August 2, 2012).
- Al-Salhy, Suadad. 2012. "Iraq Warns Against Arming Syrian Rebels." Reuters, April 1.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/01/us-iraq-syria-idUSBRE83009A20120401> (April 20, 2012).
- Anderson, Lisa. 2011. "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya." *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3): 2-7.
- Arjomand, A. Said. 1988. *The Turban For the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barker, Ann. 2011. "Time Running Out for Cornered Gaddafi." ABC News, February 24.
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-02-24/time-running-out-for-cornered-gaddafi/1955842> (May 16, 2012).
- BBC News. 2003. "Libya to Give Up WMD." December 20.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3335965.stm> (May 16, 2012).
- BBC News. 2012. "Profile: Gulf Co-operation Council." February 15.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/middle_east/country_profiles/4155001.stm (May 16, 2012).
- Beissinger, Mark R. (2006). "Promoting Democracy: Is Exporting Revolution a Constructive Strategy?" *Dissent*, Winter: 1.
- Belfast Telegraph. 2011. "Cameron: Time to Unleash Apaches Against Gaddafi." May 28.
<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/cameron-time-to-unleash-apaches-against-gaddafi-16005280.html> (May 16, 2012).
- Bell, Gertrude. 2000. *Gertrude Bell: The Arabian Diaries, 1913-1914*, ed. Rosemary O'Brien. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Bill, A. James. 1982. "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf." *Foreign Affairs* 63 (1): 108-127.
- Bremmer, Ian 2006. *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

- Brinton, Crane. 1938. *The Anatomy of Revolution*. New York: W. W. Norton Press.
- Butler, William. 2011. "Saudi Arabian Intervention in Bahrain Driven by Visceral Sunni Fear of Shias." *The Guardian*, March 19.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/bahrain-saudi-arabia-rebellion> (April 16, 2012).
- Carr, E.H., 1939. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. New York: St. Martin's.
- CBC News. 2011. "Canadian to Lead NATO's Libya mission." March 25.
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/03/25/libya-nato-mission.html> (April 16, 2012).
- CBS News. 2011. "U.S.: Libya Death Toll as High as 30,000." April 27.
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20057968.html (April 16, 2012).
- CBS News. 2012. "Tighter Sanctions Sought Against Syria." April 1.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57407712/tighter-sanctions-sought-against-syria/ (April 20, 2012).
- Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. 2011. *GDP Per Capita (PPP)*. McLean: Central Intelligence Agency.
- Chick, Kristen. 2012. "US Resumes Arms Sales to Bahrain. Activists Feel Abandoned." *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 14. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0514/US-resumes-arms-sales-to-Bahrain.-Activists-feel-abandoned> (May 16, 2012).
- CNN. 2011. "Clinton Calls Intervention in Bahrain 'Alarming.'" March 17.
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-16/us/us.bahrain_1_bahraini-state-hillary-clinton-jay-carney?_s=PM:US (April 16, 2012).
- Cockburn, Patrick, 2008. *Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq*. New York: Scribner.
- Copeland, Dale. 2000. "System, Structure, and Balance of Power." In *Realism and International Relations*, ed. Jack Donnelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Doherty, Regan and Amena Bakr. 2012. "Exclusive: Secret Turkish Nerve Center Leads Aid to Syria Rebels." Reuters, July 27. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-syria-crisis-centre-idUSBRE86Q0JM20120727> (July 27, 2012).
- The Economic Times. 2011. "Obama Asked to Take Lead in Demanding End to Libya Violence." February 23. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-02-23/news/28625797_1_protesters-libyan-people-libya-violence (April 16, 2012).
- The Economist. 2011A. "Building a New Libya." February 26, 26-27.
- The Economist. 2011B. "The Price of Protest, so Far." July 14. 22-24.
- Edwards, Haley Sweetland. 2011. "Qatar Looks to Become a Regional Player." *The Australian*, November 12. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/qatar-looks-to-become-a-regional-player/story-e6frg6z6-1226193058458> (April 16, 2012).

- Esposito, John L. 2011. "Arab Youth Want Democracy, Not Theocracy." CNN, February 28. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-28/opinion/protests.democracy.islam_1_islamists-arab-youth-islamic?_s=PM:OPINION (May 20, 2012).
- Friedman, Thomas L. 2005. *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty First Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Geddes, Barbara. 2006. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1994. "Is Revolution Individually Rational: Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action?" *Rationality and Society* 6 (1): 139 – 166.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 2003. "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, eds. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41-90.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 2011. "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011." *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3): 8-16.
- Graham, Robert. 1980. *Iran: The Illusion of Power*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Gurr, Ted. 1968. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices." *The American Political Science Review*, 62 (4): 1104-1124.
- Halliday, F. 1999. *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hamilton, Douglas. 2011. "Why Royal Dutch Shell Oil is Pulling Out of Syria." The Christian Science Monitor, December 2. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/1202/Why-Royal-Dutch-Shell-oil-is-pulling-out-of-Syria> (April 16, 2012).
- Hardy, Roger. 2005. "The Iran-Iraq War: 25 years on" BBC News, September 22. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm (May 16, 2012).
- Harrison, E. Niel. 2006. *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm*. Albany: State University Press.
- Hezbollah. 2008. "Chapter 6: War in Lebanon to Hope for Peace" In *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present, Second Edition*, eds. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz. Brandeis: University Press of New England, 423-427.
- Hoffman, Michael, and Amaney Jamal. 2012. "The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities." *Middle East Law and Governance* 4: 168-188.
- Hufbauer, G. C., J. J. Schott and K. A. Elliot. 1990. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2nd Edition*. Washington, DC: Institute For International Economics.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Isachenkov, Vladimir. 2012. "Syrian Regime Pleads With Russia for Economic Aid." *ABC News*, August 3. <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/reports-russian-warships-headed-syrian-port-16920578#.UCbn0Y41bFI> (August 3, 2012).
- Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January): 169.
- Jervis, Robert. 1993. "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle," *International Security* 17 (Spring): 52-67.
- Johnston, Hank. 2011. *States and Social Movements*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- The Justice for Iran Society. "Jimmy Carter Toasting with the Shah." *YouTube* video, 0:35. December 27, 2009. <http://youtu.be/DqrHQpRHwws> (May 14, 2012).
- Karouny, Mariam. 2011. "Hezbollah-Backed Mikati Set to Lead Lebanon Government." *Reuters*, January 24. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-lebanon-government-idUSTRE70N33820110124> (April 16, 2012).
- Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kifner, John, "Syrian Troops are Said to Battle Rebels Encircled in Central City," *New York Times*, 12 February, 2012.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kinzer, S. 2003. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Krauss, Clifford, 2011. "For Qatar, Libyan Intervention May Be a Turning Point" *New York Times*, 4 April, 2011.
- Lerman, David. 2011. "Libyan Opposition Leaders Receive U.S. Offer of 'Assistance,' Clinton Says." *Bloomberg*, February 27. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-27/libyan-opposition-leaders-receive-u-s-offer-of-assistance-clinton-says.html> (May 16, 2012).
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton.
- Meichtry, Stacey. 2011. "U.S. Seeks to Use Frozen Gadhafi Assets to Aid Rebels." *Wall Street Journal*, 6 May, 2011.
- Mohammed, Arshad and Ross Colvin 2010. "Saudi King Urged U.S. to Attack Iran: WikiLeaks." *Reuters*, November 29. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/us-wikileaks-usa-idUSTRE6AP06Z20101129> (April 16, 2012).
- Moore Jr, B. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Morgenthau, Hans. 1978. *Politics Among Nations* (Rev. 5th ed). New York: Knopf.
- Moubayed, Sami. 2012. "Has the World Abandoned Syria." *Gulfnews.com*, May 8. <http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/has-the-world-abandoned-syria-1.1019682> (May 20, 2012).

- Neuman, William. 2011. "U.N. Data Notes Sharp Rise in World Food Prices." *New York Times*, 5 February, 2011
- Olson Jr., Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Goods*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- O'Neill, B. E. 2005. *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Dulles: Potomac Books, Inc.
- Payan, Gregory. 2002. *Marquis de Lafayette: French Hero of the American Revolution*. New York: Rosen Publishing.
- Petraeus, David H. 2006. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Chicago: University of Chicago
- Plato. 1968. *The Republic of Plato* (2nd ed.). Trans. Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books.
- Rabinovich, Itamar and Jehuda Reinharz. 2008. "Chapter 6: War in Lebanon to Hope for Peace." In *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present* (2nd ed.). eds. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz. Brandeis: University Press of New England, 423-427.
- Radvanyi, J. 1972. *Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- RT. 2012. "Al Jazeera Exodus: Channel Losing Staff Over 'Bias'." March 12. <http://www.rt.com/news/al-jazeera-loses-staff-335/> (April 16, 2012).
- Shehata, Dina. 2011. "The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End." *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3): 26-32.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1976. France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 18 (2): 175-211.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Adam. 1976. In *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, eds. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Snow, Anita. 2012. "Russia, China Veto U.N. Syria plan." *USA Today*, 5 February, 2012.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thucydides. 2000. *Thucydides' Theory of International Relations: A Lasting Possession*, ed. Lowell S. Gustafson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Press.
- U.N. Security Council, 6498th Meeting. 2011a. "Resolution 1973 (2011) [The situation in Libya]" (S/RES/1973). March 17, 2011. Official Record (PDF).
- U.N. Security Council, 6498th Meeting (Night). 2011b. *Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' Over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions*. March 17. New York: Department of Public Information.

- UPI.com. 2012. "Iran to Aid Syria with Electricity." July 27.
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/07/27/Iran-to-aid-Syria-with-electricity/UPI-68401343384811/ (July 27, 2012).
- U.S. Department of State. Office of the Press Secretary. 2003. *The President's National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya's Announcement*. Washington D.C.: Department of State.
- Walt, Stephen. 1990. *The Origins of Alliances*. NY: Cornell University Press.
- Walt, Stephen. 1996. *Revolution and War*. NY: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. MA: Addison-Wesley Press.
- The Washington Post. 2011. "Youth Movement in the Middle East." February 15.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/world/middle-east-youth-population/>
(May 16, 2012).
- Watson, Katy. 2011. "Libya Conflict: Qatar Tries to Forge a New Global Role." BBC News, September 12. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/business-14887635> (May 16, 2012).
- Xuequan, Mu. 2011. "Iran Opposes Military Intervention in Bahrain." Xinhuanet, March 16.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-03/16/c_13780412.htm (April 16, 2012).
- Yates, Douglas A. 1996. *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon*. Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. NJ: Princeton University Press.