DEFENSE AND COMPLIANCE: EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF
NARCISSISM, SELF-ESTEEM, AND GENDER IN MANIPULATED
SELF-PERCEIVED COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE

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Defense and Compliance: Examining the Influence of Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and Gender in Manipulated Self-Perceived Communication Competence

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Self-reports of evaluative characteristics, such as competence or intelligence, are subjective in nature and are susceptible to biases. One such self-serving phenomenon troublesome for social scientific research is the “better-than average effect” or Wobegon effect, which involves an inflated self-evaluation above the average midpoint. Illusionary thoughts lead individuals to perceive themselves better than the comparative average person, indicating a need to regulate these biases in self-assessment research.

The present study will use priming prompts to elicit memories of previously failed, neutral or successful communicative or social interactions to examine the influence on self-perceptions of communication competence. This thesis aims to replicate a recent study on communication competence that found an unpredicted gender effect. In hopes to explain this unexpected result, narcissism and discrepant self-esteem will be incorporated. The results revealed no significant interaction effect for prime condition and sex, which was found in the previous study. When controlling for narcissism or discrepant self-esteem, there were not significant main or interaction effects for prime condition or sex. Exploratory analyses revealed significant main effect for narcissism, with males rating higher than females, and significant interaction effects for factors of the communication competence scale. The discussion points to potential underlying structures to the communication competence measure in terms of gender. The main results and exploratory analyses are discussed with suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 1

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Self-assessments of subjective qualities and skills have been under scrutiny in scientific research for the inherent biases individuals are prone to display when evaluating their own behavior. A known bias in such studies is the “better-than-average” effect (BTAE) or Wobegon effect (Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Guenther & Alicke, 2010; Kruger, 1999), named after a fictional city where all the children are above average. This pervasive tendency to overestimate achievements and capabilities skews self-assessments of qualities, such as competency, intellect, and performance (Moore, 2007).

Lake Wobegon effect or the BTAE exists in a wide range of self-evaluative skills or attributions, such as personality descriptions, academic performance, and highly desirable traits (Alicke, 1985; Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999). Even organizations emanate the BTAE when reporting CEO salaries because no one wants to suggest that their CEO is below average (Hayes & Shaefer, 2008). Recent analysis of an ongoing data collection of American college students’ self-perceptions of various abilities and traits, such as self-confidence, drive to achieve, leadership ability, and writing ability, reveals an increase between the years of 1966 to 2009 in percentage of students who believe they are “above average” (Twenge, 2010). For example, more students in 2009, versus students in 1966, rated themselves as above average in: social self-confidence (73%), writing ability (53%), intellectual self-confidence (54%), and leadership ability (51%).

Research has found many factors that moderate the BTAE, such as the attainability of the evaluative trait and the increase of knowledge about the comparative ‘other,’ pointing to the fact that the BTAE is most prominent in controllable subjective comparisons, rather than controllable traits like intellectual ability (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). Within the communication discipline, research often includes uncontrollable traits, such as communication competence, and therefore is subject to self-serving biases, such as the BTAE. Given the reliance on self-assessments in social scientific research, it is
imperative to investigate a potential technique to regulate such biases. In attempt to do so, Spitzberg and Wiedmaier (2010) used priming to manipulate participants’ responses to a self-report measure of communication competence. After finding an unexpected gender difference based on priming condition, their results are in need of further investigation.

This proposed study aims to replicate and extend the study by Spitzberg and Wiedmaier (2010) on manipulated self-assessed communication competence. Focusing on gender differences in the areas of narcissism and self-esteem, this study hopes to account for the unexpected interaction effect between priming and gender found in their original study, which will be discussed in the following literature review. The premise of this study is the need to investigate biases in self-evaluations because of the dependency on such assessments in social scientific research and learning contexts. The second priority of this study is to investigate potential variables that explain the gender difference Spitzberg and Wiedmaier found to shed light on the relationship between gender and priming. The following literature review will explore previous research and further clarify the purpose of this study. The proposed hypotheses to be tested are integrated throughout, appearing with the appropriate topical argument. The methodology, including instrumentation and procedure, are presented in Chapter 2, followed by Chapter 3 which delves into the results of the study. Lastly, Chapter 4 presents a discussion of the relevant findings, limitations, and suggestions for future research.

This chapter introduces the notion that BTAE and Lake Wobegon Effect are pervasive in social scientific research and the necessity to regulate it is imperative to our knowledge seeking process of research. The following review of literature will advance exploration into self-assessments, communication competence, and describe Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) original study. An overview of narcissism and self-esteem research will be given followed by a brief rationale for considering each of these constructs as explanations for the gender differences found in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s original study.

**SELF-ASSESSMENTS**

In a meta-analytic review of research on the asymmetrical relationship between self-perceptions and social perceptions, Pronin, Gilovich, and Ross (2004) claim that biases, “exacerbate and perpetuate the historical and economic roots of the conflicts that are all-too-
present elements of the human condition” (p. 797). The overreliance on self-assessments within communication research elucidates the necessity to understand or “regulate” these biases. Relying on self-views too much, as is the case with a great deal of research in the communication field, can lead to inaccurate or idealistic assessments. Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003) have presented multiple examples of the influence of individuals’ self-views on performance assessments. For example, inducing more positive versus negative self-views of their knowledge of North American geography influenced participants’ self-assessments of performance on a geography quiz, while actual performance was not affected. Second, women performed equal to men on a science quiz, however underestimated their performance due to a lower self-view of their scientific reasoning ability than men.

Critcher and Dunning (2009) offer an interesting explanation for the connection between self-views and performance estimates. The authors found that the relationship between chronic self-views and performance estimates was mediated by perceptions of bottom-up experiences, a concrete experience with the task/action. Using this approach, the researchers showed that self-views and previous experiences are not independent of one another when it comes to self-assessments. Given this hypothesis, priming of past experiences may influence individuals’ self-view in a way that ‘regulates’ biases and influences a more realistic response to a self-assessment. By grounding the self-knowledge in actual instances from previous interactions, biases such as the BTAE may be regulated and thus reduce the tendency to over-estimate one’s self-perceived characteristics, abilities, and competencies.

Dependence on self-evaluations in much of social scientific research raises major validity concerns for such assessment tools. Research often only finds a correlation between .40 and .50 between an individual’s self-assessment and others’ perceptions of that individual (Kenny, 1994; Ready, Clark, Watson, & Westerhouse, 2000). Investigating this relationship further, Heine and Renshaw (2002) found peer-self accuracy to be strongly related to the desirability of the trait, similar to the results found by John and Robins (1993). For positive traits, respondents showed a negative correlation between peer-self accuracy and the desirability of the traits ($r = -.64$). Second, the correlation between the evaluativeness (the absolute value of the standardized desirability scores) and accuracy revealed a significant negative correlation ($r = -.56$). These results allude to the fact that traits high or low in
desirability lead to less agreement between self-assessments and others’ perceptions. One such desirable trait may be communication competence since the use of communication is pertinent to everyday life. It is noteworthy to investigate the self-assessment of such a trait, because the presence of the BTAE may be more prevalent in such a generic ability to everyday life.

**COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE**

Self-perceptions are potentially shaped by a broad array of processes, including distal influences such as socialization, interpersonal relationships, media, gender roles, and culture. These and more proximal influences such as daily interactions influence views of self-efficacy, personality, and self-esteem. The development of these self-conceptions is likely to provide an adaptive sense of competence in each domain of life. A particular self-conception likely to be adaptive in everyday interactions is communication competence, conceptualized as the perceived ability to communicate in an effective and appropriate manner (Spitzberg, 1988). Both trait and state self-perceptions of communication competence have been linked to increased odds of educational achievement (Rubin & Graham, 1988), productive conflict management (Canary & Spitzberg, 1989; Gross & Guerrero, 1993), and relationship satisfaction (Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998). In contrast, deficits in self-perceived communication competence increase the odds of juvenile delinquency, sexually coercive behaviors, divorce, unemployment, poverty, and interpersonal problems such as loneliness, depression, and affect disorders (see Spitzberg & Cupach, 1989). Given the centrality of perceived communication competence in everyday social functioning, identifying the influence of such perceptions becomes an important objective for investigation.

Competence judgments depend on personal and contextual factors such as mood, self-esteem, goal orientation, and social comparison information (Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1987; Kruger, 1999; Mruk, 2006; Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). According to Pavitt and Haight’s (1985, 1986) *inferential model of competence* judgment, judgments of competency often assimilate or contrast from a cognitive prototype of an ‘ideal communicator.’ The main component of this model is a social comparison process, which is sensitive to stimuli that are cognitively processed automatically (Want, 2009). Such stimuli elicit both consciously relevant corresponding experiences and unconscious associations of
meanings, thus drawing out evaluative judgments at a low level of consciousness (Back et al., 2009). Communication is the medium through which all of the distal and proximal influences develop self-conceptions. Although communication behavior is enacted in objectively identifiable physical actions, its meaning and quality (i.e., competence) are inherently subjective, and open to social negotiation. Self-conceptions of communication competence are subject to numerous influences, including: time, locus and focus of attention (i.e., self or other), culture, type of relationship, and specificity of referent action (Spitzberg, 1987). As such, self-perceptions of communication competence may well be sensitive to a shifting of focus and attention to one’s own successes and failures.

Given the subjective nature of the concept, particular biases are prominent in the research involving self-evaluation of competence, such as the Wobegon effect or BTAE (Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Guenther & Alicke, 2010; Kruger, 1999). Spitzberg and Wiedmaier (2010) investigated the possibility to delimit these biases that appear in self-assessments of ability. In their study, 248 participants were randomly assigned to one of three priming conditions: social failure, neutral, or social successes. The social failure prime asked participants to indicate whether they had ever experienced any of 20 common social blunders or problems (e.g., told a joke that no one found funny). The neutral condition asked whether the participant had experienced any of 20 common yet relatively non-social activities (e.g., traveled out of state). The success prime involved 20 common experiences of positive outcomes (e.g., negotiate a good deal on something). Participants subsequently completed the Interpersonal Competence Survey (ICS; Spitzberg, 2007; Spitzberg, 2011), which represents a broad range of contexts or actions of interpersonal communication ability, such as empathy, listening, support, and adaptability.

The authors hoped to discover a way to ‘calibrate’ self-report measures to reveal a more accurate average response. In particular, they hypothesized that respondents would produce self-ratings of competence in ordinal correspondence to the prime conditions: lowest ratings in the failure prime, moderate ratings in the neutral prime, and BTAE ratings in the success condition. The authors found a significant but unexpected interaction effect between gender and priming condition. In contrast to the original hypothesis, the men reported perceived competence compensatory to the valence of the prime (neutral < success < failure). More specifically, the men inflated their perceived competence when failure-primed, and
deflated their perceived competence in the neutral and success-primed conditions. The pattern for women was in line with the original hypothesis: an ordinal direction of differences in perceived competence with the priming condition (failure < neutral < success).

These findings suggest that individuals’ self-reports of competence are sensitive to manipulation; however, it is important to replicate it and explore the possible mediating variables to explain the unanticipated interaction effect between gender and priming. Given that this study is a replication study, the first hypothesis presented is the original hypothesis from Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s study. If this hypothesis is not supported, the subsequent hypotheses in this paper will be tested in order to understand the underlying influences.

H1: There will be an ordinal direction of differences in self-rated communication competence: failure-primed participants would see themselves significantly lower than neutrally-primed participants, who would see themselves as significantly lower in self-rated competence than those who were success-primed.

**PRIMING**

The fairly ambiguous and socially constructed nature of communicative contexts may allow for cognitive priming to help individuals recognize that routine communication is more difficult than commonly assumed. Through grounding the retrieval of self-knowledge in actual previous experiences, priming may thus diminish the tendencies toward positively biased self-assessments. Mussweiler and Strack (1997) argue that “generating knowledge increases its subsequent accessibility, so that it is more likely to be used for the absolute judgment” (p.140). In general, priming influences the knowledge about the self that becomes salient and thus may sway subsequent self-assessments of ability or skill.

As previously discussed, previous researchers have successfully manipulated the BTAE in different contexts and with increasing comparative information (Alicke et al., 1995; Allison et al., 1989; Dunning et al., 1989); therefore, it is expected that by cognitively priming individuals to think about past communicative experiences, replicating Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) procedure, should produce the same manipulation of the BTAE effect in a self-assessment of communication competence. If people can be reminded of, or primed for, past failure or success experiences, such information may lead to moderation of such evaluations. According to Moore (2007), “when people gain some information about themselves, others, or the task at hand, they can use that information to update their beliefs or expectations regarding performance” (p. 47). This study aims to investigate if biases can be
delimited by priming prompts that activate self-knowledge and recollections of communicative failure or success before taking a self-assessment of competency.

Given the unexpected sex difference in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) study, priming may work differently for men and women. The men were more reactive to the primes in an unexpected direction than the women, who fell in line with the predicted pattern. As will be discussed next, both narcissism and self-esteem literature refer to defensiveness to describe men’s responses to ego-threats (Horvath & Morf, 2009; Lupien, Seery, & Almonte, 2010; Zeigler-Hill, Myers, & Clark, 2010). Therefore, one such ego-threat may be the negative priming prompt addressing failed experiences or in opposition, an ego-enhancement would be the positive priming prompt addressing successes. McCall and Dasgupta (2007) found that subtly manipulating status in a social interaction changed automatic self-beliefs, but the dynamic was very different depending on the interactant and status. Men assigned to a low-status role unconsciously counteracted this role by exhibiting more leader-like self-beliefs than men placed in a high-status role. When a woman served as the confederate leader, men counteracted this subordination by amplifying their stereotypical male self-concepts automatically. Given the design of the manipulation on status, the authors indicate that this effect may also be due to the participants in the lower-status condition being driven by the threat of criticism rather than threat to social status. Although there is not a way to solve this limitation for McCall and Dasgupta, its implications can be explored in the present study to see if males’ self-concepts are malleable in the same way; since the men in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) original study showed different self-beliefs than the women in the study.

NARCISSISM

Originally explored in the clinical field, the study of narcissism has now penetrated social and personality research to describe individuals possessing a grandiose self-image (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Paulhus, 2001). Pincus et al. (2009) conceptualize narcissism as “one’s capacity to maintain a relatively positive self-image through a variety of self-, affect-, and field-regulatory processes” (p. 365). Narcissism has two expressions, normal and pathological. While the latter is often examined more in clinical settings, normal narcissism is often connected to non-impairing adaptive behaviors,
such as inflated self-concept and competitiveness (Campbell, Rudich & Sedikides, 2002; Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994). Other scholars place the construct on more of a continuum, from modest manifestations of narcissism to extreme psychological maladaptive versions seen in clinical patients (Foster & Campbell, 2007; Watson, Hickman, & Morris, 1996; Watson, Varnell, & Morris, 1999). The normal form of narcissism studied by social scientists is not dysfunctional and can be described in terms of the Five-Factor Model of personality, thus it can be viewed as a normal component of personality (Foster & Twenge, 2011).

Foster, Campbell, and Twenge (2003) contend that narcissism has increased in recent generations. The authors found that narcissism is negatively correlated with age, described as a birth cohort effect, in which each generation of individuals are exposed to certain cultural influences and narcissism is a predominant influence that has increased over the last fifty years. Research supports the argument that recent cohorts are more narcissistic, with higher self-esteem and self-evaluations rising from generation to generation (Twenge & Campbell, 2001; Twenge & Foster, 2010; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008). As discussed earlier, American college students have increased their perceptions of ability by at least 50% on particular skills since 1966 (Twenge, 2010). Foster et al. (2003) further argue that as these narcissistic generations grow older, they are more likely to experience more opportunities for frequent failure. With more failures comes a reality check on their grandiose self-image, resulting in a decline in their level of narcissism. As younger generations have not had enough time to be exposed to failure, they are more likely to have higher levels of narcissism. Since Spitzberg and Wiedmaier (2010) used a convenient sample of college age students, the sample may have had higher levels of narcissism than seen in older populations, thus making narcissism a valid construct to explore in this context.

Research shows a slight gender difference, in which men score higher on overall narcissism measures (Barelds & Dijkstra, 2010; Foster et al., 2003; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Paulhus and John (1998) have even found narcissists to view themselves higher and overestimate their intelligence and competence in the more traditionally male-oriented agentic domains. Additionally, Rhodewalt and Eddings (2002) investigated memory distortion in response to ego-threatening feedback in narcissistic males. After receiving an acceptance or rejection from a female confederate posing as an interested dating partner, the
participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire about their dating history. The results indicated a significant interaction between narcissism and social feedback. High narcissistic men recalled more positive romantic histories in response to rejection and more humble histories in response to selection. The researchers concluded that “it seems reasonable that a common response for many narcissists who experience threat or rejection is to summon to mind evidence that refutes or muddles the implications of the current threat” (Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002, p. 113).

Morf and Rhodewalt (2001) depict narcissists as endorsing positive illusions about the self while diminishing knowledge that does not adhere to that positive image in order to continually maintain a grandiose, yet vulnerable self-image. Scholars contend this fragility represents a low implicit level of self-esteem, hidden behind the high explicit level (Horvath & Morf, 2009; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Narcissists are believed to have a high self-concept in order to compensate for their low subconscious self-esteem and are believed to be vulnerable to the acceptance and approval from others. Zeigler-Hill et al. (2010) found narcissists to be highly reactive to negative achievement events. Similarly, Horvath and Morf (2009) found narcissists to be hyper-vigilant in responses to failure priming. Narcissists initially activate a sense of worthlessness when failure primed, but immediately inhibit this by repressing the negative feedback. The authors argue that this process is automatic and subconscious. Further, they explain these results as indicators of narcissists’ aim to avoid worthlessness in order to protect and maintain their grandiose self-view.

In regard to the gender differences found in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) study, narcissism may explain this effect because men tend to be more narcissistic and narcissists aim to maintain a positive self-image, even at the face of failure. As Horvath and Morf (2009) argued, the narcissistic men may repress the negative feedback and activate a self-protection motive to avoid worthlessness or the appearance of such. Therefore, the following formal hypothesis is presented.

H2: Any main or interaction effects of sex on self-perceived competence by prime condition will be nonsignificant when controlling for narcissism.
SELF-ESTEEM

Research on self-esteem is vast in quantity, yet shallow in conclusive answers because of the complex cognitive and affective nature of the phenomenon. Most at least contend that there is an implicit and explicit level of self-esteem that make up a global sense of self-worth (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Kernis, 2005; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Implicit self-esteem refers to the unconscious and automatic evaluations of self and explicit self-esteem is generally defined as the conscious and deliberately reasoned feelings of self-worth and self-liking (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Although these two facets comprise an individual’s overall global self-worth, it is possible that “implicit and explicit beliefs are acquired through separate, and largely independent, processes” (Bosson et al., 2003, p. 170). Implicit self-esteem may stem from life-time affective and socialized experiences (Koole & Pelham, 2003) and explicit self-esteem may be based on logical evaluation of self-relevant feedback (Bosson et al., 2003). Bosson et al. argue that an individual can maintain different levels of these two dimensions simultaneously, resulting in a stable high (high explicit/high implicit), stable low (low explicit/low implicit), or discrepant self-esteem (high explicit/low implicit or low explicit/high implicit).

Sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) assumes that self-esteem is predominantly dependent on the quality of past social feedback and is viewed as an internal monitoring system, or sociometer, that measures how likely we are to be accepted by others (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). The theory contends that individuals’ concern with their self-esteem is based on the fundamental need to be accepted by others. Therefore, individuals are thought to monitor their self-esteem when in the presence of social feedback in order to maintain the likelihood of acceptance by others (Leary et al., 1995). Leary (2004) argues that in the face of feedback that ought to decrease self-esteem, individuals may “cognitively override the sociometer” (p.388). Leary proposed that individuals with discrepant or unstable self-esteem may have a hyperactive sociometer, in which they pay too much attention to maintaining a positive self-esteem. Drawing from this theory as explanation for defensiveness, it is possible that individuals with discrepant self-esteem will respond defensively to failure feedback because of their over concern for being accepted by others. Although there are two combinations of discrepant self-esteem (high explicit/low...
implicit and low explicit/high implicit), research on defensiveness only addresses the high explicit/low implicit combination. Therefore, discrepant self-esteem will be conceptualized the same in this study.

Recent research on implicit self-esteem and mild self-concept threat has found that individuals show preference for words, initials, and names associated with the self after a mild ego-threatening task, such as writing about character flaws (Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2005; Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004; Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002). Participants were found to be unaware of the reasons for their choices, suggesting that threat unconsciously leads individuals to favor the self. Epstein and Morling (1995) propose, and research has shown, individuals with high discrepant self-esteem often react very defensively to negative evaluative information (Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003). Kernis, Lackner, and Heppner (2008) found the higher the implicit self-esteem, the less defensive participants were. All of these findings point to the defense mechanism employed by those with discrepant self-esteem, potentially to subdue the discrepant feelings in order to maintain the high explicit level.

Karpinski (2004) has found marginally lower implicit self-esteem scores for men than for women. Similarly, after discovering a stronger correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem for women rather than men, Pelham et al. (2005) claimed that gender-role socialization plays an influential part in shaping individual’s implicit self-esteem. Starting at a young age, men are encouraged to be strong and rational and women are socialized to be in tune with intuition and feelings, thus resulting in more of a disconnect between implicit and explicit self-esteem for men than women (Pelham et al., 2005). The involvement of success or failure priming may elicit a self-report response based on the subconscious implicit level. Schacter (1992) claimed that “priming can be thought of as a form of implicit memory” (p. 244), in which priming of previous positive or negative encounters will unconsciously conjure up corresponding feelings. However, the high explicit level of self-esteem may act as a regulation on the low unconscious self-image by responding defensively to an ego-threat.

Given that implicit memory involves experiences, ideas, and beliefs that are held unconsciously, implicit self-esteem is most likely the unconscious level elicited by priming with successful or failed communicative experiences in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) study. Research indicates that men with discrepant self-esteem are more sensitive than
women to negative feedback and show higher levels of defensiveness (Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003; Lambird & Mann, 2006; Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007). Therefore, it is postulated that men with discrepant self-esteem will produce inflated self-rated competence when failure-primed as a self-enhancing defense mechanism. Given that cognitive priming elicits the implicit level of self-esteem, individuals with discrepant self-esteem may reveal their true low perception of ability in a self-evaluation of competence under the neutral-primed condition. The neutral and success-primed conditions will not pose an ego-threat like the failure condition, and therefore we can expect the self-rated competence to be lower in the absence of self-enhancement. Priming discrepant self-esteem individuals with successful memories may only slightly bolster their inherently low perception.

Dijksterhuis (2004) found that individuals’ implicit self-esteem can be enhanced with positive feedback, however only to a certain extent because the weight of an already low level regulates how much it can be enhanced. Similarly, Baccus, Baldwin, and Packer (2004) found positive priming conditions to be least effective on those with discrepant self-esteem and postulate that the incongruent self-esteem may interfere with their ability to benefit from positive social feedback. Individuals with discrepant self-esteem have an anchored view of themselves and by success priming them, the anchor may only move slightly. Therefore, the neutral and success-primed conditions are expected to report lower levels of competence than the failure-primed because the priming conditions will not pose as an ego-threat. The following hypothesis will be tested.

H3: Any main or interaction effects of sex on self-perceived competence by prime condition will be nonsignificant when controlling for discrepant self-esteem.
CHAPTER 2

METHOD

This chapter includes demographic information for the study participants and outlines the procedure for participant recruitment and data collection. In addition, the instrumentation used to measure each variable in the study is described.

PARTICIPANTS

A total of 360 (137 male, 223 female) undergraduate students completed the online survey. Participants ranged between 18 to 54 years old with a mean age of 20.52 (SD=4.17). Although the respondents were mostly Caucasian (54.6%) and freshman class level (54.8%). The sample also included 5% sophomores, 16.3% juniors, and 21.9% seniors. Based on self-identification, ethnic backgrounds were 3.3% Black, 12.5% Asian, 16.9% Hispanic, 4.7% Middle Eastern, and less than 1% Native American. Eleven participants (3%) marked ‘other’ and filled in self-identified classifications, such as European, Portuguese, and Pacific Islander.

DATA COLLECTION

Students enrolled in communication courses were solicited to volunteer as participants and instructors offered extra credit for participation. The study was posted on a research website for the department in which students could access the study from home at anytime. There were three conditions of the study (positive, neutral, and negative priming) which called for three different URL links. The instructions indicated that participants were to follow the URL link according to the last two digits of their university identification number. This technique assumes random assignment based on the university claim that student identification numbers are randomly generated. Upon signing in to the SurveyMonkey website, participants were given a consent form to electronically sign and were asked a few demographic questions, such as age, sex, class standing and racial/ethnicity background. The first portion, which was the same for all participants, contained the implicit self-esteem measure, explicit self-esteem measure, and narcissism measure. The reason for
this specific order stems from Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker’s (2000) findings on order effects for the presentation of explicit and implicit self-esteem measures. The authors found a significant main effect for the IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), in which this implicit measure was strongly related to the explicit measures when the explicit measures were administered first. Lower correlations were found between explicit and implicit measures when implicit was administered first. Given the fact that implicit measures try to tap into the unconscious level of self-esteem, offering the explicit measure or narcissism measure, which asks participants similar questions, would sensitize them to the aims of the study. They may be more aware that we are measuring self-esteem and respond in socially desirable ways.

The first measurement was the implicit self-esteem measure, which required the participants to download a particular plug-in and have administrative access to run the online software. Due to this complicated step in the study, only 151 participants completed this specific portion of the study. The other 210 participants skipped this measure and continued on to the next within Survemonkey. After completing the first portion, two current event stories were displayed for the participants to read and answer questions about. This was designed as a neutral distraction in between the self-esteem section of the study and the main focus, priming and communication competence. The estimated time required to read and answer questions about the current event story was about ten minutes. Following this diversion, the participants were prompted to complete the priming prompt corresponding to their condition (success, neutral, failure) followed by the Interpersonal Competence Survey (ICS), which was the same across all conditions. Neither the announcement nor the survey instructions indicated anything other than the study was an investigation of “everyday communication behaviors.”

**MEASUREMENT**

This study measured variables of self-esteem, narcissism, and communication competence with priming prompts for positive, neutral, and negative conditions. This section describes the details of each measure, the three priming prompts, and provides reliability information for each. See Appendix A for complete survey instruments.
Implicit Self-Esteem

A widely used measure of implicit self-esteem is the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), which is a computer-based program that measures automatic association of self-relevant or non-self-relevant words as pleasant or unpleasant. The program contained 13 pleasant (i.e. caress, cuddle, joy) and 13 unpleasant (i.e. abuse, agony, death, vomit) words, 5 ‘me’ words (I, me, my, mine, self), and 5 ‘not-me’ words (they, them, their, it, other). The program displays these target words one at a time on the screen for the respondent to categorize them into the pleasant or unpleasant or me or not-me categories by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard as quickly as possible. The program organizes different combinations of these two dimensions, such as the first may be pleasant and not-me categories classified by pressing the left key and unpleasant and me categories classified by pressing the right key. Seven blocks of time are presented with different combinations each time. All but two blocks are considered ‘practice’ blocks and do not count in the overall IAT score. In order to minimize the impact of order effect the two possible combination (me/pleasant and not-me/pleasant) blocks were presented in different orders across participants (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).

The difference between the mean latencies for each block is calculated, and then divided by the standard deviation of all the latencies in the two test blocks to create an IAT score (Greenwald et al., 2003). This score allows the researcher to make an inference whether the self is associated with pleasant or unpleasant feelings, reflecting the individual’s implicit self-esteem. The premise of this test is based on the argument that individuals with high implicit self-esteem respond faster when self and pleasant share a keyed response because automatic associations between the self and pleasant interfere with associations between self-and unpleasant. Therefore, if the IAT score is positive, the individual shows a stronger association with the self and pleasant combination or if the score is negative there is a stronger association with the self and unpleasant combination. The absolute value of the score reflects the strength of that association. Essentially, the test shows which block combination is easier, thus reflecting the implicit feelings of the self to be either pleasant or unpleasant.
**Explicit Self-Esteem**

One of the most widely used measures of explicit self-esteem is the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The RSES is a 10-item scale that measures respondents' overall self-worth by indicating their level of agreement with statements about themselves on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’ (See Appendix A). Example items include questions such as “I feel that I have a number of good qualities” and “At times I think I am no good at all.” Previous research has found the RSES to be the only explicit self-esteem measure that had good test-retest reliability (α = .80) (Bosson et al., 2000). In the present study, the reliability analysis concluded the scale to be highly reliable (α = .86).

**Narcissism**

The most widely used measurement of narcissism is the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988). In previous studies, the NPI has had reliability of α = .93 (Samuel & Widiger, 2008). The NPI consists of 40 forced choice items, such as “My body is nothing special” versus “I like to look at my body” and “I am more capable than other people” versus “There is a lot that I can learn from other people.” Participants are instructed to choose the item that best aligns with their opinion. The more narcissistic statement of each pair receives a score of 1 versus 0 for the non-narcissistic statement. The overall narcissistic score is then calculated by summatating the items into a single scale, with a higher score indicating a more narcissistic personality. This study obtained an overall high reliability for the NPI (α = .82).

**Priming**

Mimicking the procedure in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier (2010), the priming prompts consisted of 20 binary-choice (true/false) items regarding communicative or social failure (negative condition), neutral, or successful (positive condition) past experiences. The authors originally developed the prompts based on extensive embarrassment, social difficulty, and problematic interpersonal encounters literature (see Spitzberg & Wiedmaier, 2010 for complete description and rationale). A total of 20 negative failure items were created and a positive success version mirrored the former in semantic and syntactical structure. To establish a neutral condition, 20 non-valence and non-interactional items were created to
represent mundane life events, such as “I have made a good grade on a school assignment.” An example of a negative item is “I have said or done something in a social context that made me feel embarrassed.” The mirrored positive item is “I have said or done something in a social context that made me feel proud of myself.” A score was not calculated for the priming prompts because the purpose was not to measure a concept, but to elicit previous memories to ground the following self-assessment on. All prime conditions achieved a sizeable majority of affirmations, indicating that the three stimuli were successful in extracting a sequence of recalled communication experiences consistent with the prime condition.

**Communication Competence**

The Interpersonal Competence Survey (ICS; Spitzberg, 2011) was used to measure communication competence. This measure represents contexts or actions of interpersonal communication ability, such as empathy, listening, support, and adaptability. The directions reflect social comparisons inherent in biases and thus applicable to represent the Wobegon effect: “Compared to typical conversationalists I encounter, I am… [below average-to-above average].” The 69 items reflect 23 subscales representing contexts or skills of communication competence and are arranged on a 7-point likert scale, ranging from 1 ‘extremely below average’ to 7 ‘extremely above average.’

The 69 items were subjected to a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation, producing a satisfactory Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin coefficient (KMO= .93). Eleven components were produced with eigenvalues > 1.0. Items were defined as loaded if the primary loading was >.50 with no secondary loadings > .30, and reliability of the factors were > .70. Accounting for 70.66% of the common variance, the eleven factors include: conversation, loading eight items with a reliability of $\alpha = .97$; persuasion, loading three items with a reliability of $\alpha = .87$; immediacy, loading seven items with reliability of $\alpha = .91$; objectivity, loading four items with reliability of $\alpha = .87$; directness, loading three items with reliability of $\alpha = .89$; entertaining, loading six items with reliability of $\alpha = .90$; regulative, loading six items with reliability of $\alpha = .85$; secrecy, loading three items with reliability of $\alpha = .78$; empathy, loading three items with reliability of $\alpha = .87$; adaptability, loading three items with reliability of $\alpha = .85$; deception, loading three items with reliability of $\alpha = .90$. 
This factor analysis reveals a different number of factors than intended by Spitzberg (2011); therefore, the measure was treated as a uni-dimensional scale because the hypotheses did not address the individual subscales of the ICS. The summated ICS obtained an overall high reliability ($\alpha = .98$). However, given the relatively newness of the measure, exploratory analyses were conducted using the 11 factors found in this study.

**DATA ANALYSIS**

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 19.0) was used to analyze the collected data. Scores for the Implicit Association Test were combined with the data from the survey to generate one complete data set. First, descriptive statistics were used to determine the mean, median, standard deviation and variance in the age of participants. Then, frequency and descriptive statistics were calculated for sex, class level, ethnicity, and prime condition (see Table B1-B4, Appendix B). Hypothesis One was tested using a multiple factor analysis of variance with the summated communication competence measure as the dependent variable, sex as fixed factor, and prime condition as the random factor. Hypotheses Two and Three were tested using multiple factor analysis of covariance, with the priming condition as the random independent variable (success, neutral, failure), sex (male, female) as fixed independent variable, the hypothesized variables (self-esteem interaction, narcissism) as the covariates, and communication competence as the dependent variable.
CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

This chapter details the results of the statistical analyses performed for each of the three hypotheses. The hypotheses are presented one at a time with the results, statement of whether the hypothesis was supported or not supported, and the results from exploratory analyses.

Although Spitzberg (2007) created the ICS measure with 23, 3-item subscales, in this study the items were summed across to present a comprehensive measure of interpersonal competence. However, for exploratory purposes the measure was factor analyzed and resulted in 11 factors with high reliability. Each hypothesis was tested using the summated measure, but secondary analyses were conducted to examine specific differences on the 11 factors of communication competence.

Hypothesis One stated that there will be an ordinal direction of differences in self-rated communication competence: failure-primed participants would see themselves significantly lower than neutrally-primed participants, who would see themselves as significantly lower in self-rated competence than those who were success-primed. A 3 (prime condition) x 2 (sex) multiple factor analysis of variance was conducted to test this hypothesis. The analysis revealed no significant main effect for sex, $F(1, .04)=.05, p=.84$, or prime condition, $F(2, .76)=.92, p=.52$. In addition, the analysis did not reveal a significant interaction effect for sex and prime condition, $F(2, .82)=1.13, p=.32$. The plot of marginal means reveals disordinal responses for both males and females (Figure B1, Appendix B); however, females’ deflate their self-rated communication competence in the negative prime condition, but over-inflate in the neutral prime condition and marginally in the positive condition. Males produce an ordinal difference in responses, but not in the predicted direction. The males inflate their self-perceived competence in response to failure priming and neutral priming, but appear to deflate their self-perceived competence in the success priming condition. Overall, Hypothesis One was not supported.
In the exploratory analyses, each communication competence subscale was entered as dependent variable in separate multiple factor analysis of variance tests. The only main effect for sex found for all the communication competence subscales was with the secrecy subscale, $F(1, 0.69) = 20.02, p = 0.03$, partial $\eta^2 = .88$, and the only main effect for prime condition was with the secrecy subscale, $F(2, 1.45) = 49.06, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .98$. The interaction between sex and prime condition was significant for the persuasion subscale, $F(2, 4.04) = 3.41, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, and the deception subscale, $F(2, 6.88) = 4.82, p = .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$. For the plot of marginal means on the persuasion and deception subscales, see Figures B2 and B3 in Appendix B.

Hypothesis Two stated that any main or interaction effects of sex on self-perceived competence by prime condition will be nonsignificant when controlling for narcissism. In test of Hypothesis Two, a 3 (prime condition) x 2 (sex) multiple factor analysis of covariance was conducted using prime condition as random independent variable, sex as fixed independent variable, competence as dependent variable, and narcissism as covariate. The analysis revealed a main effect for narcissism, $F(1, 40.15) = 65.45, p = .00$, partial $\eta^2 = .16$. However, the analysis did not reveal a significant main effect for sex, $F(1, 1.36) = 8.82, p = .08$, or main effect for prime condition, $F(2, 1.98) = 1.413, p = .42$. In addition, there was not a significant interaction effect between sex and priming condition, $F(2, 344) = 0.236, p = .79$. For a plot of marginal means when controlling for narcissism, see Figure B4 in Appendix B. Overall, Hypothesis Two was not supported.

Similar to the exploratory analyses for Hypothesis One, each communication competence subscale was entered as dependent variable in separate analysis of covariance tests using prime condition as random independent variable, sex as fixed independent variable, and narcissism as covariate. The analysis revealed a main effect for condition on the secrecy subscale, $F(2, 1.4) = 133.41, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = 1.00$ and a main effect for sex on the empathy subscale, $F(1, 4.17) = 14.63, p = .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .19$, and adaptability subscale, $F(1, 0.71) = 28.03, p = .00$, partial $\eta^2 = .39$. The only subscale with a significant interaction effect for sex by condition was deception, $F(2, 4.82) = 3.68, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$. For a plot of marginal means for the deception subscale when controlling for narcissism, see Figure B5 in Appendix B.
For exploratory purposes, an analysis of variance was conducted to investigate if there were significant differences between males and females on the narcissism measure and there was a significant difference between the groups, $F(1, 340.05)=7.43, p=.01, \eta^2=.02$. The males responded more narcissistic than females.

Hypothesis Three stated that any main or interaction effects of sex on self-perceived competence by prime condition will be nonsignificant when controlling for discrepant self-esteem. First, implicit self-esteem and explicit self-esteem were centered on their respective means (Aiken & West, 1991) and then multiplied to create the interaction term of implicit/explicit self-esteem. To test the hypothesis, an analysis of covariance was conducted with priming condition as the random factor, sex as the fixed factor, competence as the dependent variable, and the esteem interaction term as the covariate. The analysis revealed no significant main effect for the esteem interaction term, $F(1, .22)=.30, p=.58$. The analysis also revealed no significant main effect for sex, $F(1, .12)=.13, p=.76$, or prime condition, $F(2, .04)=.05, p=.96$. In addition, the analysis revealed no significant interaction effect for sex and prime condition, $F(2, .91)=1.24, p=.29$. Overall, Hypothesis Three was not supported. For a plot of marginal means when controlling for the self-esteem interaction term, see Figure B6 in Appendix B.

Exploratory analysis entered each of the 11 factors for the communication competence scale as dependent variable in separate analysis of covariance tests using prime condition as random independent variable, sex as fixed independent variable, and esteem interaction term as covariate. The analysis revealed a main effect for the esteem interaction term on the persuasion subscale, $F(1, 5.48)= 4.71, p=.03$, partial $\eta^2=.03$, and the regulative subscale, $F(1, 5.24)=7.08, p=.01$, partial $\eta^2=.05$. A main effect for sex was found for the secrecy subscale, $F(1, 4.50)=13.59, p=.05$, partial $\eta^2=.85$. Lastly, the only interaction effect for sex by condition was found for the deception subscale, $F(2, 4.93)=4.02, p=.02$, partial $\eta^2=.05$. For a plot of marginal means for the deception subscale when controlling for the self-esteem interaction, see Figure B7 in Appendix B.
CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

This chapter summarizes the findings, discusses the results of the exploratory analyses, addresses limitations of this study, and explores implications and suggestions for future research.

SUMMARY

The present study aimed to replicate and extend research investigating self-evaluation biases and the cognitive processes underlying them. An effect known as the “Wobegon” effect, “self-enhancement” effect, or the “better-than-average” effect (BTAE) has generated several lines of research and theoretical speculation. In general, people appear to be positively biased in their self-evaluations. People generally consider themselves better drivers, leaders, students, and communicators than either their actual performance skill levels would demonstrate, or the judgments of others would subjectively indicate. In an exploration of whether or not such self-evaluations could be directionally primed, Spitzberg and Wiedmaier (2010) conducted a study on manipulated self-assessments of communication competence. By duplicating the original study design, the intention of the present study was to investigate if Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s interaction effect between sex and priming condition could be replicated. The study included narcissism and discrepant self-esteem measures in order to account for this interaction, if it prevailed.

Hypothesis One intended to test this interaction effect, but it was not supported. There was not a significant interaction effect for prime condition and sex, as anticipated, but in looking at the plot of means there were definite directional patterns for the male and female responses (See Figure B1, Appendix B). The females seemed to deflate ratings of communication competence in the negative prime condition, but over-inflate in the neutral prime condition and respond somewhere in the middle of the other two for the positive condition. The males inflated self-rated communication competence in response to negative priming and neutral priming, but appeared to deflate their self-perceived competence in the
positive priming condition. Although the hypothesis was not supported and no interaction effect was found, it still appears that males and females respond to primes differently.

The inflation of communication competence in the negative prime condition for males is congruent with what was found in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) original study. Even though the difference was not large enough to be significant, it is still worth noting that the men’s highest ratings of self-perceived communication competence were in the negative prime condition. It is apparent that the negative primes strike a chord with the males and lead them to respond more defensively. Research continuously shows males to respond defensively to ego-threats, which is arguably what they are presented with for the negative priming prompt in this study (Dietrich, 1995; Jordan et al., 2003). Critcher, Dunning, and Armor (2010) refer to this defensiveness as the “psychological immune system” starting up when the self experiences threat. Males appear disinclined to consider their own personal failure when confronted with evidence of such; thus, threats lead to a defensive reinforcement of self-confidence in response. Explanations of this behavior often reference males’ masculine, independent, and competitive nature (Li, Harmer, & Acock, 1996; White & Duda, 1994).

The pattern found for the women aligns with previous research on gender and self-assessment accuracy. Beyer (1998) found gender differences in accuracy of self-perceptions on a masculine task and no gender differences on a feminine task. Further, Bar-Tal and Jarymowicz (2010) found that men use more cognitive biases in the context of priming than females. The authors argue that “women tend to react more to the objective characteristics of a stimulus, while men react more to pertinent pre-existing schema, which influence their perception” (p. 85). Given that females rated lowest in the negative prime condition and highest in the neutral, these findings may support the lack of cognitive biases for females in priming situations. When negatively primed, females responded to the objective evaluation provided in the primes, communication failures. In the neutral or positive prime condition, the females may have responded objectively based on the recalled events in the prime. The males in this study may have already had a pre-existing schema of their communication skills and therefore reacted to the primes based on these biases. Since there was not a significant main effect for priming, there is not substantial support for this assumption but in light of previous research, this may be a viable explanation.
Hypothesis Two aimed to use narcissism to explain the interaction effect, if it prevailed within this study, but unfortunately it did not. However, there are still interesting conclusions that can be extrapolated from the results. Similar to findings of previous research, sex showed significant effects on narcissism, with men rating higher on the narcissism measure than females (Barelds & Dijkstra, 2010; Foster et al., 2003; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). When controlling for narcissism in Hypothesis Two, there was not a significant interaction between sex and prime condition; however, the plot of means reveal an interesting pattern for male’s responses (See Figure B4, Appendix B). When controlling for narcissism, the males appeared to deflate their self-assessed communication competence in all three conditions. The above average responses found for the males in the neutral and negative prime conditions in the analysis of variance tests (Figure B1, Appendix B), disappear when narcissism is controlled (See Figure B4, Appendix B). This finding lends plausibility to the male defensiveness interpretation previously discussed (Critcher et al., 2010; Dietrich, 1995; Jordan et al., 2003). As for the females, the pattern of responses (positive<neutral<negative) do not seem to change. Narcissism appears to play a role in the males’ responses, but not enough to be statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis Two was not supported.

For the analyses involving discrepant self-esteem, measured by the interaction self-esteem term, the pattern of responses for females and males appeared quite different. When controlling for implicit/explicit self-esteem, the responses appeared to be opposite from the pattern found for prime and sex differences in the analysis of variance test (See Figure B1 and B6, Appendix B). Strictly looking at response patterns for sex and prime condition, the females rated low in the positive condition, high in the neutral condition, and lowest in the negative condition. When controlling for implicit/explicit self-esteem, this pattern did not change, except for the positive responses came down as low as the negative condition. When controlling for implicit/explicit self-esteem, the males responded opposite of the females with positive responses high, neutral condition responses the lowest, and negative condition the highest. Even when controlling for implicit/explicit self-esteem, the males’ responses were highest in the negative condition. It is evident that implicit and explicit self-esteem are not significant variables influencing self-perceived communication competence because when controlling for this variable, the patterns of responses for males and females are still
completely opposite in each condition. The fact that males’ responses in the negative primed condition remained highest, reflects the BTAE for males found in Spitzberg and Wiedmaier’s (2010) study and mirrors the findings from the other hypotheses tests in this study.

The implications of these findings fall upon the attempt to investigate a way to calibrate or regulate the BTAE. It may be the case that self-assessments are doomed to remain subject to biases. Research on self-assessment suggests that more competent individuals are able to self-assess with higher accuracy than those less competent (Lew, Alwis, & Schmidt, 2010). The individual differences in competency overall could sabotage the endeavor of calibrating self-assessments. There is an excess of individual and gender differences that hinder accurate and reliable techniques to regulate the BTAE in self-assessments. From this study, it appears that men and women view life experiences in different ways and may recover different examples or instances of communicative failures or successes when primed.

According to Mussweiler and Strack’s (1997) selective accessibility model, socially comparative self-evaluations are influenced by a tendency to place the self on a judgment line against a standard and generate evidence in order to support a sense of similarity or dissimilarity to it. If the assessment involves an attainable characteristic, ability, or behavior, the individual will concentrate on the similar aspects of the self (similarity testing) in comparison to the standard and result in assimilation (Mussweiler, Ruter, & Epstude, 2004). However, if the assessment involves an unattainable feature, contrast is most likely to occur as a result of focusing on the dissimilarities of the self compared to the standard. In this study, the directions for the communication competence measure stated “Compared to typical conversationalists I encounter” and therefore the ‘typical conversationalist’ can be classified as the standard to compare to. Males and females may differ in perceptions of attainability or the inclination to generate similar or dissimilar evidence when confronted with a comparative task.

**EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS**

There are many areas underlying the ICS used to measure communication competence, including empathy, persuasion, deception detection, immediacy, and directness. Certain aspects measured with this instrument may seem more relevant to females than males, and vice versa. Women have a more relational orientation to the world and place
value on their social skills, agreeableness, and appearing likable in social interactions (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007; Ickes, 1981; Lee & Robbins, 2000; Nezlek, Schütz, & Sellin, 2007). Men have a more agentic orientation to the world and place value on accomplishment, independence, and efficiency (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Communication competence encompasses all of these facets, and therefore, gender differences may have been obscured by summing across all the items in this measure. Therefore, the exploratory analyses reveal interesting findings about the difference between males and females on the sub-traits of communication competence. There was a significant interaction effect between sex and condition for the persuasion and deception subscales in the analysis of variance for sex and prime condition. When narcissism or implicit/explicit self-esteem was treated as a covariate, there was a significant interaction effect for the deception scale in both.

The persuasion and deception components of communication competence were similar in nature to one another, with the persuasion asking questions such as “I am ____ at getting someone to do something I want” and the deception factor included the item “I am ____ at keeping people from getting away with deceiving me successfully.” Both of these components reveal an ego threat and are asked in such a way that may lead to socially desirable responses by both males and females. Being deceived is viewed as a serious threat to the male ego and therefore, may lead to defensive responses. DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, and Muhlenbruck (1997) found males to be more confident than females in deception detection. It is possible that the males in this study display overconfidence in their deception detection ability because of the connection to female partner infidelity. Brand, Markey, Mills, and Hodges (2007) found that males were more suspicious of infidelity and more likely to use any way possible to find out about the cheating. This may relate to our overestimation of deception detection in the negative priming condition because it reveals male’s sensitivity to being deceived by females in particular.

With multiple dimensions within the communication competence scale, males and females may respond more accurately or conservatively for different dimensions, resulting in no significant difference overall. This may be seen as a limitation of this study, but also points to the fact that both sexes may be competent communicators in their own ways (Ickes, 1981). Although an older study, Buhrmester, Furman, Wittenberg, and Reis (1988) found self-perceptions of competence to vary as a function of respondent’s sex and competence
domain. Similarly, Klein (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of interpersonal skills research and found that women appeared to score higher on empathy, but lower on assertive communication in all the studies reviewed. Thus, indicating that the results of this study may be shadowed by gendered tendencies to rate higher or lower on certain aspects of communication skills.

The consistent results of males rating highest in the negative prime condition and lowest in the positive condition and females rating highest in the neutral and lowest in the positive and negative prime condition, reflects traditional socialized gender roles. Research on impression management decisions has found associations between socialized gender roles and chosen impression management tactics. Impression management involves an active regulation of the impression others form of themselves (Goffman, 1959; Jones, 1990; Rosenfeld, Edwards, & Thomas, 2005). Men have been found to use self-bolstering tactics more than women (Lee, Quigley, Nesler, Corbett, & Tedeschi, 1999; Strutton, Pelton, & Lumpkin, 1995) while women often are more modest of their ability (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007; Heatherington, Burns, & Gustafson, 1998). However, when there is not a presence of threat the males may not bolster as much because they lack the motivation to do so. Ickes, Gesn, and Graham (2000) argue that the gender difference found in most research on interpersonal sensitivity, a similar concept to the components of communication competence, may depend on motivational factors. The authors argue that studies that make the construct of interest salient are therefore reflecting motivation instead of ability. Therefore, a self-assessment of communication competence obviously makes the goal of measuring communication abilities salient and presents gender stereotypes. The men may be acting defensively because they are motivated to show more competence than they have been stereotyped to have. The high ratings of communication competence in the neutral condition for females may also indicate the gender stereotype that they are naturally suppose to be good communicators.

**LIMITATIONS**

Bearing in mind the implications of this study, it is important to recognize a few limitations due to respondent participation and methodology. First, the implicit association test was a separate URL link within the surveymonkey survey that the participants were asked to click on to be redirected. By the end of the study, there were 361 total participants...
registered on surveymonkey, but only 151 participants completed the IAT. Therefore, the analyses that included the esteem interaction variable as covariate was only based on 151 responses, while the narcissism analysis was based on 361 participants. A possible reason for this may have been due to the lengthy text directions on the page that contained the URL link. The restrictions on the software prohibited the measure to be completed on a MAC computer and required administrative access on the computer, so it was necessary to inform and direct participants regarding these limitations. Respondents may have decided to skip over this step since there were not any questions to answer or they chose to ignore these restrictions and continue to the next step. Another reason could be that once redirected to the IAT website, the respondent was immediately asked to download a plug-in in order to complete the task. This may have deterred participants because of fear of viruses or downloading unfamiliar plug-ins. In addition, by having participants take the survey and more importantly the IAT at home, the study executed less control over the environment and the circumstances. If the study had been in a controlled environment, more respondents might have completed the study correctly.

Although reported as statistically reliable and valid, the measures in this study demand evaluation. First, as with all self-assessments, responses to the self-esteem, narcissism, and communication competence measures reflect a self-perception of the constructs as opposed to actual abilities. Since the original tenets of this study aimed to regulate the BTAE, the reliability on self-assessments was necessary. However, given that prime condition did not have a significant effect on communication competence ratings, it is difficult to discover how to regulate the limitations inherent in self-assessments. The problem may be that communication competence is too broad a concept to use. As discussed previously, this construct is multi-faceted and impervious to multiple individual and gendered differences. As beneficial as the endeavor of uncovering a manipulation technique to regulate biases is, it may be the case that such a goal is unfeasible with such a broad concept.

The Interpersonal Competence Survey (Spitzberg, 2011) used in this study was confounding because it was treated as a one dimensional scale. Spitzberg (2007) argues for the scale to be treated as a uni-dimensional scale, but the scale was initially created to represent 23 dimensions of communication competence. These dimensions illustrate diverse
aspects of communication that could overlap or interact with one another in various ways. This proved to be the case with the factor analysis in this study that revealed only 11 factors, instead of 23. Over 100 factors or skills have been ascribed to interpersonal competence (Spitzberg & Chagnon, 2009; Spitzberg & Cupach, 1989, 2002), which makes it a difficult construct to examine altogether. The ICS was reliable as a one-dimensional scale but also proved to be reliable as individual subscales. In the exploratory analysis using the 11 factors as dependent variable instead of the summated ICS, interesting findings were discovered. Although a limitation of this method was the increased likelihood of committing Type I error because of the compounding of separate analyses of variance tests, instead of conducting a multiple analysis of (co)variance with all 11 factors as dependent variables together. Therefore, it is possible that the significant findings for the deception and persuasion factors were found by chance and are not actually there. Recognized as a limitation in this study, it was still viewed as beneficial to include the exploratory results to shed light on the findings in this study.

**Future Research**

Given that priming was not shown to be significant it is not possible to make significant claims about regulating biases; however, if communication competence responses changed in magnitude and not direction when controlling for narcissism, this construct could be the place to start in this ambition to understand biases. Twenge and Campbell (2009) claim we are living in the midst of a “narcissistic epidemic” in which the feelings of entitlement, high self-concepts, and superiority are taking over our younger generations. Everyone considers themselves “better-than-average” and has been socialized to think “everyone is a winner.” Although the results from this study support previous research findings of men rating higher on narcissism measures than women, the underlying issues related to this gender difference is worth exploring. How have males been socialized to be more narcissistic? What implications does this have for self-assessment research? Most research involving self-evaluations measure social desirability tendencies in order to use as explanation for high responses, but maybe we should be looking to narcissism instead. If biases are ever to be regulated in self-assessments, it is necessary to first understand where these biases come from.
The underlying gender differences of self-perceived communication competence suggested in this discussion may be more specific to certain aspects. Given the insignificant findings for most of the subscales and the new 11 factors uncovered in this study, future research should approach communication competence as multi-dimensional and test if these 11 factors emerge again. In the realm of gender differences, considering the 11 factors to investigate what aspects of communication competence males and females differ on could have important implications for gender difference research and offer an interesting avenue to observe biases at a more specific level. Males may be better deception detectors while women are better conversationalists. Males and females may assimilate or contrast on certain aspects of communication competence due to stereotypes or expected gender roles. Research like this may bring us closer to understanding biases in self-assessment research and help to discover a technique for regulation as attempted in this study. One such technique could be more explicitly priming gender or giving feedback instead of priming interactions that have shown to elicit different responses in this study.
REFERENCES


Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. J. (2008). Egos inflating over time: A cross temporal meta-analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. *Journal of Personality, 76*, 875-901.


APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1965)
Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. On the whole I am satisfied with myself.
2. At times I think that I am no good at all. [R]
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. [R]
6. I certainly feel useless at times. [R]
7. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least the equal of others.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. [R]
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. [R]
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Note: [R] indicates reverse scored

Narcissistic Personality Inventory
(Raskin & Terry, 1988)
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of a number of pairs of statements with which you may or may not identify. You may identify with both choices. In this case you should choose the statement which seems closer to yourself. Or, if you do not identify with either statement, select the one which you agree with most. In other words, read each pair of statements and then choose the one that is closer to your own feelings. Please do not skip any items.

1. A. I have a natural talent for influencing people.
   B. I am not good at influencing people.
2. A. Modesty doesn't become me.
   B. I am essentially a modest person.
3. A. I would do almost anything on a dare.  
   B. I tend to be a fairly cautious person.
4. A. When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.  
   B. I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.
5. A. The thought of ruling the world frightens the hell out of me.  
   B. If I ruled the world it would be a better place.
6. A. I can usually talk my way out of anything.  
   B. I try to accept the consequences of my behavior.
7. A. I prefer to blend in with the crowd.  
   B. I like to be the center of attention.
8. A. I will be a success.  
   B. I am not too concerned about success.
9. A. I am no better or worse than most people.  
   B. I think I am a special person.
10. A. I am not sure if I would make a good leader.  
    B. I see myself as a good leader.
11. A. I am assertive.  
    B. I wish I were more assertive.
12. A. I like to have authority over other people.  
    B. I don't mind following orders.
13. A. I find it easy to manipulate people.  
    B. I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people.
14. A. I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.  
    B. I usually get the respect that I deserve.
15. A. I don't particularly like to show off my body.  
    B. I like to show off my body.
16. A. I can read people like a book.  
    B. People are sometimes hard to understand.
17. A. If I feel competent I am willing to take responsibility for making decisions.  
    B. I like to take responsibility for making decisions.
18. A. I just want to be reasonably happy.
   B. I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world.
19. A. My body is nothing special.
   B. I like to look at my body.
20. A. I try not to be a show off.
   B. I will usually show off if I get the chance.
21. A. I always know what I am doing.
   B. Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing.
22. A. I sometimes depend on people to get things done.
   B. I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done.
23. A. Sometimes I tell good stories.
   B. Everybody likes to hear my stories.
24. A. I expect a great deal from other people.
   B. I like to do things for other people.
25. A. I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.
   B. I take my satisfactions as they come.
26. A. Compliments embarrass me.
   B. I like to be complimented.
27. A. I have a strong will to power.
   B. Power for its own sake doesn't interest me.
28. A. I don't care about new fads and fashions.
   B. I like to start new fads and fashions.
29. A. I like to look at myself in the mirror.
   B. I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.
30. A. I really like to be the center of attention.
   B. It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention.
31. A. I can live my life in any way I want to.
   B. People can't always live their lives in terms of what they want.
32. A. Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.
   B. People always seem to recognize my authority.
33. A. I would prefer to be a leader.
   B. It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not.
34. A. I am going to be a great person.
   B. I hope I am going to be successful.
35. A. People sometimes believe what I tell them.
   B. I can make anybody believe anything I want them to.
36. A. I am a born leader.
   B. Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop.
37. A. I wish somebody would someday write my biography.
   B. I don't like people to pry into my life for any reason.
38. A. I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.
   B. I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public.
39. A. I am more capable than other people.
   B. There is a lot that I can learn from other people.
40. A. I am much like everybody else.
   B. I am an extraordinary person

**Priming Prompts**
Spitzberg, & Wiedmaier (2010)

**Failure-Negative Priming Prompt**
Instructions: What follows is a series of situations people experience on an everyday basis. We would like you to think about your own experience of each situation in your adult life, and indicate whether or not you have experienced the particular type of situation or not.

☐ 1-True  ☐ 2-False

1. I have said or done something in a social context that made me feel embarrassed.
2. I have anticipated communicating in a situation in which I felt anxiety about the situation.
3. I have said or done something in a social situation that embarrassed someone else.
4. I have lost an argument I tried hard to win.
5. I have engaged in a negotiation in which I found out later I did not get a very good deal.
6. I have been in a situation in which I discovered I misinterpreted another person’s statements when it was very important for me to have the correct interpretation.
7. I have told a joke in a social group that the group considered distinctly inappropriate.
8. I have tried to lead a group of people to do something only to find out that I was not the leader the group needed.
9. I have given a speech in public that did not go as well as I hoped.
10. I have had a conflict with someone I care about that turned out badly for our relationship.
11. I have said something that hurt someone’s feelings that I regretted saying.
12. I have sent something via email or text message that I regretted sending.
13. I have experienced difficulties communicating with someone because of how different that person’s culture was from my own.
14. I have discovered too late that someone I cared about lied to me about something important.
15. I have been caught in a lie about something important.
16. I have experienced an important situation in which I was unable to really understand what another person was feeling or trying to communicate.
17. I have discovered that I made an important mistake because I did not listen very well to someone.
18. I have made enemies of someone despite trying to get that person to like me.
19. I have misinterpreted someone’s feelings in a situation that was very important to that person.
20. I have been in a situation (e.g., a person cutting in line in front of me) in which I wanted to assert my opinion but did not.
Neutral Priming Prompt

Instructions: What follows is a series of situations people experience on an everyday basis. We would like you to think about your own experience of each situation in your adult life, and indicate whether or not you have experienced the particular type of situation or not.

☐ 1-True  ☐ 2-False

1. I have voted in a political election.
2. I have received a speeding ticket.
3. I have made a good grade on a school assignment.
4. I have traveled to a foreign country before.
5. I have had to return an item of merchandise that I purchased and found I didn’t want or need.
6. I have gotten onto the wrong bus or subway at some point.
7. I have created something artistic, like a picture or piece of pottery.
8. I have eaten something that most people would consider gross or disgusting.
9. I have had a computer or hard drive crash while I was working on something.
10. I have found a way of doing something on my computer without consulting the manual.
11. I have tried to learn to play a musical instrument only to find I wasn’t very good at it.
12. I have gotten badly sunburned on my skin at some point in my life.
13. I have taken a trip of over a month somewhere.
14. I have tried to parallel park in a tight spot only to give up and park elsewhere.
15. I have tried to cook something that turned out inedible.
16. I have found myself very late on turning in assignments in at least one course.
17. I have been in a situation in which I was bored.
18. I have experienced a time when I drank too much alcohol.
19. I have seen a movie I really didn’t enjoy at all.
20. I have wasted time playing some computer game when there were more important things I should have been doing.
**Success-Positive Priming Prompt**

Instructions: What follows is a series of situations people experience on an everyday basis. We would like you to think about your own experience of each situation in your adult life, and indicate whether or not you have experienced the particular type of situation or not.

1. 1-True 2-False

1. I have said or done something in a social context that made me feel proud of myself.
2. I have anticipated communicating in a situation in which I felt great confidence about the situation.
3. I have said or done something in a social situation that ‘saved another person’s face’.
4. I have won an argument I tried hard to win.
5. I have engaged in a negotiation in which I found out later I got a very good deal.
6. I have been in a situation in which I discovered I accurately interpreted another person’s statements when it was very important for me to have the correct interpretation.
7. I have told a joke in a social group that the group considered distinctly appropriate.
8. I have led a group of people to do something only to find out that I was exactly the leader the group needed.
9. I have given a speech in public that went as well as or better as I hoped.
10. I have had a conflict with someone I care about that turned out very well for our relationship.
11. I have said something that made someone feel better that I’m glad I said.
12. I have sent something via email or text message that I am proud of sending.
13. I have experienced communicating successfully with someone despite how different that person’s culture was from my own.
14. I have been able to discover just in time that someone I cared about lied to me about something important.
15. I have successfully avoided being caught in a lie about something important.
16. I have experienced an important situation in which I was able to really understand what another person was feeling or trying to communicate.
17. I have discovered that I avoided an important mistake because I listened very well to someone.
18. I have made friends of someone despite that person not initially liking me.
19. I have accurately interpreted someone’s feelings in a situation that was very important to that person.
20. I have been in a situation (e.g., a person cutting in line in front of me) in which asserted my opinion successfully.

**Interpersonal Competence Survey (ICS)**
(Spitzberg, 2011)

Instructions: People differ quite a bit in terms of how skilled they are at communicating and conversing with others. For the following statements, we would like you to estimate, compared to typical conversationalists you encounter, how skilled you are …

Compared to a typical conversationalist you encounter,
I AM…  1 = Extremely below average…
        2 = Moderately below average…
        3 = Slightly below average…
        4 = Average…
        5 = Slightly above average…
        6 = Moderately above average…
        7 = Extremely above average…

1. I am ____ at small talk
2. I am ____ at chatting with a diverse range of people
3. I am ____ at engaging in casual conversation with others
4. I am ____ at conversation with others
5. I am ____ at interacting with a variety of other people
6. I am ____ at carrying on conversations
7. I am ____ at making my intentions clear when I speak
8. I am ____ at getting others to understand what I’m saying
9. I am ____ at getting my meanings across to others
10. I am ____ at letting others know who I am
11. I am ____ at revealing myself to others
12. I am ____ at providing others enough information about myself for them to know me
13. I am ____ at beginning a conversation with a stranger
14. I am ____ at introducing myself to others
15. I am ____ at starting up conversations in mixed company
16. I am ____ at getting others to disclose themselves to me when I want to get to know people
17. I am ____ at getting others to open up to me
18. I am ____ at finding out about people when I interact with them
19. I am ____ at understanding others’ feelings when I’m interacting with them
20. I am ____ at interpreting others’ emotions correctly
21. I am ____ at feeling what others are feeling when conversing with them
22. I am ____ at telling if someone is lying to me
23. I am ____ at keeping people from getting away with deceiving me successfully
24. I am ____ at detecting others’ deceptions
25. I am ____ at listening to others
26. I am ____ at paying attention to what others really mean by what they are saying
27. I am ____ at recalling and using details conversational partners say in my own conversation
28. I am ____ at providing the support others need when they talk about their troubles
29. I am ____ at giving others the emotional support they need when facing difficulties
30. I am ____ at providing sympathy
31. I am ____ at letting others “be themselves” during conversation
32. I am ____ at smoothing over potentially embarrassing moments in conversations
33. I am ____ at conversing with others so they feel I respect them
34. I am ____ at telling those I’m close to how I feel about them
35. I am ____ at letting those I care about know how important they are to me
36. I am ____ at showing warmth and closeness when I converse with others I like
37. I am ____ at retelling my experiences in the form of entertaining stories
38. I am ____ at turning the little things in life into interesting stories
39. I am ____ at providing appropriate anecdotes during conversations
40. I am ____ at telling a good joke
41. I am ____ at making witty remarks that entertain others
42. I am ____ at contributing to laughter and humorous conversation
43. I am ____ at keeping secrets from others
44. I am ____ at hiding what I’m really feeling from those I’m conversing with when I want to
45. I am ____ at revealing only what I want to reveal in interactions
46. I am ____ at getting someone to do something I want
47. I am ____ at getting others to do what I need them to do
48. I am ____ at persuading others
49. I am ____ at communicating exactly the emotions I intend to communicate
50. I am ____ at managing the emotional tone of conversations
51. I am ____ at keeping arguments from getting out of control
52. I am ____ at providing criticism in constructive ways
53. I am ____ at offering a “model” for how to behave better in conversations
54. I am ____ at politely letting others know when they’ve said or done something inappropriate
55. I am ____ at finding win-win solutions in disagreements
56. I am ____ at resolving conflicts without leaving bad feelings
57. I am ____ at maintaining a cooperative climate during differences of opinion
58. I am ____ at confronting others with my opinions
59. I am ____ at speaking up for my rights without demeaning the rights of others
60. I am ____ at being assertive in conversation
61. I am ____ at understanding others with diverse cultural or ethnic backgrounds
62. I am ____ at respecting the unique cultural or ethnic styles of my conversational partner(s)
63. I am ____ at getting along with others who come from very different backgrounds than my own
64. I am ____ at interacting with others in groups
65. I am ____ at engaging in cooperative actions during group interaction
66. I am ____ at serving as a good group member
67. I am ____ at changing my behavior to fit the situation
68. I am ____ at altering my conversational actions as the situation changes
69. I am ____ at paying attention to cues about how to behave from one situation to the next
APPENDIX B

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure B1. Marginal means for communication competence ratings by sex and priming condition.

Figure B2. Marginal means of persuasion subscale ratings by sex and priming condition.
Figure B3. Marginal means of deception subscale ratings by sex and priming condition.

Figure B4. Marginal means of communication competence ratings when controlling for narcissism.
Figure B5. Marginal means of deception subscale ratings when controlling for narcissism.

Figure B6. Marginal means of communication competence responses when controlling for implicit/explicit self-esteem interaction.
Figure B7. Marginal means of deception subscale ratings when controlling for esteem interaction.

Table B1. Frequency Statistics for Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Female</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Male</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>38.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Frequencies and percents for male and female participants in the study.
Table B2. Frequency Statistics for Class Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Freshman</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sophomore</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Junior</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Senior</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Graduate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
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<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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Table B3. Frequency Statistics for Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Black</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Asian</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 White</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Hispanic</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Middle</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Native</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B4. Descriptive Statistics for Prime Condition by Sex

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1 Positive</td>
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<td>.67240</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Neutral</td>
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<td>.81235</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Negative</td>
<td>4.7890</td>
<td>.94858</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.8546</td>
<td>.81819</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Male</td>
<td>1 Positive</td>
<td>4.9546</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Neutral</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3 Negative</td>
<td>5.0495</td>
<td>.61514</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.8992</td>
<td>.91142</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>.67814</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Neutral</td>
<td>4.9193</td>
<td>.96527</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Negative</td>
<td>4.8570</td>
<td>.87506</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.8688</td>
<td>.84603</td>
<td>148</td>
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