CZECH RESISTANCE TO GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1939-1945: A CASE STUDY OF DECENTRALIZED NETWORKS ENGAGED IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
San Diego State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
in
Homeland Security

by
John Phillip Sabou, Jr.
Fall 2011
SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Undersigned Faculty Committee Approves the

Thesis of John Phillip Sabou, Jr.:

Czech Resistance to German Occupation, 1939-1945: A Case Study of
Decentralized Networks Engaged in Irregular Warfare

Jeffrey McIlwain, Chair
Homeland Security Program

Cezar Ornatowski
Department of Rhetoric and Writing Studies

Allen Greb
International Security and Conflict Resolution Program

Sept 19, 2011
Approval Date
DEDICATION

I’d like to dedicate this work to my mother and brother. They have been my support in all times and I could not have climbed to the height at which I am now without them. I love you both.
History cannot give us a program for the future, but it can give us a fuller understanding of ourselves, and of our common humanity, so that we can better face the future.

-Robert Penn Warren
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Czech Resistance to German Occupation, 1939-1945: A Case Study of Decentralized Networks Engaged in Irregular Warfare by
John Phillip Sabou, Jr.
Master of Science in Homeland Security
San Diego State University, 2011

The war on terror has set a precedent in human history where decentralized organizations are evolving. The way law enforcement and traditional military confronts the spread and survival of non-state enemies is insufficient to keep up with that evolution. It is because of a lack of understanding about how non-state actors are formed and function that creates a gap in how state actors respond to non-state threats. The way a terrorist organization or a drug cartel is formed is not much different from the way any other group is created. Most non-state organizations follow the same pattern of decentralized networking explained in Ori Brafman’s *Starfish and the Spider*. However, where Brafman reasons that the decentralized nature observed in groups are a new phenomena, one of the purposes of this case is to show historical evidence that decentralized networking is not a new occurrence. To illustrate this point this author has chosen to observe and compare the Czech resistance to Nazi German occupation during World War II.

The story of the Czech resistance falls in line with most guerrilla organizations fighting a larger, superior, and well-trained force. It was a loose cluster of cells that for the most part worked independently of each other against a common enemy. The origins of this group also follow a similar pattern described in Brafman’s principles of decentralization and that is typical of most decentralized networks today. This study is significant because it recognizes that the organization of underground or non-formal groups is a humanly innate phenomenon. Criminal syndicates, terrorist organizations, and resistance groups are more a challenge today than they have ever been and by looking at history one can find new solutions to current challenges in combating non-state actors. In addition, this study will also compare the Czech case study to challenges that the United States and the international community face today. It provides an in depth look at the Czechoslovak condition under Nazi occupation, and traces the creation, adaptation, and survival of the resistance to the Nazis and the puppet government it supported.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CHAPTER |
|-------------------------|--------|
| **1** INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| **2** THE FIRST WAVE OF RESISTANCE | 6 |
| **3** THE GERMAN RESPONSE | 18 |
| Women in Decentralized Organization | 20 |
| The Erlan Strategy | 20 |
| Agent A-54, “Franta” | 23 |
| Operation Anthropoid | 24 |
| Heydrich is Dead | 28 |
| The Massacre at Lidic | 28 |
| German Crackdown Continues | 29 |
| **4** THIRD WAVE OF RESISTANCE AND GUERILLA WARFARE | 31 |
| More Splinters and Cells | 31 |
| Internal Divisions Within the Resistance | 32 |
| Cultivating Contacts and Communications | 33 |
| Luza’s Meeting for Long Awaited Uprising | 35 |
| Czechs Targeting Czechs | 37 |
| The Divide: Communist Subversion of Western Backed Resistance | 38 |
| The Slovak Uprising | 39 |
| Soviets Refocus their Efforts on Poland | 40 |
| Allies and Enemies: Frenemies? | 41 |
| Guerrilla Actions Begin in Bohemia-Moravia | 42 |
| Jagdkommandos | 42 |
| Patton Crosses into Bohemia | 44 |
| The German Line Collapses | 45 |
Roadside Raids .......................................................................................................46
The Prague Uprising ..............................................................................................47
Plzen in Uprising ....................................................................................................47
The Last Spasms of War .........................................................................................49

5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................52

Principles of Decentralization ................................................................................52
   First Principle of Decentralization .................................................................52
   Second Principle of Decentralization .............................................................53
   Third Principle of Decentralization .................................................................53
   Fourth Principle of Decentralization ...............................................................53
   Fifth Principle of Decentralization .................................................................54
   Sixth Principle of Decentralization .................................................................54
   Seventh Principle of Decentralization ............................................................54

Comparisons Between the Czech Resistance and the Afghan Taliban .............55
Past Mistakes .........................................................................................................56
Specialized Units to Track and Target Guerrilla Fighters ...................................58
Counterinsurgency Manual ....................................................................................59

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................62
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I’d like to thank Dr. Eric Frost and Jeffrey McIlwain. They are examples of leadership that students can aspire to. Without their contributions to the Homeland Security program at SDSU and academia this thesis could not have been possible.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The war on terror has set a precedent in human history where decentralized organizations are evolving. The way law enforcement and traditional military confronts the spread and survival of non-state enemies is insufficient to keep up with that evolution. It is because of a lack of understanding about how non-state actors are formed and function that creates a gap in how state actors respond to non-state threats. The way a terrorist organization or a drug cartel is formed is not much different from the way any other group is created. Most non-state organizations follow the same pattern of decentralized organization explained in Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom’s *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations*. However, where Brafman reasons that decentralized nature observed in some groups like Youtube, Grokster, and Wikipedia are a new phenomena, one of the purposes of this case is to show historical evidence that decentralization is not a new occurrence. To illustrate this point this author has chosen to observe and compare the Czech resistance to Nazi German occupation during World War II.

Historically, Czechoslovakia is criticized for not having done enough to liberate themselves early in the war. Unlike the revolts in Poland, Yugoslavia, France, Denmark, and Sweden, the Czech condition was strategically unfavorable from a rebel standpoint. The Czechoslovak resistance had to operate virtually without allied aid in arms, equipment, or personnel until 1944, in an area that was furthest from both the West and Eastern fronts respectively. To add to this litany of misfortune, the German occupation was terrifyingly effective at suppressing dissent and obliterating resistance organizations.

Nevertheless, members of the Czech military, private citizens, and war profiteers emerged and repeatedly attempted to raise an armed revolt against the German occupation. While numerous studies on this subject have been conducted it is still a rather poorly documented case. The 50 years of communist control that followed after the war destroyed most documentation of resistance organizations that were not directly pro-communist; many of their organizers who were operating from 1939-1948 were arbitrarily thrown in gulags and
not released until the 1970s and 1980s. Memoirs and autobiographies of the special few who escaped like Radomir Luza or the Masin brothers have been out for some time, but it wasn’t until the 1990s that the stories of the Czech Resistance fighters during World War II started to come out. In the 20 years since the end of the Iron Curtain there are barely a handful of people still alive to tell the whole tale. Who were these players? How were they organized? How were they in contact with the Allies? What countermeasures did they have to endure by the Nazis? This thesis will focus on those stories and how those groups were formed and operated and make comparisons to modern day non-state actors.

This study is significant because it recognizes that the organization of underground or non-formal groups is a humanly innate phenomenon. Criminal syndicates, terrorist organizations, and resistance groups are more a challenge today than they have ever been and by looking at history one can find new solutions to current challenges in combating non-state actors. In addition, this study will also compare the Czech case study to challenges that the United States and the international community face today. It provides an in depth look at the Czechoslovak condition under Nazi occupation, and traces the creation, adaptation, and survival of the resistance to the Nazis and the puppet government it supported.

This thesis study will also apply Professor Jeffrey Mcillwain’s social networking theory to show that, much like the way other syndicates are formed, so too are guerrilla resistance movements during wartime organized in similar fashion. This study will draw primarily from personal Memoirs, autobiographies, and other historical readings geared toward Czechoslovakia under Nazi occupation from 1939 to 1945, as well as online resources directed at the same or similar material. The narrative will be in chronological order from 1939 to 1945 and will draw primarily from readings of a number of very detailed sources. Then it will conclude with a look at modern day decentralized organizations like the Afghan Taliban, Mexico’s drug cartels, Alcoholics anonymous, P2P networks and a host of other groups to make the point that the way these groups formed and interact are humanly innate and observable. Not only that but they can be observed in historical documentation throughout time and the solutions drawn from past experiences like the Czech case, can be applied and refined in current and future war environments.

In 1939 Czechoslovakia was one of the most industrialized, modern, and democratic nations in Europe. It had the largest middle class comparatively to any nation in central and
Eastern Europe, and in fact prospered better than their German neighbors west of them. Although the global depression had exacerbated ethnic relations between Czechs and Germans, the nation was prospering. Czechoslovakia was one of the few functioning democracies established after the Versailles Treaty. A successful experiment initiated by the British and French two decades before, becoming a model for future progression in the region. Well armed with modern guns, tanks, aircraft, and massive lines of fortifications modeled after France’s Maginot line, no one would have thought that the following year all of it would be in the hands of the Nazis (Duff 59). What’s more is that the Czechs were convinced that their pacts with France and Britain would protect them should a conflict break out. The German people had suffered greatly after the treaty at Versailles. Twenty-one years of depression and social turmoil motivated German society to reject democratic and economic models and adopt radical ideas and aggressive behavior. A decorated World War I veteran and leader of a growing political party captured the zeitgeist. To the German people Adolf Hitler was a rallying figure. He envisioned a pan Eurasian empire modeled after the old Roman empires of antiquity (Duff 59).

After becoming Chancellor in 1933 Hitler awarded himself absolute power as dictator for life, and by 1935 the Sudeten Germans had bought into Hitler’s nationalistic views and began rioting for their right to secede from Czechoslovakia (Shirer 165). In 1936 Hitler moved his armies into the forbidden Rhineland bolstering his military industry and then in spring 1938 he annexed Austria outright. Hitler was not fooling the Czechs about his intentions, nor did he try to hide them. Inflaming political and ethnic relations between Germans and Czechs, Hitler set the stage of things to come (Shirer 170). When Hitler announced his intention to annex the Sudetenland, the entire world watched to see what Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Great Britain and his counterpart Eduourd Daladier, President of France, would do. However instead of the strength of friendship promised at Versailles, their nerve buckled, unwilling to take a stand at the risk of open war (Duff 59). In 1938 Czechoslovakia, one of the most technologically bestowed, wealthy, and defensible countries in Europe was forced to watch as not only it’s frontier was gobbled up by the new Reich, but also its military assets and only real military defensive position.

On the night of March 14th 1939 Czechoslovakia was invaded by two German mechanized armies: the 3rd and 5th Heresgruppenkommando, which comprised of nine army
corps and important units from five others. Their objective was to secure the Czechoslovak lines of communications, the administrative centers for Bohemia and Moravia, and most importantly, the industrial towns that would propel German war production against future enemies, namely the British and French armed forces. Hitler knew the Czechs would have to be the first to be removed if his dream of a greater German Reich were to come to fruition. For years Czechoslovakia was Germany’s only serious industrial competitor in central and Eastern Europe. It was Czech machinery, textile goods, and glass, which competed with Germany in the world markets and their “Bat’a” shoes which shod the shoeless, especially after the First World War (Duff 60). Czechoslovakia had large free exchange markets abroad, and up to 1938 was relatively one of the richest and independent countries in Europe. Compared with Poland, the level of industrial production counted per head of the population was over six times greater and savings were five times higher. In fact the United States and Great Britain were fourth and fifth respectively on the list of Czechoslovak exports while Germany took only one-sixth of its total foreign trade. Militarily, Czechoslovakia was in fact well endowed to defend itself from Germany (Duff 60). But by neutralizing western support for Czechoslovakia, Hitler had created doubt in the Czech leadership. President Edvard Benes did not believe his country could withstand a German invasion without support from the British and French (Duff 60.) Czech military resistance to the German invasion was precluded by the events of 1938, not only had Czech fortifications been handed over to Germany by a four-Power agreement between Britain, France, Italy, and Germany at the treaty of Munich, but the German border was advanced with the annex of the Sudeten territories (Duff 61).

Military domination of Czechoslovakia was swift and not long after it was already known who would be next on the list of Germany’s planned expansion. German intention to occupy Poland was spoken of freely by German officers (Duff 64). Many of them expected that the Polish attack would commence immediately after Czechoslovakia. In reality, German high command needed a few months to prepare for the Polish offensive. During 1939 extensive road and rail preparations were started, running northeast towards the Polish border. The depository dumps of the Czech Army were taken over quickly and filled with German war materiel (Duff 63). Bohemia was declared a “protectorate” and Slovakia was made an “independent” German satellite. The aim of the German forces, which occupied
Bohemia-Moravia, was two fold. First they had to break all possibility of a large-scale resistance by the Czech population; second, they had to organize the attack on Poland. If all possibility of large-scale resistance was to be effectively snuffed, it was not sufficient to merely disarm the Czech Army. The German occupation forces had to also break up its organization. The Czech Army, like most continental armies of that time, was primarily conscript based on a two-year service (Duff 60). The bulk of the Czech military were young recruits for whom demobilization meant a return to civilian life and the loss of contact with former comrades. On the other hand, the cadres of commissioned officers, professional soldiers and World War I veterans, based their organization on lifetime collaboration (Duff 70). It was these cadres that that would form the first configurations of resistance.
CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST WAVE OF RESISTANCE

At the time of the invasion, the Czech Army had been divided into four regional commands; Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, and Western, and Eastern Slovakia. Vojtech Luza, veteran of World War I, and general of the Bohemian command region, was the most respected and capable of all the commanders. Unlike his friends and colleagues who made up the military command structure, Luza was not very outspoken. Even when it became apparent that Benes would not endorse the defense of Czechoslovakia, Luza still held Benes in high regard as a statesman (Luza and Vella 22). On September 29, 1939, the army representatives went to Prague to compel Benes not to accept capitulation. “They entreated, threatened, begged, some wept,” according to Benes, own account (Benes 12). Luza too, tried to convince Benes that although they did not have the support of the British or French, their own military could hold out for at least 3 months, by which time the Poles would also have to choose a side as the fighting would predictably spill over. The French and British would not be any more willing to go to war, still Luza and the military apparatus were convinced that world-wide popular support would rest with the Czechs and then Chamberlain and Daladier would be pressured to intervene at least diplomatically against the Germans. Benes, heartsick and intimidated, opted to stand down and accept surrender. Benes later wrote, “The generals left dissatisfied, embittered, and in a desperate mood” (Benes 13). With the occupation of the Czech lands and western Slovakia, the German army seized 1,582 airplanes, 591 anti-aircraft guns, 2,175 pieces of artillery, 469 tanks, 43,876 machine guns, 1,090,000 rifles, and huge reserves of other weapons and war materiel (Benneckenstein 2).

Two weeks after occupation, General Alois Elias, Luza’s friend and colleague, had been appointed prime minister of the new “Reich Protectorate” under Hitler’s Reich Protector, Konstatin von Neurath. Elias and Luza came together on a weekend in a summer cottage near Sazava River (Luza 23). They agreed that their ultimate goal was to prepare and incite armed insurrection by the Czech military against the German occupiers. But the timing had to be right. A broken military, disbanded and weaponless was no match for the
Wehrmacht at this stage and they agreed that the work of the resistance would have to revolve around gathering intelligence and smuggling it abroad to whoever would have it used against the Nazis (Luza 23). Unlike many of their colleagues, they believed that Germany could not occupy Czechoslovakia forever and that war in Europe was inevitable. They also came to the conclusion that Hitler’s defeat would require the involvement of both the United States and the Soviet Union, the only anti-fascist nations big enough to curtail Germany’s efforts. That meant that from the beginning the Czech Resistance could not endorse futile uprisings that would leave countless people dead needlessly, but rather act as an adjunct for when allied military operations commenced (Luza 24). To forge this partnership is was evident that the political hierarchy under Benes, which had vacated the country on the eve of its invasion, would have to take up this task. Benes later bitterly found out that his kowtowing to Chamberlain had not earned him any respect among his British counterparts and in fact was less popular on his arrival to England (Duff 72).

Nevertheless he and General Ingr, Luza’s former superior and right hand to Benes went to work organizing a resistance movement with those who were left behind. Ingr became the military liaison between Luza, and the British as well as Benes himself (Luza 30). After the invasion of Poland and the declaration of war on Germany by the Allies, Ingr and British special operations executive, the precursor to future British special operations began immediately the arduous task of smuggling Czech and Polish, pilots, officers, and other willing fighters for the upcoming battle to France (Olson and Cloud 18). Originally, they were to be used as reserve forces or attached as advisors to British forces for the expected quick and decisive battle.

However when France surrendered and the British expeditionary force retreated at Dunkirk, their aid and expertise became invaluable. Their participation in the Battle of Britain helped turn the tide in the war by bringing an end to Germany’s western advances in 1940-1941 (Gretzyngier and Matusiak 25). Czech and Polish pilots are recognized for having been the highest aces among all pilots at the Battle of Britain. For example; Sergeant Josef Frantisek, a Czech RAF pilot was credited with 17 confirmed kills and dozens of unconfirmed or damaged enemy aircraft. The Czechs, who numbered 80 pilots from the remnant Czech air force, were integrated into the Polish 303 squadron, which is famous for having the highest kill rate of all RAF squadrons during the Battle of Britain (Kenety 9).
Back in Czechoslovakia, resistance organizations were forming. The resistance networks that existed during the early years of the war were formally recognized under the leadership of president Beneš, who together with General Ingr and František Moravec (head of Czechoslovak military intelligence) coordinated resistance activity while in exile in London. In the context of German persecution, the major resistance groups consolidated its ranks under the “Central Leadership of Home Resistance”, or ÚVOD (Masty 33). UVOD was an umbrella term for a number of factions that sprang up in the name of anti-Nazi resistance.

The long-term purpose of the resistance umbrella known as UVOD was to serve as a shadow government until Czechoslovakia’s liberation from Nazi rule. The three major resistance groups that consolidated under ÚVOD were the Political Center (Politické ústředí, PÚ), the Committee of the Petition “We Remain Faithful” (PVVZ), and the Nation’s Defense (Obrana národa, ON). These groups were all democratic in nature, as opposed to the fourth official resistance group, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ). In 1941, ÚVOD endorsed the political platform designed by the leftist group PVVZ, titled “For Freedom: Into a New Czechoslovak Republic” (Masty 33). In it, ÚVOD professed allegiance to the democratic ideals of past-Czechoslovak president Tomáš Masaryk, and called for the establishment of a republic with socialist features (Masaryk 20). In addition to serving as the means of communication between London and Prague, the ÚVOD was also responsible for the transmission of intelligence and military reports via wireless radio communication like the one possessed by the Three Kings resistance cell and a secret radio station hidden in the Moravian countryside (Shirer 218).

General Ingr, Moravec, President Benes and General Bartik (head of Czech special forces who at the time were being trained by the British SOE for special assignments in Europe) believed that Britain and France would Smash Hitler’s war machine quickly. Therefore they did not setup conditions with the idea in mind that the home resistance would have to survive for years in secret (Masty 44). UVOD was a good start but it was poorly devised in the safety and comfort of The Abbey at Aston Abbots in Buckinghamshire, UK. The British plan at this stage of the war was to encourage a simultaneous mass uprising in the occupied territories, thus drawing German forces to the trouble spots and minimizing British causalities when the advance into Germany was made (Masty 45).
The members of UVOD were instructed to meet frequently and in predictable places like coffee shops, town squares, and protests outside of government offices. They also kept files and made lists of their members and hatched far-fetched plans for igniting mass revolt (Masty 45). Luza, technically a member of ON, the military branch of the resistance of UVOD, took efforts to distance himself from this first wave of resistance when it became apparent the danger of UVOD’s transparency. He warned the UVOD members about their predictability and not long after his warning, the German Gestapo sprung into action by arresting a great number of its members. Many of Luza’s friends and colleagues who were in O.N. (National Defense) were executed and only a handful of survivors escaped into the woods in northern Moravia (Luza 27).

It became clear that any resistance from this point on had to operate through loose circles, and not one central command as prescribed by the exiled government. After the events of 1939-1940, Luza stepped in and proscribed a new strategy, a loose confederation of networks organized clandestinely around a nucleus of ten to twelve individuals each (Luza 28). Luza’s first group comprised of both military and civilians whom he knew he could rely on: Otakar Zalman, Jaromir Appel, Frantisek Peller, Ludvik Tuma, Frantisek Peller, Ludvik Tuma, Frantisek Jedlicka, and Sylvestr Voda. Each of these men and women served a purpose… Luza’s strategy involved only using a handful of people at a time and not drawing on overwhelming numbers for useless protests (Luza 28). However, Luza believed that terrorist attacks on German targets would only invite disproportionate retaliation on Czechs and intended to focus his group’s attention on network building, smuggling, intelligence gathering, and begin the delicate process of preparing a viable rebellion that would push out the occupation. Of course not all Czech resistance factions believed in this assessment.

Elsewhere other anti-Nazi groups were taking shape. Another World War I veteran, Josef Frantisek Masin, was busy channeling his rage against the Germans. Masin had fought hard for an independent Czechoslovakia in his youth. Having once been a conscript of the Austrian Imperial army, Masin was captured in the Siberian campaign and sent to a P.O.W. camp in Dalovice near Kiev, in 1916 (Masin 9). Being a P.O.W. did not change his earthly status. Among those at the camp were thousands of Austrians and Germans who, as it was back home, held an assumption of godly privilege over the Czechs. They demanded and were given preferential treatment from their captors. Better food, better lodgings, better clothes,
and warmer blankets. Some were even allowed leave into Kiev on weekends. As a result thousands of Czechs died of starvation, disease, and brutal treatment at the hands of the Germans and Austrians. (Masin 10). It was at that point that the Russians approached the Czech prisoners with a peculiar proposition; to form a Czechoslovak legion that would fight against their former masters and “liberate” their country. The Russian Czar, nearing the end of his reign was willing to try anything that took his troops away from the front and back in the cities where Bolshevism was rampaging unchecked.

Baffled but intrigued, Masin and thousand of other Czechs signed up for the legion and fought on the eastern front with the Russian “big brother”. At the end of that war Masin had remained in the army and became a major with the 5th artillery regiment attached to Prague’s defense (Masin 10). His men were veterans and professionals ready to fight when the Germans crossed the Sudetenland into Bohemia. Yet, per the instructions of President Benes, no orders were given to mobilize. Infuriated, Masin and some of his colleagues went to work setting explosive charges to the weapons stockpiles at their station before the Germans could reach it and equipping his men for guerrilla action (Masin 26). Just as this was going on, word reached up the command chain of what he was doing. General Vaclav Sara, commander of the 1rst Army artillery regiment was sent to talk him down.

‘Pepa’, he said, ‘I heard about the foolish thing you are doing… such a rash thing. Don’t you see it would have dire consequences for the nation?’ [Masin, desperate for approval, countered,] ‘I only want to do my duty!’ ‘I understand your frustration. But you do not have the right to act this way! Our time will come, and we will need capable people when it does.’ (Masin 26)

Masin was having none of it however. General Sara even tried promoting him to Commander of the regiment but Masin refused, knowing that in a few hours the title would be meaningless. As the last straw, Sara relieved Masin of his command and dismissed him. Instead of watching a triumphant Wehrmacht army march through the streets, Masin returned to his hometown of Dolne Liboc. He confided in his wife that to that point he had followed orders, but from that day on he would work alone (Masin 27). Dedicating himself to full-time resistance. Whenever anybody asked him what he did for a living, he smiled and answered, “I’m self employed” (Masin 26). Josef Masin did not work alone for long despite his feeling that the world was against him. His long time friend and colleague Lieutenant Colonel Josef Balaban, had been dismissed under similar circumstances. Instead of being kicked out of the army outright he had been relegated to the liquidation office, the department responsible for
singling out and executing individuals that could pose a threat to the new “Protectorate” regime. Balaban found this job repugnant and began meeting with former military officers and members of O.N. in it’s infancy (Kadlecik 12). However, the open locations and lack of discretion unnerved him, and like General Luza, he stopped going to meetings right after the invasion of Poland. Balaban took leave from his job in Prague and traveled to Masin’s home to visit his old friend and recruit him into a private group of resisters that they would organize together. Like General’s Luza and Elias, they too began scheming their revenge. A third man soon came to join the duo. Captain Vaclav Moravek, a god-fearing protestant and devout bible reader from the town of Kolin, was introduced to Masin and Balaban by a fellow resister (Kadlecik 15). Like Masin and Balaban, Moravek was a marksman and excellent horse rider. He was also well known for his quirky personality and humor, which would become the group’s hallmark. Moravek was also famous for carrying dual revolvers into battle. He once was quoted stating “I believe in God almighty and my guns” (Kadlecik 27). They named themselves the Three Kings after the ones present at the birth of Jesus Christ.

The early days of Czech capitulation were fluid. Masin and his colleagues returned on numerous occasions to the Ruzyne barracks where Masin had tried to blow up the armory but was interrupted by General Sara. Surprisingly the Germans had not yet come to occupy the barracks and armory. By the time they did arrive, Masin and his friends had smuggled out 18 heavy machine guns, 300 rifles with 70,000 rounds of ammunition, 580 army pistols with 12,000 rounds of ammunition, and an assortment of military equipment and explosives which they hid in private gardens, quarries, forests, and basements throughout Bohemia (Masin 22). Chief warrant officer Josef Palat, a fellow resister who hid some of the weapons in his own home once asked, “Where did you get so many guns?” to which Masin replied, “I drove to the Vrchoviske Barracks, loaded them up and the Germans opened the gates for me when I left.” Later Masin arrived with a carload of submachine guns and Palat asked again how he had obtained them. Masin, simple as ever said “I took them out of the Germans’ car on the street.” Obviously this story is hard to believe, however it is true that early in the occupation the Germans were arrogantly over impressed with themselves. After all, what country would try to form a resistance if it had not even the nerve to defend itself from invasion? It is possible that the Germans from whom Masin took the weapons from thought he had come
there to deliver them to another garrison, dump, or simply to a site where they would be destroyed (Masin 22). In addition to such near comical thefts, Balaban had a friend who happened to tailor German uniforms and was able to acquire uniforms and insignias for them as well as German IDs and documentation. Mr Cabicar, the tailor, supplied the Three Kings with various disguises including various German military uniforms, railway worker clothes, and even Gestapo coats and hats. Using this array of disguises Balaban, who spoke German fluently, repeatedly bluffed his way into Gestapo headquarters in Petschkov palace and reconnoitered it with impunity. Sometimes he even obtained German communiqués with High Command in Berlin about troop movements, future plans, and names of captured resisters (Masin 22). Over a period of several months the Three Kings created a network of collaborators from all strata of Czech society, including well-known personalities from political and military circles, tradesmen, private citizens, and even a cemetery night watchmen. Many of them had been members of a patriotic gymnasium known as Sokol which Balaban was himself a member of before the Germans closed it down.

Despite Masin’s vow never to take orders again, the Three Kings were put into contact with General Ingr and the Czech government in exile at Major Moravek’s insistence. Moravek had ties to a former army radio operator named Palatin, who had been transmitting information from the secret radio station in Moravia and disseminating instructions from President Benes to other resistance groups. With General Ingr, the Three Kings coordinated an underground railroad that smuggled people, primarily Czech officers who wanted to join the Allies in fighting the Axis (Masin 22). They also engaged in printing illegal newspapers and fliers detailing anti-Nazi propaganda and news feeds about the course of the war. While Balaban was going to meetings and cultivating contacts in the various resistance factions before the Gestapo raids began, Masin and Moravek where busy gathering intelligence on new German weapons. Today Škoda is a well-known Czech automobile company that produces good cars at reasonable prices. It is a household brand name. Before the invasion in 1939 however, Škoda was responsible for producing the Czech military’s cutting edge weaponry endorsed by Britain and France. It was planned that in the event of a crisis, Poland and Czechoslovakia would act as proxies in the region minimizing western involvement. The Škoda works in Plzen produced a constant stream of industrial black smoke, churning out the latest in heavy arms manufacture around the clock. When Hitler arrived, the Wehrmacht took
over numerous Czech prototype weapons projects and improved them with their own engineering (Masin 27). Škoda manufactured the world's first triple-barreled gun turrets for the *Tegetthoff* class of battleships of the Austro-Hungarian navy in World War I. Prior to World War II Škoda also produced LT-35 and LT-38 tanks, which are better known under their German labels Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t). These tanks were originally produced for the Czechoslovak army and their production continued during the occupation by Nazi Germany (Encyclopedia Britannica).

The Plzen works was a massive complex of factories, refineries, steel mills, and assembly lines that produced tanks, armored troop carriers, trucks, aircraft, and an endless assortment of weapons and ammunition for everything in the German arsenal. In reality, Hitler cared little of Prague or the Czechs, his main goal in invading Czechoslovakia was to take the Plzen complex and immediately begin bolstering his armies (Encyclopedia Britannica). Through Balaban and O.N, Masin had made contact with the head foreman and owner of the Skoda works, Albert Goering who personally had a hand in every new weapons project. Although working along side German scientists and engineers, Goering was sympathetic to the Czech plight. He smuggled out copies of German plans for the infamous tiger tank and the double-barreled machine gun to Moravek and Masin who, through a courier dispatched the plans to Ingr in London via smuggling routes through Romania. Before the destruction of UVOD the Three Kings also became acquainted with Dr. Felix Man, another collaborator who was employed at the Semtin Complex, which produced explosives. Semtin would later develop the high yield explosive Semtex (Masin 32). At great personal risk Felix smuggled out hundreds of pounds of dynamite and several crates of blasting caps from the heavily guarded facility. Associates who repaired Gestapo vehicles brazenly transported the explosives in German trucks to a safe house in Prague. One of the drivers, master tinsmith Josef Likar and his wife Marie and her brothers Vaclav and Frantisek Rehak who owned a Prague workshop which they converted into a personal armament factory. Right under the nose of the Gestapo they assembled over two thousand bombs disguised as coal briquettes and hid them in coal shipments bound for factories in the Reich. News of the sabotage was broadcast over the BBC but in Germany and occupied territories the story was swept under the rug (Shirer 53). German authorities threatened that anyone who mentioned it would be arrested. The Three Kings also went after high profile targets
right in the heart of the Reich: Berlin. Major Ctibor Novak, Masin’s wife’s brother, had gotten a job as a translator in Berlin. On September 15, 1939 Novak planted bombs from the Likar safe house in the Reich Luftfahrtministerium (aviation ministry) and the Reich Police Directorate. Novak escaped Berlin but got as far as the Austrian/Hungarian border when he was shot in the leg and captured (Masin 32). He survived Gestapo interrogation and never named any names. The Gestapo never figured out that he was the actual bomber of the German offices and Novak disappeared into the Gestapo jails and was not heard from until after the war when he returned to Czechoslovakia and joined the communist party.

The Three Kings also made an unsuccessful attempt on Heinrich Himmler’s life by exploding a bomb in the Anhalt Railway Station in Berlin in February 1941. Two train conductors who had secretly transported the explosives to Berlin and put them in a luggage storage office at the Anhalt station were later arrested and executed (Masin 32). The Three Kings continued their bombings, destroying bridges and railways frequented by German troops.

Aside from this however, their main task was to maintain contact with Agent A-54 aka “Franta”. Franta, was a spy deeply entrenched in the German war machine and was responsible for providing valuable intelligence in the opening years of the war. At this time Moravek was entrusted by General Bartik with the knowledge of this man’s identity. Bartik had already been in contact with this individual before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was “Franta” who warned of the impending doom and allowed time for Benes and his staff to make their exodus. Major Moravek, the contact point between the Czech exiles and the Three Kings, became Franta’s contact; he along with Peltan, a late addition and radio operator, decoded Franta’s messages, recoded them for transmission, and dispatched them promptly to Bartik in London (Wiener 21).

Meanwhile the German “protectorate” government was becoming frustrated. In the opening days of the war the Germans had little trouble curbing the Czech’s appetite for revenge. However, as Poland fell and Holland, Denmark, and Norway followed suit, it was apparent that moods in Czech society were uncharacteristically quiet. Too quiet. The man in charge of overseeing the Czechs, Reichsprotector Konstantin Von Neurath failed to see any danger despite the constant protests of his underlings. Von Neurath was an aristocrat, and believed he was above the daily ministrations of the lowly Czechs and refused to deal with
them directly (Masin 34). Instead he appointed Herman Frank to be his deputy, while Neurath lavished himself with expensive parties and entertainment. Seething at Neurath’s disassociation that anything was wrong, Herman Frank, Neurath’s second in command and unofficial overlord of the Protectorate, was charged with addressing the issues threatening the Protectorate authority. Disgusted by Neurath’s odiousness, yet giddy that he had been given free reign, Frank demanded that Otto Geschke, Chief of the Gestapo in Prague, appoint a new special deputy with the express mission of tracking down and eliminating the Three Kings (Masin 34).

Police Captain Oskar Fleischer was appointed to the position. Moravek, the comedian of the Three Kings and a bit reckless took up a personal vendetta with Fleischer. Fleischer had dug through the Czech military records and found out that Moravek had been assigned work as a bookkeeper for which he had not appeared for once after the Czech surrender. (Officers of the Czech military were required to report to German authority figures in a probationary fashion). Fleischer questioned Moravek’s former colleagues who all denied remembering what he looked like. Nevertheless Fleischer learned the location of Moravek’s hideout in Prague (Masin 35). Moravek got wind of the raid just as Fleischer and a truck full of soldiers were leaving Gestapo headquarters and managed to escape in time but left his winter coat which became the source for Moravek’s eccentric attitude toward his pursuer. Whenever Fleischer got close, Moravek would leave false clues and rude messages to heckle him and berate him for “stealing his coat.” One evening, Fleischer was having a cigarette at a bar, exhausted at hunting his quarry. A fellow German wearing a Nazi swastika patch sat next to him and asked him if he could light his cigarette so he could smoke too (Masin 35). The gentleman finished his cigarette, drank a beer, and thanked Fleischer for the light before leaving. A week later, Geschke, Chief of the Gestapo, called Fleischer into his office. He asked Fleischer how the hunt for Moravek and his cohorts was going to which Fleischer stated that he believed they had gone abroad. At this point Geschke handed him a postcard that had been addressed to Geschke’s office. It was from Moravek…

‘Otto you Scoundrel!’

I made a bet with Masin and Balaban that I could light my cigarette with your cigar and I am herby informing you that I won the bet on Tuesday…

B+M+M. (Masin 35)
After reading the stunning note, it is said that Fleischer turned white as a ghost and Geschke exploded obscenities on Fleischer. From then on every Gestapo colleague would ask him for a light when he walked the halls of Gestapo headquarters. Even in the streets Czechs would point and laugh. Everyone it seemed was laughing at his expense. Fleischer was furious and he renewed his efforts making blind arrests and torturing people around the clock only to eventually release them when it was clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that his captives were not the ones he was looking for (Masin 35). Meanwhile agent A-54 continued to provide Moravek with intelligence of the highest importance. In April 1940, a month before France would surrender, “Franta” sent along an urgent message describing the German plan of attack for France. Plan “Rochade” detailed a march along the Maginot line and push by German troops through Belgium. Benes and Ingr, received the information with and relayed it to the British and French. However, despite knowing the reliability of Czech intelligence, the French did not believe that this type of attack was feasible and did nothing to offset it. A few weeks later Paris was occupied and France fell (Wiener 25).

At the end of July 1940 Franta again sent along important information, this time about Hitler’s plans for England. During the next several weeks, complete plans for an invasion, scheduled for September 15, were dispatched to London. Ships, boats, submarines, and aircraft spreading poison gas were to be used. Corroborating this information with supplemental reports and confirmations from other sources, England was able to arrange a series of defenses that forced Germany to abandon their invasion strategy and focus instead on attacks from the air. “Franta” struck again when at the end of September he notified Czech resistance that Hitler had abandoned his plans for England and began working feverishly on a new strategy called “Barbarossa,” a plan for the imminent invasion of the Soviet Union. This too was forwarded to London and the Soviets in Moscow (Wiener 28). Yet, like the French before them, the Russians disregarded the report and did nothing until it was too late. The failure of Allied leadership to heed the warnings provided by the Czechs was disheartening to say the least. The Three Kings vented their frustrations by harassing German supplies and communications and tormenting Fleischer some more.

The string of bombings continued until 1941 when the Gestapo raided O.N. in Prague and began executing anyone even remotely affiliated with it. The Three Kings had grown in number to a little over a dozen members now however suffered their first tragedy. On April
22, 1941, the Gestapo tracked down Balabán to a warehouse where he was to meet with a fellow resister from another organization and pick up vital communiqués intercepted by Czech radio decoders. Unknown to Balaban an Army sergeant and resister who had met with Balaban before but had been captured by the Gestapo had leaked the whereabouts of Balaban’s meeting under interrogation. It was revealed that “an illegal” meeting was about to take place in Dejvice but the Gestapo did not know who was yet involved (Kadlecik 24). To the Gestapo’s fortune they found non other than Josef Balaban, a Three Kings founder and leader (Koura 269). After a short gunfight Balaban tried to escape through a window but was shot in the leg and back, the other resister was killed in the gunfight trying to hold off the Gestapo agents while Balaban made his escape. After his arrest Balaban was subjected to prolonged torture but survived. He only revealed the names of executed resistance fighters. Eventually he was imprisoned and after the onset of Reichsprotector Reinhard Heydrich declaring martial law, Balaban was sentenced to death. On October 3rd, 1941, Joseph was shot in Prague-Ruzyne prison (Kadlecik 29).

Hitler reasoned correctly that the Czech Intelligensia was responsible for the recent troubles and charged Von Neurath with stamping out the seeds of rebellion that were cropping up like weeds. Von Neurath however, was a reluctant candidate for the position of “Reichsprotector.” Squamish and odious, Neurath believed in a “soft” approach to the Czech question (Wiener 21). He preferred minimal contact with the Czechs and delegated administrative duties to his subordinate Karl Hermann Frank who chaffed under Neurath. The Germans were losing lives every week to the Three Kings and Frank begged Neurath to tighten his hold on the Czech people. It wasn’t until the attempt on Himmler’s life by agents associated with the Three Kings that Hitler himself stepped in. Feeling that Neurath was protecting the Czechs, Hitler appointed a close colleague and like-minded Nazi to oversee the counter insurgency (Wiener 29). The infamous Reinhardt Heydrich. A true believer in the thousand years Reich and Aryan purity, Heydrich went to work immediately after being appointed. By this time it had painfully occurred to Hitler and his staff that a serious leak was present. Heydrich’s task was to hunt down the resistance, “Germanize” the Czechs, and get Franta.
CHAPTER 3

THE GERMAN RESPONSE

Reinhardt Tristan Eugen Heydrich also known as “the Hangman,” was a high-ranking German Nazi official. Prior to his appointment to Reichsprotector for Bohemia-Moravia, Heydrich was responsible for a number of Hitler’s special projects regarding “racial warfare” in addition to forming an intelligence community for Hitler before the war. Reichsprotector von Neurath was recalled to Berlin at the insistence of Hitler. The official media declared von Neurath had fallen ill and that his replacement would be Reinhardt Heydrich. After his appointment, Heydrich instituted martial law in Prague and Brno, capitals of Bohemia and Moravia respectively. Following that he sentenced all Czechs currently in prison or under detention to be either sent to concentration camps or executed. During his first week 163 people were sentenced to death and 718 sent to concentration camps, only 14 people who were brought before a court martial were acquitted. In a report dated October 11, 1941, Heydrich states “approximately 5,000 Czechs have been arrested and await courts martial” (Wiener 44). By then Benes and his staff were being pushed by the British to provide a military target for assassination to demonstrate Czech resolve against German occupation. In the British view they needed to know if the Czechs could be counted on to resist or if they had capitulated fully to the Reich. On October 3rd the exiled Czechoslovak ministry of national defense held a meeting in London to which General Palecheck, Head of Czechoslovak Special Forces Group was called. He was also requested to bring two of his best paratroopers with him to discuss “an action that would enter history…..” Despite Moravek’s warnings against assassinating the Reichsprotector, stating that it would have drastic consequences for the Czech people and the resistance, President Benes (at the insistence of Prime Minster Churchill and his staff) concluded that Reinhardt Heydrich must die (Wiener 44).

The plan set forth on October 3rd required that two members of the Czechoslovak special forces group (whom most at the time were trained by British SOE) would parachute into Bohemia on October 10, link up with the Prague underground, ascertain the daily routine
of Heydrich, and select an appropriate time and date for his elimination no later than October 28. Meanwhile back in Prague, the mass “interrogations” of Heydrich’s prisoners were yielding a name here and a bit of information there, each bringing the Gestapo closer to the true sources of resistance activity. Moravek and his team were forced to move constantly, abandoning spare equipment and leaving clues (Masin 45). However, one evening as Moravek hurriedly set up their transmitter in Peltan’s apartment, two Gestapo agents who had come to Peltan’s apartment on a “hunch” arrived on the unsuspecting resisters. Moravek, Masin, and Peltan had no idea until the Gestapo rang the doorbell with their staccato, insistent morse code, the Gestapo’s calling card. When no one answered the door the two agents kicked the door down. Masin yelled out “I’ll stall them!” while Moravek and Peltan destroyed their intelligence material. Masin shot the nearest Gestapo man to focus attention on himself (Masin 45).

The Gestapo agents hesitated to fire since they were interested in taking prisoners so they tackled Masin and a brawl broke out. In the ensuing fight Masin succeeded in steering the battle to the top of the stairs and they all, including himself, rolled down in a bundle. Masin was subdued and knocked unconscious but gave enough time for Moravek and Peltan to get away via a steel cable they bound from the sofa and dropped it from the apartment window, 45 feet from the ground (Masin 46). They both slid down the contraption and on the way down Peltan’s foot was badly injured and Moravek’s left index finger was nearly cut off. Moravek stuck his bleeding hand in his pocket and hopped on a streetcar but Peltan was too slow and was forced to escape on foot. Moravek made his way to a friend’s house and cleaned himself up and went looking for his radioman, avoiding Gestapo patrols. In the morning he visited a friend who gave him breakfast and informed him that Peltan had been captured during the night (Masin 46). Both he and Masin were now under intensive German interrogation.

Meanwhile every underground organization was being shaken down. The second Gestapo purge was underway at Reinhardt Heydrich’s orders and supervision. General Luza’s group, which had cultivated access to persons at important areas of the Nazi hierarchy but with no radio of their own, coordinated with the Three Kings by providing them whatever valuable intelligence they could gather for transmission to London (Luza 85). The Luza group were also in the middle of organizing a cohesive, planned, and viable uprising when
they were forced to take refuge in the country side as Heydrich’s extermination campaign left most of the resistance in disarray albeit, alive and functioning. Members of The three major resistance groups that comprised UVOD, Political Center (Politické ústředí, PÚ), the Committee of the Petition “We Remain Faithful” (PVVZ), and the Nation’s Defense (Obrana národa, ON), were systematically all but wiped out (Luza 86). Members of Political center and the committee of the petition were mainly political bodies made up of students that survived the first purge and engaged in anti-German propaganda, intelligence gathering, intellectual poetry, and sometimes sabotage.

**WOMEN IN DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION**

It is important to note the role of Czech women during the war years. Decentralized organizations like the Czech resistance transcend gender inequalities like those seen in a corporately organized structure. Notable names that come to the forefront include persons such as Elena Haas, who joined the Czech Resistance at the age of 25. Haas’ education as a civil engineer was interrupted when Hitler closed all the universities in Bohemia (Cook 271). This was a serious error on his part because he did not foresee that certain trades would come in handy against his regime. Haas had learned to be quite proficient in the use of demolitions and with aid of a French agent and supplies dropped by British Special Operations Executive, destroyed an important bridge on the Ohne River near Terezin, killing thirty-five German soldiers. In 1945 she was caught in a fierce shootout and gunned down 18 miles north of Prague while leading a group of partisan fighters against a Nazi controlled airfield near Melnik. Maria Gulovich, a Slovakian schoolteacher who joined the underground resistance during World War II is also famous for her contributions to anti-Nazi operations. Nicknamed “the sweetheart of OSS”, She was awarded the Bronze Star for her "heroic and meritorious" service in aiding agents of the American Office of Strategic Services ("OSS") and British intelligence, especially helping downed pilots escape from Nazi-occupied territory during the winter of 1944-1945 (McLellan 1).

**THE ERLAN STRATEGY**

Under Von Neurath, a few Czech dissidents were tolerated and to be expected. But Heydrich, who was disgusted at any representation of “slaves” much less their resistance, had become very adept at tracking down and arresting important individuals in the Czech
resistance. Among them was General Elias, prime minister to the German backed Czech government such as it was and secret resistance leader. The military branch of the resistance, O.N. also suffered from arrests and had many of their meticulous plans undone, but not as devastatingly as PU and PVVZ. The method that was used to shake up the resistance wasn’t anything new, just simply not thought of until Czech resistance became violent. Even before Heydrich’s appointment to Bohemian Reichsprotector, the Gestapo had implemented a new strategy to infiltrate the resistance and find out how deep it ran. With no shortage of Czech prisoners many were released and some were even paid on the condition that they would be double agents for the Gestapo and report on all their findings related to the resistance. To do this, the Gestapo set up a fake import company in Brno and Prague for the purpose of being a headquarters for their informants and a place to lure resisters to their doom. In a personal account, Radomir Luza, son of General Vojtech Luza, depicts the conversation in which they were warned of the Gestapo ruse:

It was Robotka who first found out about the informer on Saturday, May 20. As he crossed the square he heard someone behind him running to catch up and calling his name. It was Paprskar. ‘I must see you my friend,’ Paprskar said breathlessly.

‘Is it serious?’ Robotka asked.

‘You know perhaps that the Gestapo has started using Czech agents to infiltrate resistance groups? Yes Czechs, A man is caught harboring someone unregistered or being involved in some resistance. He’s offered reprieve for himself or maybe his family if he’ll get more involved in the resistance and report on everyone he deals with. Perhaps you have heard of Erlan?’

‘Erlan…? The import company?” What about it?’

‘Erlan’s front is an import company. In reality it’s the headquarters where informers come to report to the Gestapo on their contacts. Janska Street number 7.’

‘How do you know about these things?’ Robotka replied.

‘Erlan is run by the Germans. The Gestapo has cover apartments there for agents to use as their “homes”. There are other cover apartments too, all over Brno. An informer can bring resisters together for meetings. Generals perhaps. Even generals living underground can meet in the apartment of a “Czech friend”, and the Gestapo will know every syllable the generals utter.’ Paprskar was speaking very slowly now.

‘So you are one of these Gestapo agents?’ Robotka asked.
‘Not just me. Rysanek, Jizera, and many others… we all work for the Gestapo. We are all Erlan’. (Luza 211)

Robotka and Paprskar were part of General Luza’s network, who at the time was busy trying to recruit the Brno fire Brigade, the German sanctioned Moravian Militia, and even the German backed Police force in preparation for an uprising. All of these groups were Czech but with German masters supervising them. At the same time General Luza himself was coordinating with Vavro Srobar, leader of the Slovakian resistance group “Flora” in creating a simultaneous uprising against the German satellite government in Slovakia. However successful planning and coordination required a meeting, which General Ingr in London insisted upon. It was Ingr’s idea that command of the Slovakian uprising be supervised by Luza. Over the course of several months Luza met with Srobar’s lieutenant Colonel Novak. Paprskar was in charge of setting up the meeting and finding a safe place for it. However, in a last minute episode of guilty conscience Paprskar betrayed the Gestapo and warned Luza of the danger (Luza 215). In 1941 the Gestapo established two headquarters in Brno and Prague with a division called the Third Section, Nachrichten Referate. The purpose of this group was to bore into the underground resistance using a collection of informers known as “V-persons” from the Gestapo’s supply of prisoners. These spies would extract information from “A-persons”, or genuine resisters at decision-making levels like General Luza. By 1942 the Gestapo setup up the import company known as “Erlan” to accommodate the growing number of spies they were pumping into the Czech underground (Luza 215). Rysanek, General Luza’s aid and lieutenant, was in fact the most productive of the Erlan spies. He had been in Sokol, the patriotic gymnasium club, and the army. For a resister, those credentials were in high standing enough for people to trust him.

Having been warned of the Gestapo’s shadow activity, General Luza called off the meeting and once again, he and his colleagues as well as most of what remained of O.N. were forced to escape into the country side where friends, relatives, and willing resisters sheltered them in secret rooms, compartments, their gardens, and of course the deep forests. Meanwhile, Heydrich’s search for the notorious leak known as Franta was gaining ground. Known only to Major Moravek, a playboy German lawyer, Dr. Steinberg was a well renowned ladies’ man, diplomat, and socio-elite deeply entrenched in government circles. For someone with such social caliber it was no wonder that Dr. Steinberg AKA Agent A-54, or “Franta,” was the Czech underground’s most valued intelligence asset. At the same time,
“Dr. Steinberg” was merely a cover name. Steinberg’s real identity was Paul Thummel, chief of German Military Intelligence for southeast Europe, stationed in Prague (Wiener 61). In this capacity Dr. Steinberg, with full Gestapo sanction and cooperation as a German agent, was highly placed and had access to strategic German Intelligence which, as Agent A-54 he passed to the Allies through the Czech resistance.

**AGENT A-54, “FRANTA”**

It has been speculated by some historians, like Jan Wiener and others, that Thummel’s reasons for betraying his country were humanitarianly motivated. Thummel was not just some German in the cogs of war. He was a personal friend of Heinrich Himmler and met Adolf Hitler on a number of occasions. It was he who supplied the Three Kings with Himmler’s location on the day of his attempted assassination. In the beginning of the Nazi era, Thummel was present at Hitler’s rallies and indeed had a hand in the party’s rise to power (Wiener 62). Thummel had shared at one point Himmler’s desire for a German superpower leading events on the global stage. But it is unclear when or why exactly Thummel decided to turn from that path. Regardless, Thummel accepted a strategic post in Hitler’s steamroller, keeping one step ahead of it and warning those about to be crushed (Wiener 62).

Heydrich, having connected the dots even before he arrived in Prague, suspected that Thummel was the leak and sent SS Captain Abendschoen of the Gestapo to verify the hunch. Abendschoen too had his own suspicions of Thummel, partly because it was well known that Thummel had a reputation as a seducer of men’s wives, and possibly Abendschoen’s. For whatever his reasons Abendschoen had already taken a personal side-assignment to expose Thummel (Wiener 64). At the same time, Moravek had had so many close calls with his nemesis Oskar Fleischer that each time he escaped the Gestapo’s grip he left behind a bit of information that formed breadcrumbs to Thummel. Abendschoen pieced together the parcels of information, which was incoherent and speculative, and arrested Thummel on the grounds that he, Abendschoen had uncovered documents that alleged to prove Thummel’s relationship with Moravek. In Kladno, a Gestapo prison and headquarters, Abendschoen subjected Thummel to several days of uninterrupted interrogation. During this time Thummel insisted that his contact with Moravek had been carried on in pursuance of his own
intelligence duties (Wiener 64). According to Thummel, Moravek was just the tip to a larger network of resistance groups as well as the “real” Agent A-54, and that Abendschoen’s interference had jeopardized his operation at a critical point (Wiener 65). He admitted that he had kept his contact with Moravek secret from his friend Oskar Fleischer, stating that for personal reasons Fleischer would have arrested Moravek too soon and that to reveal the true source of the intelligence leak more time was needed. Abendschoen, half convinced, released him and kept him on a short leash, seeing potential for his own advancement by using Thummel and taking credit for the breakthrough himself (Wiener 65). Meanwhile, Moravek had learned of “Steinberg’s” arrest and was planning a way to “kidnap” him and thus save him for future work.

By this time British SOE had flown and dropped the two paratroopers who would be Heydrich’s assassins. Paratroopers Jan Kubis and Jozef Gabcik had been specially trained for assignments such as this and upon landing in Bohemia they quickly integrated into the population and made contact with Major Moravek. With him they were able to ascertain Heydrich’s daily schedule through the Czech servants he employed at his statehouse outside of Prague. In addition to the two assassins, British SOE also dispatched radio teams to compensate for the loss of the Three Kings’ transmitter. These teams were codenamed “Silver”, “Barium”, and “Calcium” (Wiener 65).

**OPERATION ANTHROPOID**

Allied command wanted consistent updates on the progress of “Operation Anthropoid” as it was called. From the Allied perspective, Heydrich’s removal would enrage Hitler and cascade in momentary chaos for the occupied territories. Allied command predicted that Hitler would order a number of divisions to terrorize the occupied territories, namely Czechoslovakia, thus reducing the buildup of forces in places such as France and North Africa, and cause a momentary panic in the German command long enough to initiate other secret actions in Europe (J. Martin 54). Although the civilian populations of occupied lands would carry the brunt of German reprisals, the Allied leaders reasoned that the war effort took precedence. With Heydrich dead the Germans would tighten their grip to the point of rebellion, or so the Allied Command believed. Yet, like so many mistakes in that war the Allies did not foresee the need to supply weapons to the Czechs for an uprising.
General Luza had repeatedly pleaded for the Allies to supply them with weapons and equipment. General Ingr and the other Czechs abroad wanted to arm the home resistance as well and made appeals to the British for assistance. In one of his communiqués to Ingr, General Luza explained his situation:

We have consolidated the home resistance under a unified leadership and have for a long time done everything we can to carry on our fight. To be effective in this critical period of the war, we need weapons. We made urgent requests about two months ago; you promised arms within two weeks but nothing happened. I am very resentful of this situation because ours is one of the most active groups, led by possibly the most dedicated soldiers of the republic. For the sake of these men, I ask you to intervene immediately and fulfill your commitment to send arms to us. Please brother General, explain why we have not received the weapons and do everything you can to insure their delivery. It is difficult to imagine all the obstacles and hardships we are facing every moment. I urge you to take my words as seriously as they are meant. (Luza 205)

No weapons were sent because the political situation trumped military necessity. By that time Hitler had already gone to war with the Soviet Union and in the east the tide was turning in favor of the Russians. In the British view “the Protectorate” was part of the Soviet war zone; therefore the Soviets would be responsible for supplying any anti-German insurgency even though the British wanted one to happen (Stafford 80). The fear was that any weapons they dropped might eventually fall into the hands of the Communist resisters with whom they were increasingly becoming disillusioned. At the same time the Soviets did little to encourage the Czech resistance. They did not want to set a stage so as to congratulate the Czechs on liberating themselves, nor were they eager to take over a country with an independent army that looked to its own leaders for direction (Stafford 80).

Back in Prague, Moravek had linked up with Gabcik and Kubis and integrated them into the Three Kings group, which now numbered over two dozen members. Gabcik and Kubis’ mission was postponed repeatedly since rescuing Franta took precedence. On March 21 Moravek tried to dissuade the pair from assassinating Heydrich, pointing out that now with Franta’s information cut off and the underground on the run, they would all be more useful if they could form a guerrilla unit (Masin 40). The Paratrooper’s training would help provide a strong core and they could possibly convince England to send more paratroopers for this purpose. The “Anthropoids” were interested in this scheme but were also eager to carry out their own assignment. Of course, “Franta’s” kidnapping was first on the agenda before anything could continue. Even Allied command agreed that the retrieval of Agent- A
was of paramount importance. Moravek briefed the pair on their role in the rescue and left to meet with another of his workers at a prearranged meeting place. Arriving a few minutes late he found “Dandy” Rehak, surrounded by Gestapo men and fighting for his life.

Fleischer, along with Abendschoen had finally caught up to Moravek. Even though Moravek could have easily slipped away he pulled out his pistol and started shooting in an effort to focus the German’s attention on himself. It worked. Determined to catch Moravek alive, they shot only to wound and crippled him. They hit him ten times in various parts of his body, legs, and arms. Moravek fired fifty rounds while trying to run away. Bleeding out and realizing he was too badly injured to escape, he sat down in path of his approaching pursuers, held his pistol to his head and pulled the trigger. In a frustrated fury Fleischer unloaded his entire pistol magazine into Moravek’s face leaving no official means of confirming the kill except through the fact that Moravek’s left index finger was missing from a previous escape (Wiener 65).

Reinhardt Heydrich reported on the day’s doings to Berlin by special delivery.

I am able to report that we were able to infiltrate into the Czech resistance movement and with that into the British-Czech intelligence service. On the 27th of February it was found out that this person is the main agent of the Command of Counterespionage in Prague, Paul Thummel. As far as one can evaluate Thummel is guilty of high treason. We are of the opinion that Thummel was a very good, probably the best agent of the Czech intelligence service. He has received from the Czech intelligence service over 40,000 marks. On March 21, 1942, SS officers from German security police investigated known secret hideouts and post office boxes of the former Major Moravek, leader of the British-Czech espionage group and of the sabotage organization known as ‘Three Kings’. Among the arrested are two Czech radio operators who were in communication with London and three sleeping car conductors who functioned as couriers for British intelligence service. During this action we confiscated: 3 transmitters, 6 receivers, many spare parts for construction of transmitters, and a great number of radio telegrams. (Heydrich 110)

With the death of Moravek, most of what was now the Three Kings went into deep hiding as well, suspending all their operations. Wanting revenge and free to pursue their original goal, Gabcik and Kubis set about the assassination of Reichsprotector Reinhardt Heydrich. The morning of May 27th, Kubis and Gabcik, in their separate hideouts, both arose with early birds and in cheery moods. Kubis only stopped to say goodbye to his host, Mrs. Sojkova whose husband was sent to a concentration camp, and her little daughter Alenka, who had already become accustomed to calling him “Uncle” (Calic 75). ‘This will be a busy
day.’ he said. ‘If I’m not back by eight o’clock tonight, I won’t be home, so don’t worry.’ He waved and ran down the stairs and through the front door. According to the prearranged plan, the paratroopers went separately to a meeting place in the Vysocany sector of Prague along Heydrich’s daily morning drive to work. There they would be joined by members of the underground including Zelenka and Rela Fafek, members of the Luza group (Calic 75). Here each of the helpers was assigned a battle station. Valchik, a surviving three kings member was posted at the bend in the road to signal the approach of the target by refracting light from the sun into his mirror. The others were to mingle with the street population as ‘passers-by’ along the route, ready to distract or engage the police if necessary. According to the plan Gabcik would shoot Heydrich and his driver with his Sten sub machine gun while Kubis grabbed Heydrich’s briefcase which would doubtlessly be full of strategic information of use to London and plant a bomb hidden in Kubis’ own briefcase in the car to substitute for Heydrich’s, hopefully killing other high ranking individuals later on (Calic 75).

At 10:31 AM Valchik signaled that Heydrich’s black, open roofed, Mercedes, a favorite of Nazi officers, was approaching the bend. Gabcik dropped his coat and stepped into the road. He took aim and fired but nothing happened. He pulled the trigger again, and nothing happened. His Sten had jammed. At this time Heydrich and his chauffer stopped their vehicle and drew their pistols to shoot him down. Kubis, tense and ready, withdrew his bomb and hurled it toward Heydrich, who was now standing up in the car aiming at the stunned Gabcik. The bomb exploded near the car’s rear wheel, shattering the door. Heydrich was wounded and immobilized. Fragments from the bomb hit Kubis in the face and impaired his vision but he managed to get on his bicycle and ride away while bleeding profusely. Gabcik meanwhile, pulled out his shoulder pistol and shot the pursuing chauffer in both legs. Then he too escaped. Heydrich was still standing, probably in shock and waiting for help to come. But all around him all he saw were stone faced pedestrians who noticed nothing out of order. Only one lone woman- a collaborator recognized Heydrich and turned in agitation to those around her appealing for aid (Calic 75).

‘It is Herr Heydrich!’ she screamed. ‘Help him!’ No one did. Unsympathetic passers-by made various sarcastic remarks before melting away. ‘The hospital is around the corner.’ They said. ‘Let him walk!’ It was some time before the woman was able to flag down a truck and demand assistance to which the driver obliged. After loading him into the passenger seat
they rode off to the nearest hospital. Heydrich had been attacked at 10:33AM. By 11:00 AM all of Prague knew what was happening as the loudspeakers blared out news of the attack and descriptions of Gabcik and Kubis (Calic 75).

**HEYDRICH IS DEAD**

At the hospital, Reinhardt Heydrich did not die right away. The surgical staff headed by Professor Dick, a German surgeon, and at the personal request of the Reichsprotector, Dr. Hollbaum from the “German clinic” had performed an operation in an effort to stabilize the dying Heydrich (Calic 76). X rays revealed that the bomb fragments had penetrated Heydrich’s ribs and damaged his chest, with the fragments embedded in his pleura, the membrane between the ribs and lungs. Another fragment was embedded in his spleen. Hollbaum also found that “dirt” from the bomb was also present but not expected to be fatal (Calic 77). On June 4th, Reinhardt Heydrich slipped into a coma and died. The causes of death as reported by Professors Hamperl and Weyrich of the German Pathological Institute stated: “Death set in as a consequence of damage to life important parenchymatical organs through bacteria’s or poisons, entering with the explosives fragments, which settled partly in the pleura and in the surrounding of the spleen where they concentrated and multiplied” (Calic 77).

**THE MASSACRE AT LIDIC**

The Gestapo soon realized that the fugitives were not merely a duo of upstart murderers as previously believed by the Gestapo who were investigating the attack. Now there was no doubt that they were Allied assassins. Since they had not been found the entire Protectorate was guilty of sheltering them. On the 5th of June armored vehicles rode through the streets of Prague to remind people of the strength and determination of the German occupiers. Mass executions, already a daily event were now performed with no pretense at trials (Wiener 103). When the mass executions, curfews, searches, and a reward of twenty million Czech crowns did not produce a single shred of the culprits, Hitler, enraged and ballistic wanted to start with the brutal, widespread killing of the Czech people but, after consultation, he reduced his directive to only to several thousand (Wiener 103). The Czech lands were an important industrial zone for the German military and indiscriminate killing could reduce the productivity of the region. Hitler himself selected the town of Lidice, a
mining town 15 miles from Prague. An inconspicuous spot, Hitler himself chose it at random to be wiped from the map. The *Wehrmacht* army along with SS officers overseeing the deed, looted the town, separated the men, women and children, and burned the town to the ground (Wiener 104).

All of the men over the age of 15 were shot and killed. The women were loaded onto trains and sent to concentration camps. The children, separated from their mothers, were inspected by SS doctors and those that fit the Aryan description were spared and given to childless German families, usually military and SS. Those that did not were sent to Mauthausen, a concentration camp in the north where the survivors were ushered to the front of the gas chamber lines. The ruins of Lidice were then bulldozed. Nothing stands there today (Wiener 106).

After Lidice all of Czechoslovakia was left in a state of shock. Still however, the assassins remained at large. The Allies had their proof that Czechoslovak enslavement was not voluntary. Although helpless in its chains, the public statement of defiance in the wake of Heydrich’s death left open new possibilities for the Allies to consider. Britain sent more paratroopers to help build a guerrilla force to further harass the Germans. Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik, Adolf Opalka, Josef Valchik, Jaroslav Schwartz, Jan Hruby, and Josef Bublik, who were all British trained Paratroopers assigned to Special Operations Executive, would form the core of the guerrilla force (Stafford 86). What’s more is that Soviet prisoners of war were escaping from POW and concentration camps in eastern Germany and Poland and in an effort to return to their forces on the frontlines, found their way to the Czech Resistance, namely the communist Partisans who were also growing in number. Little by little the Russians trickled into Bohemia, unable to go further due to the buildup of troops after the assassination. Some made a go of it anyway but only got as far as Slovakia where they linked up with the Slovak resistance. Most of them however remained in Bohemia and trained their Czech counterparts in guerrilla warfare and outdoor survival (Stafford 86).

**GERMAN CRACKDOWN CONTINUES**

While the Germans were retaliating Radomir Luza, son of the General Vojtech Luza and made arrangements for collaboration and coordination of guerrilla operations between the Three Kings and the Luza group. Unfortunately, Karel Curda, resister turned Erlan agent
had been hiding out in the same home where Gabcik had been quartered and learned of Gabcik’s whereabouts in the Karel Boromaeus Greek Orthodox Church. There seven of the paratroopers including Gabcik and Kubis were hiding. Curda betrayed several safe houses provided by the Jindra group whose function was to provide safe haven for resisters, including that of the Moravec family in Žižkov who had sheltered Gabcik and Kubis before and even helped them gather information on Heydrich’s daily dealings (McDonald 183).

It was they who had friends who worked as servants in Heydrich’s home and who were able to steal vital papers and intelligence. At 5.00 am on June 17, the Moravec apartment was raided. The family was made to stand in the corridor while the Gestapo searched their flat. Mrs. Moravec was allowed to go to the toilet, and killed herself with a cyanide capsule. Mr. Moravec was taken to the Pecek Palace together with his son Ata. Ata was tortured throughout the day. Finally, he was stupefied with brandy and shown his mother’s severed head in a fish tank. Ata Moravec told the Gestapo what they wanted to know. SS troops led by Oskar Felisher laid siege to the church but, despite the best efforts of over 700 German soldiers, they were unable to take the paratroopers alive; three, including Heydrich’s assassin Kubis, were killed in the prayer loft (Kubis was said to have survived the battle, but died shortly afterward from his injuries) after a 2-hour gun battle. The other four, including Gabcik, committed suicide in the crypt after fending off SS attacks, attempts to smoke them out, and fire trucks being brought in to try to flood the crypt. The Germans (SS and police) also had casualties, allegedly 14 SS killed and 21 wounded (McDonald 202).

The Czech resistance, having already suffered greatly under Heydrich’s purges was literally sent running for the hills as the troop levels increased in Bohemia and Moravia. The death of the Reichsprotector spurred the Germans into action, and just as the Allies predicted, regiments were pulled out from France and Africa to participate in terrorizing the Czechs. All resistance in Prague was effectively snuffed, forcing both democratic and communist underground factions to take refuge in the vast countryside. Whatever hopes the Czechs and the Allies had of an uprising in the near future died with Heydrich. Back at square one, the survivors picked up the pieces and began building again.
CHAPTER 4

THIRD WAVE OF RESISTANCE AND GUERILLA WARFARE

MORE SPLINTERS AND CELLS

After the initial purges were carried out at the order of Karl Hermann Frank, now successor to the late Reinhardt Heydrich. General Vojtech Luza and everyone in the resistance went “underground.” That did not stop them however from making contacts with other resisters and recruiting fresh boots. To the Germans, the Czech resistance had suddenly gone dark, giving them the idea that the Gestapo raids on the resistance and the student intelligencia, were a complete success. Radomir Luza, son of general Vojtech Luza and author of the Hitler kiss, recounts in his book the personal experience of being a part of his father’s resistance force.

No one in fact really knew where the other active people were or how many people had survived. There was no club called ‘The Resistance.’ We were all like weeds, springing up here and there in the cracks in the Nazi system, being rooted out, coming back again from a few seeds. (Luza 83)

As mentioned before, the Resistance was at first a number of political and military organizations that were already predetermined and sanctioned by the government in exile and allied partners. Following the first round of arrests and executions those groups persisted but scattered, forming splinter groups that acted independently of each other. Some groups were larger than others. One group of military officers that survived the raids might know the location to a secret cache of weapons, another might be a group of private citizens who decided, either together or separately that they would provide shelter to resisters and thus themselves be implicated. All over Bohemia and Moravia the corporate structure of UVOD, that is the 3 primary factions that comprised it, fragmented into clusters with overlapping operations of varying effectiveness. So when reference is made to these factions, in fact it is referring to the clusters of splinter groups that stemmed from the original 3 groups excluding the communist party, as they were a stand-alone organization.
General Luza was one of these splinters and constantly tried to locate other survivors, mainly military leaders so that when the time came for action, they could coordinate their efforts. It was at this point that resistance to the German occupation started to turn violent, inviting the second purge under Reinhardt Heydrich. The second purge was by far more successful than it’s predecessor and it truly damaged the Czech resistance’s ability to operate (Luza 84). However, survivors always seemed to make it somewhere. Following the death of Heydrich and Germany’s reprisals on the Czech people, only the scattered remnants of ON and the communist party remained to carry the torch of rebellion. For three years the many factions of the resistance operated in this way, each group going about their operations independently, only making contact with each other when absolutely necessary (Luza 84).

**INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE RESISTANCE**

By 1943 it was clear that Hitler would lose the war. Meanwhile the German policies toward the Czechs did not change. Only Poland received similar if not harsher treatment by the German occupiers. By comparison the conditions in Holland, France, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway were far more lenient than, that is to say as lenient as Nazi’s can be. In those countries the policy stood that if you did not bother them, they would not bother you. In the east however, blood flowed like water. Yet, Hitler had overextended himself and the tide turned at Stalingrad and then again at Kursk. North Africa and Italy also capitulated to the Allies. Now it would be the Germans who would retreat. Still, it did not change the circumstances. State Minister Karl Hermann Frank, who was in charge of persecuting Czechs, did his utmost to ensure that every month a minimum of one hundred people were executed (Luza 84). However once the war began turning in favor of the Allies, the Germans stopped publicizing the deaths as they had done so in the past. The Czechs, whose labor was vital to the war, were not to be pushed to the point of rebellion.

Hitler had decided privately that the Czech nation and bloodline would disappear. In a way he saw it as a pleasurable irony. As Czechoslovakia was a model experiment crafted by the Allies at Versailles, Hitler would make it a model for the Germanization of Europe. This meant that only the few that possessed Aryan looking features would be spared and assimilated while the bulk would be discarded in concentration camps. The Jews in Europe were just the first step. Despite the Gestapo’s merciless and imaginative correctives to the
Czech populace, the resistance was resurging. At this time the democratic remnants of UVOD had gone into hiding, but the communist resisters (KSC) had distinguished themselves in 1940 and 1941 (Luza 84). They organized, they undertook sabotage missions, and operated their own radio transmitter linked to Moscow (a prized asset in the underground). Yet, they also repeatedly shifted their stance on cooperating with their democratic counterparts, often attacking Benes as a tool of the imperialists, depending on the direction of Moscow (Luza 84). After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, they decided that a unified home resistance would be more effective. They had ulterior hopes of course, which included infiltrating and subsuming their democratic partners. Instead however the communist underground was practically wiped out during the two periods of martial law and did not recover until late in the war. It was well known that Gestapo agents permeated the ranks of the KSC, which made working with them akin to working with a sick and contagious individual. Usually communists who had been arrested had turned into informers as a condition of their release. German tribunals were especially vicious against communists, any action that indicated communist association, like donating money to the Red Relief for example, meant an automatic death sentence (Luza 85).

**Cultivating Contacts and Communications**

While Benes encouraged the UVOD to work with their communist allies, few groups that comprised it were so eager. The Luza organization continued to cultivate contacts for the purpose of intelligence gathering and forming the basis for which an effective uprising could begin. One of Luza’s contacts, an engineer named Karel Staller developed a new type of machine gun called the “Bren”, which he also sold to the British before the war. Luza and Staller became acquainted in 1933 while recovering from bronchitis in a sanatorium in the High Tatras, a mountainous region of dense forests and high altitude. In 1939 Staller became general director of the Brno Small Arms Factory (Luza 85). One section of many in the Brno works. Brno was the location of a massive military complex of factories, foundries, and steel mills that was famous for building armies overnight during World War I. Staller was in charge of supervising production to the German Wehrmacht. In addition to donating his own money to the resistance, he siphoned funds from the Small Arms Factory, and provided Luza with blueprints of future weapons, which Luza passed along to the Allies (Luza 85).
Luza had a courier in his group, named Rudolf Rastacky, a Slovak sugar exporter, who carried microfilm in the heels of his shoes. Ostensibly he was allowed travel because he was also helping the Germans evade the Allied blockade in the Mediterranean. As part of his work, he regularly traveled from Bratislava to Switzerland where he would meet former Czechoslovak envoy to Switzerland, Jaromir Kopecky, who in turn relayed information to London via radio or couriers (Luza 86). Sometimes Frastacky took the microfilm to Istanbul, where the Czechoslovak government in exile had representatives. Staller was also in close contact with Albert Goring, brother of Hermann Goring who was the lead director of industry of the entire Brno complex. It was through Staller that the Gorings were introduced into the resistance, and through them, introduced to Major Moravek and the Three Kings (Luza 86). It was Albert Goring that confided in Staller the dates and means of the invasion of France, which Staller promptly reported, to Luza and through Luza the British. For over a year radio transmission to London relied on the Luza connection since the Germans had found the secret radio station in Moravia during the first purge and their wireless transmitters. Luza and Staller organized a courier network from the Protectorate to Slovakia to Switzerland to England (Luza 86).

The study of social networking, particularly in organized crime and resistance organizations varies based on what groups specialize in certain activities. General Luza used his social standing and rank to connect to people in other areas throughout occupied Czechoslovakia in preparation for a major uprising. By contrast the Three Kings excelled in more kinetic operations against the Germans. The primary research addressing the role of social networks and organized crime culture originated from anthropologist Anton Blok. Blok spent two and a half years in the town of Genuardo in the west Sicilian hinterlands to observe the social networks of the Mafiosi and what made them a powerful political force in Sicily. Instead of looking at the Mafia of Sicily through the traditional sociological lens that would see it from a top down corporate system, Blok deviated from that approach and singled out the structures that kept it thriving for centuries. He did so by examining “the rural setting in which the phenomenon originated and prospered rather than with the cities in which it eventually multiplied” (Blok 5).

Similarly, nowhere did the Czech underground prosper more than in the vast countryside and deep forests. Farmers, village folk, and woodsmen typically gave shelter to
fleeing resisters where Nazi influence was moderate to minimal as opposed to the cities where the bulk of German garrisons resided. In the protection of the village masses, the Resistance survived and regrouped (Luza 151). Over time they also became a sort of a shadow authority where German influence was absent. Resisters raised funds through donation drives, commandeered certain equipment and vehicles, even bicycles, and whenever a resister was on the run, or if someone’s family was in danger, shelter was always abundant with neighbors. By 1943 the Luza group’s strength had returned, new members from surviving resistance groups like ON were assimilated by General Luza. By that time he was trying to subsume all the underground groups in the Czech lands under his leadership, though they were to remain functionally independent. Radomir Luza, states in his autobiography that the groups were many and remembers having to catalog them in his head (Luza 151). Although each group comprised of only a few members there happened to be many of them all throughout the country, too much for Radomir to remember. It was clear that these individuals, many of whom were remnants of ON, PRNC, clusters of intellectuals in Prague, and a new group called the Council of Three (the successor to the Three Kings), made up a sizable fighting force ready to take up arms at a moment’s notice. Resistance membership had multiplied quickly in the wake of the German surge.

The communists had been busy too, the influx of Russian prisoners of war escaping into Czechoslovakia from Germany had trained and armed the Partisans in guerrilla warfare and were becoming increasingly proficient in that practice. When the western Allies arrived at the Rhine and the eastern front was moving, The Soviets resumed special operations in Czechoslovakia by sending teams of paratroopers for the purpose of bolstering the Partisan forces (Luza 161). In 1941, the Soviets had engaged in this action too but unreliable intelligence and reckless use of radio transmission by the Czech communists led to the capture or death of numerous groups dropped in the occupied territory. Following these debacles the Soviets stopped sending their special teams and instructed their Czech counterparts to take up anti-propaganda duties (Luza 153).

LUZA’S MEETING FOR LONG AWAITED UPRISING

By September 11, 1944, General Vojetech Luza had at last organized a rebel army that, with the help of the Partisans, could push out the Germans from Prague. Luza held a
Staff meeting for the first time with all the major players present: The Ourednik organization, Sazava, Cisar network, the fire brigade, ON, PRNC, The Council of Three, the Svaton group the Revolutionary Trade Union, and the Communist party (Luza 153). Luza reasoned that in order to truly defeat the German occupation they would have to reorganize militarily and set forth viable objectives for the insurrection. Being the only remaining officer of serious rank, Luza nominated himself Supreme Commander of the “Home Resistance” (Luza 153). At the meeting he issued his first military order which distributed duties and supplies, provided instruction on how to mobilize military units, and warned that any officer who refused to participate in the uprising would not only be banned from rejoining the Czech military at the end of the war but would also be subject to courts martial. This event in the Czech resistance denotes the fact that decentralized organizations, being fluid and responsive to changing conditions, can at times quickly assimilate a corporate structure based on the tactical needs of a situation. In a loose organization or confederation of groups such as the Czech resistance, leaders step forward to the forefront and lead, while followers will assume their roles as well until such time that their promotion is warranted (Luza 153).

On October 6th 1944, on a mild rainy night, just weeks away from the planned uprising, General Luza and his personal aid and bodyguard had taken refuge in the village of Hriste in the Moravian hills. There they stayed at an Inn, wearing disguises of fake beards and village clothing. The town Mayor greeted them and showed them to the Inn having no idea as to their real identities. Not long after a Gendarme patrol (Nazi loyal Czech police) got wind of the new arrivals and decided to check it out. They kicked open the door and barked “Hands up!” but were greeted with General Luza springing into action, pulling his pistol on the officers (Luza 161).

Unfortunately the rain had soaked into his coat pocket where he kept it and his pistol jammed. The officers gunned General Luza down. Votava, Luza’s aid, made a break through the window but was shot in the back. He made a few more steps before he pulled out his revolver, put it to the side of his head and fired. The Gestapo was soon summoned to the site of the shootout and identified the body of General Luza (Luza 161). On his person they found seven thousand crowns, two pistols, and a notebook in which the dead man had written, “Life without freedom has no meaning.” Additionally there was a reference to a French book about Guerrilla warfare, over a hundred pages of which Luza had translated in a
neat binder. The killings of General Luza and Votava were avenged by Radomir Luza a week later when Radomir had linked up with a group of Partisans and persuaded them to travel to Hriste and massacre the Gendarme Police station (Luza 161).

**Czechs Targeting Czechs**

The strike force, consisting of mainly Russians and Czechs approached the station at midday, capturing a patrol and forcing them to trick their comrades into opening the gates. The Partisans stormed the Gendarmes, who had no time to react and surprisingly put up no resistance. They ushered them into the police station’s basement and executed them one by one. Only two members of that station were allowed to live to spread the tale and warn other Czechs that collaboration with the enemy would bring consequences (Luza 161).

Without the direction of Luza the uprising would have to be postponed until a new commander could be appointed, preferably a western individual. However, by 1944 the British and the Americans had signed the treaty of Yalta, and resolved not to directly aid the Czechs in their resistance. That task would be for the Soviets. Instead British SOE drafted a new policy directed at aiding the Soviet offensive in the east. The following is taken from a document detailing that instruction.

**Document 7**

Special Operations Executive Directive for 1943 Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 20 March 1943, COS(43)142(0) in CAB 80/68. Operations by the Special Operations Executive should be carried out in accordance with the following directives for 1943, which has been prepared in conformity with the strategy decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

………………

7. RESISTANCE GROUPS AND PATRIOT FORCES

SOE OPERATIONS BY THEATRES

POLAND & CZECHOSLOVAKIA

29. The sabotage of German communications to the Russian Front in these areas is of primary importance. The preparation of forces to take organized military action when the German hold is weakened has great political importance in these countries. Such forces will undoubtedly yield valuable results when the time comes, but the supply of equipment for them should not be allowed to interfere to great an extent with the provision of material for sabotage, which can be carried out now. (Stafford 30)
THE DIVIDE: COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF WESTERN BACKED RESISTANCE

Again, the unified home resistance that had been established by General Vojtech Luza quickly melted into a decentralized fashion. Radomir, his son, was respected as an intellectual and a fighter but he was not his father who had the charisma and experience to lead men into battle. Radomir faded from the “Luza group” as it was already being taken over by Luza’s leftist unofficial second in command, Albert Steiner. Steiner was sympathetic to the Soviet agenda and being himself of the working class, disliked intellectuals. He had maintained close relations with the KSC but was never allowed to integrate their members into the Luza group for fear that it would invite collaborators who had been turned by the Gestapo (Luza 201).

Now, with Luza out of the way, Steiner opened the gates of membership, using Luza’s name as a rallying banner for a new “socialist” movement within the organization. Both Radomir and his father were anti-communist, and using his father’s name for the Soviet agenda created deep divisions. The democratically educated intellectuals and army officers that had over time joined Luza were ostracized and singled out, making way for inexperienced revolutionaries and partisans taking over vital positions. By this time the government in exile under Benes had also been relegated to the backburner. Contact with the resistance had slowed to a crawl in London as transmissions became less frequent (Luza 201). This was of course in part due to the fact that the Democratic organizations did not have the means to transmit data in real time to London, and neither the British nor the Americans were willing to risk a supply run. The radio operators previously sent by the British had been uncovered under Heydrich’s reign. The survivors integrated into the countryside Partisan groups where they aided them for the duration of the war. As explained before, the Soviets were expected to be in a position to provide that sort of equipment and they did, but only to the communist oriented groups who employed their own discretion as to what information would be passed to the west, according to the direction of Moscow (Luza 201). This reliance on the communists as well as a lack of adequate support from the western allies, led to the effective discourse of the western backed underground. Radomir Luza had not sat idly by however. During the course of the war he had made his own network of
informants and volunteers of whom only he knew the identities. Radomir Luza left the Luza group, forming his own starfish (Luza 201).

THE SLOVAK UPRISING

By 1945 the Soviets had crossed into Eastern Europe and were moving through Slovakia and Poland. It was upon the arrival of the Red Army that the western policy towards the Soviet Union started to shift. In Slovakia, the resistance had grown into a legion of thousands that had already been embroiled in constant skirmishes with the German backed government, a satellite of the Reich. Slovakia was formally a constituent part of Czechoslovakia, a state with a brief but tumultuous history, and the events discussed here are commonly referred to as the Slovak National Uprising (Brown 5). The Slovak insurgency was a complex affair. The uprising started on August 29th, 1944, when the Slovak army mutinied against its own government, a nominally independent yet staunchly pro-Nazi regime led by a Catholic priest, Father Jozef Tiso. Slovakia had become Nazi Germany's first ally in 1939 when it had seceded from Czechoslovakia under Berlin's tutelage on March 14th, the day before the unopposed German occupation of Prague (Brown 6). Slovakia's army took part in the invasion of Poland that September, and in the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The revolt's primary objective was simple enough. As a senior Czechoslovak officer explained in early August 1944: “The goal of the Czechoslovak uprising is to open the frontiers in the Carpathians (mountains in eastern Slovakia) to allow units of the Red Army to penetrate into the interior of Slovakia in one night’s action, and thus to shift the front line 250-300 kilometers further west… (Brown 6)”

The insurgency began with high hopes. Its 60,000 fighters were soon recognized by the Allies as fellow combatants (referred to as the 'Czechoslovak Forces of the Interior' or the 'First Czechoslovak Army'), and by mid-September they had gained control of a large portion of Slovakia (Brown 7). Their headquarters were strategically located in the town of Banska Bystrica, in the centre of the country. The timing was not auspicious as the western Allies' attempts to cross into Germany were soon ground to a halt. The Soviet summer offensive had also run into difficulties, and forecasts that the collapse of the Third Reich was imminent were to prove premature (Brown 8).
Berlin was determined to crush the Slovak uprising and moved in 40,000 well-equipped soldiers, including frontline SS divisions, to suppress it, in an operation personally supervised by Heinrich Himmler. Desperate fighting ensued; the insurgents struggled to hold on to the territory they had liberated, while the Germans were equally determined to re-secure a vital sector in their eastern defenses (Brown 3). By the end of October Axis forces had re-taken most of the territory held by the insurgents, at a cost of some 10,000 lives on each side. Squads of Einsatzgruppen combed the countryside, and thousands of Slovak civilians, particularly from the Jewish population, perished in the retaliation that followed. Tens of thousands more were transported to concentration camps (Brown 9).

The case of the Slovak resistance was also an unspoken battle after the rise of communism in the east. At the time, although speculated but unbeknownst by the west, the Soviets held to the philosophy that any anti German resistance would require complete capitulation to Soviet influence following the removal of the fascists. As it was in Czech, Slovak resistance was split into hundreds of groups that consisted of both democratic and communist loving peoples with a wide spectrum of grievances against each other (Vlcko 110).

Any future occupation by the Red Army would be met with resistance by the former; hence, Stalin decided that the Red Army would wait until the final moment to intervene when the bulk of the Slovak resistance was on the verge of defeat. This action would laud them into the country as heroes and hopefully leave any democratic resistance a futile gesture (Vlcko 110). However, the Soviets did not count on Germany’s resolve to hold the line. A major German counteroffensive began on October 17–18 when 35,000 German troops entered the country from Hungary, which had been under German military occupation since March 1944 (Vlcko 110). The western advance of Soviet forces came to a screeching halt in late October 1944. By the end of October, Axis forces (six German divisions and one pro-Nazi Slovak unit) had taken back the territory. As it became apparent that the Red Army had done too little too late, Stalin refocused his attention on Poland and Hungary.

SOVIETS REFOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON POLAND

In Poland, the Warsaw Ghetto uprising had already begun and upon hearing of the advance of the Red Army the Polish underground, which had suffered just as greatly as the
Czechs if not more, initiated operation Storm with the aim of capturing the cities and German defenses before the Red Army arrived. In early 1943, after the German defeat at Stalingrad, the western Allies had made relatively little progress toward an invasion of the European continent, and that the planned Polish uprising would face a still powerful German army rather than units retreating to their defeated homeland. It became clear that the advancing Red Army might not come to Poland as a liberator but rather, as General Rowecki put it, “our allies' ally” (Marek 62).

On November 26, 1943, the Polish government in exile issued instructions that, if diplomatic relations had not resumed with the Soviet Union before the Soviets entered Poland, Home Army forces was to remain underground pending further decisions. The Polish Home Army's commander on the ground, however, took a different approach (Wojciech 1). The plan was to cooperate with the advancing Red Army on a tactical level, while Polish civil authorities came out from underground and took power in Allied-controlled Polish territory. On January 2, 1944, Red Army forces of the 2nd Belarusian Front crossed the prewar Polish border (Wojciech 2).

Together they retook Kowel and Włodzimierz on April 6th. The Poles were however, soon forced to retreat west, and in Polesie was attacked by both German and Soviet forces. Polish soldiers taken prisoner by the Soviets were given the choice of joining the Red Army or being sent to Soviet forced-labor camps (Kotbanski 6). Joseph Stalin would not let the Polish government in exile return and instead created a puppet Moscow-backed government, while arresting or killing Polish resistance personnel and members of the civil authorities (Naimark 92).

**ALLIES AND ENEMIES: FRENEMIES?**

The actions of the Soviets in Poland and Slovakia marked a precedent in Western-Soviet relations. After Poland, Churchill and Truman had agreed that a communist controlled east was not in the best interests of the continent and that they must both immediately try to reverse the concessions given to Stalin at Yalta. General George Patton’s 3rd army was given the approval to make his way into Austria and from there, to the Plzen complex in Bohemia and if possible to Prague. Allied supply runs had resumed in earnest to the Czech resistance, an action not seen since the beginning of the war (Zaloga and Hook 15). Czechoslovakia
holds a strategic position in Europe to this day, and in the event of war with an eastern aggressor it would be a tactical high ground separating East from West. By January 1945 the Red Army redoubled its efforts, driving German troops out of southern Slovakia (Zaloga and Hook 15).

**GUERRILLA ACTIONS BEGIN IN BOHEMIA-MORAVIA**

On January 19, 1945, the Red Army took Bardejov, Svidník, Prešov and Košice in eastern Slovakia and was quickly pursuing the retreating German’s into Moravia. In the South, Patton surged through Austria and crossed the Bohemian border. Finally after years of struggle and limbo the Czech resistance began initiating it’s own uprising. The event itself was not coordinated. On hearing of the Allied advance from two directions the pockets of resistance that had sprung up under the Nazi regime increased their tempo. Partisan groups openly ambushed German convoys daily and raids on airfields and strategic locations increased in frequency (Luza 168). There was little coordination to speak of but all nonetheless understood the goal. Wherever Nazi authority existed, now was the time to strike. Meanwhile Radomir Luza was busy coordinating his own network in roadside raids. The Soviets had increased their number of Soviet Special Forces drops in Bohemia and wherever he encountered them, Radomir took in the Russians into his own group. His network had transformed into a guerrilla force numbering 60 people including Czechs and Russians (Luza 168). All throughout Czechoslovakia the Czech underground turned violent, openly defying the Germans. However, the resistance was still outmatched by superior German armor and weapons. Radomir recalled in his book, “the Hitler Kiss” the sentiment at the time: “As the Allies were closing in on the Germans, the Germans seemed to be closing in on us. This was something of an illusion to us because, though we didn’t realize it, resistance networks were popping up toward the end of the war faster than the Nazis could smother them (Luza 169).”

**JAGDKOMMANDOS**

The German response to increased guerrilla activity was two-fold and, as usual, effective. When Karl Hermann Frank realized that the Nazis were losing control of the countryside, he began frantically reorganizing the German Police force in Prague, into special units to fight the partisans. These units were called the *Jagdkommandos*, whose name
derived from the German word for hunting, Jagd. The Jagdkommandos excelled in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency (Sünkler 1).

In contrast, Radomir Luza explains the tactics, which the JagdKommandos used, and how his network adapted to them.

As these were not large units at first, they could not stop us from attacking an isolated Gendarme station or a lone supply truck; in those instances, we struck and disappeared before they knew what happened and they could not patrol the back roads, which remained ours. But the Jagdkommandos did keep the towns and the main transportation routes relatively safe for German activity. Moreover, they generally had inside information; they could learn exactly where the partisans were. They were brutal when they made a raid, incinerating people who had only been marginal helpers, shooting and hanging partisans on the spot. (Luza 195)

In addition to the Jagdkommandos the Germans employed the Vlasov legion which proved to be an even greater nuisance to Partisan guerrillas. Like Hitler, Stalin had his own internal enemies. When taken prisoner by the Germans, a Russian could earn his release by volunteering to work as an anti-Bolshevik activist. By 1944 these renegades formed an army of over 100,000 under the leadership of captured ex-Soviet general Andrei Vlasov (Luza 196). They fought side-by-side German units at Stalingrad and were later assigned to Czechoslovakia to Karl Hermann Frank. Vlasovs were known to comb through Czech villages on horseback in groups of six or eight, rooting out partisans, informants and helping the Jagdkommandos by posing as escaped Soviet prisoners of war (Mueller 7). They still wore their Red Army uniforms, which by now were tattered and torn giving them the implication that they’d been incarcerated in German camps. This tactic proved to be quite deadly as the Czech population could not tell Vlasovs from real Russian partisans apart (Mueller 7).

The Gestapo often captured them in a raid along with genuine resisters and later let them go. Meanwhile the Americans had begun dropping arms, equipment, and radios to the Czech resistance from Italy. The U.S. Army Air Force 2641st Special Group stationed near Livorno had a flight of sixty operational B-52s with a screen of Mustang fighter craft flying runs into Czechoslovakia around the clock (Luza 196).
**PATTON CROSSES INTO BOHEMIA**

Despite the Red Army’s brutal advance, General George Patton and his 3rd Army crossed into Bohemia from Austria first, making tremendous strides in a short amount of time. Daily intelligence reports detailed the rapid disintegration of the German 7th Army, which had been stationed to oppose Patton’s advance along the Czechoslovak border (Dickerson 10). Unable to maintain a coherent defensive line, the German 7th Army had resorted to delaying tactics that utilized roadblocks and strong points.

The Third Army G-2 (Intelligence) Periodic Report for May 2nd stated that there was “no organized enemy front line” opposite XII Corps. Intelligence officers for Third Army and XII Corps estimated that only 6,500 to 7,000 German soldiers and 35 tanks and assault guns were actively opposing the corps. Of the several divisions identified in 7th Army, most were ad hoc units or remnants of units. Only the 11th Panzer Division was believed to be anywhere near its authorized strength (Dickerson 10).

With Third Army in force along the border and Soviet forces advancing from the east, the German Army was being forced into a pocket in Bohemia. It was estimated that there were a total of 141,250 German soldiers and 325 tanks in the Czechoslovak pocket, the vast majority of whom were desperately embattled with the Soviets (Dickerson 12). In late April, Patton's intelligence teams concluded that conditions within the German 7th Army were worse than American intelligence officers estimated. The 2nd Panzer Division was down to less than 20 tanks and 2,000 men. Seventh Army Chief of Staff General Freiherr von Gersdorff wrote that the army was practically immobilized for lack of fuel (Dickerson 12).

What little stocks they had were confiscated for use against the Soviets. A counter-attack by the 2nd and 11th Panzer Divisions against Third Army’s left flank had been ordered, but could not be carried out because of the lack of fuel. German Generalmajor Karl Weissenberger, commander of Military Area XIII or 13th Corps, later wrote, “the front consisted only of strong points and roadblocks and we had not been able to fill the gaps” (Dickerson 12). With the Western and Eastern Fronts converging, Field Marshall Ferdinand Schoerner assumed command of all German forces in the Czechoslovak Pocket and ordered the 11th Panzer Division, 7th Army’s largest and most effective remaining combat unit, to immediately proceed east to fight the Soviets. For the German soldiers, fighting against the
Soviets meant certain death, either on the battlefield or in prisoner of war camps should they be captured (Dickerson 14).

Needless to say, Schoerner's orders were not well received by the officers and men of the 11th Panzer Division. Instead, the 11th Panzer's commander General Wendt von Weitersheim decided that continuing the war was hopeless and that his regiment's best chance for survival lay in surrendering to the Americans before the Soviets made their assault on Prague (Dickerson 14). He met on May 4th 1945 with officers of the 90th Infantry Division in the Czech village of Vseruby to discuss the surrender of his division. There, arrangements were agreed upon, and von Weitersheim unconditionally surrendered his division to the Americans (Dickerson 14).

**THE GERMAN LINE COLLAPSES**

The surrender of the 11th Panzer Division en masse to the Americans was an irreparable disaster for the German 7th Army. This left a huge gap in its already stretched lines that could not be filled. “The unexpectedly hurried departure of the 11th Panzer Division meant the exposure of our southern flank and clearance of the Taus-Pilsen road for the Americans,” Gen. Weissenberger later wrote, “The road to Prague lay wide open” (Dickerson 15). The military situation was changing rapidly in central Europe. Not surprisingly, this made co-ordination between the Western Allied and Soviet armies very difficult. In a cable sent through the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow to General Alexei Antonov of the Soviet High Command on 30 April, Eisenhower had raised the possibility of his forces advancing up to a line that ran southeasterly from Karlovy Vary through Plzen to Ceska Budejovice (Dickerson 15). Then, two days later, Montgomery's forces finally captured Lübeck on the Baltic, and pushed on to a line that ran from Wismar through Schwerin to Doemitz. His forces arrived in all three places scant hours before the Soviet forces. On 4 May, Eisenhower decided to send Patton into Czechoslovakia (Dickerson 15-16). He sent a cable to Antonov informing the Soviets of this, along with the possibility of an advance all the way to the east bank of the Vltava River. Such a move naturally would include liberating at least part of Prague, because the river ran through the middle of the city. For the past several days, V Corps had been moving down from the north as part of First Army's effort to cover Third Army's lengthening left flank. Third Army now had 18 divisions
and over 540,000 men. This was the largest field army ever fielded by the U.S. Army. As Patton's Chief of Staff Major General Hobart Gay, recorded in his diary, “this is probably one of the most powerful armies ever assembled in the history of war…” (Dickerson 16).

The plan called for both V and XII Corps to attack side-by-side on a broad front that stretched the width of Czechoslovakia. In the north, the 1st Infantry Division supported by Combat Command A of the 9th Armored Division would attack towards Karlovy Vary. In the center, the 97th and 2nd Infantry Divisions would advance to clear a path. The 16th Armored Division would exploit that path and liberate the city of Plzen (Pickett and Millington 33). In Prague, partisans rose up against the Germans and were initially successful. With the Americans pushing on Plzen and the Soviets nearing the Outskirts of Prague, the Germans were in a severely weakened position to prevent an uprising. Also, the Vlasov legion mentioned earlier, under the command of former Soviet Army Lieutenant General Andrei Vlasov, decided now was a good time to switch sides again, hoping to find reprieve for their earlier transgressions (Dickerson 16). They stopped on their journey to reinforce German forces fighting the Soviets and redirected to help the Partisans in Prague. In an effort to secure the city for a siege, Field Marshal Schoerner immediately dispatched two divisions of SS troops and tanks to crush the rebellion.

**ROADSIDE RAIDS**

Radomir Luza, with his guerrilla force of 60 strong, participated marginally in the Battle of Prague, he instead focused his men on harassing German convoys and troops trying to re-enter the city near the eastern Moravian side.

We forgot, in those wonderful, dizzying days, that war is hell and that this war had been the worst of hells for five years. By day we were attacking every German group that we could reasonably hope to defeat. By night, we met semipublicly in the Turk's tavern at Nine Crosses to plan the next day's raids. The Russians from PAM 5 (Soviet paratroops & Partisan mixes) often gathered for lunch there too, often filling the place with German uniforms looted from the dead as they were the only clothes we had. Since we now could arm people from the villages, we were joined by men in the vicinity who lived at home but could participate in specific actions. The village of Hluboke became a sort of partisan community. (Luza 230)
THE PRAGUE UPRISING

The “fever revolt” erupted in Prague on May 30th 1945. The Czech national Council with remnants of ON and groups of other military people began. Throughout the city people were in frenzy, taking up arms, even attacking Germans with melee weapons. The insurrection was spontaneous and uncoordinated and took the council leaders by surprise. Before the Council could mobilize a phalanx of ordinary citizens and Protectorate policemen seized the Prague radio station and was broadcasting frantic calls to the Americans for help. The underground military group Ales, led by General Frantisek Slunecko and Karel Kutlvasr (who had together put ON back together after General Novaks arrest and General Luza's death) were at first the de facto military directors of the revolt. The Czech's battle raged for three days with little more than pistols, hunting rifles, rakes, and bludgeons against forty thousand trained soldiers with tanks and artillery (Toussiant 74).

Everywhere the situation was fluid. The Germans would leave a place, the town would rejoice and tear down swastikas and German signs. Fearing that their army's lines of communication might be threatened, the Germans would sometimes halt their retreat, return to a town and reassert control. They'd reinstall German flags put back German names on the buildings, and retreat again a few days later. Then a startling, spontaneous development occurred in the last spasms of the war. ‘It was not an organized rebellion such as Father had planned, but a spate of uprisings that came quickly and unpredictably in towns where Germans were still on their way out. Like twisters in the wake of a hurricane, the uprisings were random, disconnected, and vicious. (Luza 227)

PLZEN IN UPRISING

The Partisans in Plzen had also begun their uprising in anticipation of American assistance. The 69th Armored Infantry Battalion, several platoons of the 16th Tank Battalion, Troop B of 23rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and a platoon of the 216th Armored Engineers Battalion converged on the outskirts of the city (Pickett and Millington 33). Yet it was estimated that the German garrison there was 10,000 strong with the American force having only a total of 2,500 men. However, in an audacious decision, Colonel Noble, Commander of the advance force for Plzen (Task Force A) decided to attack the city despite being outnumbered. His gambit worked and by 8:00 AM the lead elements of Task Force A arrived in Republic Square at the center of Plzen (Pickett and Millington 34). They were greeted by crowds of cheering Czechs. Not long after, Col. Noble joined them and he too became swept up in the crowds of the Czechs joyous over their liberation. Other forces of
Combat Command B secured the Skoda Works and the city airport, capturing hundreds of German soldiers. Thousands of people turned out to greet their liberators and celebrate their liberation from the Germans in Republic Square. The Czechs showered their American liberators with flowers, food, and their world-famed Pilsner beer. Vera Fiedlerova was nineteen years old at the time, recalled “I was among those happy people with tears in my eyes (Dickerson 1).”

The celebration in Republic Square was short-lived. At around 10:00 AM, German snipers perched high up in the steeple of St. Bartholomew's Cathedral in the center of the square opened fire on the crowd below. Other German snipers opened fire from nearby houses. The crowds dispersed to find cover. American machine gun crews returned fire on the snipers. Vera Fiedlerova later recalled how calmly the American soldiers went about taking out the snipers. The Germans were no match for the 16th armored soldiers and their machine guns mounted on armored vehicles. A squad of soldiers ascended St. Bartholomew's steeple and captured the Germans holed up there (Pickett and Millington 35). Other Americans fanned out and subdued other pockets of snipers. In the afternoon, Lt. Charles Schaefer of the 216th Armored Engineers came across the commander of the German garrison in Plzen, Lt. Gen. George von Majewski, and his staff in their headquarters. Not long after, Combat Command B's executive officer Lt. Col. Percy Perkins showed up and demanded that von Majewski surrender unconditionally. After signing the surrender document, the German commander shot himself fatally in the head with a pistol that he had managed to hide from the Americans (Pickett and Millington 36).

Though most of the German garrison surrendered, scattered pockets of diehard German soldiers continued to fire on the Americans from numerous places around the city. For the remainder of the day, the 16th Armored soldiers fought to subdue these pockets. They also set up defensive positions around the city that led to further skirmishes. Such was the situation all over occupied Czech where the allies were making headway.

At the very end we were capturing twenty or thirty troops together. Once our Tisnov group took seventy-five German soldiers near Kurimska Nova Ves whom we turned over to the approaching Red army. They didn't put up much of a fight, they knew the war was ending. Still, most Germans were never demoralized or disorganized as we might have expected. Although our efforts were working to slow the retreat, at some point the Germans decided that using just Jagdkommandos was not enough and they sent tanks and troops to flush us out.
Each day they came and cleared the main roads for their troop movements, quite a job since it stretched all the way to Kadolec and Krizanov. Large panzer units went through our area removing obstacles on the roads, their infantry raking the woofs for partisans. Convoys of German trucks or jeeps with mounted machine guns passed to and fro without interference since we couldn't hope to overcome them. At night though, the Germans retreated to their forts and we owned the roads… the Germans could not move at night unless in large numbers. (Luza 201)

While much of the 16th Armored was consolidating in and around Plzen, some of its elements were pushing east towards Prague at General Patton's explicit orders. Patton, having had a history of being an unorthodox commander, he did not care for General Eisenhower’s misgivings over the political ramifications of his advancing on Prague. For days Patton had listened to rogue radio broadcasts from the partisans appealing for American aid (Patton 57). Infuriated by his superior's resistance to push forward and heartsick at the Czech people's plight, Patton signaled his forces to forge ahead. While Third Army soldiers were headed relentlessly towards Prague, General Bradley, Patton's colleague attempted to relay Eisenhower's halt orders. He finally reached Patton by phone after the latter returned from Sunday church services (Patton 58). “The halt line through Plzen is mandatory, George, for V and XII Corps,” Bradley informed him. He also ordered Patton not to send recon patrols any farther than five miles northeast of Plzen (Patton 58). Patton's objections were vigorous but futile.

**THE LAST SPASMS OF WAR**

Slowly but surely, word was passed down the chain of command to halt the armored forces. According to Gaston Gee, his reconnaissance unit of the 4th Armored Division's 51st Armored Infantry Battalion made it to the outskirts of Prague (Pickett and Millington 40). Units of the 16th Armored Division were also halted short of Prague. “We were 17 miles from Prague on the 6th [of May] and they turned us around and brought us back,” Sgt. Jack Gallagher of the 5th Tank Battalion later recalled (Pickett and Millington 40). The 69th Armored Infantry's commander, Lt. Col. George B. Pickett, later wrote that his reconnaissance platoon got half way to Prague before being told to halt (Pickett and Millington 40). Since the previous day, reports of the uprising in Prague and calls for American assistance against the Germans were being received by American forces. Many of the American soldiers could hear the radio broadcasts from Prague. Czech partisans from Prague made their way to forward units of both the 4th and 16th Armored Divisions to
request immediate help against the Germans. These requests were passed on up the chain of command through Third Army and Twelfth Army Group to Eisenhower's own Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) itself. “At 0415 hours 6 May 1945, Prague asked again for “American support by planes and tanks during this day,” read one of several messages from the Czech Military Mission to Eisenhower (Pickett and Millington 40). “The population holds down firmly, but support necessary, we appeal for it.” Hearing the radio broadcasts coming from Prague, the Czechoslovak government in London also sent urgent appeals to Eisenhower through its Military Mission (Dickerson 43). Despite the repeated calls for help from Prague and the lack of German resistance to American forces, Eisenhower did not permit Third Army to continue its drive on Prague and the rescue of the embattled citizens of the city. Instead he informed the Soviet High Command of their requests and of his intentions to abide by the Karlovy Vary - Plzen - Ceska Budejovice halt line (Dickerson 43).

Fearing that the Americans might be induced to advance and occupy Prague, the Red Army regrouped its advancing line near Saxony and moved thousands of Soviet troops and tanks over the Sudeten mountains to the capital. The Germans, anxious to avoid capture by the Russians, abandoned the fight and fled the city (G. Martin 78). On May 8th the Germans capitulated to the Czech rebels fighting them in the streets of Prague and left the city. They marched westward to Pilsen where Americans were rounding up and processing German prisoners (G. Martin 79). The Red Army arrived at last on May 9th to find the city in the hands of the Czech national council, which was made of leaders from the many resistance groups that had participated in the battle. The next day Stalin dissolved the Czech national council and installed the Communist friendly Kosice government (G. Martin 79). To legitimatize this to the western allies Stalin used the acceptance of the Vlasov legion into the Czech resistance, (who were Soviet traitors) as a pretext for dissolving the Czech authority (Dickerson 46). Stainer and Grna, the pro communists who had pushed out Radomir from his father's resistance group, traveled to Prague giddy with anticipation that their socialist allies would appoint them to new positions in the reformed government (Luza 212). Neither of them had participated in the Prague uprising and when they arrived they were simply pushed aside by men appointed by Stalin himself. The war was over. Radomir Luza explains the reality of the end of war for the Czechs.
The radio in our headquarters was suddenly soundless. ‘Stand by for an important announcement,’ said a BBC broadcaster, the radio signal broken and whiny. ‘German capitulation…unconditional surrender…armistice signed…end at midnight May 8…historic occasion.’ The war did not end sharply in our part of the country but rather died by imperceptible degrees. The Germans moved out, the Soviets moved in, and the front moved somewhere ahead of us. At ten Kristek burst into our headquarters near Bites shouting ‘The Russians are here! The Russians are here!’ We hurried out to the sawmill two miles away to welcome them. People were smiling and chuckling, the first crowd of happy Czechs I’d seen in 5 years. These first arrivals of the Red Army, part of the Second Ukrainian Front under Marshal Radion Malinovsky were officers- educated, well behaved, groomed. They were hardened veterans and arrived to a party atmosphere with surprising control over themselves. One officer climbed down from his tank and gave me a nod and a smile. We shook hands and as we did he leaned in close and said ‘Be careful, behind us are coming some others. Lock up your girls and whatever you do, don't give them even a taste of slivovitz. (Luza 210-211)
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

PRINCIPLES OF DECENTRALIZATION

Much of this study is derived from the theory explained in Ori Brafman’s *Starfish and the Spider*. In that book, Brafman explores the rise of decentralized organizations and contrast them to corporately structured groups. However, as Brafman reasons that decentralized groups like Wikipedia, Grokster and YouTube are a recent phenomenon, one of the purposes of this case is to show historical evidence that decentralization is not a new occurrence (Brafman and Beckstrom 3). The spider and starfish analogy refers to the contrasting biological nature of the respective organisms, starfish having a decentralized neural structure permitting regeneration. There are eleven principles to decentralized organization that Ori Brafman refers to, several of which pertain to the survival habits of the Czechs during occupation in 1939-1945.

First Principle of Decentralization

When attacked, a decentralized organization tends to become even more open and decentralized. Spider – Centralized. Central body with legs. Cut off the head and it dies. Starfish – Decentralized network. No head. Major organs are replicated throughout each arm. Cut it in half and you get two starfish. Brafman makes reference to Bill Wilson, creator of Alcoholics Anonymous to make this point clear. At AA, no one’s in charge and yet everyone is in charge. You automatically become part of the leadership – an arm of the starfish – the moment you join. Because no one is in charge, everyone is responsible for keeping themselves and everyone else on track...the sponsor doesn’t lead by coercion but by example. The Czech underground operated in this same way. When *Reichprotector* Heydrich was assassinated the Czech resistance scattered even more fluidly. As one cell was broken up a few more would take its place, then more and more until by 1944 there were literally hundreds of resistance cells spread across Bohemia-Moravia.
Second Principle of Decentralization

It’s easy to mistake starfish for spiders. The problem with the Gestapo in the early days of Czech occupation was that it did not realize that resisters are not regular soldiers. They do not lay down arms after a lost battle and formal surrender. They survive, adapt, and rebuild until they have either achieved victory or they are dead. Persons in a decentralized organization will simply splinter off if their original group has become compromised or their personal needs are not being satisfied.

Third Principle of Decentralization

An open system doesn’t have central intelligence; the intelligence is spread throughout the system. The Czech resistance operated this way as well after the first Gestapo purge. General Vojtech Luza for example, was able to gather vast collections of intelligence data but had no way to transmit it, therefore he disseminated the information to other resistance groups, namely to Major Moravek and the Three Kings organization as they were the only ones with a radio transmitter aside from the Czech Communist party. Most people in Prague for example; actually had up to date information on the course of the war thanks to the rapid dissemination of information through resistance cells. That ended upon the arrival of Reichsprotector Reinhardt Heydrich and the surge of German troops in a new campaign against the Czechs. However, the rapid spread of information resumed in 1944.

Fourth Principle of Decentralization

As soon as an outside force presents itself, the decentralized organization quickly mutates to meet the new challenge or need. It is constantly mutating and staying a step ahead of the external force. The Czech resistance was for the most part a fluid cluster of cells that constantly reconfigured to stay ahead of the Gestapo who were trying to crack down on them. Many resisters for example shared living space in “safe houses” provided by neighbors or relatives. In those spaces they met and coordinated with dozens of others, often exchanging information and services when an upcoming operation was to commence. While resisters usually belonged to a single cell, membership in other groups was sometimes fluid under the right conditions.
**Fifth Principle of Decentralization**

The decentralized organization sneaks up on you. Because it mutates so quickly, it can also grow incredibly quickly. Brafman uses modern day P2P groups and software cracking organizations to emphasize this point. “P2P networks are reacting at blazing speed, constantly mutating and staying a step ahead of the music labels” (Brafman and Beckstrom 37). As the Czech resistance survived and adapted, it also grew. By 1941 it’s ranks swelled in the tens of thousands and even though the Czechs suffered tremendous setbacks under the second declaration of martial law under Reichsprotector Heydrich, membership in the Czech resistance persisted. The atrocities that the Nazis made on the Czechs had the opposite effect. Instead of deterring membership, they spurred it.

**Sixth Principle of Decentralization**

As industries become decentralized, overall profits decrease. The biggest challenge to a non-state actor is that it must rely on personal contributions of wealth and “illegitimate” means of acquiring funds. The Czechs resistance, like any non-state actor, relied on donations in hardware and currency from rural towns and villages where German activity was lacking. Sometimes, resistance cells forcibly removed items from their owners.

**Seventh Principle of Decentralization**

Put people into an open system and they’ll automatically want to contribute. The Czech people by and large were conscientious contributors to resisters. This fact is illustrated because without neighbors or strangers to shelter them, turn a blind eye, or even participate actively with them, the resistance could not have survived for as long as it did.

These principles apply to every decentralized organization and they also apply to everyday life. In high school, students will gravitate around groups that best resemble their own interests but can also maintain relations with other groups. Sure enough, these groups can be exclusive, mutual, and/or intertwined, forming a complex social network with varying degrees of bondage. The underground world of black markets works exactly this same way. Ethnicities and religion do not play a role in the continuation of relationships. They are motivated by common interest. And then there are facilitators, creators of markets that fill the structural holes where groups can meet on common ground and interact in a fluid and robust environment. The Czech underground communicated and coordinated as best they could with
other resistance groups all throughout Europe due to a common predicament- A foreign aggressor occupying their respective territories. In the modern era, Mexican drug cartels are linked to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah because they share a common enemy: The United States, and a common goal: Money. Many criminal international groups cooperate with each other out of the sheer wish to make a profit (Grayson 16).

Not only do these groups ally with each other over common interests, they often have the tendency to splinter, forming more organizations that operate in the realm of secrecy. Of course cooperation is not always common. Rivalries do arise. An example of this is the Mexican Los Zetas cartel that splintered from the Gulf Syndicate, a powerful drug cartel in Mexico. The Czechs too had deep divisions primarily because of the prevalence in communist sympathies (Grayson 4). Communist oriented resistance cells like the KSC were very stringent with their collaboration with the western backed organizations and their goal of subverting their democratic “allies” made working together problematic.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE CZECH RESISTANCE AND THE AFGHAN TALIBAN

A similar and modern comparison to the Czech resistance, and indeed that of many others throughout history is the case study of the Afghan Taliban forces that NATO allies are combating in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. Although significantly different from the Czech resistance during World War II, the way the Taliban is organized is not so different from any other syndicate or underground group, including the Czech case study. Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that presents enormous challenges as well as potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy (Peters and Rassler 5).

In the Afghan theatre, poor governance and widespread state corruption fuel anti-state actors engaged in and protecting organized crime. Activities the Taliban engage in revolve mainly around smuggling, extortion and kidnapping to raise funds and spread fear and insecurity to coalition development in the region (Peters and Rassler 5). Militant groups on either side of the Pakistan/Afghan border function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized and how funds are acquired. Their interactions with each other vary in terms of cooperative
development...they sometimes have a tendency to fight one another for various reasons, foremost of which is the contesting of viable resources (Peters and Rassler 20). This section will serve to illustrate that the Taliban is not a cohesive, corporate entity, as would traditional methods of observation dictate. Instead it is factionalized into various groups that share similar beliefs and use the term “Taliban” as a brand name to instill fear and respect from civilians and opposing forces (Peters and Rassler 22). The Taliban, meaning "students" in Arabic, is a cluster of Islamist militia groups that ruled large parts of Afghanistan from September 1996 onwards until the U.S. led invasion in 2001 (Levitt 3). While in power the Taliban ruled as an Islamic state, forcing over half the Afghan population to adopt their beliefs through the threat and application of violence against civilian targets. When the U.S. invasion commenced in 2001, the Taliban scattered, fleeing into the countryside and the mountainous Tora Bora region. As this was happening the former “Islamic Republic” fractured into multiple clusters of insurgents (Levitt 4). To date there are half a dozen groups that openly use the brand name “Taliban” to defy coalition forces and over a dozen other groups that have splintered off for their own gains but still cooperate with the various insurgent groups in the country and extra-nationally as well (Peters and Rassler 21).

In comparison to the Czech case study, the Czech resistance stemmed from political bodies that held legitimacy prior to the German invasion in 1939. After the formal government was dissolved and the puppet government established, those bodies faded to civilian life and there reorganized to act as shadow government for the Czech people and with the eventual goal of ousting the invaders. The Czech resisters too had to survive by instilling fear into civilians to deter them from cooperating with the Nazis regardless of their motivations. The Czech resistance cells also operated loosely, as Radomir Luza stated “There was no club called the resistance”. Resistance cells were everywhere in all shapes and sizes and merely used the term “Resistance” as a brand name to leverage human capital, shelter, authority, and resources to continue the fight against the Nazi Germans.

**PAST MISTAKES**

The initial counter insurgency policies used by the U.S. and NATO allies match the same failures as the Allied policy towards Germany early in WWII. Predictably the best outcome in any war is a quick and decisive victory where the enemy is completely dominated
with the least amount of force possible. Such was the case with the first operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like the British hope in World War II with central Europe, the American operations of the early 2000s counted on the establishment of a quick and friendly regime in both theatres to act as proxies in the region in the war on terrorist organizations. The French and British had counted on Poland and Czechoslovakia to counter both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in case of war. In fact the British and French invested a great deal of treasure into the military assets of the Czechs before 1938. But their reluctance to support the Czechs in the face of Hitler’s aggression led to an even greater conflict. Many historians speculate that had the allies held firm, the inevitable conflict would have been confined and short. U.S. foreign strategy today rightly revolves around blocking the rise of belligerent state and non-state actors as they attempt to transition into a global power.

In Afghanistan the Taliban factions established fiefdoms in areas where coalition influence was absent or minimal. All of it put together meant that a shadow government filled a vacuum where coalition attention was needed. Drawing the civilian population away from coalition support through fear and the lucrative illegal enterprises that are a staple economy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, an Afghan farmer may generate 10 times the revenue growing Poppy fields under Taliban rule rather than a coalition endorsed “legitimate” fruit field (Eben and Bruno 7). That farmer may be obliged to give up a percentage to Taliban enforcers. But still the remainder will be enough to feed himself and his family. Similarly, in occupied Bohemia the German troops were concentrated in cities and administrative centers. The countryside was nominally under the supervision of the Czech shadow government (resistance) that collected funds, hardware, and war material from civilians in rural areas. Also, growing ones own food or having meat was considered illegal under German occupation, yet everyone engaged in some form of illegitimate act or another just to survive. While owning a secret livestock from which to feed your family is a far cry from growing heroine, the principle comparison shows that what is legitimate and what is not is subjective. The have-nots will always do what is necessary to survive and yield greater dividends with minimal cost regardless of legitimacy.

In Iraq, kidnapping statistics escalated startlingly when U.S. forces began targeting smuggling operations along the Syrian border to stop the flow of foreign fighters (Levitt 2). While at first glance this may seem a sound strategy, it leaves one to consider the
socioeconomic implications of the local populations. Iraq is geographically centered between the Mediterranean countries and East Asia, thus logically one can deduce that Iraq has always been a historically vibrant trade route for both the legitimate and not so legitimate businessmen. One cannot accurately account for what the smuggling industry is worth in Iraq. But what can be assumed is that it is an astronomically high value. When the tribes or clans that for generations have engaged in this practice for centuries suddenly lose that revenue stream, their interests not only align against the Coalition, but they begin engaging in practices that substitute for their loss. Among them was attacking coalition convoys laden with supplies or servicemen, or kidnapping contractors or high value individuals for ransom (Levitt 2). In 2006, the U.S. allowed some groups to resume their traditional professions in exchange for vital intelligence on cross border activity, and the assurances that they would not aid foreign fighters (Levitt 4). When this happened the number of kidnappings and attacks on coalition troops and interests dropped dramatically. Criminality cannot be wiped out completely, and when put in the position of an authority trying to achieve a specific goal one must pick and choose which criminal elements can align and cooperate with that goal. If one wants to crack down on one group of criminals, that objective will require the aid of another syndicate that will have something to gain from a potential competitor’s demise.

**SPECIALIZED UNITS TO TRACK AND TARGET GUERRILLA FIGHTERS**

The tactics the Germans employed on the Czech resistance in many ways mirror modern day COIN strategies seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, though with a few fundamental differences such as the focus on civilians. Unlike American policy as stated in the U.S. Army’s Counter Insurgency Manual concerning the protection of civilians and property, German Jagdkommandos (German special operators) were unrestricted in their use of violent approach to rooting out Partisans. The introduction of this force would have yielded definitive dividends had they been implemented earlier. The Jagdkommandos in tandem with the Vlasov legionnaires caused serious problems for Partisan Guerrillas in 1944-1945. It was because of their specialized training, small group tactics, and quick mobility that allowed them to catch partisan raiders as they were fleeing from a crime scene. The Jagdkommandos employed questionable tactics that nonetheless yielded the whereabouts of many resistance camps and lead to the elimination of many resisters. The methods the Jagdkommandos used
were controversial even for Nazi standards. A similar controversy that comes to mind is that of enhanced interrogation techniques and CIA detention centers for captured combatants. The use of these techniques is considered by some experts to be contrary to democratic and civil principles; however the argument that they are not effective or yield false positive information is subjective. There is considerable evidence that special techniques used to fight guerrilla war fighters like those in Afghanistan do in fact yield vital intelligence leading to the death or capture of other terrorists that would have done harm to others. Other historical case studies also yield similar if not the same answers to this dilemma. The brutal effectiveness of the *Jagdkommandos* against the Czech resistance illustrates this point.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL**

A counterinsurgency campaign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. The balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving this balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until recently at our combat training centers. Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies. Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign are daunting; however, the discussions in this manual alert leaders to the challenges of such campaigns and suggest general approaches for grappling with those challenges. Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders. It is our hope that this manual provides the guidelines needed to succeed in operations that are exceedingly difficult and complex. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve nothing less (Patreaus and Amos 1).

Iraq circa 2006-2007, saw a shift in strategy where U.S. military units were required to aggressively take towns and vital civilian neighborhoods and maintain a presence as a show of support to the civilian population that had become disillusioned with the United States (Dilanian 6). Prior to 2006 U.S. military dialogue with local government institutions was minimal. Lack of communication resulted in a lack of effort, giving AQI the time and space to influence sections of Baghdad’s Sunni population. What Czech Partisans and AQI
insurgents had in common was their wide networks of facilitators. AQI relied heavily on Syrian smugglers. In war, the smuggling of people through restricted borders is a very lucrative enterprise. There is never a shortage of facilitators willing to guide unscrupulous individuals for the right price. Czech partisans had similar partnerships with neighboring countries, especially those under German occupation. While smuggling and facilitation coordinators like Abu Ghadiyah, an AQI facilitator, have played an important role for AQI. They also posed difficulties since many of these coordinators were motivated more by money than by loyalty. According to the Sinjar records, AQI experienced difficulties in funding stemming from financial disputes with Syrian coordinators. In 2006, "Shahin the administrator" reported that there was a shortage of funds in 2006 because the money didn't arrive with the suicide bombers, and the coordinating “brothers” in Syria kept the money (Levitt 16). Indeed, Abu Ghadiyah himself is reported to have used AQI funds for his personal use (Levitt 17). Although factual records of Czech smuggling during the war period are scarce one can compare other case studies and assume that this evidence correlates. Once across the Syrian border AQI agents made serious strides in inciting violence throughout Baghdad and the tribal regions. Typically through fear, intimidation, and ethnic inflammation, AQI created deep divisions between Sunni and Shi’a communities and set in motion a total destabilization of coalition efforts (Dilanian 5). Faced with a meltdown and growing political pressure at home, president Bush quickly acted, greatly to the dislike of many Americans by ordering the 2006-2007-troop surge. The surge of U.S. forces had two goals, to improve relations with Iraq’s and cooperate against AQI which was also responsible for many Iraqi civilian deaths, and to directly challenge AQI by moving into AQI strongholds and denying them the ability to target civilians (Dilanian 9).

Similarly today, coalition strategy in fighting insurgencies revolves on the increase of specialized groups that operate in small teams with specific forms of support. The Germans in occupied Czechoslovakia learned this very quickly and devised very effective countermeasures. The Erlan spies, the Jagdkommandos, military surges in areas where German influence was lacking, all had a tremendous effect at deterring any effective uprising until the Soviet advance in 1945. By looking at history and applying those experiences to modern day challenges, we can implement techniques that will ensure we do not repeat the same mistakes and avoid failures.
This conclusion has outlined and explained the reasoning behind this research and made comparisons to modern non-state organizations that frustrate U.S. and allied efforts to deter and destroy terrorism. Decentralized organization is a humanly innate phenomenon that manifests itself in the absence of structure. That is to say, non-state organizations will form in the absence of a proactive authority, and it will repeatedly and relentlessly invent new ways to ensure its survival and continue its way of life. Whether it be a terrorist organization that seeks world domination under Shari’ah law, an online pirating group that seeks to disseminate privately owned and incorporated material over the internet, or a nation of freedom fighters battling to oust an occupying invader, these groups will survive and thrive in ways that are constantly shifting the balance of power between the state and non-state actors. However, by looking at the history of warfare and human beings one can deduce solutions that were perhaps long forgotten and can be applied to a current problem. The Czech case study is relevant to this purpose as it shows us that decentralized organization is in human nature and can be observed repeatedly through history and even in everyday life.
REFERENCES


